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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis the rationales of corporate risk management, as well as the implementation 
of different risk management strategies and the use of risk management instruments in 
Croatian and Slovenian companies have been investigated. Based on arguments arising from 
the review of the literature, we have proposed several hypotheses. We have tested whether the 
decision to hedge or not, and the decision to hedge with derivatives made by Croatian and 
Slovenian non-financial companies, is a function of six factors ± financial distress costs, 
agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, managerial 
utility maximisation and hedge substitutes. We have also tested the assumption that corporate 
risk management is more developed or has different rationales among Slovenian than among 
Croatian companies. 
On the basis of our research results, it could be concluded that the explored hedging 
rationales have little predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions both 
in Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence based on univariate and multivariate 
empirical relations between the decision to hedge or use derivatives in Croatian companies 
and the predicted theories of hedging fails to provide support for any of the tested hypotheses 
but one - capital market imperfections and costly external financing.  
The univariate analysis and multivariate regression conducted for Slovenian companies 
have revealed that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the decision to 
hedge; therefore we can conclude it is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of 
hedging. The decision to use derivatives, however, has been shown as dependent on the size 
of the company. The multivariate test has proven a positive relation between the use of 
derivatives and the size of Slovenian companies, which supports the informational and 
 V 
transactional scale economies argument that larger firms will be more likely to use 
derivatives.  
The analysis conducted to explore differences between risk management practices in 
Slovenian and Croatian companies has shown statistically significant evidence that Slovenian 
companies use all types of derivatives, especially structured derivatives, more intensively than 
Croatian companies. Additionally, Croatian companies use simple risk management 
instruments like natural hedging to a greater extent in comparison with Slovenian companies. 
These findings are consistent with our research prediction that Slovenian companies have 
more advanced risk management practices than Croatian companies.  
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 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Subject of research 
 
According to Fisher and Hall (1969), risk is defined as the inability to predict the outcome 
of a future event with complete certainty. Entrepreneurs are viewed as making decisions 
under uncertainty on the basis of probabilistic expectations about future outcomes. If certainty 
is a situation where the entrepreneur's anticipation will be fulfilled, then uncertainty can be 
measured by the likelihood that the actual outcome will differ from the anticipated outcome.   
There is a common agreement that risk management, like all other fields of business, is 
both an art and a science. As an art, risk management needs personnel with considerable 
background in many fields such as economics, law, mathematics and insurance, who are able 
to apply their knowledge to different risk situations. As a science, risk management should be 
based on the principles derived from a consistent body of knowledge, which would give more 
insight into the phenomenon of pure risks and guide risk managers' behaviour and decisions 
(Gahin, 1967). 
Schmit and Roth (1990) have argued that risk management can be described as the 
performance of activities designed to minimise the negative impact of risk regarding possible 
losses. Because risk reduction is costly, minimising the negative impact will not necessarily 
eliminate risk. Rather, management must decide between alternative methods to balance risk 
DQGFRVWDQGWKHDOWHUQDWLYHFKRVHQZLOOGHSHQGXSRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VULVNFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,W
might be helpful to arrive at agreement on just what the function of risk management is in a 
corporation. The most important function of risk management is transferring to someone else 
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buying a service that another can perform for the company, better or cheaper than the 
company can itself (Smith, 1964). 
The research subject of this thesis is corporate or financial risk management1 practices in 
Croatian and Slovenian companies. The determinants of corporate hedging, together with the 
implementation of different risk management strategies and the use of risk management 
instruments, in Croatian and Slovenian companies are investigated. This evidence is important 
for evaluating the overall risk characteristics of firms that use different hedging instruments, 
which is of interest to bankers, investors, the monetary authorities, and to scholars as well. 
Our research aims to explore whether financial risk management, as one of the most important 
objectives of modern corporate strategy, is less developed or has different rationales in 
Slovenian and Croatian companies than among their western counterparts. 
Financial or corporate risks - the risks to a corporation stemming from price fluctuations - are 
pervasive, and directly or indirectly influence the value of a company. A combination of greater 
deregulation, international competition, interest rates and foreign exchange rate volatility, 
together with commodity price discontinuities starting in the late 1960s, heightened corporate 
concerns, which have resulted in the increased importance of financial risk management in the 
decades that followed. Whether it is a multinational company and exchange rates, 
transportation companies and the price of fuel, or real estate companies and interest rates, how 
and to what extent such risks are managed now often plays a major role in the success or failure 
of a business. In this thesis we explore whether Croatian and Slovenian companies are aware of 
the price uncertainties and if they are, what kind of risk management strategies they undertake in 
order to protect their earnings and cash-flows from adverse fluctuations.  
It should be noted that, before derivatives markets were truly developed, the means for 
dealing with corporate risks were few, and thus financial risks were largely outside managerial 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, financial risk is equated with the corporate risk, and the analysis will include interest-rate risk, 
exchange-rate risk and commodity price risk.  
 3 
control. Shareholders and stakeholders have accepted explanations that unfavourable and 
unforeseeable movements of prices which were not under the control of management resulted 
in poor financial results. Few exchange-traded derivatives existed, but they allowed corporate 
users to hedge only certain financial risks, in limited ways and over fairly short time horizons. 
The derivatives markets were very incomplete. Firms were often forced to resort to operational 
alternatives like establishing plants abroad to minimise exchange-rate risks, or to natural hedging 
by trying to match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities.   
During the 1980s and 1990s, markets for derivative instruments such as forwards and 
futures, swaps and options, and innovative combinations of these basic financial instruments, 
have developed and grown at a breathtaking pace, and many corporations have become active 
participants in derivatives markets. It could be said that the derivatives revolution began. Since 
then, the range and quality of both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives, together with the depth 
of the market for such instruments, have expanded intensively (Allen and Santomero, 1998).  
With the development of the derivatives market, active risk management has become an 
important part of modern corporate strategy, as can be seen from the fact that financial 
executives in companies all around the world have ranked risk management as one of their 
most important objectives. Moreover, Bartram (2000) has argued that efficient corporate risk 
management has become a leading competitive advantage in almost all industrial sectors. By 
engaging in risk management, corporate managers believe they affect the exposure that firms 
have to interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices, and investors seem to pay 
attention to these exposures.  
Essentially, research studies on corporate risk management can be broadly categorised into 
three groups. The first group of papers comprises theoretical papers addressing the issue of the 
relevance or irrelevance of corporate risk management. Arguments in favour of the irrelevance 
of corporate risk management are based on the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964; 
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Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
On the other hand, imperfections in the capital market are used to argue for the relevance of 
corporate risk management practices. The second group of papers investigates the hedging 
effectiveness of various risk management instruments such as derivatives, diversification 
strategies, operational hedging etc. The last group of papers consists of empirical studies trying 
to determine what risk management practices are in use, and what factors influence a corporate 
decision to hedge. They have played a leading role in the advancement of economic 
knowledge and understanding of corporate risk management. This thesis belongs to the last 
group of papers, incorporating an extensive review of theoretical and empirical studies regarding 
the determinants, rationales and practices of corporate risk management published in the last 
few decades.  
 
1.2 Research Goals, Aims and Objectives 
 
In spite of the extensive body of literature on corporate risk management and the efforts 
that have been devoted to developing theoretical rationales for hedging, it seems fair to say 
that there is not yet a single accepted framework which can be used to guide hedging 
strategies, or widely accepted explanations for risk management as a corporate policy. There 
is no consensus as to which theory is the most important in explaining corporate risk 
management decisions. Rather than presenting additional evidence on the existence of 
financial market imperfections, this dissertation produces new empirical evidence on hedging 
rationales by exploring the risk management activity in Croatian and Slovenian companies, 
which should support the implications of the theory that it develops.  
Corporate risk management is a propulsive field that has made significant progress, but it 
still has much room for further contributions. In this thesis we explore rationales as well as 
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existing practices of corporate risk management. Hypotheses explaining corporate hedging 
decision are tested, and empirical evidence on the relative importance of these corporate 
motives is offered. Additionally, the implementation of different risk management strategies 
and the use of risk management instruments in Croatian and Slovenian companies are 
investigated.  
Research hypotheses are tested on the biggest companies in the selected countries and a 
comparative analysis of research results is made. Two countries - Croatia and Slovenia - have 
been chosen for a comparative analysis. From 1918 these countries were part of Yugoslavia, 
firstly the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, then the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.2 Therefore, for a long time they have followed similar economic and political 
patterns. After they declared their independence from the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, 
they started to develop their own economies.  
Croatia is a larger country than Slovenia.3 It has 4.5 million inhabitants and a total area of 
56, 538 square kilometres, while Slovenia has 1.95 million inhabitants and a total area of 20, 
526 square kilometres. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Croatia was, after Slovenia, the 
most prosperous and industrialised republic with a per capita output about one-third above the 
Yugoslav average. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Civil War that affected 
WKH FRXQWU\ IURP  WR  &URDWLD¶V HFRQRPLF SHUIRUPDQFH KDV IDOOHQ VKRUW RI LWV
potential. The disruptions caused by the War and the lack of competitiveness of many export 
sectors led to a decline in traditional industries like base metals, textiles, wood and food 
                                                 
2
 Until the end of World War I, Slovenia and Croatia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When Austria-
Hungary collapsed after the War, fear of an expansionist Italy inspired Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian leaders 
to form the new federation known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Regardless of ethnic hatred, 
language barriers and cultural and religious differences, the creation of Yugoslavia, which was re-established as 
the communist-ruled Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after World War II, fulfilled the dream of many South 
Slavs, who disregarded fundamental differences between the twelve million people of the new country. After a 
few decades of expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the federal system in general, especially during the 
1970s and 1980s, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Republic of Yugoslavia on June 25, 
1991.  
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industry. Only in the recent past has the economy begun to show the kind of performance its 
people and infrastructure should be able to deliver, with tourism4, banking and public 
investment leading the way. The average growth rate in the period 2000-2005 was 4 per cent5, 
but it is achieved through high fiscal and current account deficits. Overall, it could be 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW &URDWLD¶V HFRQRP\ UHPDLQV YXOQHUDEOH WR H[WHUQDO VKRFNV LQ YLHZ RI LWV
reliance on the tourism sector, and also the weakness of its merchandise export sectors.6 
Progress in enterprise restructuring through the ending of the privatisation process, SME 
development and export promotion will therefore continue to be important in ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and balanced growth in the future.  
2QHRI&URDWLD¶VPDMRUSUREOHPVUHPDLQV WKHKLJKXQHPSOR\PHQWDWDERXWSHUFHQW
with structural factors slowing its decline. The private sector has not grown fast enough to 
generate jobs for workers whose jobs continue to be eliminated through privatisation and 
restructuring. Another serious problem Croatia still faces is corruption ± as reported by 
Transparency International, from the least to the most corrupt countries (1-145) in the year 
2005, Croatia ranks as 67th FRXQWU\&URDWLD¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKH(8DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
have improved considerably in recent years ± it has made good progress in accession to the 
World Trade Organisation and NATO, and initiating the processes required to join the 
European Union ± which could be seen as good indicators for the future growth and 
SURVSHULW\ RI &URDWLD 7KH (8 DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV VKRXOG DFFHOHUDWH FRXQWU\¶V ILVFDO DQG
structural reforms.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 The following review is based on The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited publications ± QDPHO\ ³&RXQWU\
3URILOH´ IRU &URDWLD DQG 6ORYHQLD LQ WKH SHULRG - DV ZHOO DV ³&URDWLD 5HYLHZ ´ DQG ³6ORYHQLD
5HYLHZ´ 
4
 CroatLD¶VORFDWLRQRQWKH$GULDWLFOLQNVWKHLQWHULRURIHDVWHUQDQGVRXWKHUQ(XURSHZLWKWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ7KH
county possesses great tourist assets ± the Adriatic coastline rich in historically significant sites. 
5
 GDP growth rate varied from 2.9 per cent in the year 2000, to 5.2 per cent in the year 2002 and 3.7 per cent in 
2005. 
6
 The macroeconomic stabilisation programme conducted in the beginning of 1990s has resulted in low inflation 
rates and stable domestic currency, but the other side of this coin is FXUUHQF\¶V RYHUYDOXDWLRQ RQ IRUHLJQ
H[FKDQJHUDWHVZKLFKKDVUHGXFHG&URDWLD¶VH[SRUWFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV 
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In contrast to Croatia, which faced huge losses during the Balkan Civil Wars, Slovenia 
KDGRQO\³WKH7HQ'D\:DU´DQGLWPDQDJHGWRHVFDSHWKHLQWHQVHYLROHQFHWKDWDIIHFWHGPXFK
of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. The largely homogeneous Slovenia was spared any 
significant involvement in ethnically based conflicts. It could be said that Slovenia has 
enjoyed a high degree of internal political stability during its short history of self-rule. Its 
economy has been remarkably steady, particularly for a very open system in transition, with 
considerable potential vulnerability to external shocks. A balanced level of trade, with exports 
and imports each exceeding 50 per cent of annual GDP on a regular basis, characterises 
6ORYHQLD¶VVPDOOHFRQRP\:LWK6ORYHQLD¶VVWURQJHFRQRP\DQGORZXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVas 
well as the establishment of stable democracy since independence, the country was regarded 
as one of the better prepared EU candidate countries.  
%\6ORYHQLDGLVWLQJXLVKHGLWVHOIDVEHLQJRQHRI(XURSH¶VOHDVWFRUUXSWFRXQWULHV,W
was ranked as the most corruption-free of the former communist states of Eastern Europe 
(27th place on the scale from 1 to 145 as reported by Transparency International). Also, 
Slovenia enjoys a strong Standard & Poor A rating for its long-term foreign currency debt  
obligations. This development was regarded as a favourable one in regard to EU accession. In 
March 2004 Slovenia was admitted into NATO, while in May 2004 it entered in the EU. 
Today, it is one of the best economic performers in central and eastern Europe, with a GDP 
per capita estimated at 13,534 US dollars in 2005. Slovenia has enjoyed healthy growth 
figures since 1997, averaging 4 per cent annual GDP growth. In contrast to Croatia, one of 
6ORYHQLD¶VPDMRU DVVHWV LV LWVZHOO HGXFDWHGDQG SURGXFWLYHZRUN IRUFH. Privatisation of the 
economy proceeded at an accelerated pace in 2002-03, and the budget deficit dropped from 3 
per cent of GDP in 2002 to 1.6 per cent in 2003.  
Regarding the political disputes between the two neighbouring countries under analysis, 
since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia relations between Slovenia and Croatia have 
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been strained by disagreements concerning their delineation of the maritime border in Piran 
%D\ZKLFKKDVEHHQVHHQDVDSURPLQHQWLVVXHLQERWKFRXQWULHV¶IRUHLJQSROLF\and in public 
RSLQLRQ5HJDUGLQJHFRQRPLFUHODWLRQV6ORYHQLDLVDPRQJ&URDWLD¶VPDMRUH[SRUWDQGLPSRUW
SDUWQHUVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQSHUFHQWRI&URDWLD¶VLPSRUWDVZHOODVSHUFHQWRI&URDWLD¶V
export in the year 2005, whereas Croatia is only a major export partner to Slovenia but not a 
major import partner. Slovenia is more oriented towards trade with the EU members ± 
roughly two-WKLUGVRI6ORYHQLD¶VWUDGHLVZLWKWKH(8± which makes Germany, Italy, France 
and Austria its major import partners.  
It can be seen from the analysis presented above that, in spite of the same starting position 
after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Slovenia has achieved much better results than Croatia 
during the last fifteen years. Therefore, besides other objectives, this research explores 
whether financial risk management, as one of the most important objectives of modern 
corporate strategy, is more developed or has different rationales among the Slovenian than 
among the Croatian companies. Empirical research is conducted on the biggest and the most 
successful companies due to the fact that these companies have access to derivatives markets 
and should have developed a risk management function. The majority of existing studies have 
been conducted on American or Western-European companies. The purpose and contribution 
of this research is in bringing new evidence and adding value to the prevailing knowledge and 
understanding of the rationales and practices of corporate risk management gained in the case 
of the south-eastern European countries.  
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
 
There are a considerable number of studies on corporate risk management practices. The 
financial literature on why firms manage risk at all is usually traced back to 1984. In that year, 
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Stulz (1984) suggested a viable reason for objective function concavity, and his contribution 
is widely cited as a starting point of this burgeoning literature. A number of potential 
rationales for hedging have been developed by, amongst others, Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz 
(1990; 1996), Breeden and Viswanathan (1990), Mayers and Smith (1990), DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1992), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993; 1994), 
Dolde (1995), Tufano (1996; 1998), Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Minton 
and Schrand (1999), Haushalter (2000), Hoyt and Khang (2000), Allayannis and Weston 
(2001), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002).  
Studies that test the relevance of risk management for the firm generally support the 
expected rHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQULVNDQGWKHILUP¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV0D\HUVDQG6PLWK
have found that among firms owned by less diversified investors and among smaller firms 
there is a tendency to reduce their risk by hedging. Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have constructed models of corporate hedging. These 
models have predicted that firms attempt to reduce the risks they face if they have poorly 
diversified and risk-averse owners, face progressive taxes, suffer large costs from potential 
bankruptcy, or have funding needs for future investment projects in the face of strongly 
asymmetric information. In many instances, such risk reduction can be achieved by hedging.  
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), as well as Dolde (1995), Getzy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997) and Haushalter (2000) have also found evidence that firms whose capital structures are 
highly leveraged hedge more. The probability of the firm encountering financial distress is 
directly related to the size of the ILUP¶VIL[HGFODLPVUHODWLYHWRWKHYDOXHRILWVDVVHWV+HQFH
hedging becomes more valuable the more a firm is indebted because financial distress can 
lead to bankruptcy and reorganisation or liquidation - situations in which the firm faces direct 
costs of financial distress.  
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Warner (1977) has found that these direct costs of financial distress are less than 
SURSRUWLRQDO WR WKH ILUP¶V VL]H LPSO\LQJ WKDW VPDOO ILUPV DUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR KHGJH
Additionally, smaller firms are more likely to have taxable income in the progressive region 
of the tax schedule; again implying that small firms are more likely to hedge. In contrast to 
:DUQHU¶V ILQGLQJV 0LDQ  *HW]\ 0LQWRQ DQG 6FKUDQG  DQG +XVKDOWHU 
have argued that larger firms were more likely to hedge. One of the key factors in the 
corporate risk management rationale pertains to the costs of engaging in risk-management 
activities. The cost of hedging includes the direct transaction costs and the agency costs of 
ensuring that managers transact appropriately.7  
The assumption underlying this rationale is that there are substantial economies of scale or 
economically significant costs related to hedging (e.g. costs related to executing the 
transactions, hiring personnel with the required skills, acquiring relevant information and 
monitoring the hedge positions, etc.). Indeed, for many firms (particularly smaller firms), the 
marginal benefits of a hedging program may be exceeded by these marginal costs. These facts 
suggest there may be sizable set-up costs related to operating a corporate risk-management 
program. Thus, numerous firms may not hedge at all, even though they are exposed to 
financial risks, simply because it is not an economically worthwhile activity.  
Therefore, only firms with sufficiently large risk exposures are likely to benefit from a 
formal hedging program. Organising the Treasury for risk management involves significant 
fixed costs. A survey conducted by Dolde (1995) found that more than 45 per cent of the 
                                                 
   
7
 Transaction costs of hedging include the costs of trading, as well as the substantial costs of information systems 
needed to provide the data necessary to decide on the appropriate hedging positions to take. For forwards, futures, 
options, and swaps, this cost consists of out-of-pocket costs such as brokerage fees in futures markets and the implicit 
cost of the bid-ask spread. These costs have fallen with the growth of the derivatives markets. Then, there are 
agency costs that such activities bring, which include the costs of the internal control systems to run the hedging 
program. These include the problems associated with the opportunities for speculation that participation in derivative 
and other markets allows. Scandals that have occurred in Metalgesellschaft, Barings Bank and other firms where large 
amounts of money were lost, are extreme examples of these agency costs. Due to these scandals, there is more 
oversight at the level of the corporate board, and companies have been devoting more resources to ensure that 
hedging programs are better controlled.  
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Fortune 500 firms surveyed used at least one full-time-equivalent professional for risk 
management, with almost 15 per cent using three or more full-time-equivalents. His survey 
GDWD KDYH DOVR LQGLFDWHG WKDW PDQDJHPHQW¶V ODFN RI IDPLOLDULW\ ZLWK VRSKLVWLFDWHG ILQDQFLDO
instruments is a major impediment to the hedging decision. In addition to economies of scale 
in obtaining information on hedging techniques and instruments, there are also economies of 
scale in transaction costs associated with trading financial derivatives.  
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have examined the use of forwards, futures, swaps, 
and options on Fortune 500 firms using survey data. They have found that firms that hedged 
had larger investment tax credits, larger tax loss carry forwards and more of the range of  pre-
tax income in the convex region of the tax schedule. In addition, larger firms, firms with 
higher debt/equity ratios and less coverage of fixed claims, as well as firms with a wider range 
of investment projects available (measured by more growth options in their investment 
opportunity set) were more likely to hedge.  
To conclude, the results of the empirical studies suggest that the use of derivatives and 
risk management practices are broadly consistent with the predictions from the theoretical 
literature, which is based upon value maximising behaviour. By hedging financial risks such 
as currency, interest rate and commodity risk, firms can decrease cash flow volatility. By 
reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease expected taxes, agency costs and 
costs of financial distress, thereby enhancing the present value of expected future cash flows. 
In addition, reducing cash flow volatility can improve the probability of having sufficient 
internal funds for planned investments, (e.g. see: Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993) eliminating the need either to cut profitable projects or bear the 
transaction costs of obtaining external funding. However, this gain must be balanced against 
WKH PDQDJHPHQW¶V SRWHQWLDl to over-invest when using internal funds, which leads to 
avoidance of the external market scrutiny discipline.  
 12 
It is important to note that firms must weigh benefits of cash flow volatility reduction 
against the costs, which can vary across firms and industries. For example, Minton and 
Schrand (1999) have argued that risk management costs are likely to be low for firms in oil 
and gas, mining, and agriculture industries where liquid and well-developed derivatives 
markets exist for a risk that represents a significant source of a firm's cash flow volatility. In 
contrast, hedging costs are likely to be higher for firms in which significant cash flow 
volatility results from factors that are relatively uncorrelated with interest rates, foreign 
exchange prices or commodity prices. In total, if the costs of using corporate risk management 
instruments, e.g. financial derivatives that include employee salaries, computers, training and 
facilities as well as transaction costs, are less than the benefits provided via the avenues 
mentioned above, or any other benefit perceived by the market, then risk management will be 
a shareholder-value enhancing activity (empirical evidence found by Allayannis and Weston, 
2001).  
Another line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders value maximisation 
hypothesis is generally attributed to the work of Stulz (1984) and it refers to the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis. He has argued that managers have limited ability to diversify 
their own personal wealth position, associated with the company stock holdings and the 
capitalisation of their career earnings. Therefore, they will have an incentive to hedge their 
own wealth associated with the employment position at the expense of the shareholders.  
To avoid this problem, Stulz (1984) has suggested that a managerial compensation 
contract must be designed so that when managers increase the value of the firm they also 
increase their expected utility. Specifically, Smith and Stulz (1985) have discussed that the 
incorporation of option-OLNHSURYLVLRQVLQPDQDJHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLQFUHDVHVWKHLQFHQWLYHV
for managers to take risks. The expected utility of managerial wealth can be a convex 
IXQFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V H[SHFWHG SURILWV ZKHQ PDQDJHUV RZQ XQH[HUFLVHG RSWLRQV
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Consequently, the more option-like features there are in the compensation plans, the less 
managers will hedge. This theory is confirmed by Tufano (1996), who has found that firms 
ZKRVHPDQDJHUVKDYHPRUHZHDOWKLQYHVWHGLQWKHILUP¶VVWRFNPDQDJHPRUHFRUSRUDWHULVN
while managers who own more stock options have less incentives to hedge.  
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric information, is put 
forward by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who focus on 
PDQDJHUV¶ UHSXtations. They have argued that managers may prefer to engage in risk 
management so as to better communicate their skills to the labour market. Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have argued that younger executives are 
more willing to embrace new concepts like risk management than are their older colleagues. 
Managerial tenure might play a similar role, because it is possible that short-tenure financial 
managers would have less developed reputations than longer-tenure managers. Therefore, 
they would have an incentive to signal their quality through hedging. To the extent that these 
assumptions are correct, firms with younger managers, and those whose managers have 
shorter tenures on the job would be more willing to manage risk.  
Another theory connected to corporate risk management refers to alternative financial 
policies. It has been argued that, instead of managing risk through hedging, firms could 
pursue alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management strategies. Although 
they are not considered as a special kind of risk management strategy, it should be noted that 
the literature has argued that alternative financial policies, usually referred to as "hedge 
substitutes", can also reduce a firm's risk without requiring the firm to directly engage in risk 
management activities. Firms could adopt conservative financial policies such as maintaining 
low leverage, a low dividend pay-out ratio or carrying large cash balances to protect them 
against potential hardship (see: Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). Structured debt, also referred 
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WR DV K\EULG GHEW FDQ EH VHHQ DV DQRWKHU H[DPSOH RI ³KHGJH VXEVWLWXWHV´ VHH HJ Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985). A firm that issues structured debt can 
achieve the identical market exposure by issuing debt and entering into a derivatives contract. 
In addition to the structured debt, the firm could control agency problems by using preferred 
stock rather than straight debt (see: Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). So it could be concluded that the greater use of these substitute risk management 
activities should be associated with less financial risk management activities 
 
1.3.1 Summary of Empirical Predictions 
 
Based on the arguments that arise from the analysed papers presented in this thesis we 
propose several hypotheses. First we argue that hedging can increase the value of the firm by 
reducing the costs associated with financial distress, the agency costs of debt, expected taxes 
and capital market imperfections. These premises are known as the shareholder maximisation 
hypothesis and are tested in the first four assumptions.  
1) The argument of reducing the transaction costs of financial distress implies that the 
EHQHILWV RI KHGJLQJ VKRXOG EH JUHDWHU WKH ODUJHU WKH IUDFWLRQ RI IL[HG FODLPV LQ WKH ILUP¶V
capital structure and the smaller the firm. However, the informational and transactional scale 
economies argument implies that larger firms will be more likely to hedge; so the predicted 
impact of size is indeterminate. We believe that the argument is stronger in the case of the 
significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging. Therefore, we 
preGLFW D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ D FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DV ZHOO DV D
FRPSDQ\¶VOHYHUDJHDQGWKHGHFLVLRQWRKHGJH 
2) The argument of the agency cost of debt implies that the benefits of hedging should be 
JUHDWHUWKHKLJKHUWKHILUP¶V leverage and asymmetric information problem.  
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3) The argument of capital market imperfections implies that the benefits of hedging 
VKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVWKHUHDUHLQWKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\VHW 
4) The tax hypothesis suggests that the benefits of hedging should be greater the higher 
WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWWKHILUP¶VSUH-tax income is in the progressive region of the tax schedule 
DQGDOVRWKHJUHDWHUWKHYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VWD[ORVVFDUU\-forwards, investment tax credits and 
other provisions of the tax code. 
The next group of assumptions regards the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. 
We argue as follows.  
5) Managers with greater stock ownership would prefer more risk management, while 
those with greater option holdings would prefer less risk management. Additionally, firms 
with younger managers and those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job would be 
more inclined to manage risk. 
We have also tested the hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies that are 
considered substitutes for corporate hedging because they reduce expected taxes, transaction 
costs, or agency costs. We propose the following assumption.  
6) The likelihood of the firm employing risk management instruments is lower the more 
convertible debt the firm issues, the more preferred stock the firm issues, the more liquid the 
ILUP¶VDVVHWVDUHDQGWKHORZHUWKHILUP¶VGLYLGHQGSD\RXWLV 
The last group of assumptions regards risk management practices in Croatia vs Slovenia. 
To test the hypothesis that financial risk management, as one of the most important objectives 
of modern corporate strategy, is more developed or has different rationales among Slovenian 
than among Croatian companies, we propose following research propositions.   
7) The Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices in 
comparison with the Croatian companies, measured by the total number of companies that use 
derivative instruments to manage their risk exposures.  
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8) The Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices than the 
Croatian companies, measured by the implementation of the more sophisticated risk 
management strategies. To distinguish the less and more sophisticated risk management 
strategies, we took the use of different derivatives instruments with an emphasis on structured 
derivatives as an example of the more advanced risk management strategies, while 
instruments like natural hedge or international and business diversification we have classified 
as a less sophisticated risk management strategies.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
A considerable part of a material presented in the thesis is a result of an analysis or survey 
of existing literature. An extensive list of the prevailing theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the determinants, rationales and practices of corporate risk management is 
presented in Chapter 2. Besides the survey of the literature, we have conducted empirical 
research and collect our own unique data set to test the research hypothesis.  
At the beginning of our analysis, we have presented summary statistics for the proxy 
variables, which have given an insight into corporate characteristics of firms in the sample. 
Then, by using t-test, we have tested the differences between means for the two 
independent separate samples: hedgers and nonhedgers as well as users and nonusers of 
derivative instruments. T-test enables a calculation of statistically significant differences 
between small and mutually unrelated parametric samples. In other words, it points to those 
differences that are not random. Additionally, correlation analysis was conducted by 
calculating 3HDUVRQ¶V FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW DV D PHDVXUH RI OLQHDU FRUUHODWLRQ EHFDXVH
variables in the model are of interval/ratio nature (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
 17 
In our multivariate analysis, binominal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish 
between the possible explanations for the decision to hedge and use derivatives. We have 
chosen binomial (or binary) logistic regression because it is a form of regression that is used 
when the dependent variable is a dichotomy (limited, discrete and not continuous) and the 
independents are of any type (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Rice, 1994; Allison, 1999; 
Menard, 2002). Besides the fact that the dependent variable in our research is discrete and not 
continuous, we have chosen logistic regression because it enables the researcher to overcome 
many of the restrictive assumptions of OLS regression. Because multiple proxies are available 
to measure some characteristics of a firm, we have estimated separate logistic regressions, 
using all possible combinations of variables representing each predicted construct.  
Among the other research methods that we have employed in this thesis, a comparative 
analysis was used in Chapter 6 as a dominant method in order to compare the results of 
empirical research conducted on the Croatian and Slovenian companies. Chapter 6 is a 
³FODVVLF´ FRPSDUH-and-contrast work (Walk, 1998) in which we have weighted results for 
both countries equally trying to find crucial differences as well as commonalities in financial 
risk management practices. The body of the chapter is organised in the point-by-point way, in 
which the points about Slovenia are presented with the comparable points about Croatia.  
 
1.5  Outline of the Chapters 
  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, where the 
research area and research subject are defined. Then, the goals of the doctoral thesis are 
determined, out of which the thesis objectives are derived. The goals and objectives outline 
are followed by the main thesis discussion and the methodology section. Finally, the outline 
of chapters is provided at the end of Chapter 1. 
 18 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review that provides the historical and theoretical basis for 
this study covering the relevance of corporate risk management function and its influence on 
WKH FRPSDQ\¶V YDOXH WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH UDWLRQDOHV IRU KHGJLQJ One of the most important 
implications of modern capital market theory is that diversified shareholders should care only 
about the systematic component of total risk. On the surface it would appear that this implies 
that managers of firms who are acting in the best interests of shareholders should be 
indifferent about hedging of risks that are unsystematic. However, it is apparent that 
managers are constantly engaged in hedging activities that are directed at the reduction of 
unsystematic risk. Two classes of explanations or determinants for management concern with 
hedging of non-systematic risk have appeared in the literature. The first class of explanations 
focuses on risk management as a means to maximise shareholder value, and the second 
IRFXVHV RQ ULVN PDQDJHPHQW DV D PHDQV WR PD[LPLVH PDQDJHUV¶ SULYDWH XWLOLW\ &KDSWHU 
presents and discusses the theories related to these arguments and their empirical implications. 
 Chapter 3 describes data sources and research methods used to undertake the survey. The 
relevance of the analysis conducted to the test research hypothesis is explained. In this 
chapter we provide a review of the methodology used in the most recent empirical studies 
conducted on the corporate risk management, as well as the methodology of our research. The 
methodology review is presented in a way that follows our research hypothesis. The variables 
used as proxies to test different hypotheses in the analysed papers are presented in section 
3.2., which has helped us to create our own set of variables that we present in section 3.3. This 
is followed by section 3.4., where a review of the econometric and statistical analysis used in 
previous studies is presented in sub-section 3.4.1., which again was a base for econometric 
analysis conducted in our thesis presented in sub-section 3.4.2.  Finally, data description and 
the process of collecting research data are explained in section 3.5.  
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  The empirical results are presented and discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 
presents research results on risk management rationales and practices in Croatian 
companies, while Chapter 5 presents results for Slovenian companies. In sections 4.2. 
and 5.2. summary statistics of FRPSDQLHV¶ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQ WKH &URDWLDQ DQG
Slovenian samples are presented. Here we provide a detailed description of corporate risk 
management practices, such as usage of different risk management instruments, motives for 
usage and non-usage, exposures and types of financial risk hedged by the analysed Croatian 
and Slovenian non-financial companies. In sections 4.3. and 5.3. results of univariate analysis 
have been presented. The analysis has been conducted for two different groups. In the first 
group, we have explored differences between sub-samples of hedgers and nonhedgers, while 
in the second group we have investigated differences between companies that are derivative 
users and those companies that do not use derivatives. In both cases, we have employed the 
Pearson test of correlation and t-test to determine if the means of two unrelated samples 
differ.  
  In sections 4.4. and 5.4. we present the results of multivariate analysis for the Croatian 
and Slovenian companies. We have employed logistic regression where we tested the 
hypothesis that the decision to hedge, as well as the decision to hedge with derivatives, is a 
function of the six factors - financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market 
imperfections, taxes, managerial utility, and hedge substitutes. Chapter 6 presents a 
comparative analysis of results for both countries where we explore whether financial risk 
management, as one of the most important objectives of modern corporate strategy, is more 
developed or has different rationales among Slovenian than among Croatian companies. 
A final chapter concludes the dissertation, summarising the findings and contributions of 
the dissertation, evaluation some of the limitations of the study and introducing avenues for 
further research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Corporate Risk Management Practices 
 
2.1.1 The Relevance of Corporate Risk Management Function and its Influence 
RQWKH&RPSDQ\¶V9DOXH 
 
In this sub-section, we present the relevance of our research subject and its influence on 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHDVFRUSRUDWHULVNPDQDJHPHQWIXQFWLRQZDVIRUDORQJWLPHFRQVLGHUHG
WREHLUUHOHYDQWIURPWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶YDOXHPD[LPLVDWLRQYLHZ,WKDVEHHQRQO\WZRGHFDGHV
since both scholars and practitioners have realised that managing corporate risk lies at the 
heart of a competitive corporate strategy, and that the management of corporate risk is central 
to organisational evolution. 
In a classical decision theory, risk is devised as reflecting the variation in the distribution 
of possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values. Risk is measured either by 
nonlinearities in the revealed utility for money or by the variance of the probability 
distribution of possible gains and losses associated with a particular alternative (Pratt, 1964; 
Arrow, 1965). In the latter formulation, a risky alternative is one for which the variance is 
large and risk is one of the attributes that, along with the expected value of the alternative, are 
used in evaluating alternative gambles. It should be emphasised that the idea of risk is 
embedded in the larger idea of choice as affected by the expected return of an alternative 
(Lindley, 1971).  
Virtually all theories of choice assume that decision makers prefer larger expected returns 
to smaller ones, provided all other factors (e.g. risk) are constant. In general, they also assume 
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that decision makers prefer smaller risks to larger ones, provided other factors (e.g. expected 
value) are constant (Arrow, 1965). Thus, expected value is assumed to be positively 
associated, and risk is assumed to be negatively associated, with the attractiveness of an 
alternative. If the risk of an investment is high, it is expected that the return on that investment 
will also be high, or else a lower risk investment would have been sought (Oviatt and 
Bauerschmidt, 1991).  
Finding a satisfactory empirical definition within this theoretical framework has proven 
difficult. Simple measures of mean and variance have led to empirical observations that can 
be interpreted as being off the mean-variance frontier. This has led to efforts to develop 
modified conceptions of risk, particularly in studies of financial markets. Early criticism of 
variance definitions of risk (Markowitz, 1952), as confounding downside risk with upside 
opportunities, has contributed to a number of efforts to develop models based on the 
semivariance (Fishburn, 1977). Both variance and semivariance ideas of risk, however, have 
been shown to be inconsistent except under rather narrow conditions (Levy and Markowitz, 
1979) and these results have stimulated scholars to estimate risk and risk preference from 
observed prices. 
This procedure is essentially the approach of the majority of the contemporary literature 
on risk financial markets. One example is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that has 
become one standard approach to financial analysis (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 
1966). It defines the degree to which a given portfolio co-varies with the market portfolio as 
the systematic risk. The residual (in a regression sense) is defined as nonsystematic or specific 
risk (March and Shapira, 1987). The model, which is commonly used to assess the risk-
adjusted return on a particular stock, separates risk into two components: (1) systematic risk, 
which captures the variation in a stock's return ascribable to market-wide forces and (2) 
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business, or unsystematic, risk, which reflects the variation in a stock's return ascribable to 
firm-specific forces. 
 Empirical tests by financial economists relying on the Capital Asset Pricing Model and 
using stock market data have confirmed that the relationship between return and systematic 
risk ± the undiversifiable risk that an individual security has in common with the overall 
economy ± is positive (Copeland and Weston, 1988). According to the CAPM, since investors 
can diversify away business risk, they only worry about the market risk of a stock, which is 
called its beta. Thus, under the assumptions of the CAPM, corporate managers should not be 
concerned with reducing their firm-specific business risk since it should have no effect on 
their firms' stock returns. There is no reason for the corporation to hedge on behalf of the 
investor. Or, put somewhat differently, hedging transactions at the corporate level sometimes 
lose money and sometimes make money, but on average they break even. 
 The conclusion is that companies cannot systematically make money by hedging. Unlike 
individual risk management, corporate risk management does not hurt, but it also does not 
help (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). From this perspective, the expected net present 
value of business risk management on the efficient capital market should be zero. Hence, a 
decision of a financial manDJHUWRLQVXUHRUKHGJHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIXWXUHFDVKIORZVZRXOGEH
MXVW³QHXWUDOPXWDWLRQV´ZKLFKGRQRWLQIOXHQFHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHZKLOHLQWKHZRUVWFDVH
a decision to manage risk would be irrational behaviour because it incurs certain costs which 
lowHU WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK 6KDSLUR DQG 7LWPDQ  It could be concluded that 
business risk management is unnecessary from the perspective of the CAPM.  
Miller and Modigliani's "M&M" proposition supports these findings (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). According to the classic Modigliani and Miller paradigm, risk management is 
irrelevant to the firm and, under certain conditions, the corporate capital structure decision is 
irrelevant. The key insight of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller is that value is created on 
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the left-hand side of the balance sheet when companies make good investments that ultimately 
increase operating cash flows. How companies finance those investments on the right-hand 
side of a balance sheet - whether through debt, equity or retained earnings - is completely 
irrelevant. These decisions about financial policy can affect only how the value created by a 
FRPSDQ\¶VUHDOLQYHVWPHQWVLVGLYLGHGDPRQJLWVLQYHVWRUV,QDQHIILFLHQWFDSLWDOPDUNHWWKH\
cannot affect the overall value of those investments (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994).  
In the "frictionless" M&M framework, management cannot increase a firm's value by 
changing either capital structure or hedging policy. These are purely financial transactions 
that do not affect the vaOXHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VRSHUDWLQJDVVHWV Investors can adjust their own 
holdings of debt and equity to create whatever capital structure they desire, just as they can do 
their own hedging against financial risks. The stockholders of an airline, for example, can 
diversify their holdings into oil companies, hedging themselves against the risk of oil price 
increases. If the airline's management faces hedging costs in excess of stockholders' 
diversification costs, the firm should not hedge against oil price increases (Culp, 1994). 
Because investors effectively lever (or unlever) the companies in their portfolios through their 
own borrowing and lending decisions, an individual company's debt-to-equity ratio, and the kinds 
of securities it chooses to issue, should not affect its value. The conditions underlying the M&M 
propositions also imply that decisions to hedge corporate exposures to interest rates, exchange 
rates and commodity prices are equally irrelevant ± because stockholders already protect themselves 
against such risks by holding well-diversified portfolios. Indeed, once the transaction costs 
associated with hedging instruments are factored in, a Modigliani-Miller disciple would argue 
against risk management at all.  
The M&M propositions were intended to hold only under a restrictive set of conditions, 
the most important of which are that there are no costs associated with bankruptcy or financial 
distress, no taxes or transactions costs, that corporate investment decisions are not influenced 
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by financing choices, including decisions to hedge various price risks, that reliable 
information about the firm's future earnings prospects is costlessly available to all investors 
and managers alike, and that individuals and firms have equal access to all security markets, 
including the ability to issue identical securities on the same terms (Culp, 1994). It should be 
noted that, thirty years after the M&M propositions were created, even Merton Miller (Miller, 
1988) has written that the view that capital structure is literally irrelevant to corporate finance 
is far from what Modigliani and Miller ever actually said about the real-world applications of 
their theoretical propositions.  
'HVSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW LQ WKH EDVLF 0	0 ZRUOG KHGJLQJ GRHV QRW DOWHU D ILUP¶V YDOXH
markets where derivatives are traded are dominated by corporations and institutions, not by 
individuals trading for their personal accounts. In the real world, financial managers and 
treasurers give a great deal of thought to matters of capital structure and securities design. 
Bettis (1981) has suggested that managing corporate risk lies at the heart of a competitive 
strategy, which could be seen from the widespread and growing use of derivatives in hedging 
interest rate, currency and commodity price risks.  
The positive import of the M&M framework, and its main message to corporate 
practitioners, is presented by several theories suggesting that hedging is a value-increasing 
strategy for the firm. Research in the 1980s and 1990s has extended the knowledge on risk 
management by examining the unique characteristics of large, widely held corporations. 
Based on work by Mayers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate demand for 
insurance, scholars such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Shapiro and Titman 
(1998) have examined why large, well-diversified firms actively engage in hedging activities. 
These authors argued that the earlier theories are applicable to individuals and small, closely 
held firms but could not be used as a theoretical rationale for hedging by large corporations. 
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The authors demonstrated several theories of hedging which overcome the irrelevancy 
arguments of modern portfolio and corporate finance theory.  
Most of these theories rely on the introduction of frictions into the M&M model and argue 
that market imperfections enable firms to add value through hedges that cannot be exactly 
duplicated by individual investors. That is, if corporate financing and hedging decisions are 
capable of increasing firm values, they can do so only for reasons such as the following: they 
reduce the probability or costs of financial distress, they reduce taxes or transactions costs, 
WKH\UHGXFHWKHFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLQIRUPDWLRQ³DV\PPHWULHV´E\VLJQDOOLQJPDQDJHPHQW
V
view of the company's prospects to LQYHVWRUVRUWKH\UHGXFH³DJHQF\´SUREOHPVFRQIOLFWVRI
interest among management, shareholders, and creditors), including distortions of 
management's incentives to undertake all value-adding investments (Bartram, 2000). 
Hedging refers to activities undertaken by the company in order to mitigate the impact of 
uncertainties stemming from price fluctuations on the value of the firm. Modern financial 
theory defines the market value of a firm as the sum of the expected discounted future cash 
flows. Thus, a reduction in corporate risk may affect the market value of a firm through either 
future cash flows or through the weighted average cost of capital that presents the discount 
rate in the model.  
 
(1) 
 
 
cV  - present value of the company 
tCF  - future cash flows in period t 
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By hedging financial risks such as currency, interest rate and commodity risk, firms can 
decrease cash flow volatility, which leads to a lower variance of a firm value. This means that 
QRWRQO\LVDILUP¶VYDOXHPRYLQJOHVVEXWWKHSUREDELOLW\RIRFFXUULQJORZYDOXHVLVVPDOOHU
than without hedging (Bartram, 2000). Positive theories of risk management, as a lever for 
VKDUHKROGHUYDOXHFUHDWLRQDUJXHWKDWDILUP¶VYDOXHLVDFRQFDYHREMHFWLYHIXQFWLRQEHFDXVH
of capital market imperfections. By reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease 
expected taxes, agency costs and costs of financial distress, thereby enhancing the present 
value of expected future cash flows. In addition, reducing cash flow volatility can improve the 
probability of having sufficient internal funds for planned investments eliminating the need 
either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external funding.  
A very important motive for corporate risk reduction derives from the effect of uncertainty 
DERXWWKHILUP¶VRSHUDWLRQVRQLWVFDVKIORZV,QVWDEOHHQYLronments, corporations' operations 
should be efficient and the volatility of their earnings should be low. Conversely, in unstable 
environments, firms' operations might be less efficient and their earnings more volatile. 
Production planning provides a simple example. In a stable environment with little 
uncertainty about the demand for firms' products, they can efficiently manage production 
scheduling, finished-goods inventory management and the timing and amounts of supplies of 
raw materials and labour. Firms can thus realise numerous cost savings. In such a setting, it is 
in the interest of shareholders to reduce corporate risk (Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein, 1986; 
Aron, 1988; Marshall, Yawitz and Greenberg, 1984).  
This class of arguments suggests in effect that low corporate risk allows firms to acquire 
inputs cheaply or to operate efficiently. In industries that are less than perfectly competitive, 
reduced corporate risk will enhance a firm's market value. Thus, according to this motive for 
corporate risk reduction, a negative relation should exist between cash flows and corporate 
risk. This risk reduction motive is called the cash-flow motive. The results of Amit and 
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:HUQHUIHOW¶VVWXG\VXSSRUWWKHWKHVLVWKDWORZHULQJFRUSRUDWHULVNLVYDOXDEOHEHFDXVH
ceteris paribus, it allows firms to increase cash flows. Results suggest that low corporate risk 
allows firms to acquire factors of production at lower costs, to operate more efficiently, or 
both. Consequently, a reduced cash flow volatility results in lower costs associated with the 
capital market imperfections, larger cash flows to the owners of the firm, and thus higher 
expected firm value (see graph 2.1.). In general, a concave corporate objective function is a 
necessary condition for risk management at the firm level to create value (Bartram, 2000).  
 
Graph 2.1. The Effect of Hedging on Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bartram, 2000 
 
However, the results of implementing risk management instruments, especially derivatives 
use, on the shareholder value are still an open question. With the popular press spotlighting 
the misuse and abuse of derivatives, many firms still worry that the use of derivative products 
may result in negative price effects and reduction of the company¶V YDOXH 7KH IROORZLQJ
analysis aims to present results of studies that address this issue and offer a reduction of 
FRPSDQLHV¶FRQFHUQ 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examined the use of foreign currency derivatives in a 
sample of 720 large US non-financial firms between 1990 and 1995, and its potential impact 
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RQ WKHILUP¶VYDOXH7KH\DVVXPHGWKDW ILUPVZKLFKKHGJH WKHLUH[SRVXUHV WRH[FKDQJHUDWH
risk by using foreign currency derivatives are likely to be rewarded by investors with higher 
valuation in the marketplace, as hedging may substantially mitigate underinvestment. They 
found a positive relation between firm value and the use of FCDs. On average, firms that face 
currency risk and use currency derivatives have 4.87 per cent higher value than firms that do 
not use currency derivatives. Additionally, they performed further tests to examine whether 
hedging causes an increase in firm value. They found evidence that firms that begin a hedging 
policy experience an increase in value above those firms that choose to remain unhedged. 
Also, firms that cease hedging experience a decrease in value relative to those firms that 
choose to remain hedged. These results are consistent with theories that suggest the decision 
to hedge is value-increasing. While their results suggest that the use of FCDs increases firm 
value, Allayannis and Weston (2001) have argued that other types of derivatives use, such as 
interest rate or commodity, may also be beneficial for a firm.  
Another study that has addressed the question of whether there is a direct relation between 
KHGJLQJDQGDILUP¶VYDOXHLV7XIDQR,QKLVSDSHUKHKDVVWXGLHG1RUWK$PHULFDQJROG
mining firms, and their exposures to fluctuations in gold prices. Almost certainly, the value of 
gold mines changes with the price of gold. Tufano measured the size of these exposures, 
analytically established their determinants and empirically tested how observed exposures 
correspond to analytically predicted exposures. He has shown how exposures are determined 
jointly by market characteristics such as the price of gold, firm characteristics such as the 
ILUP¶VFRVWVWUXFWXUHDQGWKHILQDQFLDOSROLFLHVRIWKHILUPVXFKDVLWVOHYHUDJHFKRLFHVDQGULVN
management policy. As predicted, gold exposures are negatively related to the level of the 
gold price, the volatility of gold prices, the degree to which the firm has activities outside 
mining, and the amount of hedging done by the firm. Also, as predicted by theory, the amount 
of exposure is positively related to the amount of financial leverage held by the firm. Finally, 
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exposures seem larger for larger firms, where firm size is measured by current production,  
reserves, or market value, although part of this result might be attributable to the slower speed 
at which the prices of smaller firms seem to adjust to new information. The study has shown 
that capital markets take firm-specific and market-specific factors into account when 
determining exposures of firms and incorporate information on hedging activities into their 
valuatioQRIWKHILUPV)URP7XIDQR¶VUHVXOWVLWLVREYLRXVWKDWULVNPDQDJHPHQWSOD\V
an important role in changing the risk exposures of gold mining firms, and that the stock 
market recognises it.  
&KR  KDV H[SORUHG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ D ILUP¶V value and risk management 
activities using Gordon's Constant Dividend Growth Model. In the framework of the infinite 
growth model, the value of a firm depends upon after-tax expected earnings, cost of capital, 
the earnings growth rate, and the dividend payout ratio. Cost of capital is evaluated after 
considering fluctuations of cash flows. Firm value is determined by discounting appropriate 
cash flows at cost of capital in excess of the earnings growth rate. Optimum levels of loss 
control with and without risk management activities have been examined, and relevant 
elements affecting loss control have been identified. With the assumption that risk 
management activities affect the firm's cost of capital, Cho (1988) has shown that under 
certain conditions, risk management activities lower the cost of capital, thus raising the 
present value of the firm to investors. This result suggests that the investors place positive 
value on the risk management process.  
 
2.1.2 Complete versus Selective Hedging 
 
The risk management process involves the determination of what risks a corporation 
faces. It is useful to break down the risks inherent in financial assets into three subgroups; 
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risks that can be eliminated or avoided by business practices, risks that can be transferred to 
other participants, and risks that must be actively managed at the firm level. This will allow 
companies both to consider which risks belong to each group and how to deal with each type 
of risk.  
When a company has classified the different types of risk to which it is exposed, the job of 
a risk manager is to decide how he will protect a company from those risks. A risk manager 
will attain maximum risk management effectiveness by applying common sense, knowledge 
of his own company and its financial ramifications, and knowledge of managing risks in more 
or less equal parts. Once a financial manager has assessed all of the risks to which a company 
may be exposed, he must separate them into two piles - those he is unwilling or unable to 
retain, and those he feels the company can deal with. Each risk must be assessed in light of its 
SULFH DQG WKH LPSDFW RQ HLWKHU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V SURILW DQG ORVV RU LWV EDODQFH VKHHW 6PLWK
1964).  
)HZ VFKRODUV KDYH H[SORUHG KRZ PDQDJHUV FRQFHSWXDOLVH ULVN 0DR¶V  LQWHUYLHZV
with executives have indicated that managers characterise risk as failure to meet some target 
rate of return, rather than variance. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) identified the 
magnitude of the loss, the chance of loss and the exposure to loss as the essence of risk. 
March and Shapira (1987) have reported that when managers were asked whether they viewed 
risk in terms of a distribution of all possible outcomes, or just the negative ones, or just the 
positive ones, 80 per cent indicated they considered only the negative outcomes. On the basis 
of this result, March and Shapira (1987) have concluded that there is a persistent tension 
between "risk" as a measure (e.g. variance) on the distribution of possible outcomes, and 
"risk" as a danger or hazard.  
Firms invest in financial and real options to reduce downside risk while maintaining 
upside potential (see: Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). The use of risk variance 
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measures in empirical strategy research conflicts with the understanding of risk as 
performance below expectations found in much of the strategy literature. The behavioural 
decision theory, finance, and management studies provide a strong basis for shifting strategy 
UHVHDUFKHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ IURP YDULDQFH PHDVXUHV RI ULVN WR GRZQVLGH PHDVXUHV 0LOOHU Dnd 
Reuer, 1996). 
Selective hedging emerges from the acceptance of the downside risk reduction while 
maintaining upside potential, instead of complete risk reduction and acceptance of the 
variance minimisation model. The fundamental objective of corporate risk management 
function can be seen from a perspective of a well-out-of-the-money put option that limits the 
corporate loss, while the opportunity for realising potential gains is left open (Stulz, 1996). In 
other words, the purpose of selective hedging is not risk avoidance, in the strict sense, but 
avoidance of loss. When hedging is done selectively, the advantage of hedging to the 
individual firm may often be measured approximately by the amount of loss avoided directly 
by the hedging. Selective hedging almost inevitably yields large advantages to a corporation 
that is able to anticipate price changes reasonably well (Working, 1962).  
The choice of a risk management strategy depends to a great extent on the information 
available to the financial manager regarding the future expectations of commodity price, 
interest rates and exchange rate movements. Efficient risk management does not imply 
minimisation of all risks that a corporation is exposed to by forming a perfect hedge. It 
implies the choice of a strategy that will allow a company to protect its cash flow from severe 
outcomes, while leaving a possibility to realise extra earnings though financial price changes 
WKDWKDVDSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZV&RPSDQLHVWKDWKDYHDFRPSHWLWLYH
advantage in collecting information and which leave a certain risky position open could 
increase their value due to a strategy of selective risk management.  
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2.1.3 Measures of Exposure to Corporate Risks 
.  
Exposure refers to the extent to which external environmental contingencies affect a 
company's performance (Miller, 1998). There are several ways companies can measure their 
risk exposure. Many financial institutions quantify the probability of lower-tail outcomes by 
using a very popular and well known-measure called Value at Risk (VaR) (e.g. see: Dowd, 
1999; 2000). The biggest advantage of VaR is its ability to compress the expected distribution 
of bad outcomes into a single number. Regardless of its advantages, VaR is not an adequate 
measure in the case of non-financial companies and cannot be used as an effective tool for 
corporate risk management. VaR is a measure calculated for a short period and it tells the 
PD[LPXPH[WHQWRIDFRPSDQ\¶V ORVVHV LQFDVHVRXWRI 9D5HYDOXDWHGDW WKHSHU
cent level of significance) in a given day, or in a given month. VaR does not give useful 
LQIRUPDWLRQZKHQPDQDJHPHQW¶VFRQFHUQLVZKHWKHUILUPYDOXHZLOOIDOOEHORZVRPHFULWLFDO
value over an extended period of time.  
An alternative to VaR is future cash flow simulation in order to estimate the default 
SUREDELOLWLHVRIDFRPSDQ\7KHPRVWSUDFWLFDODSSURDFKWRDVVHVVLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VSUREDELOLW\
of financial distress is to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the expected distribution of cash 
flows. Using Monte Carlo simulDWLRQVDFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZVFDQEHSURMHFWHGRYHUDWHQ-
year horizon in a way that reflects the combined effect of, as well as interaction between, all 
WKH ILUP¶VPDMRU ULVNH[SRVXUHVRQ LWVGHIDXOWSUREDELOLW\7RGR WKLVSURSHUO\ WKH ILQDQFLDO
manageUPXVW VSHFLI\ D UDQJHRI OLNHO\ IXWXUH HFRQRPLF VFHQDULRV DQGKRZ WKH ILUP¶V FDVK
flows will be affected by these developments. The probability of distress over the period 
would be measured by the fraction of simulated distributions that falls below a certain 
threshold level of cumulated cash flow. Such a technique could also be used to estimate the 
expected effect of various hedging strategies on the probability of distress.  
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One of the advantages of using simulation techniques in this context is their ability to 
incorporate any special properties of the cash flow that are not normal. The VaR approach 
assumes that the gains and losses from risky positions are not dependent. This assumption is 
not likely to be real when it is applied to operational cash flows of a non-financial company. 
There is a high probability that the poor cash realised flow today will negatively affect cash 
flow tomorrow. Simulation techniques have an ability to anticipate and build the 
interdependence of cash flows in the probability analysis that a company will face financial 
distress (Stulz, 1996).  
 
2.1.4 Corporate Risk Management Strategies 
 
Corporate risk management can be conducted in two rather distinct ways. Either the firm 
can engage in activities which together result in less volatility than they would exhibit 
individually, or the firm can engage in financial transactions that will have a similar effect. 
The first approach is to embark upon a diversification strategy in the portfolio of businesses 
operated by the firm. A second straWHJ\RIFRQGXFWLQJFRUSRUDWHULVNPDQDJHPHQWLVWKHILUP¶V
engagement in financial transactions. In the place of diversification strategy, firms, concerned 
about the volatility of earnings, have turned to the financial markets. This is because the 
financial markets have developed more direct approaches to risk management that transcend 
the need to directly invest in activities that reduce volatility. The task of managing corporate 
risks has been facilitated by the increasing availability of a variety of instruments to transfer 
financial price risks to other parties. This dissertation explores which corporate management 
strategies are employed in the analysed Croatian and Slovenian companies and it gives the 
evaluation of their importance.  
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2.1.4.1 Diversification Strategy 
 
 
This is a strategy that is sometimes promoted in the management literature. Corporate 
diversification is often justified on the grounds that it reduces risk, or volatility in rates of 
UHWXUQE\UHGXFLQJDILUP¶VH[SRVXUHWRWKHF\FOLFDOLW\RIDQy single industry. The theoretical 
rationale for this concept is borrowed from the modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). 
However, diversification based upon conglomerate activity, while once a popular strategy, has 
fallen out of favour. During the 1950s and 1960s many corporations undertook massive 
diversification programs. In a few decades the trend has reversed, with a study by Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) documenting and confirming a return to specialisation. This push toward focus 
apparently resulted from the view that unrelated diversification actually decreases firm value. 
Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing and value-
reducing effects. Consistent with observed trends in diversification activity, theoretical argu-
ments developed during the late 1960s and early 1970s have generally addressed the benefits 
of diversification, whereas more recent papers have addressed the costs.  
The potential benefits of operating different lines of business within one firm include greater 
operating efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present value projects, greater debt 
capacity and lower taxes. It was argued that, because multidivisional firms create a level of 
management concerned with coordination of specialised divisions, they are more efficient and 
thus more profitable than their lines of business would be separately. Weston (1970) has 
stated that resource allocation is more efficient in internal than in external capital markets. 
He therefore has contended that diversified firms allocate resources more efficiently because 
they create a larger internal capital market. Stulz (1990) has argued that diversified firms, by 
creating a larger internal capital market, reduce the underinvestment p roblem (Myers, 
1977). These internal capital market arguments predict that diversified companies make 
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more positive net present value investments than their segments would make as separate 
firms.  
Another potential benefit of diversification arises from combining businesses with 
imperfectly correlated earnings streams, which results in the greater debt capacity of 
diversified firms in comparison with single-line businesses of a similar size (Lewellen, 1971). 
One way in which increased debt capacity creates value is by increasing interest tax shields. 
Thus, diversified firms are predicted to have higher leverage and lower tax payments than 
their businesses would show if operated separately. A further tax advantage arises from the tax 
code's asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. Majd and Myers (1987) have argued that 
undiversified firms are at a significant tax disadvantage because tax is paid to the government 
when income is positive, but the government does not pay the firm when income is negative. 
This disadvantage is reduced, but not eliminated, by the tax code's carry-back and carry-
forward provisions. The Majd and Myers (1987) analysis has predicted that, as long as one or 
more segments of a conglomerate experience losses in some years, a conglomerate pays less 
taxes than its segments would pay separately.  
Apart from benefits that have been presented, diversification can create various costs. The 
potential costs of diversification include the use of increased resources to undertake value-
decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain resources from the 
better-performing segments, and misalignment of incentives between central and divisional 
managers. Stulz (1990) has argued that diversified firms will invest too much in lines of 
business with poor investment opportunities. Jensen's (1986; 1988) assertion that managers of 
firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake 
value-decreasing investments has a similar implication. To the extent that lines of business 
have an access to more free cash flows as part of a diversified firm than on their own, he has 
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predicted that diversified firms invest more in negative net present value projects than their 
segments would if operated independently.  
Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) have made a related argument regarding the cross-
subsidisation of failing business segments. Since a failing business cannot have a value below 
zero if operated on its own, but can have a negative value if it is a part of a conglomerate that 
provides cross-subsidies, they have predicted that unprofitable lines of business create greater 
value losses in conglomerates than they would as independent firms. Finally, Myerson 
(1982) and Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) have discussed the information asymmetry costs 
that arise between central management and divisional managers in decentralised firms. These 
costs are higher in conglomerates than in focused firms to the extent that information is 
more dispersed within the firm, leading to the prediction that diversified firms are less 
profitable than their lines of business would be separately.  
It could be said that there are no clear conclusions about the overall value effect of 
diversification. Berger and Ofek (1995) have used segment-level data to estimate the valuation 
effect of diversification and to examine the potential sources of value gains or losses. They 
compared the sum of the imputed stand-alone values of the segments of diversified companies 
to the actual values of those companies, and documented that diversified firms have values 
that average 13 per cent to 15 per cent below the sum of the imputed values of their segments. 
Authors have found additional support for the conclusion that diversification reduces value 
by documenting that the segments of diversified firms have lower operating profitability than 
single-line businesses. They have identified overinvestment in segments by industries with 
limited investment opportunities as one source of the value loss. An additional source of 
loss in value is cross-subsidisation of poorly performing divisions by better-performing 
divisions. Two potential benefits of diversification are increased interest tax shields resulting 
from higher debt capacity and the ability of multi-segment firms to immediately realise tax 
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savings by offsetting losses in some segments against profits in others. Berger and Ofek¶V
estimate of the tax saving, however, is only 0.1 per cent of sales, far too small to offset the 
documented value loss.  
The papers discussed have not distinguished between related and unrelated diversification. 
Some authors have argued that related diversified firms perform better than conglomerates. 
Nayyar (1993) has discussed that benefits from a positive reputation in an existing business 
and from economies of scope are available from related but not from unrelated diversification. 
The resulting prediction is that the valuation effect of diversification is more positive for 
related than unrelated lines of business. /XEDWNLQ DQG &KDWWHUMHH¶V ILndings (1994) have 
questioned the accuracy of this rationale. Instead of a linear relationship between corporate 
diversification and stock return risk, they have found a curvilinear relationship, suggesting 
that there is an optimal level of diversification for firms. It appears that risk, however 
measured, is best minimised by some midrange level of diversification, such as a constrained 
strategy, in which opportunities to share tangible and intangible assets are numerous.  
Unrelated firms were found to be associated with high levels of risk, suggesting that 
diversification intended to spread and thus reduce risk may be accomplishing the opposite. 
The unsystematic risk findings highlight this point because, everything else being the same, 
unrelated-diversified firms should show the lowest levels of such risk because they combine 
businesses whose cash flows are weakly correlated. But the unrelated firms that have been 
DQDO\VHGE\/XEDWNLQDQG&KDWWHUMHH¶VKDYHVKRZQKLJKOHYHOVRIXQV\VWHPDWLFULVNLQ
spite of an offsetting positive portfolio effect. The systematic risk findings suggest that 
corporations can achieve a reduction in risk that stockholders can not achieve on their own. 
7KLV UHGXFWLRQ LQ V\VWHPDWLF ULVN HQKDQFHV D ILUP¶V IXWXUH SHUIRUPDQFH for low systematic 
risk implies a low cost of capital. 
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/XEDWNLQDQG&KDWWHUMHH¶VILQGLQJVDUHWKHUHIRUHFRQWUDU\WR WKHSRSXODUSRUWIROLR
theory. Firms that diversify in a constrained manner are able to realise synergies that other 
diversification types can not achieve, and these synergies help to protect the firm from 
macroeconomic uncertainties. Their results have important implications and suggest that 
diversifying into new markets only for the purpose of hedging may actually increase corporate 
risks. It could be concluded that it is better for corporate managers to focus their attention on 
building competitive advantages in each market in which they participate, and that can be 
accomplished through a constrained diversification strategy. 
In addition to using diversification strategies, a firm could manage its risk exposure 
through operational hedging. An example of an operational hedging policy would be to locate 
production in a country where significant sales revenues in the local currency are expected. 
Multinational corporations often sell products in various countries with prices denominated in 
corresponding local currencies. The effect of unexpected changes in exchange rates and 
foreign demand conditions on domestic currency value of sales revenues are hedged by 
similar changes in the domestic currency value of local production costs. Operational hedging 
is a way to conduct a multinational diversification strategy, which provides a reason for direct 
foreign investments by firms, and may further explain the existence of multinational firms 
with production facilities at several foreign locations.   
The costs of implementing a financial hedge are likely to be smaller than those of 
implementing an operational hedge. After all, in order to implement an operational hedge, a 
firm may be required to open a production plant in another country, whereas to implement a 
ILQDQFLDOKHGJHPD\ VLPSO\ UHTXLUH D FRQWDFWZLWK WKH ILUP¶VEDQN7KHUHIRUH WKHTXHVWLRQ
regarding the advantages of operational hedging policies versus a financial hedge emerges. 
Chowdhry and Howe (1999) have argued that one of the advantages of an operational hedge 
 39 
is that it allows the firm to match domestic currency production costs and revenues more 
closely.  
In their paper they have proven that, if the quantity of foreign currency revenues the firm 
is expected to generate is certain, it is easy to hedge the exchange risk exposure associated 
with it by using a forward contract. This eliminates the associated transaction exposure 
completely with a relatively simple financial hedge. However, fluctuating foreign currency 
cash flows represents an additional source of uncertainty for many multinationals. For certain 
products, demand conditions can change dramatically from year to year, inducing large 
changes in foreign currency revenues. If the quantity of foreign currency revenues is uncertain 
(and not perfectly correlated with the exchange rate), no financial contract (which must be 
agreed upon ex ante) that is contingent only on ex post observable variables such as the 
exchange rate, can completely eliminate the exchange risk.  
The Chowdhry and Howe (1999) results are also consistent with the prediction that firms 
often seem to use financial instruments to hedge short-term exposures but not long-term 
exposures. This prediction is based on the argument that demand uncertainty will be smaller 
for shorter horizons than for longer horizons, as firms will be able to forecast their sales more 
accurately in the short term. Their analysis thus confirms that firms are likely to use financial 
instruments to a greater extent to hedge short-term exposures and rely on operational hedging 
more heavily to hedge long-term exposures.  
 
2.1.4.2  Derivatives Instruments 
 
 
One prominent definition of a derivatives contract is a bilateral contract or payment 
exchange whose market value is determined by the value of a specific, underlying asset or 
underlying reference rate or index. To be more precise, derivatives are defined as products 
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that exist in "zero net supply" - that is for every long (buyer) there must be a short (seller). 
This definition eliminates debt and equity securities, leaving only contracts that are based on 
the value of securities and on other prices, rates, and indexes (Santomero, 1995). The notional 
contractual cash-flows associated with derivative instruments can also be used to offset or 
match the risk associated with a known series of the firm's operating cash flows. At first 
glance, the list of derivative products looks very long. Forwards, futures, options, swaps, caps 
and floors are just some of the more frequently used derivatives, and new ones are being 
designed all the time. However, as discussed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), all these 
products are derived from just two basic building blocks: forwards and options.  
It should be noted that, before derivatives markets were truly developed, the means for 
dealing with corporate risks were few, and thus financial risks were largely outside managerial 
control. A few exchange-traded derivatives existed, but they allowed corporate users to hedge 
only certain financial risks, in limited ways and over fairly short time horizons. The derivatives 
markets were highly incomplete. Firms were often forced to resort to the operational alternatives 
like establishing plants abroad to minimise exchange-rate risks, or to the natural hedging by 
trying to match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities.   
Allen and Santomero (1998) have written that, during the 1980s and 1990s, commercial and 
investment banks introduced a broad selection of new products designed to help corporate 
managers in handling financial risks. At the same time, the derivatives exchanges, which 
successfully introduced interest rate and currency derivatives in the 1970s, have become 
vigorous innovators, continually adding new products, refining existing ones, and finding new 
ways to increase liquidity. Markets for derivative instruments such as forwards and futures, 
swaps and options, and innovative combinations of these basic financial instruments8, have 
developed and grown at a breathtaking pace, and many corporations have become active 
                                                 
8
 E.g. cylinder options, compound options, hindsight options, synthetic options, synthetic forwards, participating 
forwards, forward exchange agreements, break forwards, etc. 
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participants in derivatives markets. It could be said that the derivatives revolution began. Since 
then, the range and quality of both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives, together with the depth 
of the market for such instruments, have expanded intensively.  
The emergence of the modern and innovative derivative markets allowed corporations to 
insulate themselves from financial risks, or to modify them. Using derivatives, a corporation is 
increasingly able to determine the environment in which it will operate, and to create for itself a 
SULYDWH ³GHULYDWLYH UHDOLW\´ D V\QWKHWLF ZRUOG UHOHDVHG IURP ULVNV WKDW D FRUSRUDWLRQ FRQVLGHUV
undesirable (Hu, 1995; 1996). Therefore, under these new conditions, shareholders and 
stakeholders increasingly expect management to be able to identify and manage exposures to 
corporate risks.  
While companies have been using derivatives for many years, little has been known about 
the extent or pattern of their use because, until recently, firms have not been required to 
publicly report their derivatives activity. Unfortunately, the use of derivatives by companies 
only appears to receive attention in response to special cases of huge derivative-related losses. 
Well known cases of Procter&Gamble or Metallgesellschaft are two of the most frequently 
cited examples (Mello and Peterson, 1995a; Shirreff, 2004). It should be emphasised that 
without a clear set of risk-management goals, using derivatives can be dangerous. The most 
important fact regarding the losses incurred is that both Procter&Gamble and 
Metallgesellschaft lost substantial amounts of money because they took positions in 
derivatives that did not fit well with their corporate strategies (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1994).  
Santomero (1995) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) have argued that those ³EDG´
realisations have led investors, creditors, and regulators to become increasingly concerned 
about how firms use these instruments. The normal beneficial use of derivative instruments in 
the daily risk management activities of companies receives much less attention in the financial 
 42 
press. However, empirical evidence that documents WKHSDWWHUQVRIXVHRUILUPV¶DWtitudes and 
policies regarding derivative use, as well as the effect of derivatives on firms' risk, exists and is 
presented in this sub-section. Several studies have investigated whether firms systematically 
reduce or increase their corporate risk with derivatives. Such research is important because 
the possibility that firms use derivatives to increase their risk exposures has been a principal 
concern guiding regulatory agencies in their considerations of derivatives regulation. 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) have focused on intensive users of derivatives and found 
that even for firms that hold large derivatives positions relative to overall firm size, they could 
not detect an economically significant link between derivatives and increased volatility. Their 
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms use derivatives to speculate on a large 
scale. In particular, the analysed sample reveals no association between the volatility of a 
ILUP¶VVWRFNSULFHVDQGWKHVL]HRIWKHILUP¶VGHULYDWLYHVSRVLWLRQ That is not to say that firms 
cannot take large risks with derivatives, or that no firms alter their exposures or volatilities 
through derivatives. However, the Hentschel and Kothari (2001) findings have shown that 
these effects are currently small for most firms, even those with large derivatives positions.  
The findings by Hentschel and Kothari are supported by Allayannis and Ofek (2001) who 
have examined whether firms use foreign currency derivatives for hedging or for speculative  
purposes. Using a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms for 1993, they have found evidence 
that firms use currency derivatives for hedging rather than for speculating in the foreign 
exchange market, as their use significantly reduces the exchange-rate exposure that firms 
face. This is proven by strong negative association between foreign currency derivative use 
and firm exchange-rate exposure.  
The results of Allayannis and Ofek (2001) complement those in Guay (1999) and those in 
Tufano (1996). In a sample of 254 non-financial corporations that begin using derivatives, 
Guay (1999) has found that the firm risk, measured in several ways, declines over the period 
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following the initiation of a derivatives program. New users of derivatives experience 
statistically and economically significant reductions in stock-return volatility, interest-rate 
exposure, and exchange-rate exposure when compared to matched samples of control firms 
that do not use derivatives.  
Tufano (1996) has examined commodity hedging activities in the gold mining industry. 
Most of the 48 North American gold mines studied in his paper are not well diversified, thus 
their gold price risk management involves hedging (the shedding of all exposure through the 
sale of gold at fixed prices) or insurance (the shedding of downside exposure, for instance 
WKURXJKWKHSXUFKDVHRISXWRSWLRQV7XIDQR¶VVWXG\KDVSURYHQWKDWWKHUHDUHQRILUPV
that used these financial transactions to increase gold price exposure; thus, it appears that the 
financial risk management programs produce risk reduction, rather than risk enhancement (or 
speculation). Taken together, evidence from the analysed studies is consistent with firms 
using derivatives for hedging purposes, on average, and not to increase shareholder risk.  
Several surveys have investigated derivative usage for risk management purposes. A 
survey conducted by Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) has revealed that at least 50 per cent of 
US non-financial companies are using some form of financial engineering to manage interest 
rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk, with usage heavily tilted toward large firms. 
With regard to the type of hedging instrument, forward (72 per cent) and OTC options (37 per 
cent) are more commonly used than exchange-traded futures and options (17 per cent and 14 
per cent, respectively). The US firms indicate that their key motive behind financial hedging 
is to decrease the volatility of the cash flows, however stabilising accounting earnings is a 
close second. Foreign exchange risk is the most commonly hedged risk using derivatives, 
followed by interest rate risk. Additionally, the authors have found that risk management 
decisions and activities are largely centralised and the hedging horizon for financial 
derivatives is typically less than one year.  
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Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) have compared derivatives usage between US and German 
firms using the responses from the 1995 Wharton Survey (Bodnar et.al., 1995) and an 
identical survey of German public firms. Their results have indicated that more German firms 
than US firms use derivatives. This result could be explained by the fact that, at the time a 
survey was conducted, Germany was a smaller and more open economy in comparison with 
the US, which resulted in greater exposure of its firms to financial risk, especially to the 
foreign exchange risk. Survey results have clearly indicated that both US and German non-
financial companies stick primarily with simple foreign-exchange instruments. Currency 
forwards are by far the most important instruments in both countries. Moreover, the use of 
over-the-counter instruments (forwards, swaps and options) dominates the exchange-traded 
instruments. With US companies the use of futures is considerably higher than in Germany. 
Interest rate derivatives are a close second in terms of frequency to foreign currency 
derivatives. The most commonly used interest rate derivative both in Germany and the US is 
the swap from floating to fixed-rate debt. Among the second and third most commonly used 
forms of interest rate derivatives are namely forwards and OTC options. Exchange-traded 
interest rate instruments are not popular among firms in both countries. There is a lower 
frequency of commodity derivative use among firms. The survey results indicated that US 
firms use a broader array of commodity derivatives than German firms. German firms, it 
appears, tend to use primarily forwards to hedge commodity risk. US firms are more likely to 
favour futures, swaps, or options for commodity hedges than are German firms.  
Commercial banks are the primary source for derivative transactions for the majority of 
US firms, while universal banks are the primary source for derivative transactions for the 
majority of German firms. US firms use investment banks and insurance companies as a very 
important source for derivative transaction, while very few German firms use them as 
counterparties. The authors concluded that the general pattern of usage across industry and 
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firm size is very comparable for the two analysed countries. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) 
have suggested that the determinants of derivative use are primarily driven by economic 
considerations such as activities and firm characteristics and not the result of corporate culture 
or other country-specific differences. Although this study provides comparative information 
on risk management practices inside and outside the US setting, it is not a sophisticated 
comparison between US and non-US firms. The two samples are matched across industries, 
but they are different with respect to size and industry distribution.  
Bodnar, Jong and Macrae (2003) have surveyed the risk management activities of firms in 
the Netherlands using a survey identical to that used in the 1998 Wharton Survey (Bodnar, 
Hayt and Marston, 1998). They compared survey results with the results from US firms. The 
unique feature of this study is that the results are compared in a more precise way using a 
weighting scheme for the US results across both a firm size and industry classification that 
produces a US sample with the same size and industry characteristics as the Dutch sample. 
%RGQDU -RQJ DQG 0DFUDH¶V  UHVXOWV KDYH LQGLFDWHG WKDW 'XWFK ILUPV XVH GHULYDWLYHV
more often to hedge financial risk than US firms for all size and industry classes, with an 
emphasis on foreign exchange risk management - a result that is driven by the fact that the 
Dutch economy is much more open than the US economy.  
While US firms also rely on commercial banks for derivatives, they have a much wider 
array of counter-parties for derivatives transactions, such as investment banks, other finance 
firms, insurance companies or exchanges. The survey results suggest a general pattern of 
Dutch firms showing a stronger preference than US firms for over-the-counter instruments 
that come from banks. This result is similar to the results obtained in Bodnar and Gebhardt 
(1998). The common reason in both countries for not using derivatives is insufficient 
exposure to financial risk. This might suggest that these firms are naturally hedged, in that 
their revenues and costs in foreign currency are reasonably balanced, thereby reducing the 
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total foreign currency exposure to a tolerable level without using derivatives. Also, some of 
the foreign exchange exposure may be shed by means other than using derivatives. 
Operational hedging, for instance, by moving factories to countries where foreign currency 
revenues are incurred, or financing in the foreign currency, may be alternative strategies to 
using derivatives. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) as well as Bodnar, Jong and Macrae (2003) 
have argued that the characteristics of Dutch and German firms could be found in other 
continental European countries and may act as a baseline from which to generalise. Therefore, 
the analysed surveys also suggest a broader comparison between US and European firms.  
Jesswein (1995) has examined the extent to which US-based corporations have adopted 
innovations in foreign exchange risk management and how their adoptions are affected by 
ERWK WKH ILUP¶V ULVN PDQDJHPHQW DSSURDFK DQG WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFs of the new instruments. 
Among his principal findings are the following. First, among the various products, a forward 
contract remains the hedging vehicle of choice, and the popularity of forward contracts has 
not been threatened by the introduction of more sophisticated instruments. The next group of 
more popular products is foreign currency swaps and over-the-counter currency options. 
Though falling in the same category, the exchange-traded products have substantially smaller 
percentages of adoption. The greater use of over-the-counter products is probably attributable 
to their flexibility and convenience. Since the respondent firms are mostly large corporations 
that can trade in wholesale markets, custom-made over-the-counter products are likely to fit 
their specific needs better. Use of "exotic, third-generation" products, by contrast, is quite 
limited.  
Although the innovations of the third generation have received much attention in the 
academic literature, their adoption is less common, as would be expected. The likely 
explanation is that most of their business needs are already well covered by the more common 
plain-vanilla products such as forward contracts, over-the-counter options, and currency 
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swaps. Second, Jesswein (1995) has also found that an overwhelming majority of the 
respondent firms said that currency risk management is a worthwhile activity. Among these 
respondents, there also appeared to be a decided preference for "active" or "view-driven" risk 
management as opposed to a full-cover or variance-minimising hedging approach. Finally, the 
product attributes of greatest value to corporate users appear to be simplicity, liquidity and 
IOH[LELOLW\ $OVR LPSRUWDQW KRZHYHU LV WKH FRPSDWLELOLW\ RI DQ LQVWUXPHQW ZLWK WKH ILUP¶V
approach. Jesswein (1995) has concluded his paper with an argument that investment bankers 
intent on stimulating greater corporate use of third-generation products may want to focus 
more of their efforts on reducing the difficulty of entry and exit for their products, and on 
increasing understanding of them by corporate treasurers.  
 
2.1.4.2.1 Risks of Derivatives Use 
 
The continuing discussion of risks and regulation in derivative markets illustrates that 
there is little agreement on what the risks are, or whether regulation is a useful tool for their 
control. One source of confusion is the sheer profusion of names describing the risks arising 
IURPGHULYDWLYHV%HVLGHVWKH³SULFHULVN´RISRWHQWLDO ORVVHVRQGHULYDWLYHVIURPFKDQJHVLQ
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or commodity SULFHVWKHUHLV³GHIDXOWULVN´VRPHWLPHV
UHIHUUHGWRDV³FRXQWHUSDUW\ULVN´³OLTXLGLW\RUIXQGLQJULVN´³OHJDOULVN´³VHWWOHPHQWULVN´
DQG ³RSHUDWLRQV ULVN´ /DVW EXW QRW OHDVW LV ³V\VWHPDWLF ULVN´ ± the notion of problems in 
derivatives markets spreading throughout the financial system that seems to be at the heart of 
many regulatory concerns.  
Hentschel and Smith (1997) have argued that the possibility of a widespread default 
throughout the financial system caused by derivatives has been exaggerated, principally due 
to the failure to appreciate the low default risk associated with individual derivative contracts. 
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They provide a parametric model of hedging in which they show that firms that use 
derivatives have lower default probabilities on these derivatives than they do on their debt. 
Based on this insight and empirical evidence on bond default rates, they have computed a 
conservative default probability for derivatives, and estimated that the expected annual loss 
due to default on a 10 million USD interests rate swap is unlikely to exceed 25 USD. Given 
these small default rates, Hentschel and Smith (1997) have shown that the systematic risk - 
the probability of a widespread default - is even smaller. They have proven that, to the extent 
that derivatives are being used primarily to hedge rather than to speculate, the default 
probability associated with derivatives is less than half the default probability on debt issued 
by the same firms.  
Hentschel and Smith (1997) have concluded that default and systematic risks are not the 
major problems in derivative markets, and argue that many firms are exposed to agency risk, a 
reference to the principal-agent conflicts from which they arise. This risk arises when 
employees in the derivatives area (the agents) have decision rights over derivatives and are 
not working towards the general corporate objectives set by the senior management and 
shareholders (the principals). In many instances, the magnitudes of the derivative losses and, 
hence, the underlying derivative positions came as surprises to the senior management and 
shareholders. This is an internal control problem that financial accounting standards simply 
cannot solve, so the authors have suggested that careful control and supervision is critically 
important for derivatives, because employees should be properly monitored on account of 
their misaligned incentives relative to the firm. 
Hentschel and Smith (1997) have argued that the main cause of this principal-agent 
conflict lies in the compensation systems attributed to employees with decision rights over 
derivatives transactions. Firms that pay large bonuses based on short-term performance can 
encourage excessive risk-taking by employees. Authors warned that the primary problem in 
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linking pay to derivative profits is the limited liability of employees. Although employees can 
participate in the upside, they usually have insufficient resources to share large negative 
outcomes. This asymmetry induces option-like features in compensation planes based on 
trading profits. As a solution to the problem, Hentschel and Smith (1997) have suggested 
compensation systems on the basis of long-term performance, which reduces these option-like 
features that would otherwise encourage traders to take riskier positions.  
It could be concluded that firms are changing the way in which they manage their 
derivatives operations to account of these risk issues. As firms gather more experience with 
these compensations and control systems, control of these problems is likely to improve. The 
proper balancing of decision rights, incentives and control should be a major firm-internal 
concern for firms with derivatives activity. Due to the several well-known cases that we have 
already mentioned in this sub-section, where huge derivative-related losses occurred, there is 
more oversight at the level of the corporate board and companies have been devoting more 
resources to ensure that hedging programs are better controlled. 
 
2.1.4.3 Hedge substitutes 
 
 
Instead of managing risk through hedging, firms could pursue alternative activities that 
substitute for financial risk management strategies. Although they are not considered as a 
special kind of risk management strategy, it should be noted that the literature has argued that 
alternative financial policies, usually referred to as "hedge substitutes", can also reduce a 
ILUP¶VULVNZLWKRXWUHTXLULQJWKHILUPWRGLUHFWO\HQJDJHLQULVNPDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVFirms 
could adopt conservative financial policies such as maintaining low leverage, a low dividend 
pay-out ratio, or carrying large cash balances to protect them against potential financial 
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difficulties (a form of negative leverage). Greater use of these substitute risk management 
activities should be associated with less financial risk management activities. 
Thus, a firm with a relatively conservative capital structure and dividend policy is 
"hedging" against adverse business conditions since any future earnings shortfall can be 
compensated more easily by, for example, drawing down cash available from a large cash 
balance (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993). This is 
confirmed by Tufano (1996) who has found that firms with lower cash balances manage more 
gold price risk. Pulvino (1998) and Harford (1999) have discussed that cash reserves can 
provide a valuable source of funds for investments when current internally generated funds 
fall short and external financing is costly. Smith and Warner (1979) and Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) have proven that firms also could reduce the probability of default by 
investing in more liquid or less risky assets or by imposing dividend restrictions. More liquid 
assets or lower dividend-payout ratios help to assure bondholders that funds will be available 
to pay fixed claims - the more times these fixed claims are covered, the lower are the expected 
costs due to financial distress and agency costs.  
A question should be raised regarding the management choice to select such a 
conservative capital structure. If the reasoning behind their decision lies in the inability to 
predict financial prices trends, they should reconsider their decision. What they have done is 
use low leverage instead of different kinds of hedging instruments to protect against the risk 
in those economic variables. It should be emphasised that reducing the debt-equity ratio can 
be unattractive because it also reduces debt-UHODWHG WD[ VKLHOGV DQG LQFUHDVHV WKH ILUP¶V WD[
liability. An alternative management strategy would be to take on more debt and then hedge 
those risks directly, for example, in the derivatives markets.  
 51 
Structured debt9, also referred to as hybrid debt (e.g. putable or convertible bonds), can be 
VHHQ DV DQRWKHU H[DPSOH RI ³KHGJH VXEVWLWXWHV´ VHH Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985). A firm that issues structured debt can achieve the identical market 
exposure by issuing debt and entering into a derivatives contract. Some complex debt 
LQVWUXPHQWVDUHGHVLJQHGLQSDUW WRIXUQLVKLQYHVWRUVZLWKVHFXULWLHVWKDW³WKH\FDQQRWREWDLQ
elsewherH´ )RU H[DPSOH FRPPRGLW\-linked bonds typically contain embedded long-dated 
forwards or options on commodity prices that are not available on organised exchanges. 
,QYHVWRUV PD\ EH ZLOOLQJ WR ³SD\ XS´ IRU VWUXFWXUHG GHEW WKDW DOORZV WKHP WR WDNH VXFK
positions, thereby reducing the issuer's funding costs (Smithson and Chew, 1992).  
Another potential benefit of managing price risks with structured debt is that it avoids the 
corporate costs associated with the use of derivatives like the costs of building expertise in 
derivatives markets, the costs of managing the counterparty credit risk, the costs of managing 
the funding and operational risks associated with all derivatives. Additionally, structured debt 
has the potential to reduce the costs of dealing with financial distress by reducing the agency 
problems between management and investors. Management could address the agency 
problems by using straight debt together with derivatives instead of structured debt. But the 
additional advantage of structured debt in such circumstances is that it reduces the costs 
incurred by creditors in monitoring the borrower's hedging activity (e.g. see: Culp, 1994).  
In addition to the structured debt, the firm could use preferred stock rather than straight 
debt (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Preferred stock reduces the 
probability of financial distress, but it does not produce tax shields as debt financing does. It 
is important to understand that convertible debt helps control conflicts of interest among 
stockholders and bondholders and thereby reduces incentives to hedge, while preferred stock 
                                                 
9
 Structured debt effectively combines straight debt with one or more "embedded'' derivatives contracts that often 
correspond to a corporate exposure to interest rate, currency, or commodity price risks. Structured debt can be 
synthetically replicated by, and is best understood as, a contract whose payoff features combine debt with a 
derivatives transaction. 
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reduces the probability of financial distress. Although similar to debt, preferred stock pays 
periodic dividends and firms can omit a preferred dividend payment without being forced into 
bankruptcy. In contrast, bankruptcy filing is virtually inevitable if an interest payment on debt 
is not met.  
The empirical evidence does not clearly support the thesis regarding the use of structured 
debt and preferred stock as hedging substitutes. While Smith and Stulz (1985) and Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993) have proven a negative relationship between hedging and the 
ILUP¶V XVH RI FRQYHUWLEOH GHEW DQG SUHIHUUHG VWRFN *HF]\ 0LQWRQ DQG 6FKUDQG  DQG
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have argued that the relationship is positive because 
FRQYHUWLEOHGHEWDQGSUHIHUUHGVWRFNDUHKLGGHQILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHZKLFKFRQVWUDLQVDILUP¶V
access to external funds. This prediction is based on the Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
argument that firms that are more financially constrained are exposed to greater 
underinvestment costs.  
 
2.2 Theoretic Rationales for Corporate Risk Management 
 
One of the most important implications of modern capital market theory is that 
diversified shareholders should care only about the systematic component of total risk. On the 
surface it would appear that this implies that managers of firms who are acting in the best 
interests of shareholders should be indifferent about hedging of risks that are unsystematic. 
However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging activities that are 
directed at the reduction of unsystematic risk. If the design and execution of such hedging 
strategies are costly, it would seem that these activities would not be in the interests of 
diversified shareholders. Two classes of explanations or determinants for management concern 
with hedging of non-systematic risk have appeared in the literature. The first class of 
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explanations focuses on risk management as a means to maximise shareholder value, and the 
VHFRQGIRFXVHVRQULVNPDQDJHPHQWDVDPHDQV WRPD[LPLVHPDQDJHUV¶SULYDWHXWLOLW\7KLV
section presents and discusses the theories related to these arguments and their empirical 
implications. 
 
2.2.1 Shareholder Maximisation Hypothesis  
 
2.2.1.1 Cost of Financial Distress  
 
 
One of the possible explanations IRUPDQDJHUV¶FKRLFHVRIULVNPDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVRQ
behalf of their firms is based on the fact that non-systematic risk does affect the probability 
that a firm will go bankrupt or experience financial distress. If financial distress generates 
real costs for the firm as a whole, then shareholders will be interested in hedging this risk 
(Campbell and Kracaw, 1987). Additionally, the cost of financial distress is one of the reasons 
why firm performance and market value might be directly associated with volatility (Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1985; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998; Haushalter 
2000). In the MM world, financial distress is assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the 
probability of financial distress does not affect firm value. If financial distress is costly, firms 
have incentives to reduce its probability, and hedging is one method by which a firm can 
reduce the volatility of its earnings. Costs of financial distress include the legal and 
administrative costs of bankruptcy, as well as the agency, moral hazard, monitoring and 
contracting costs which can erode firm value even if formal default is avoided (Myers, 1984). 
By reducing the variance of DILUP¶VFDVKIORZVRUDFFRXQWLQJSURILWVKHGJLQJGHFUHDVHVWKH
probability, and thus the expected costs, of financial distress.  
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The literature is filled with such stories. The classic paper by Warner (1977) was the first 
to present empirical evidence of the cost of bankruptcy, but some other studies, such as Weiss 
(1990), have continued to reinforce its importance. Smith and Stulz (1985) used the same 
argument to justify a desire for reduced volatility. The authors were on firm ground, as there 
is ample evidence that financial distress leads to substantially increased costs associated with 
bankruptcy proceedings, legal costs, and perhaps most importantly, the diversion of 
management attention from creating real economic value.  
 
Graph 2.2. Hedging and the cost of financial distress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bartram, 2000 
 
While the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm value, it augments 
VKDUHKROGHUYDOXHHYHQIXUWKHUE\VLPXOWDQHRXVO\UDLVLQJWKHILUP¶V potential to carry debt. It 
is known that corporate debt creates a fixed cost that can be used as a competitive weapon 
(see e.g.: Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988). This follows from the fact that 
interest payments of debt are made out of pre-tax income creating a tax shield of debt 
financing. As is shown in graph 2.3., corporate risk management lowers the cost of financial 
distress, which leads to a higher optimal debt ratio (or lower financing costs), and the tax 
shields of the additional debt capital further increases the value of the firm. However, 
Firm value after 
hedging 
Firm value before 
hedging 
Firm value E1(v) E2(v) 
Probability of 
financial distress 
 55 
shareholders must account for hedging costs when they decide among alternative hedging 
strategies (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
 
Graph 2.3. Hedging and the higher optimal debt ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smith and Stulz, 1985 
 
Dobson and Soenen (1993) have argued that foreign exchange hedging will lower the 
probability of corporate bankruptcy. By extending the longevity of corporations, hedging will 
tend to ameliorate the moral-hazard-agency-problem. Moral hazard arises from conflicts of 
interest among corporate stakeholders, for example management and debtholders.  By 
reducing the probability of bankruptcy and thereby increasing the perceived duration of 
contractual relations between stakeholders, foreign exchange hedging increases the power of 
reputation to enforce contracts. They have also proven that when a firm undertakes 
international capital projects, uncertainty exists concerning the domestic currency value of the 
future cash flows from these projects. Foreign exchange hedging reduces this uncertainty by 
smoothing the future cash flow stream. Although this uncertainty is largely unsystematic, it 
does not just impact firm risk. It also directly impacts firm value. If projects are financed by 
debt, then the smoothing of the cash flow stream tends to lower the firm's cost of debt. 
Bessembinder's (1991) model focuses on simple debt contracts and the senior claim, but 
the analysis can be extended to any obligation with higher legal priority than equity. He has 
Cost of financial 
distress 
NPV of tax 
shields 
Firm value with 
100% equity 
V 
Debt/Equity - Ratio D1 D2 
 56 
shown that hedging increases value by improving contracting terms. The hedging instrument 
specifically evaluated in his study is a forward contract, but the analysis also applies to other 
financial contracts, such as options and swaps, which alter the cash flow distribution so that 
there is a reduced likelihood of small cash flow realisations. Hedges provide net cash inflows 
LQWKRVHVWDWHVZKHUHWKHILUP¶VFDVKIORZVDUHORZERQGLQJLWVDELOLW\WRPHHWFRPPLWPHQts 
in additional states. Bessembinder's (1991) has proven that hedging can secure value-
increasing changes in contracting terms with creditors, customers, employees and suppliers if 
the contracts with these parties have initially positive Net Present Value (NPV).  
When exploring corporate hedging behaviour, scholars are particularly interested in the 
relationship between hedging and leverage, since theoretical considerations suggest that both 
affect expected costs of financial distress and agency costs. Greater leverage exacerbates 
those costs, but greater hedging ameliorates them, suggesting a positive linkage. Dolde (1995) 
has controlled for financial risks differences by conducting a survey of Fortune 500 firms in 
1992, and presents statistically significant evidence that leverage and hedging are positively 
related. He also constructed a direct measure of expected costs of financial distress and found 
some evidence that hedging measures interact with and mitigate the effects of leverage. 
Haushalter (2000) has found that the use of commodity derivatives is to be related to the 
reduction of expected bankruptcy costs, which should increase firm value. He examined the 
hedging activities of oil and gas producers and has documented a wide variation in hedging 
policies among analysed companies. The tests conducted have found that this variation is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVHYHUDOGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHILUPV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV$PRQJRLODQGJDVSURGXFHUV
that hedge, the extent of hedging is related to proxies for financing costs. Conditional on a 
company hedging, the fraction of production hedged is increasing in the debt ratio, is greater 
for companies that pay out a smaller fraction of income in dividends, and is less for those that 
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do have a debt rating. This finding is consistent with theories of the transaction cost of 
financial distress.  
Mian (1996) has investigated all three types (commodity, interest rate and currency) of 
hedging activities for a sample of 3,022 firms. He has found no significant difference in 
leverage between hedgers and nonhedgers. Examination of the type of risk hedged yields 
results that are different from the two-way classification (hedgers vs. nonhedgers). The 
evidence indicates that interest-rate hedgers have higher leverage and longer-term debt as 
compared with nonhedgers of interest-rate risk. In contrast, currency-price hedgers have lower 
leverage and shorter-term debt as compared with nonhedgers of currency-price risk. Leverage 
is positively correlated with interest-rate hedging and negatively correlated with currency-
SULFH KHGJLQJ 0LDQ¶V  HYLGHQFH KDV VKRZQ WKDW OXPSLQJ LQWHUHVW-rate hedging and 
currency-SULFH KHGJLQJ LQWR RQH EURDG FDWHJRU\ HVVHQWLDOO\ ³DYHUDJHV RXW´ WKH QHJDWLYH
correlation between leverage and currency-price hedging, and the positive correlation between 
leverage and interest-rate hedging.  
It could be concluded that the link between hedging and financial leverage supports the 
notion that hedging can reduce financing costs and it is also consistent with the predictions of 
Stulz (1996), who has argued that corporate hedging can be viewed as a technique that allows 
managers to substitute debt for equity. If financial distress is costly and if there is an 
advantage to having debt in the capital structure, hedging may be used as a means to increase 
debt capacity. As a result, a company's risk management policy should be made jointly with 
its financing policy. If hedging and financing policies are made jointly, evidence in the 
literature survey presented in this paper indicates that studies of corporate financing decisions 
need to consider corporate hedging policies as well. In particular, a company that faces 
relatively high costs of financing and hedges may choose the same capital structure as a firm 
with lower costs of financing that does not hedge. Without controlling for hedging, the 
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relation between capital structure and the determinants of the costs of financing will be 
missed.  
 
2.2.1.2 The Agency Cost of Debt 
 
 
Besides being in a position to know more about the firm's prospects than investors, 
management also sometimes has the power to take actions that transfer value from 
bondholders to shareholders. The first agency conflict considered is usually referred to as the 
underinvestment problem. Jensen and Smith (1985) have argued that when a substantial 
portion of the value of the firm is composed of future investment opportunities, a firm with 
outstanding risky bonds can have incentives to reject positive net present value projects if the 
benefit from accepting the project accrues to the bondholders. In this example, the manager of 
a levered firm has an incentive to limit the scale of investment because the additional returns 
from further investment accrue primarily to bondholders.  
The second agency conflict considered is usually referred to as the asset substitution 
problem, also known as the risk shifting problem, which is encountered by a corporation in 
selecting among mutually exclusive investment projects. Jensen and Smith (1985) have 
REVHUYHG WKDW WKH YDOXH RI WKH VWRFNKROGHUV¶ HTXLW\ ULVHV DQG WKH YDOXH RI WKH ERQGKROGHUV¶
claim is reduced when the firm substitutes high-risk for low-risk projects. Once a corporation 
has obtained debt financing, it is well known that by switching from a relatively safe 
investment project to a riskier one, the corporation can increase the value of its equity at the 
expense of its bondholders. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the residual 
claims of shareholders can be interpreted as a call option on the assets of the firm (see e.g.: 
Black and Scholes, 1973). The value of the option will increase as the underlying assets' 
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volatility increases. Thus management ± acting in the interests of shareholders ± will tend to 
prefer capital projects with volatile cash flow streams.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith and Warner (1979) have indicated 
that actions available to the firm after bonds are sold can reduce the value of the bonds. 
Unless protected against these forms of managerial opportunism, creditors can be expected to 
reduce the price they are willing to pay for the bonds. This reduction in price (or increase in 
required yield), necessary to compensate creditors for managerial opportunism and combined 
with the costs of writing and enforcing covenants, are collectively described by economists as 
WKH ³DJHQF\ FRVWV RI GHEW´ Some of these actions are prevented by provisions in debt 
covenants (Mayers and Smith, 1982; 1987). But it should be noted that debt covenants could 
be welfare-reducing as they limit the degree of management freedom and possibly obstruct 
the realisation of profitable yet risky investment alternatives.  
According to Dobson and Soenen (1993), there are three sound reasons based on agency 
costs why management should hedge corporate risk. First, hedging reduces uncertainty by 
smoothing the cash flow stream, thereby lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency 
cost is borne by management, assuming informational asymmetry between management and 
bondholders, hedging will increase the value of the firm. Therefore, management will 
rationally choose to hedge. Second, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow 
smoothing through risk hedging will tend to reduce the risk-shifting agency problem. Finally, 
hedging reduces the likelihood of financial distress and thereby increases duration of 
contractual relations between shareholders. By fostering corporate reputation acquisition, 
hedging contributes directly to the amelioration of the moral-hazard agency problem. 
MacMinn and Han (1990) have argued that, by smoothing cash flows, hedging will tend 
to ameliorate the risk-shifting agency problem. Thus the existing claimholders of the firm are 
motivated to include provisions in the debt contract limiting the opportunities to transfer 
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wealth from the bondholders. Debt indentures frequently contain covenants requiring the firm 
to maintain certain types of hedging activity. The analysis by Mayers and Smith (1982) 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVHSURYLVLRQVUHGXFHWKHLQFHQWLYHRIWKHILUP¶VRWKHUFODLPKROGHUVWRDFFHSW
certain risk-increasing negative net present value projects after the sale of the bond issue. 
6LQFH SRWHQWLDO ZHDOWK WUDQVIHUV IURP ERQGKROGHUV WR WKH ILUP¶V RWKHU FODLPKROGHUV DUH
increased the larger the fixed claims in the capital structure, Mayers and Smith (1982) have 
DUJXHG WKDW WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI LQFOXVLRQ RI KHGJLQJ FRYHQDQWV ZLOO LQFUHDVH ZLWK WKH ILUP¶V
debt/equity ratio. 
7KHQDWXUHRIWKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\VHWDIIHFWVWKHFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶V
fixed and residual claimholders. Myers (1977) has shown that issuance of claims with higher 
SULRULW\ WKDQ HTXLW\ VHQLRU FODLPV FUHDWHV LQFHQWLYHV IRU WKH ILUP¶V HTXLW\ KROGHUV WR
µµXQGHULQYHVW¶¶$SURILWDEOHSURMHFWPD\EHUHMHFWHGE\PDQDJHPHQWLIWKHH[SHFWHGSD\RIILV
sufficient to cover the cost of debt only, thus leaving no residual cash flow for shareholders. 
Hedging mitigates this problem by decreasing the number of states in which the firm would 
default on bond payments. Corporate risk management represents a means to eliminate or 
alleviate conflict of interests between debt holders and stockholders, and the associated 
welfare loss resulting from non-realised value-increasing investments by reducing the 
volatility of firm value.  
Bessembinder (1991) has shown that corporate hedging reduces incentives to underinvest, 
HIIHFWLYHO\ ERQGLQJ WKH ILUP¶V HTXLW\ KROGHUV WR XQGHUWDNH DGGLWLRQDO SRVLWLYH 139
investment. He has argued that the hedge shifts individual future states from default to 
nondefault outcomes, increasing the number of future states in which equity holders are the 
residual claimants. As a result, the sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment 
is reduced. Bessembinder (1991) also noted that the hedge results in equity holders receiving 
a larger proportion of the incremental benefits from new projects, which increases their 
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willingness to provide funds for additional capital investment, as well as increasing their 
value due to avoided agency costs.  
Minton and Schrand (1999) have also documented that companies with more cash flow 
variation have lower levels of investment and higher costs associated with external capital. 
They conclude that cash flow volatility can lead companies to underinvest. Haushalter, 
Randall and Lie (2002) have argued that equity values reflect this potential 
underinvestment. Their empirical tests have shown that the sensitivity of an oil producer's 
value to changes in oil price uncertainty is related to proxies for the likelihood that the producer 
will encounter costly market imperfections, such as financial distress and underinvestment. They 
conclude that by reducing the expected costs from these market imperfections, corporate risk 
management can increase shareholder value. MacMinn (1987) has shown that an appropriately 
selected insurance portfolio will increase the safety of debt and allow stockholders to capture 
all the additional returns from further investment. The model has shown that the corporation 
has an incentive to purchase insurance because it may eliminate or reduce the bankruptcy 
and/or agency costs.  
 
2.2.1.3 Capital Market Imperfections and Costly External Financing 
 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) have demonstrated how the reduction in expected bankruptcy cost 
GXH WR D ORZHU SUREDELOLW\ RI HQWHULQJ EDQNUXSWF\ FDQ LQFUHDVH WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH ceteris 
paribus. In addition, the lower probability of financial distress can help the firm make sales or 
invest in future profitable projects which would have otherwise been lost. Cash flow is crucial 
to the investment process, and the investment process is a key factor for corporate value 
creation. Cash flow can often be disrupted by movements in external factors such as exchange 
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UDWHVFRPPRGLW\SULFHV DQG LQWHUHVW UDWHVSRWHQWLDOO\FRPSURPLVLQJD FRPSDQ\¶VDELOLW\ WR
invest.  
This theory examines the role of capital market imperfections in determining the demand 
for corporate hedging. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing (debt and/or 
equity) is costly, firms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows 
to avoid a shortfall in their funds, which could precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets. 
An interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is that firms which have substantial 
growth opportunities and face high costs when raising funds under financial distress will have 
an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the average firm. This rationale has been 
explored by numerous scholars, among others by Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990), Shapiro and 
Titman (1998), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002). 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have accepted the basic paradigm of the financial 
GLVWUHVVPRGHOEXWWKH\UDWLRQDOLVHGWKHFRVWRIEDGRXWFRPHVE\UHIHUHQFHWR0\HUV¶7) 
debt overhang argument. In their model, external financing is more costly than internally 
generated funds due to numerous capital market imperfections (see: Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
These may include discrete transaction costs to obtain external financing, imperfect 
information as to the riskiness of the investment opportunities present in the firm, or the high 
cost of the potential future bankruptcy state. At the same time, the firm has an investment 
opportunity set which can be ordered in terms of net present value. The existence of the 
capital market imperfections results in underinvestment in some states, where internally 
generated funds fall short of the amount of new investment that would be profitable in the 
absence of these imperfections. Stated in another way, the volatility of profitability causes the 
firm to seek external financing to exploit investment opportunities when profits are low.  
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7KH FRVW RI VXFK H[WHUQDO ILQDQFH LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH LQWHUQDO IXQGV GXH WR WKH PDUNHW¶V
higher cost structure associated with the factors enumerated above. This, in return, reduces 
optimal investment in low profit states. The cost of volatility in such a model is the forgone 
investment in each period that the firm is forced to seek external funds. Recognising this 
outcome, the firm embarks upon volatility reducing strategies, which have the effect of 
reducing the variability of earnings. Hence, risk management is optimal in that it allows the 
firm to obtain the highest expected shareholder value. All else being equal, the more 
difficulty a company has in obtaining outside financing, the more costly a shortfall in cash 
flow will be and the greater is the value that hedging provides. Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) have supported this theory with reference to evidence offered by Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Scharfstein (1991) which presented evidence that internal cash flow is, in fact, correlated 
to corporate investment.  
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) have conducted empirical tests of the theory that 
shareholders of financially constrained firms can benefit from corporate risk management. 
Their analysis of 68 oil producers for the period 1992 to 1994 has shown that the point at 
which a company encounters a cash shortfall varies across firms according to firm-specific 
characteristics. For many firms, in particular those with stable cash flows, minimal financial 
obligations, and therefore significant financial flexibility, the expected costs of 
underinvestment and financial distress are trivial. However, firms with higher levels of 
financial leverage, and therefore decreased financial flexibility, face a greater likelihood of 
encountering the costs of market imperfections. Overall, their findings indicate that capital 
markets incorporate the anticipated costs from cash flow variability into stock prices. These 
findings also support Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Mello 
and Parsons (2000), who suggested that the benefits that shareholders realise from reducing 
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cash flow variability by managing risks are associated with the likelihood that the firm will 
encounter underinvestment or bankruptcy.   
The Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) results complement and extend the findings of 
other corporate risk management studies. Specifically, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (1999) and Haushalter (2000) show that companies that are more likely 
to face market imperfections manage risks more extensively. The Haushalter, Randall and Lie 
(2002) results indicate that these are the types of companies that can realise the greatest 
benefits from reducing cash flow uncertainty. Therefore, in a broad sense, observed risk 
management policies are consistent with shareholder value maximisation.  
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) conducted a research on the 372 of the Fortune 500 
nonfinancial firms in 1990 and proven the hypothesis that hedging is used to reduce 
variability in the level of investments. They have found that firms with greater growth 
opportunities and tighter financial constraints (low accessibility to internal and external 
financing) are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result is consistent with the notion 
that firms use derivatives to reduce the variation in cash flows or earnings that might 
otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities. This result was 
confirmed by Allayannis and Ofek (2001) as well. Their study has proven that, similarly to 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), firms with larger R&D expenditures are more likely to 
use currency derivatives.  
A study by Gay and Nam (1998) has utilised better proxies for corporate investments in 
comparison with Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and employed a more rigorous 
methodology for studying the relationship between financial derivatives and the 
underinvestment problem. Their results have provided strong support for the hypothesis that 
corporate hedging activity is carried out to minimise the underinvestment problem. Gay and 
Nam (1998) have found that firms with enhanced investment opportunity sets increase their 
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use of derivatives as their levels of internally generated cash decline. They also show that 
when internally generated cash flows are positively correlated with investment opportunities, 
firms use fewer derivatives. The Gay and Nam (1998) results clearly support the shareholder 
value maximisation hypothesis. These results indicate that firms act in a manner consistent 
with the predictions of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) ± minimising the underinvestment 
problem. 
Risk managers spend much of their time examining the factors that cause cash flows to 
fluctuate. This is important work, since low cash flows may throw budgets into disarray, 
distract managers from productive work, defer capital expenditure or delay debt repayments. 
By avoiding these deadweight losses, risk managers can rightly claim they add to shareholder 
value. Consistent with this claim that cash flow volatility is costly, Minton and Schrand 
(1999) have documented that cash flow volatility is associated both with lower investment 
and with higher costs of accessing external capital. They have shown that higher cash flow 
volatility is associated with lower average levels of investment in capital expenditures, R&D, 
and advertising. This association suggests that firms do not use external capital markets to 
fully cover cash flow shortfalls, but rather permanently forgo investment.  
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Lamont (1997) all found a negative relation between annual 
investment levels and liquidity, but could not distinguish whether firms with volatile cash 
flows time their investment decisions to match internal cash flow realisations or actually 
decrease their overall level of investment. Opposite to them, the findings of Minton and 
Schrand (1999) have revealed a negative relation between volatility, measured over a period, 
and the average level of investment measured over the same period, suggesting that firms that 
experience shortfalls ultimately forgo investment.  
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Another perspective related to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) pertains to the Myers 
and Majluf (1984) ''pecking order" concept of financing. Hedging, by its ability to decrease the 
variability of cash flow, enables the firm to reduce the number of states of nature where it 
must obtain external financing (and thus hedging can help avoid sending a potentially negative 
signal to external investors). It is also important to note that although firms facing binding 
financial constraints can benefiW IURP KHGJLQJ UHGXFLQJ ILUPV¶ GHSHQGHQFH RQ WKH FDSLWDO
market does not automatically translate into an increase in shareholder wealth. In fact, Tufano 
(1998) has pointed out that hedging can lead to overinvestment. If hedging enables managers 
to take on projects without facing scrutiny from the capital markets, it can enable managers to 
ILQDQFH SURMHFWV WKDW EHQHILW PDQDJHUV EXW UHGXFH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK 7XIDQR  KDV
concluded that, although firms facing financial constraints hedge more extensively, this 
relation does not imply that hedging increases shareholder value.  
 
2.2.1.4 Taxes 
 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that the structure of the tax code can make it 
beneficial for firms to take positions in futures, forward, or option markets. If a firm's 
effective tax function is linear (the firm faces a constant effective marginal tax rate), its 
expected tax liability is unaffected by the volatility of taxable income. But if effective 
marginal corporate tax rates are an increasing function of the corpRUDWLRQ¶VSUH-tax value, or to 
put it differently, if a firm faces a convex tax function, then the after-tax value of the firm is a 
concave function of its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, 
then the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the firm is 
increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the effective long-run 
average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported earnings will enhance 
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shareholder value. The more convex the effective tax schedule is, the greater is the reduction 
in expected taxes.  
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have argued that the logic of this thesis is straight-
forward - convexity implies that a more volatile earnings stream leads to higher expected 
taxes than a less volatile earnings stream. Convexity in the tax function is quite plausible for 
some firms, particularly those which face a significant probability of negative earnings and 
are unable to carry forward 100 per cent of their tax losses to subsequent periods. 
Statutory progressivity causes the tax schedule to be convex. In addition to statutory 
progressivity, tax preference items (for example, tax loss carry forwards, foreign tax credits, 
and investment tax credits) also make the effective tax schedule convex (Zimmerman, 1988). 
Tax preference items, which are subtracted from pre-tax income, indirectly create convexity 
in the tax liability (concavity in a firm value), because the present value of unused preference 
items decreases as they are carried forward to future periods. Reducing variance through 
hedging increases the expected value of tax benefits because the probability of using 
SUHIHUHQFHLWHPVLQFUHDVHVZLWKWKHOHYHORIDILUP¶VWD[DEOHLQFRPH7KHWD[ code generally 
VSHFLILHV WKDW LI WKH ILUP¶V SUHWD[ LQFRPH IDOOV EHORZ D FHUWDLQ OHYHO WKH YDOXH RI WD[
preference items is reduced by either the loss of the tax shield or postponement of its use 
(Gurel and Pyle, 1984). Hence, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have concluded that the 
tax benefit is greater if the firm has more tax preference items. 
Graham and Smith (1996) have used simulation methods in their paper to investigate 
convexity induced by tax-code provisions. The authors have explored how uncertainty 
about future taxable income interacts with major provisions of the tax code, including 
statutory progressivity, tax-loss carry-backs and carry-forwards, inves tment tax credits, and 
the alternative minimum tax. From their analysis of more than 80,000 COMPUSTAT 
firm-year observations, they found that in approximately 50 per cent of the cases, 
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corporations face convex effective tax functions and thus have tax-based incentives to 
hedge. In approximately 25 per cent of the cases, firms face linear tax functions. The 
remaining firms face concave effective tax functions (which provide a tax-based 
disincentive to hedge). Among the analysed firms facing convex tax functions, roughly one-
quarter of the firms have potential tax savings from hedging that appear material - in 
extreme cases exceeding 40 per cent of the expected tax liability. For the remaining 
firms, the tax savings are fairly small - average tax savings from a five percent reduction in 
the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 per cent of expected tax liabilities base. 
Applied methods also allowed Graham and Smith (1996) to break down the basic 
structure of the tax code to examine the incremental impact of statutory progressivity, 
net operating loss, carry-backs and carry-forwards,  investment tax credits, the alternative 
minimum tax, and uncertainty in taxable income. They found that much of the convexity 
is induced by the asymmetric treatment of profits and losses in the tax code. Carry-back 
and carry-forward provisions effectively allow firms to smooth their losses, thereby 
reducing tax-function curvature at its most convex points and making the function 
convex over a broader range of taxable income. In contrast, the alternative minimum tax 
and investment tax credits have only a modest effect on the convexity of the tax function. 
Mayers and Smith (1982) have proven that firms with more convex tax schedules (e.g., due to 
large tax loss carry-forwards or very low net income) are more likely to engage in hedging 
activities. The evidence in MiDQ¶V VWXG\  LVPL[HGZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKHK\SRWKHVLV WKDW
hedging decisions are motivated by tax saving strategies. Consistent with the tax hypotheses, 
Mian has found the incidence of foreign tax credit (as a proxy for tax shield) to be generally 
associated with a higher likelihood of hedging. Inconsistent with the tax hypothesis, there is 
no robust relation between hedging and the incidence of progressivity in the tax schedule, and 
between hedging and the incidence of tax loss carry forwards.  
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It could be argued that, when judging the importance of the magnitude of the potential tax 
benefits, for firms with convex effective tax functions, the tax savings of hedging are not 
mutually exclusive from the hedging benefits of controlling underinvestment problems, increased 
debt capacity, or reduced agency cost of various classes of the firm's claimholders. Thus, the 
total benefit of hedging is the sum across these motives. Therefore, with the appropriate 
choice of hedging instruments, a firm can simultaneously manage the impact on its value, 
reported income, and taxable income.  
 
2.2.2 Managerial Utility Maximisation Hypothesis 
   
Shareholders hire managers because they have specialised knowledge and skills that 
increase the value of the firm. Managers cannot use their expertise unless they have some 
discretion in the choice of their actions. Yet it should be emphasised that, unless faced with 
proper incentives, managers will not maximise shareholder wealth. Firm managers have 
limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth position, associated with stock holdings 
and their career earnings from their own employment position. Therefore managers prefer 
stability to volatility because, other things being equal, such stability improves their own 
wealth, at little or no expense to other stakeholders. To avoid this problem, the managerial 
compensation contract must be designed in such a way that, when managers increase the 
value of the firm, they also increase their own expected utility. 
This rationale was first proposed by Stulz (1984). This argument can be traced back to the 
literature on the theory of agency. In this area, the relationship between firm performance and 
managerial remuneration is clearly developed in such papers as Ross (1973). Ross (1973) has 
argued that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, called 
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an agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, called a principal, in a 
particular domain of decision problems. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) have discussed the conflict of interest 
between the owners and the managers of a corporation. They assume that the contracting 
parties form rational expectations and seek to maximise their individual expected utilities 
within the effective constraints implied by their contracts. Thus conflicts of interests arise 
among the contracting parties whenever discretionary behaviour is authorised. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) demonstrated that incentives exist to write contracts which maximise the 
current market value of the firm. Conflicts of interest between the owners and the managers 
can provide a basis for the corporate demand for hedging.  
Amihud and Lev (1981) have argued that two versions of motive for corporate risk 
reduction exist. In the first one, managers seek to reduce the probability of bankruptcy in 
order to enhance their job security and preserve their investment in firm-specific human 
FDSLWDO)RUH[DPSOHWKHPDQDJHU¶VZRUNLQJOLIHLVOLPLWHGZKLOHWKHFRUSRUDWHIRUPJLYHVWKH
firm an indefinite life. This difference in time horizons produces an incentive conflict. The 
second version of the agency motive for corporate risk reduction maintains that if risk-averse 
managers are compensated on the basis of their firm's earnings, they prefer a stable earnings 
VWUHDP7KHPDQDJHU¶VFODLPRQWKHILUPKDVDOLIHZKLFKLVUHODWHGWRWKHOLIHRIKLVMRE,IKLV
compensation package includes a bonus based on reported earnings, postponing selected 
expenditures until after retirement can increase his expected compensation. In this context, 
Holmstrom (1979) has discussed that managers may take a variety of risk reducing actions at 
the expense of shareholders.  
$ PDQDJHU¶V EHKDYLRXU LV SUHGLFWDEOH DQG ZLOO EH DQWLFLSDWHG E\ WKH RZQHUV RI WKH
corporation, therefore his overall compensation is going to be adjusted to reflect the 
PDQDJHU¶V DQWLFLSDWHG DFWLRQV %HFDXVH WKH DGMXVWPHQW ZLOO LQFOXGH DQWLFLSDWHG DYRLGDEOH
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costs, managers have incentives to make believable promises not to engage in these activities 
by allowing monitoring and offering to bond their actions (Mayers and Smith, 1982). In both 
versions, the agency problem arises because managers care about total risk (systematic risk as 
well as business risk). Shareholders, however, care only about the systematic component of 
total risk, since they can diversify their portfolios to compensate for business risk.  
Fatemi and Luft (2002) have argued that, under such conditions, the managerial risk 
aversion hypothesis predicts that the managers will engage in full cover hedging. That is, they 
will attempt to eliminate deviations below, as well as those above the mean of the probability 
GLVWULEXWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V QHW FDVK IORZV 7KLV SDWWHUQ RI ULVN PDQDJHPHQW PD\ EH IXUWKHU
strengthened by managerial compensation schemes that encourage the achievements of static 
performance targets. Therefore, the managerial risk aversion hypothesis assumes that risk 
PDQDJHPHQW VWUDWHJLHV DUH LPSOHPHQWHG SULQFLSDOO\ WR HQKDQFH WKH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V
management. This brings into focus the agency costs arising from the conflicts between 
management and shareholders. In analysing this problem, it should be emphasised that full 
cover hedging eliminates desirable (upper tail) outcomes as well as all the undesirable (lower 
tail) oXWFRPHV$VVXFKIXOOFRYHUKHGJLQJGRHVQRWHQKDQFHWKHILUP¶VRUVKDUHKROGHUYDOXH
The benefits derived from it accrue only to the management. In its extreme form, Fatemi and 
Luft (2002) have emphasised that the full cover hedging can be used to protect the 
management at the expense of the shareholder.  
6PLWKDQG6WXO]KDYHFODLPHGWKDWPDQDJHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQSODQVFDQLQIOXHQFH
their hedging choices. Specifically, the incorporation of option-OLNHSURYLVLRQVLQPDQDJHUV¶
compensation increases the incentives for managers to take risks. The expected utility of 
PDQDJHULDO ZHDOWK KDV WKH VKDSH RI D FRQYH[ IXQFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V H[SHFWHG SURILWV ZKHQ
managers own unexercised options. Therefore, they have concluded that the more option-
like features there are in the compensation plans, the less managers will hedge.  In this case, 
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managers can choose to increase the risk of the firm in order to increase the value of their 
options. For instance, bonus plans that make a payment to managers only if accounting 
earnings exceed some target number will induce managers to hedge less since this payment is 
a convex function of accounting earnings. Results of some empirical studies have confirmed 
this hypothesis (e.g., see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. However, it will generally not be efficient to 
eliminate all incentives to hedge. While presenting the shareholder maximisation hypothesis 
in previous sections of our thesis, it has been shown that hedging is a value-increasing 
strategy. Moreover, a compensation plan that eliminates all hedging incentives would be 
costly to negotiate and implement. 
Smith anG6WXO]¶V SUHGLFWLRQ LV FRQILUPHG E\ 7XIDQR  ZKR H[DPLQHG FRPPRGLW\
hedging activities in the gold mining industry on the sample of the 48 North American gold 
PLQHV +H KDV IRXQG WKDW ILUPV¶ XVH RI FRPPRGLW\ GHULYDWLYHV LV QHJDWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH
number of options their managers and directors hold, and positively related to the value of 
their stock holdings. This evidence is consistent with theories of managerial risk aversion, but 
such use of derivatives may not add to the value of a firm. One must be careful not to over-
interpret the results of a single-industry study of a few dozen observations per year. With this 
LQ PLQG 7XIDQR¶V  VWXG\ KDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW ULVN PDQDJHPHQW SUDFWLFHV LQ WKH JROG
mining industry appear to be associated with both firm and managerial characteristics, 
although theories of managerial risk aversion seem more informative than those of 
shareholder value maximisation.  
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric information, is put 
forward by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who focus on 
PDQDJHUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQV 7KH\ KDYH DUJXHG WKDW PDQDJHUV PD\ SUHIHU WR HQJDJH LQ ULVN
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management so as to better communicate their skills to the labour market. Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have argued that younger executives are 
more willing to embrace new concepts like risk management, than are their older colleagues. 
Managerial tenure might play a similar role, because it is possible that short-tenure financial 
managers would have less developed reputations than longer-tenure managers. Therefore, 
they would have an incentive to signal their quality through hedging. To the extent these 
assumptions are correct, firms with younger managers and those whose managers have shorter 
tenures on the job would be more willing to manage risk.  
Contrary to the Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) predictions regarding the managers 
WHQXUH0D\KDVDUJXHGWKDWPDQDJHUV¶\HDUVZLWKWKHILUPVKRXOGEHQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHG
to the firm risk characteristics, therefore creating a greater incentive to hedge. This is because 
managerial skills become more firm-specific as time spent with the firm increases. May 
(1995) has assumed that, if diversification reduces human capital risk, firms whose managers 
have more years vested are more likely to pursue hedging strategies.  
Tufano (1996) has tested these assumptions and found that there is no meaningful 
relationship between CEO and CFO age and the extent of risk management activity, except a 
negative relationship between CFO age and risk management. The lack of association 
between age and risk management might be the result of age acting as a factor that influences 
both risk aversion and predilection to use sophisticated financial instruments. However, the 
association of tenure with risk management is stronger. Tufano (1996) has proven that firms 
whose CFOs have fewer years in their current job are more likely to engage in greater risk 
management activities, confirming the hypothesis that newer executives are more willing to 
engage in risk management activities than are their counterparts with long-tenures.  
Thus, the results can be seen as consistent with the Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) 
theory. However, their model would seem to apply to CEOs as well as CFOs ± the finding 
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that the tenure of the CEO is not related to the level of risk management is a warning not to 
over-LQWHUSUHWWKHVHUHVXOWV+RZHYHU7XIDQR¶VILQGLQJVXSSRUWVWKHJHQHUDOFRQWHQWLRQ
that managerial motives may be relevant in creating corporate risk management policy. On 
the other hand, the result could also reflect the fact that firms wishing to implemen financial 
risk management tend to hire new financial managers who are skilled in the appropriate tools 
and techniques. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
7KHUHOHYDQFHRIFRUSRUDWHULVNPDQDJHPHQWIXQFWLRQDQGLWVLQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
value, as well the theoretical rationales for hedging and their empirical implications were 
presented in this chapter. For a long time it was believed that corporate risk management is 
irrelevant to the value of the firm and the arguments in favour of the irrelevance were based on 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). One of the most important 
implications of the CAPM is that diversified shareholders should care only about the 
systematic component of total risk, which leads to the conclusion that managers of firms 
who are acting in the best interests of shareholders should be indifferent about hedging of 
risks that are unsystematic. Business risk management is unnecessary from the perspective of 
the CAPM, and if the design and execution of such hedging strategies are costly, it would seem 
that these activities would not be in the interests of diversified shareholders (Shapiro and 
Titman, 1998). 
Miller and Modigliani's "M&M" proposition supports CAPM findings due to a argument 
that, in the "frictionless" M&M framework, management cannot increase a firm's value by 
changing either capital structure or hedging policy. These are purely financial transactions 
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WKDWGRQRWDIIHFWWKHYDOXHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VRSHUDWLQJDVVHWVThe conditions underlying the the 
M&M propositions also imply that decisions to hedge corporate exposures to interest rates, 
exchange rates and commodity prices are completely irrelevant because stockholders already 
protect themselves against such risks by holding well-diversified portfolios.  
However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging activities that 
are directed at the reduction of unsystematic risk. In the real world, financial managers and 
treasurers give a great deal of thought to matters of capital structure and securities design. 
Additionally, the corporate use of derivatives in hedging interest rate, currency, and 
commodity price risks is widespread and growing. It has only been for two decades that both 
scholars and practitioners have realised that managing corporate risk lies at the heart of a 
competitive corporate strategy, and that the management of corporate risk is central to 
organisational evolution. 
As an explanation for this clash between theory and practice, imperfections in the capital 
market are used to argue for the relevance of corporate risk management function. It is well 
known that the M&M propositions were intended to hold only under a restrictive set of 
conditions, the most important of which are that there are no costs associated with bankruptcy 
or financial distress, no taxes or transactions costs, that corporate investment decisions are not 
influenced by financing choices, including decisions to hedge various price risks, that reliable 
information about the firm's future earnings prospects is costlessly available to all investors 
and managers alike, and that individuals and firms have equal access to all security markets, 
including the ability to issue identical securities on the same terms (Culp, 1994). 
Based on seminal work by Mayers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate demand 
for insurance, researchers such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Shapiro and 
Titman (1998) have examined why large, diversified firms actively engage in hedging 
activities. These authors argued that the earlier theories are applicable to individuals and 
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small, closely held firms but could not be used as a solid theoretical rationale for hedging by 
large corporations. The authors demonstrated several theories of hedging which overcome the 
irrelevancy arguments of modern portfolio and corporate finance theory. Most of these 
theories rely on the introduction of some frictions into the M&M model, and argue that 
market imperfections enable firms to add value through hedges that cannot be exactly 
duplicated by individual investors.  
The first theory suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease 
the costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1984; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998). In the MM world, financial distress is assumed to be 
costless. Hence, altering the probability of financial distress does not affect firm value. If 
financial distress is costly, firms have incentives to reduce its probability, and hedging is one 
method by which a firm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing the variance of a 
ILUP¶V FDVK IORZV RU DFFRXQWLQJ SURILWV KHGJLQJ GHFUHDVHV WKH SUREDELOLW\ DQG WKXV WKH
expected costs, of financial distress. Additionally, Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that, 
while the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm value, it augments shareholder 
YDOXHHYHQIXUWKHUE\VLPXOWDQHRXVO\UDLVLQJWKHILUP¶VSRWHQWLDOWRFDUU\GHEW&RUSRUDWHULVN
management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a higher optimal debt ratio, 
and the tax shields of the additional debt capital further increase the value of the firm. This 
theory has been empirically proven by, among others, Campbell and Kracaw (1987), 
Bessembinder (1991), Dolde (1995), Mian (1996) and Haushalter (2000).  
The second theory suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can 
decrease agency costs (see: Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Dobson and Soenen 
(1993) there are three sound reasons based on agency costs why management should hedge 
corporate risk. First, hedging reduces uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow stream, thereby 
lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency cost is borne by management, assuming 
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informational asymmetry between management and bondholders, hedging will increase the 
value of the firm. Therefore, management will rationally choose to hedge. Second, given the 
existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing through exchange risk hedging will tend to 
reduce the risk-shifting as well as the underinvestment problems (see: Jensen and Smith, 
1985). Finally, hedging reduces the probability of financial distress and thereby increases the 
duration of contractual relations between shareholders. By fostering the acquisition of 
corporate reputation, hedging contributes directly to the amelioration of the moral-hazard 
agency problem. The results of MacMinn (1987), MacMinn and Han (1990), Bessembinder 
(1991), Minton and Schrand (1999) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) support this 
hedging rationale.  
Another theory that focuses on risk management as a means to maximise shareholder 
value argue that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease expected taxes.  
This rationale is put forward by Smith and Stulz (1985), who have argued that the structure of 
the tax code can make it beneficial for firms to take positions in futures, forward, or option 
markets. If a firm faces a convex tax function, then the after-tax value of the firm is a concave 
function of its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, then the 
expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the firm is increased, as 
long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the effective long-run average tax 
rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported earnings will enhance shareholder value. 
The more convex the effective tax schedule is, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. 
This rationale has been supported by Zimmerman (1988), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996) and Graham and Smith (1996).  
In addition, reducing cash flow volatility can improve the probability of having sufficient 
internal funds for planned investments eliminating the need either to cut profitable projects or 
bear the transaction costs of obtaining external funding. The main hypothesis is that, if access 
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to external financing (debt and/or equity) is costly, firms with investment projects requiring 
funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their funds, which could precipitate 
a costly visit to the capital markets. An interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is 
that firms which have substantial growth opportunities and face high costs when raising funds 
under financial distress will have an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the 
average firm. This rationale has been explored by numerous scholars, among others by Smith 
and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1998), Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Scharfstein (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Graham and Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand (1999), 
Haushalter (2000), Mello and Parsons (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, 
Randall and Lie (2002). 
Another line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders value maximisation 
hypothesis refers to the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. It this chapter it has been 
DUJXHG WKDW D ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV KDYH OLPLWHG DELOLW\ WR GLYHUVLI\ WKHLU RZQ SHUsonal wealth 
SRVLWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVWRFNKROGLQJVDQGWKHLUHDUQLQJV¶FDSLWDOLVDWLRQ7KHUHIRUHWKH\ZLOO
have an incentive to hedge their own wealth at the expense of the shareholders. Usually that 
kind of hedging is not conducted to improve the valuHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNKROGHUVEXWWR
LPSURYH WKH PDQDJHUV¶ RZQ ZHDOWK 7R DYRLG WKLV SUREOHP PDQDJHULDO FRPSHQVDWLRQ
contracts must be designed so that when managers increase the value of the firm, they also 
increase their expected utility. This can usually be obtained by adding option-like provisions 
to managerial contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been 
further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). The results of some empirical studies have 
confirmed this hypothesis (e.g. see: Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that 
corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. 
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A different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric information, has been 
presented by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who have 
IRFXVHGRQPDQDJHUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQV ,QERWKRI WKHVHPRGHOV LW LV DUJXHG WKDWPDQDJHUVPD\
prefer to engage in risk management activities in order to better communicate their skills to 
the labour market. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have 
argued that younger executives and those with shorter tenures have less developed reputations 
than older and longer-tenure managers. Therefore, they are more willing to embrace new 
concepts like risk management with the intention of signalling their management quality. 
In this chapter we have also argued that the choice of a risk management strategy depends 
to a great extent on the information available to the financial manager regarding the future 
expectations of commodity price, interest rates and exchange rate movements (e.g. see: 
Working, 1962; March and Shapira, 1987; Stulz, 1996; Miller and Reuer, 1996). Efficient risk 
management does not imply minimisation of all the risks that a corporation is exposed to by 
forming a perfect hedge. It implies the choice of a strategy that will allow a company to 
protect its cash flow from severe outcomes, while leaving a possibility of realising extra 
HDUQLQJVWKRXJKILQDQFLDOSULFHFKDQJHVWKDWKDVSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZV
Companies which have a competitive advantage in collecting information and which leave 
certain risky positions open could increase their value due to a strategy of selective risk 
management.  
We have concluded that corporate risk management can be conducted in two rather 
distinct ways. Either the company can embark upon a diversification strategy in the portfolio 
of businesses operated by the firm, or the company can engage in financial transactions that 
will have a similar effect. However, diversification based upon conglomerate activity, while 
once a popular strategy, has fallen out of favour. During the 1950s and 1960s many 
corporations undertook massive diversification programs. In a few decades the trend has 
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reversed, with a study by Comment and Jarrell (1995) documenting and confirming a return to 
specialisation. This push toward focus apparently resulted from the evidence that unrelated 
diversification actually decreases firm value (see: Myerson, 1982; Harris, Kriebel and Raviv, 
1982; Stulz, 1990; Jensen, 1986; 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Berger and Ofek, 1995). In 
addition to using diversification strategies, a firm could manage its risk exposure through 
operational hedging. Operational hedging is a way of conducting a multinational 
diversification strategy, which provides a reason for direct foreign investment by firms, and 
may further explain the existence of multinational firms with production facilities at several 
foreign locations (Chowdhry and Howe, 1999).   
In the place of diversification strategy and operational hedging, firms, concerned about the 
volatility of earnings, have turned to the financial markets, due to the fact that the financial 
markets have developed more direct approaches to risk management that transcend the need 
to directly invest in activities that reduce volatility. The task of managing corporate risks has 
been facilitated by the increasing availability of a variety of instruments to transfer financial 
price risks to other parties. Allen and Santomero (1998) have written that, during the 1980s and 
1990s, commercial and investment banks have introduced a broad selection of new products 
designed to help corporate managers in handling financial risks. At the same time, the 
derivatives exchanges, which successfully introduced interest rate and currency derivatives in the 
1970s, have become vigorous innovators, continually adding new products, refining existing 
ones, and finding new ways to increase liquidity. Markets for derivative instruments such as 
forwards and futures, swaps and options, and innovative combinations of these basic financial 
instruments, have developed and grown at a breathtaking pace, and many corporations have 
become active participants in derivatives markets. Since then, the range and quality of both 
exchange-traded and OTC derivatives, together with the depth of the market for such 
instruments, have expanded intensively.  
 81 
It should be also noted that, instead of managing risk through hedging, firms could pursue 
alternative financial policies, XVXDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDV³KHGJHVXEVWLWXWHV´ZKLFK can also reduce 
DILUP¶VULVNZLWKRXWUHTXLULQJWKHILUPWRGLUHFWO\HQJDJHLQULVNPDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHV Firms 
could adopt conservative financial policies (e.g.: low leverage, low dividend pay-out ratio, 
large cash balances) to protect them against potential hardship (see: Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1993; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Pulvino, 1998; Harford, 1999). 
6WUXFWXUHG GHEW DV ZHOO DV SUHIHUUHG VWRFN FDQ EH VHHQ DV DQRWKHU H[DPSOH RI ³KHGJH
VXEVWLWXWHV´ VHH 6PLWK DQG 6WXO]  6PLWKVRQ DQG &KHZ  Nance, Smith and 
Smithson, 1993; Culp, 1994). In studies presented in this chapter it has been argued that the 
likelihood of the firm employing off-balance-sheet hedging instruments is lower the more 
hedging substitutes are employed by a company.  
On the basis of the presented arguments that arise from the literature survey, we have 
created our research hypothesis. We have tested whether the decision to hedge or not, and the 
decision to hedge with derivatives made by Croatian and Slovenian non-financial companies, 
is a function of six factors ± financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility maximisation and hedge 
substitutes. We have also tested the assumption that corporate risk management is more 
developed or has different rationales among Slovenian than among Croatian companies. In 
addition, the thesis has explored which hedging strategies and instruments are employed in 
order to give a consistent view of existing practices of corporate risk management in the 
analysed Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence on empirical implications of 
hedging theories and practices is presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we provide a review of the methodology used in the most recent empirical 
studies conducted on corporate risk management, as well as the methodology of our research. 
The methodology review is presented in a way that follows our research hypothesis. The 
different variables used as proxies to test the research hypothesis in the analysed papers are 
presented in section 3.2. This review has helped us to create our own set of variables which is 
presented in section 3.3, where we also explain the limitations we had in creating our research 
variables due to data unavailability.  
The analysis of variables is followed by section 3.4, where a review of the sampling 
process and data collection together with the econometric and statistical analysis used in the 
previous studies is presented in sub-section 3.4.1. This again was a base for the econometric 
analysis conducted in our thesis which is presented in sub-section 3.4.2. In the univariate 
analysis, we have employed t-test to determine whether the means of two unrelated samples 
differ. Additionally, we have conducted the Pearson test of correlation because variables in 
the model are of an interval/ratio nature (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The analysis was 
conducted for two different groups. In the first group, we have explored differences between a 
sub-sample of hedgers and nonhedgers, while in the second group we investigated differences 
between companies that are derivative users and those companies that do not use derivatives. 
In the multivariate analysis, we have chosen binomial (or binary) logistic regression 
because it is a form of regression which is used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy 
(limited, discrete and not continuous) and the independents are of any type. With a categorical 
dependent variable, discriminant function analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors 
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are continuous and nicely distributed; logit analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors 
are categorical; while logistic regression is chosen if the predictor variables are a mix of 
continuous and categorical variables and/or if they are not nicely distributed (logistic 
regression makes no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables) (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 1989; Rice, 1994; Allison, 1999; Menard, 2002). In our logistic model we 
have tested if the decision to hedge or not, as well as the decision to hedge with derivatives, is 
a function of the six factors - financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market 
imperfections, taxes, managerial utility, and hedge substitutes. 
Finally, the data description and the process of collecting research data are presented in 
section 3.5. Here we explain the sampling process for Croatia and Slovenia. Both samples 
contain the largest non-financial companies, and criteria for selecting companies in the 
samples were similar for both countries. Empirical research was conducted on the large non-
financial companies due to the fact that these companies have access to derivatives markets 
and should have developed risk management function. Financial firms were excluded from 
the sample because most of them are also market makers, hence their motivation in using 
derivatives may be different from the motivations of non-financial firms. We also explain the 
data collecting process. Data were collected from two sources: from annual reports and notes 
to the financial statements for the fiscal year 2005, and through the survey. In our research we 
have relied more on the survey data than on the annual reports for several reasons, which are 
also explained in section 3.5. We conclude the chapter with section 3.6.  
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3.2 Variables Used in the Analysed Literature 
 
3.2.1 Shareholder Maximisation Hypothesis 
 
3.2.1.1 Cost of Financial Distress 
 
 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have used two measures of borrowing capacity as 
SUR[LHV IRU D ILUP¶VSUHKHGJLQJSUREDELOLW\RI ILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV WKH LQWHUest coverage ratio, 
and the long-term debt ratio defined as the book value of the long-term debt divided by the 
PDUNHWYDOXHRIDVVHWV7KH\KDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKHORZHUDILUP¶VFRYHUDJHUDWLRDQGWKHKLJKHU
its long-term debt ratio, the greater is the probability of financial distress. To check the 
robustness of the results obtained by using long-term debt as a proxy for financial distress, 
they have used another measure - DILUP¶V6WDQGDUG	3RRU¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJ7KLVPHDVXUHKDGD
dichotomous nature and was scaled one if a firm had credit rating grade and zero otherwise. 
+DXVKDOWHU  KDV HPSOR\HG WZR PHDVXUHV IRU WKH GHJUHH RI D ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO
leverage: 1) the ratio of the book value of short-term and long-term debt to the market value 
of assets (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, have used the same measure in their study), and 2) the 
book value of short-term and long-term debt to the book value of assets. The results of 
analysis were qualitatively similar when he used these alternative measures. Allayannis and 
:HVWRQKDYHPHDVXUHGILUP¶VOHYHUDJHDVDUDWLRRIWKHORQJ-term debt scaled by the 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ HTXLW\ +R\W DQG .KDQJ  KDYH HPSOR\HG WKH GHEW-to-equity ratio 
calculated as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the long-term debt and 
market value of equity.  
Shapiro and Titman (1998) have extended the cost of financial distress to include the 
deterioration of valuable relationship with buyers and suppliers who value long-term access to 
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the firm. To measure the relative likelihood of financial distress, Tufano (1996) has collected 
GDWDRQILUPV¶FDVKFRVWVDQGOHYHUDJH$VDSUR[\IRUFDVKFRVWVKHKDVWDNHQWKHSHU-ounce 
costs of producing gold, excluding non-cash items as well as financing costs. Leverage has 
been measured as the book value of debt dividend by the total market value of financial 
claims (market value of equity plus book value of preferred stock and debt). He has predicted 
the positive relationship between the decision to manage risk and both cash costs and 
leverage. 
Mian (1996) has computed leverage as the year-end ratio of the book value of debt to the 
sum of market value of common equity and the book value of preferred equity. Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993) have employed two variables to measure leverage WKH ILUP¶VGHEW-
size ratio computed as the ratio of the book value of long-WHUPGHEWWRDILUP¶VVL]HPHDVXUHG
E\WKHVXPRIWKHERRNYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VGHEWSOXVWKHPDUNHWYDOXHRILWVHTXLW\DQGWKH
coverage of fixed claims computed as earnings before interest and taxes to the total interest 
expense. The first measure is predicted to be positively related to the decision to hedge, and 
the second one is predicted to be negatively related, meaning that firms with a higher debt-
size ratio and smaller interest cover will have more incentives to hedge.  
Tufano (1996) and Hoyt and Khang (2000) have employed a regulation in different 
industry sectors as a proxy for the incentive contracting hypothesis which predicts that 
hedging is less likely in the regulated utilities industries (e.g. firms in electric, gas, and 
sanitary services), due to the fact that regulation makes it easier for fixed claim holders to 
observe managerial action. As a consequence, the authors have predicted that firms in 
regulated industries face lower contracting costs and, therefore, they have less of an incentive 
to hedge. In both studies, a dummy variable was employed to indicate whether the firm is 
included in the utility industry. 
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3.2.1.2 The Agency Cost of Debt 
 
 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have used two proxies to measure informational 
asymmetry: the percentage of institutional ownership of the sample firms, and the number of 
investment firms with analysts following the sample firms. They have predicted that that a 
larger analyst following and a greater share of ownership by institutional investors are 
positively related to the availability of information, and thus negatively related to the 
SUREDELOLW\ RI KHGJLQJ +DXVKDOWHU  KDV HPSOR\HG D ILUP¶V 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU¶V FUHGLW
rating to test whether firms are facing fewer informational asymmetries due to the fact that 
they have undergone more capital market scrutiny. He has predicted that firms with a credit 
rating hedge less extensively. 
&RVWVDOVRSOD\D UROH LQD ILUP¶VGHFLVLon to hedge. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
have argued that firms for which external financing is more costly would be more likely to 
use risk management. It is reasonable to predict that informational asymmetries or transaction 
costs for small firms are greater than for larger ones ± at least for financial activities. 
Therefore, theory predicts a negative relation between firm size and the decision to hedge. 
Tufano (1996) has measured firm size using two proxies: 1) the total market value of financial 
claims (market value of equity plus the book value of debt and preferred stock), and 2) the 
number of ounces of proven and probable reserves, which is a common measure of firm size 
in the gold-mining industry.  
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have used the size of a company as a proxy for 
economies of scale in the costs of hedging. The size of a company is measured as the market 
value of assets, defined as the natural logarithm of market value of equity plus book value of 
total liabilities and preferred stocks minus the book value of equity. This measure was also 
used by DeMarzo and Duffie (1991), while Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and 
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Haushalter (2000) have used a similar proxy where firm size is computed as the sum of the 
ERRNYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VGHbt plus the market value of its equity. Haushalter (2000) has used 
an alternative measure of firm value calculated as the book value of assets (also employed by 
Hoyt and Khang (2000)), and got qualitatively similar results with both measures. Mian 
(1996) has used the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the 
market value of common equity, while Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have employed the 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Allayannis and Weston (2001) have 
constructed three alternative measures: 1) the logarithm of total assets, 2) the logarithm of 
total sales, and 3) the logarithm of capital expenditures, and have obtained very similar results 
with all of them.  
Several previous empirical studies (e.g., Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; 
Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found 
that firms with more assets are more likely to hedge. These studies contend that the positive 
correlation between size and hedging can be attributed to significant economies of scale in 
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVRIKHGJLQJ%DVHGRQWKLVDUJXPHQWDILUP¶VVL]HVKRXOGEH
positively related to the probability that the firm hedges.  
 
3.2.1.3 Capital Market Imperfection and Costly External Financing 
 
 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have formalised the Smith and Stulz (1985) financial 
distress explanation for optimal hedging by endogenising bankruptcy costs. They have argued 
that without hedging, firms are more likely to pursue suboptimal investment projects. Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997) have predicted a positive association between potential 
underinvestment costs and benefits of hedging. They have used three variables as proxies for 
the growth opportunities: 1) research and development H[SHQGLWXUHV WR LWV VDOHVD ILUP¶V
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FDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHVIRUSURSHUW\SODQWDQGHTXLSPHQWWRWKHILUP¶VVL]HPHDVXUHGDVWKHERRN
YDOXH RI WKH ILUP¶V GHEW DQG RXWVWDQGLQJ SUHIHUUHG VWRFN SOXV WKH ILUP¶V HTXLW\ DQG  WKH
ERRNYDOXHRIDILUP¶VFRPPRQ equity scaled by its market value.  
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have used the same measures in their study as proxies for 
JURZWK RSWLRQV LQ WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLW\ $OOD\DQQLV DQG :HVWRQ  KDYH
employed research and development expenditures DQG ILUP¶V FDSLWDO H[SHQGLWXUHV IRU
SURSHUW\ SODQW DQG HTXLSPHQW VFDOHG E\ ILUP¶V VDOHV DV PHDVXUHV RI LQYHVWPHQW JURZWK
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have employed research and development expenditures by 
the firm size as a proxy for growth opportunities. Haushalter (2000) has measured investment 
opportunities as the ratio of investment expenditures divided by the market value of assets. 
All of them have predicted a positive relation between investment opportunities and the 
benefits of hedging. Tufano (1996) has also predicted a positive relationship between 
measures of investment spending and the decision to hedge. He has taken 1) exploration 
expenditures scaled by firm value measured by the market value of equity plus book value of 
preferred stock and debt, and 2) the dollar value of acquisitions attempted over the prior three 
years scaled also by the firm value as proxies for investment opportunities.  
Mian (1996), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Hoyt and Khang (2000) have used 
the ratio of market to the book value of total assets (market-to-book ratio) to capture the 
distinction between assets in place and growth opportunities. This ratio was calculated as the 
PDUNHWYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VHTXLW\SOXVWKHERRNYDOXHRIOLDELOLWLHVGLYLGHGE\WKHERok value 
of total assets. The basic assumption behind the use of this variable is that firms with more 
growth options will have market values greater than their book values and therefore, and as 
predicted by Froot, Scharfstein Stein (1993), will have more incentives to hedge. Another 
variable that Mian (1996) has employed to test the capital market imperfection hypothesis is 
the size of the company measured by the book value of assets minus the book value of 
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common equity plus the market value of common equity. The degree of hedging is predicted 
to be negatively correlated with the size of the company due to the fact that fixed costs 
associated with capital market visits are likely to make financing more expensive for smaller 
firms. 
 
3.2.1.4 Taxes 
 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) have demonstrated that hedging increases the expected value of an 
equity-KROGHU¶VRZQHUVKLSFODLPZKHQDSURJUHVVLYHVWDWXWRU\FRUSRUDWHWD[VFKHGXOHFUHDWHV
FRQFDYLWLHVLQDILUP¶VH[SHFWHGSURILWIXQFWLRQ$GGLWLRQDOO\WD[SUHIHUHQFHLWHPVLQGLUHctly 
create convexities in the tax liabilities (concavity in the firm value), so they need to be taken 
into account as well. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have measured the availability of tax 
preference items using the book value of net operating loss carry-forwards outstanding scaled 
by total assets. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have constructed three variables to 
PHDVXUHDILUP¶VHIIHFWLYHWD[IXQFWLRQWKHERRNYDOXHRIWKHWD[ORVVFDUU\IRUZDUGVWKH
book value of the investment tax credits, and 3) a binary variable that indicates whether the 
YDULDWLRQLQWKHILUP¶VKLVWRULFDOSUHWD[LQFRPHPDNHVLWOLNHO\WKDWLWZRXOGEHLQWKHFRQYH[
region of the tax code.  
Tufano (1996) has used the tax loss carry-IRUZDUG PHDVXUH VFDOHG E\ WKH ILUP¶V value. 
Mian (1996) has used a dummy variable that equals one if a firm uses tax loss carry-forwards 
and tax credits, and zero if a firm does not use tax preference items. Hoyt and Khang (2000) 
have employed investment tax credits plus tax loss carry-forwarGVGLYLGHGE\WKHWRWDOILUP¶V
assets as a measure of the tax shield. All of them have predicted that firms with greater tax 
preference items, and more convex tax schedules, will have more incentives to hedge. 
 90 
3.2.2 Managerial Utility Maximisation Hypothesis 
 
The Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) empirical tests have included a set of hypotheses 
that are very comprehensive. They have organised the various theories into a single 
framework by discussing the incentives for derivative use from the perspectives of managers, 
bondholders and equity holders. Smith and Stulz (1985) were the first to predict a positive 
relation between managerial wealth invested in the company and the use of derivatives. 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have tested this hypothesis and have measured the 
managerial wealth derived from the shares by the log of the market value of common shares 
beneficially owned by officers and directors as a group. Haushalter (2000) has employed 
identical measure in his study, as well as the percentage of the fLUP¶VRXWVWDQGLQJVKDUHVKHOG
by officers and directors (the measure also used by Hoyt and Khang, 2000).  
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have used the total number of shares held by managers scaled 
by total shares outstanding to test theories related to managerial risk aversion. Tufano (1996) 
has collected the number of shares and the number of options owned by officers and directors 
in order to test whether managerial risk aversion is a driver of corporate risk management 
decisions. He has used the log of the dollar value of shares as a proxy of manager wealth 
invested in a firm to reflect that, while the predicted relationship between this proxy and a 
GHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLVSRVLWLYHULVNDYHUVLRQVKRXOGGHFOLQHDVPDQDJHUV¶ZHDOWKLQFUHDVHV 
On the basis of the Smith and Stulz (1985) prediction of a negative relation between 
managerial option holdings and derivatives use, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have 
tested this hypothesis by using the log of the market value of the shares obtainable by using 
outstanding options as a measure for managerial ownership of options. Haushalter (2000) has 
used four different measures for managerial option holding. All of them were predicted to be 
negatively correlated with the extent of hedging. The first one was the number of options held 
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by officers and directors that are exercisable within 60 days. The second measure was the 
number of options held by officers and directors that are exercisable within 60 days, divided 
by the number of officers and directors. A third proxy was the ratio of the sum of exercisable 
and unexercisable options divided by the number of officers and directors, and the fourth one 
was the ratio of the value of stock options awarded to the CEOs as salary bonuses. Allayannis 
and Ofek (2001) have used the total number of options held by managers scaled by the total 
number of shares to test theories related to managerial risk aversion. 
As a proxy for option holding, Tufano (1996) has used the number of options outstanding. 
He has employed two additional measures that proxy for manager age and tenure, which 
should reflect the risk aversion of the manager. It is predicted that managers who are more 
risk averse would be more likely to manage risk. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of 
the degree of risk aversion. Tufano (1996) has employed age and tenure which might serve as 
proxies, in that older managers facing retirement might prefer to minimise fluctuations in their 
own portfolios, while managers who do not have a long tenure in the analysed company are 
more likely to adopt new ideas like corporate risk management. Therefore, Tufano (1996) has 
predicted that firms with younger managers and those whose managers have shorter tenures 
RQ WKH MREZRXOGEHPRUH LQFOLQHG WRPDQDJH ULVN&RQWUDU\ WR7XIDQR¶V 96) predictions 
UHJDUGLQJWKHPDQDJHUV¶WHQXUH0D\KDVDUJXHGE\XVLQJWKHVDPHPHDVXUHDV7XIDQR
 WKDW PDQDJHUV¶ \HDUV ZLWK WKH ILUP VKRXOG EH QHJDWLYHO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ILUP ULVN
attributes, therefore creating a greater incentive to hedge.  
 
3.2.3 Alternative Financial Policy as a Substitute for Hedging 
 
While Smith and Stulz (1985) and Nance, Smith and Smithson, (1993) have proven a 
QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ KHGJLQJ DQG WKH ILUP¶V XVH RI FRQYHUWLEOH GHEW DQG SUHIHUUHG
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stock, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have 
predicted a positive relationship due to the fact that convertible debt and preferred stock are 
KLGGHQILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHZKLFKFRQVWUDLQWVDILUP¶VDFFHVVWRH[WHUQDOIXQGV7KLVSUHGLFWLRQ
is based on the Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argument that firms that are more 
financially constrained are exposed to greater underinvestment costs. Geczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) have used the book value of convertible debt and book value of preferred 
equity as proxies for hedging substitutes. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) used the book 
value of convertible debt and preferred stock both divided by the size of the company as 
measures for hedging substitutes.  
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have also argued that firms can reduce the expected 
financial distress and agency costs associated with long-term debt by maintaining greater 
short-term liquidity, and have used current ratio and dividend price ratio as measures for this 
hypothesis. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have used two variables as proxies for a 
ILUP¶V VKRUW-term liquidity: the quick ratio (Tufano (1996) has used this measure as well), 
defined as cash and short-term investment divided by current liabilities, and the dividend 
payout ratio defined as the common dividend per share divided by earnings per share (used 
DOVRE\+DXVKDOWHU7KH\KDYHSUHGLFWHGWKDWWKHJUHDWHUDILUP¶VTXLFNUDWLRDQGWKH
lower its dividend payout ratio, the lower its need to hedge to reduce the expected financial 
distress and agency cost of straight debt.  
Mian (1996) has employed year-end ratio of current assets to current liabilities as a 
measure of corporate liquidity. Haushalter (2000) has calculated the level of cash holding 
using the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the market value of total assets. Mian 
(1996), Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) have predicted a negative relation between 
numbered measures representing alternative financial policy and a decision to hedge. On the 
other hand, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have predicted a positive association between 
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liquidity and hedging, which results from the interpretation of liquidity not as a substitute for 
hedging, but as a measure of the availability of internal funds.  
 
3.3 Research Variables  
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
In this work, DV D PHDVXUH IRU D FRPSDQ\¶V KHGJLQJ we have employed a dependent 
variable in the form of a binary variable which presents a dichotomous measure. The 
GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVFRGHGDV³´IRUWKRVHILUPVWKat manage foreign exchange, interest rate 
RUFRPPRGLW\SULFHULVNDQG³´IRUWKRVHILUPVWKDWGRQRWPDQDJHILQDQFLDOULVNV,QWKHILUVW
JURXSRIFRPSDQLHVQDPHG³KHGJHUV´ZH LQFOXGHGQRWRQO\FRPSDQLHV WKDWXVHGHULYDWLYHV
instruments as an instrument of corporate risk management, but also companies that use other 
types of hedging strategies like debt with embedded options, operational hedging, natural 
hedging, international diversification of business etc. The majority of the earlier empirical 
studies on risk management such as Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997), Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Cummins, Phillips and Smith 
(2001) have used a dichotomous variable that equalled one if a firm has used derivatives and 
zero if it has not.  
Because of the decision to include all financial risk management activities, our 
dichotomous variable should not be subject to the inaccurate categorisation of functionally-
equivalent financial position. This has allowed us to disentangle derivatives activity from risk 
management activity, which is a major advantage of our approach. However, it should be 
emphasised that the use of a binary dependent variable is problematic because it does not fully 
describe the extent of a firm's hedging activity. That is, a firm which hedges 1 per cent or 100 
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per cent of its risk exposure is treated the same in the model when a binary variable is 
employed.  
Additionally, we have expanded our analysis only to companies that use derivatives as 
risk management instruments. As we have already explained, among companies that manage 
financial risks, there is a substantial number of hedgers who do not use derivatives, but 
manage risk exposure with some other instruments like natural hedge, matching liabilities and 
assets, operational hedging etc. By separating derivative users from companies that do not use 
derivatives, our intention was to show whether there are some statistically significant 
differences between these two samples, and to explore whether VRPH VSHFLILF FRPSDQ\¶V
characteristics affect the decision to hedge by using derivative instruments. We have created 
the two samples by taking together companies that manage risks but not with derivatives and 
companies that do not manage financial risks at all in the first sample, while in the second 
sample we have analysed only those companies that manage financial risks with derivatives. 
7KH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH LV FRGHG DV D ³´ IRU WKRVH ILUPV WKDW PDQDJH IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH
interest rate or commodity pricHULVNE\GHULYDWLYHLQVWUXPHQWVDQG³´IRUWKRVHILUPVWKDWGR
not use derivatives, as well as those companies that do not manage financial risks at all. 
Regarding the analysis of derivative users, a second dependent variable that we planned to 
employ and which should correct the disadvantages of a binary dependent variable, was a 
FRQWLQXRXVPHDVXUH$VDSUR[\IRUFRPSDQ\¶VKHGJLQJZHZDQWHGWRXVHDQRWLRQDOYDOXHRI
forward contracts, options and other derivatives divided by the market value of the coPSDQ\¶V
assets. This measure is the aggregate notional value of all reported derivative contracts 
deflated by the market value of assets measured at the beginning of the year for which 
derivative information is collected.  
Using the notional value as a dependent variable has several advantages over using a 
binary variable to indicate whether or not a firm uses derivatives (e.g. see: Tufano (1996) or 
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Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who have employed a continuous variable). For example, by 
using this continuous measure, we would be able to test hypotheses on the determinants of the 
DPRXQWRIKHGJLQJDQGH[DPLQH WKH LPSDFWRID ILUP¶VGHULYDWLYHXVHRQ LWV ULVNH[SRVXUH
However, a disadvantage of this measure is that the notional principal of the derivatives 
positions only gives a rough indication of the size of the exposures (eg. see Hentschel and 
Kothari, 2001). Consequently, the reported notional principal values have to be interpreted 
with care  
Unfortunately, we were not able to collect information on the notional value of derivatives 
used in the analysed companies. We asked financial managers to provide us with this 
information, but the majority of them were not willing to disclose it. Therefore, in our 
analysis, we used only dichotomous measures as our dependent variable.  
 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
There is no widely accepted measure of shareholder maximisation hypothesis. Therefore, 
to examine the relation between hedging and our first four research assumptions that relate to 
the shareholder maximisation hypothesis, we have characterised the cost of financial distress, 
agency cost of debt, taxes and underinvestment problem by employing the following firm-
specific explanatory variables: ILUP¶V VL]H GLYLGHQG SROLF\ LQYHVWPHQW SROLF\ WD[ SROLF\
credit rating, liquidity, and capital structure. On the other hand, in order to test the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis, we have employed several explanatory variables that 
represent the level of managerial firm-specific wealth invested in a company as managerial 
RZQHUVKLSRIWKHILUP¶VFRPPRQHTXLW\RUVWRFNRSWLRQVDVZHOODVPDQDJHUV¶DJHDQGhuman 
capital vested in the firm.  
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3.3.2.1 Cost of Financial Distress 
 
 
To examine the hypotheses regarding the reduction in the transaction costs of financial 
distress, we KDYHXVHGWKHVL]HRIWKHFRPSDQ\DQGWKHILUP¶VOHYHUDJH7KHVL]HRIDFRPSDQ\
is measured using two alternative proxies: 1) the book value of assets (Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt 
and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001), and 2) the book 
value total sales revenues (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). Several previous empirical studies 
(e.g., Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand, 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are 
more likely to hedge. These studies contend that the positive correlation between size and 
hedging can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and the transaction 
FRVWV RI KHGJLQJ %DVHG RQ WKLV DUJXPHQW D ILUP¶V VLze should be positively related to the 
probability that the firm hedges.  
Contrary to the predicted positive relation between size and the decision to hedge, few 
scholars have predicted the degree of hedging to be negatively correlated with the size of a 
company (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000). The 
issue of high costs of implementing a risk management program is particularly relevant for 
the relation between hedging policy and firm size. An additional argument regarding the 
negative relationship between hedging and size is put forward by Weiss (1990). He has argued 
that, everything else being equal, companies with fewer total assets are likely to have greater 
informational asymmetries with potential public investors. Additionally, the direct costs of 
bankruptcy are proportionally greater for companies with fewer assets; therefore smaller firms 
are expected to hedge more. We believe that the argument is stronger in the case of the 
significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging, so we predict a 
SRVLWLYHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQDFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HDQGWKHGHFLVLRQWRKHGJH 
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Besides measuring the reduction in the transaction costs of financial distress, leverage was 
also used as a proxy for the impact of fixed claims in the capital structure. We have 
constructed several different measures for the degree of a firm ¶s financial leverage. First, we 
have defined financial leverage as the ratio of the book value of short-term and long-term debt 
to the book value of assets (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). Alternative measures for the 
degree of financial leverage are the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book 
value of assets (Tufano, 1996; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Geczy, Minton and 
Schrand, 1997), the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to the book value of equity 
(Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Mian, 1996), and the interest cover 
ratio defined as earnings before interest and taxes to the total interest expense (Geczy, Minton 
and Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993).  
A number of studies argue that firms with higher leverage are more likely to face binding 
financial constraints (e.g. see: Mayers and Smith, 1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1985; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; Weiss, 1990; Shapiro and Titman, 1998), so we 
have used financial leverage as a proxy for probability of insolvency. It could be expected that 
companies with greater volatility of cash-flows or accounting earnings, and which are also 
highly leveraged, will benefit from risk management activity. We predict that the coefficients 
on all variables mentioned above and the decision to hedge will be positive, apart from the 
interest coverage ratio which is predicted to be negatively related, meaning that firms with 
smaller interest cover will have more incentives to hedge.  
 
3.3.2.2 The Agency Cost of Debt 
 
 
A binary variable is used to indicate whether a firm is rated by the rating agencies. The 
YDULDEOHLVFRGHGDV³´IRUFRPSDQLHVWKDWKDYHFUHGLWUDWLQJDQG³´RWKHUZLVHEverything 
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else being equal, firms with credit rating have undergone more capital market scrutiny and 
are thus assumed to face fewer informational asymmetries than ones with no rated debt. 
Moreover, because companies typically receive credit ratings only if they issue public debt, 
those that have a credit rating are the ones most likely to have access to the public debt 
market (Barclay and Smith, 1995). Firms with a credit rating are predicted to hedge less 
extensively, while firms with greater informational asymmetry will benefit greatly from risk 
management activity (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Haushalter, 2000).   
Tufano (1996) has argued that outside block-holders are primarily well-diversified 
institutional investors and, therefore, they are less likely to act like risk-averse poorly 
diversified investors. A measure of outside block-holders that we have employed, which is a 
SUR[\IRULQIRUPDWLRQDODV\PPHWU\LVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIILUP¶VVWRFNVRZQHGE\LQVWLWXWLRQDO
investors (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997). Institutional 
investors include banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension 
funds. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have predicted that a greater share of institutional 
LQYHVWRUV¶ RZQHUVKLS LV SRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG WKXV
negatively related to the probability of hedging. Therefore, we predict that the coefficient on 
this variable is negative with the decision to hedge.  
 
3.3.2.3 Capital Market Imperfection and Costly External Financing 
 
 
The level of cash holdings is accounted for using the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to the market value of total assets as a proxy for the level of cash reserves. Similarly 
to Pulvino (1998), Harford (1999), Opler et al. (1999) and Hoyt and Khang (2000) who have 
discussed that cash reserves can provide a valuable source of funds for investments when 
current internally generated funds fall short and external financing is costly, Froot, Scharfstein 
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and Stein (1993) have predicted a positive association between liquidity and hedging, which 
results from the interpretation of liquidity not as a substitute for long-term debt, but as a 
measure of the availability of internal funds. Since hedging reduces the probability of cash 
insolvency, the proxy we have used is expected to be positively related to the amount of 
hedging.  
An additional variable related to financial contracting costs is the investment (growth) 
opportunities. Myers (1977) and Smith and Watts (1992) have argued that firm value also 
depends on future investment opportunities. Because hedgers are more likely to have larger 
investment opportunities (see e.g.: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) for theoretical 
arguments, or Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) for empirical evidence), such control is 
important. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) came to one noteworthy result that high R&D 
firms are more likely to hedge. There are a couple of reasons why this might be expected in 
the context of the Froot Scharfstein and Stein (1993) model. First, it may be more difficult for 
R&D-intensive firms to raise external finance, either because their (principally intangible) 
assets are not good collateral, or because there is likely to be more asymmetric information 
about the quality of their new projects. Second, R&D "growth options" are likely to represent 
valuable investments whose appeal is not correlated with easily hedgeable risks, such as 
interest rates. Thus, common sense would imply more hedging for R&D firms. Bessembinder 
(1991) has also shown that hedging activities are predicted to be greater in firms where 
growth opportunities constitute a larger proportion of firm value, because reductions in 
agency costs are most valuable for these firms.  
We have measured investment opportunities as the ratio of investment expenditures to 
the book value of assets (Haushalter, 2000; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; DeMarzo and 
Duffie, 1991; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Growth 
opportunities are also measured as a ratio of investment expenditures to the value of total 
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sales (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Geczy, Minton and 
Schrand, 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Dolde, 1995), or as a ratio of research and 
development expenditures to the book value of total assets (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993). Myers (1977; 1984) has suggested that expected 
bankruptcy costs and underinvestment costs are increasing in the value of a firm's 
investment opportunities. %DVHGRQWKLVDUJXPHQWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLVSUHGLFWHG
to be positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. 
 
3.3.2.4 Tax Incentives to Hedge 
 
 
To examine the tax hypothesis, we have used several measures RI WKH ILUP¶V HIIHFWLYH
tax function: (1) total value of the tax loss carry-forwards and tax-loss carry-backs (Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993), (2) total value of the tax loss carry-forwards plus tax-loss carry-
backs to the total assets (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Tufano, 
1996),  (3) investment tax credits used to offset income tax payable (Nance, Smith and 
Smithson, 1993), and finally (4) a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has tax loss 
carry-forwards, tax-loss carry-backs or investment tax credits, and 0 otherwise (Allayannis 
and Ofek, 2001).  
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1999) have agued that the characteristics 
of the tax code enable corporations to potentially increase their value by hedging. If a 
FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V WD[DEOH LQFRPH IDOOV LQ WKLV SURJUHVVLYH UHJLRQ LWV H[SHFWHG WD[ OLDELOLW\ LV D
convex function of its taxable income. Based on this theory, a corporation facing an increas-
ing marginal tax rate can reduce its expected tax liability by reducing the variability of its 
taxable income. Initially, one might expect that corporations face a convex tax function only 
under unusual circumstances. However, provisions of the tax code, such as tax-loss carry-
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backs, tax-loss carry-forwards, and investment tax credits, can have a significant impact on a 
ILUP¶V WD[DEOH LQFRPH 7KHUHIRUH WKH FRHIILFLHQWV RQ all variables mentioned above are 
predicted to be positive. 
 
3.3.2.5 Managerial Utility Maximisation Hypothesis 
 
 
The level of a manDJHU¶VILUP-specific wealth is represented in two ways: (1) by the book 
value of the firm's equity owned by officers and directors (Tufano, 1996; Geczy, Minton and 
Schrand, 1997), and (2) by WKHIUDFWLRQRIWKHILUP¶VRXWVWDQGLQJVKDUHVKHOGE\RIILFHUVDQG
directors (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Haushalter, 2000). The incentives for managers to 
hedge should be increasing in both these variables (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKRSWLRQVDUHXVHGLQPDQDJHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLVJDXJHGXVLQJDELQDU\
variable that equals one if managers of a firm own stock options and zero otherwise. We 
predict this proxy to be negatively correlated with the extent of hedging. Variables that are 
employed in other studies (see e.g.: Smith and Stulz (1985); Haushalter (2000); Tufano 
(1996); Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997)), such as the number of options (total option 
holdings) held by officers and directors, the number of options (total option holdings) held by 
officers and directors divided by the number of officers and directors, or a logarithm of the 
market value of shares that could be owned by managers and directors by exercising their 
options, are better measures for testing this hypothesis, but are not available as public 
information in the case of Croatian and Slovenian companies. Therefore, we were unable to 
use them and we needed to employ an alternative measure.  
We have employed two additional measures that proxy for risk aversion of the manager; 
manager age and tenure or human capital vested in the firm. It is predicted that managers who 
are more risk-averse would be more likely to manage risk. Tufano (1996) has argued that 
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older managers facing retirement might prefer to minimise fluctuations in their own 
portfolios, while managers who do not have a long tenure in the analysed company are more 
likely to adopt new ideas like corporate risk management. Therefore, as Tufano (1996) has 
predicted, we also predict that firms with younger managers and those whose managers have 
shorter tenures on the job would be more inclined to manage risk. This hypothesis is in 
contrast to May (1995) who has predicted that firms whose managers have more years vested 
are more likely to pursue hedging strategies due to the fact that managerial skills become 
more firm-specific as the time spent with the firm increases.  
 
3.3.2.6 Alternative Financial Policy as a Substitute for Hedging 
 
 
To examine hypotheses about the substitutes for hedging we planned to employ two 
PHDVXUHV 7KH ILUVW ZDV WKH ILUP¶V XVH RI FRQYHUWLEOH GHEW GHILQHG DV WKH ERRN YDOXH RI
convertible debt divided E\ILUP¶VDVVHWVNance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Geczy, Minton 
DQG 6FKUDQG  6PLWK DQG 6WXO]  7KH VHFRQG PHDVXUH ZDV WKH ILUP¶V XVH RI
SUHIHUUHG VWRFN GHILQHG DV WKH ERRN YDOXH RI SUHIHUUHG VWRFN GLYLGHG E\ WKH ILUP¶V DVVHWV
(Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Smith and Stulz, 
 $ QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ KHGJLQJ DQG WKH ILUP¶V XVH RI FRQYHUWLEOH GHEW DQG
preferred stock was predicted. Unfortunately, these measures were excluded from the analysis 
due to the fact that there were few companies (less than 5 per cent of the total sample) in both 
countries which finance themselves by preferred stock and convertible debt. Therefore, these 
variables were not suitable for testing our hypothesis regarding hedge substitutes.   
The problem addressed above has not stopped us from testing the predicted influence of 
KHGJH VXEVWLWXWHV RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH RU QRW WR KHGJH :H KDYH HPSOR\HG
several alternative measures suggested in previous studies. Cummins, Phillips and Smith 
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(2001) in their article have also considered the possibility that publicly traded and privately 
held stock companies may behave differently with regard to risk management. The owners of 
closely held firms are likely to have a high degree of control over managerial behaviour and, 
hence, should be able to align the managers' interests with their own. Generally, the authors 
expect the owners of such firms to prefer value-maximisation. However, it is also possible that 
they may exhibit a degree of risk aversion, to the extent that the wealth of the shareholders is 
sub-optimally diversified because of their holdings in the company. To test for differences 
between publicly traded and closely held stock firms, we specify a dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. If closely held firms tend to 
be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable is predicted to be 
negative. However, if closely held companies primarily pursue value-maximisation, this 
variable will be statistically insignificant.  
7KHFRPSDQ\¶VGLYLGHQGSD\RXWUDWLRKDVEHHQLQFOXGHGLQWKHUHJUHVVLRQVDVDSUR[\IRU
dividend policy. This variable is defined as annual dividends paid to common stockholders as a 
fraction of income after interest and tax (Haushalter, 2000; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997). We 
KDYHDVVXPHGWKDWWKHORZHUWKHILUP¶VGLYLGHQGSD\RXWUDWLRWKHORZHULVLWVQHHGWRKHGJHWR
reduce the expected financial distress and agency cost of straight debt (Nance, Smith and 
Smithson, 1993).  
$GGLWLRQDOO\DFRPSDQ\¶VTXLFNUDWLRKDVEHHQXVHGDVDSUR[\IRUWKHILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\
defined as money and short term securities divided by short-term liabilities (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). $QRWKHUPHDVXUHRIDILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\LVWKH
liquidity ratio calculated as short-term assets divided by short-term liabilities. The coefficient 
on both variables is predicted to be negative (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993).  
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3.3.2.7 Summary of Empirical Predictions 
 
 
Based on the arguments that arise from the analysed papers presented in this chapter as 
well as in the previous chapters, in our thesis we propose several hypotheses. First we argue 
that hedging can increase the value of the firm by reducing the costs associated with financial 
distress, the agency costs of debt, expected taxes and capital market imperfections. These 
premises are known as the shareholder maximisation hypothesis and are tested in the first four 
assumptions.  
1) The argument of reducing the transaction costs of financial distress implies that the 
EHQHILWV RI KHGJLQJ VKRXOG EH JUHDWHU WKH ODUJHU WKH IUDFWLRQ RI IL[HG FODLPV LQ WKH ILUP¶V
capital structure and the smaller the firm. However the informational and transactional scale 
economies argument implies that larger firms will be more likely to hedge; so the predicted 
impact of size is indeterminate. We believe that the argument is stronger in the case of the 
significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging. Therefore, we 
SUHGLFW D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ D FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DV ZHOO DV
FRPSDQ\¶VOHYHUDJHDQGGHFLVLRQWRKHGJH 
2) The agency cost of debt argument implies that the benefits of hedging should be greater 
thHKLJKHUWKHILUP¶VOHYHUDJHDQGDV\PPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQSUREOHP 
3) The capital market imperfection argument implies that the benefits of hedging should 
EHJUHDWHUWKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVWKHUHDUHLQWKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\VHW 
4) The tax hypothesis suggests that the benefits of hedging should be greater the higher 
WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWWKHILUP¶VSUH-tax income is in the progressive region of the tax schedule, 
DQG WKH JUHDWHU WKH YDOXH RI WKH ILUP¶V WD[ ORVV FDUU\-forwards, investment tax credits and 
other provisions of the tax code. 
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The next group of assumptions regards the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. 
:HDUJXH WKDW GXH WR WKH IDFW WKDW D ILUP¶VPDQDJHUVKDYH OLPLWHGDELOLW\ WRGLYHUVLI\ WKHLU
own personal wealth position associated with the stock holdings and the capitalisation of their 
career earnings, they have strong incentives to hedge. Usually that kind of hedging is not 
FRQGXFWHG WR LPSURYH WKH YDOXH RI FRPSDQ\¶V VWRFNKROGHUV EXW WR LPSURYH PDQDJHUV¶ RZQ
wealth. To avoid this problem, managerial compensation contracts need to be designed so that 
when managers increase the value of the firm, they also increase their expected utility. This 
can usually be achieved by adding option-like provisions to managerial contracts.  
 5) The managerial utility maximisation hypothesis predicts that managers with greater 
stock ownership would prefer more risk management, while those with greater option 
holdings would prefer less risk management. Additionally, firms with younger managers and 
those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job would be more inclined to manage risk. 
We have also tested a hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies that are 
considered substitutes for corporate hedging because they reduce expected taxes, transaction 
costs, or agency costs. Regarding this hypothesis, we argue as follows. 
6) Instead of managing risk through hedging, firms could pursue alternative activities that 
substitute for financial risk management strategies. The substitutes for hedging imply that the 
likelihood of the firm employing off-balance-sheet hedging instruments is lower the more 
convertible debt the firm issues, the more preferred stock the firm issues, the more liquid are 
WKHILUP¶VDVVHWVDQGWKHORZHUWKHILUP¶VGLYLGHnd payout is.  
The last group of assumptions regards risk management practices in Croatia vs Slovenia. 
Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis that financial risk management, as one of the most 
important objectives of modern corporate strategy, is more developed or has different 
rationales among Slovenian than among Croatian companies, we propose the following 
research propositions:   
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7) Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices than Croatian 
companies, measured by the total number of companies that use derivative instruments to 
manage their risk exposures.  
8) Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices than Croatian 
companies, measured by the implementation of more sophisticated risk management 
strategies. To distinguish less and more sophisticated risk management strategies, we took the 
use of different derivatives instruments as an example of more advanced risk management 
strategies with an emphasis on structured derivatives use, while instruments like natural hedge 
or international and business diversification we have classified as less sophisticated risk 
management strategies.  
 
3.4 Statistical Analysis of Collected Data 
 
3.4.1 Statistical Analysis Used in the Previous Empirical Studies 
 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have conducted both univariate and multivariate 
analysis in their study. Using a sample that represented 372 of the Fortune 500 U.S. industrial 
non-financial firms with the highest sales for the fiscal year 1990, they have presented 
summary statistics for proxy variables, and tests of differences between the means of these 
variables for users and nonusers of currency derivatives. They have proven that user firms are  
statistically different from non-user firms with respect to variables that are proxies for 
LQYHVWPHQW JURZWK RSSRUWXQLWLHV $GGLWLRQDOO\ FXUUHQF\ GHULYDWLYH XVHUV¶ TXLFN UDWLRV DUH
statistically lower that those of nonusers. Users also have larger managerial option holdings, 
and more informational asymmetry than nonusers, as measured by institutional ownership or 
analyst following.  
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The Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) univariate tests have suggested that users of 
currency derivatives are not statistically different from nonusers with respect to managerial  
wealth, substitutes for hedging, or tax preference items, while results related to the proxies for 
financial distress are mixed. Although the long-term debt ratios of currency derivatives users 
are statistically lower than those of nonusers, the interest coverage ratios of the two groups are 
not statistically different. Regarding the size of the analysed companies as a proxy for the cost 
of implementing a derivative strategy, on average, user firms are statistically larger that 
nonuser firms.  
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have estimated logit regression to distinguish between 
the possible explanations for derivatives use. The dependent variable was equal to one if a 
firm has used currency derivatives and zero in the firm has not used them. Due to the fact that 
multiple proxies were available to measure some firm characteristics, they have estimated 
separate logit regressions, using all possible combinations of variables representing each 
predicted construct. The results on all regressions were qualitatively similar. They have also 
conducted the Pearson correlation tests to identify possible correlations between the 
independent variables.  
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) have proven that financial constraints provide 
incentives for hedging. Higher quick ratios that indicate more internally available funds imply 
a significantly lower probability of using currency derivative instruments. The results also 
suggested that potential underinvestment costs, measured by the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to sales, provide incentives for hedging. Finally, the costs 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKLPSOHPHQWLQJDGHULYDWLYHVVWUDWHJ\DOVRSOD\DUROHLQDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRXVH
FXUUHQF\ GHULYDWLYHV 7KH ORJLW UHVXOWV KDYH QRW VXSSRUWHG 'H0DU]R DQG 'XIILH¶V 
information asymmetry explanation for hedging, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on 
the standardised number of analyst firms. Additionally, the results do not support the Smith 
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and Stulz (1985) tax or managerial contracting cost explanations for corporate hedging, due to 
the fact that proxies used for these variables in the logit regression are not statistically 
significant.  
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have used a more complex econometric analysis by using a 
two-VWDJHIUDPHZRUNNQRZQDVWKH&UDJJ¶VPRGHOWRH[DPLQHZKDWGHWHUPLQHVFRUSRUDWLRQV¶
level of derivative use. This two-VWDJH SURFHVV DOORZV D VHSDUDWH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI D ILUP¶V
decision to hedge from its decision on how much to hedge. In the first stage, using all firms, 
they have employed a binominal probit model in which the decision to hedge is related to 
variables that are broadly consistent with theories of optimal hedging and controls for 
exchange-rate exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have obtained similar results to those of 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997). Using a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms for the 
year 1993 (the total sample consisted of 378 firms), they have found that firm size, research 
and development expenditures, and controls for exposure (foreign income and trade) are 
LPSRUWDQW GHWHUPLQDQWV LQ D ILUP¶VGHFLVLon to use foreign currency derivatives. Results are 
robust to the alternative time intervals, exchange-rate indexes, different regression model 
(weighted least squares and probit models) and the alternative sample (US manufacturing 
firms with available data in COMPUSTAT). None of the other variables employed in the 
SDSHUZHUHVLJQLILFDQWLQH[SODLQLQJDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRPDQDJHULVNV,QWKHVHFRQGVWDJHRI
their estimation, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) have estimated truncated regression by using the 
notional amount of currency derivatives for those firms which have chose to hedge. As noted, 
WKHSURELWPRGHOGRHVQRWDFFRPPRGDWHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWDILUP¶VKHGJLQJSROLF\GHSHQGV
on two decisions which could have different determinants. In an effort to disentangle these 
relations, they have used a variant of the tobit model proposed by Cragg (1971). The Cragg 
model applies when the probability of a nonlimit outcome (e.g., the decision to hedge 
production) is determined separately from the level of the nonlimit outcome (e.g., the fraction 
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of production to hedge). Therefore, this model is a combination of a binomial probit (i.e., the 
decision equation) and a conditional regression (i.e., the regression equation for nonzero 
outcomes). The second stage of research has enabled them to find out that exposure factors 
(foreign sales and foreign trade) are the sole determinants of the degree of hedging.  
Haushalter (2000) has examined the risk management activities of 100 oil and gas 
producers for the years 1992 to 1994. He has investigated whether the fraction of production 
that an oil and gas producer hedges against price fluctuations is related to its financing policy, 
tax status, compensation policy, ownership structure, and operating characteristics. He has 
provided detailed descriptive statistics (1st and 3rd quartile, mean, median, minimum and 
maximum, as well as a standard deviation) for the firms in the sample regarding the 
dependent and control variables. In his univariate analysis, he has employed the Wicoxon test 
for difference in medians, as well as correlation analysis (Pearson correlation coefficient).  
To investigate the characteristics of a firm related to its hedging policy, Haushalter (2000) 
has estimated cross-sectional tobit regression. He has chosen tobit model because there were a 
significant number of zero observations for the fraction of production hedged, and this model 
implies that the observed value of the dependent variable is censored as zero. For each of the 
independent variables, the author has examined the assumptions of homoskedasticity of the 
error terms using chi-square tests. Tobit analysis is a standard procedure for dealing with 
censored dependent variables, where the variable is continuous for some observations but 
equal to zero (or some other constant) for others, A criticism of tobit model is that it 
measures the participation decision and the volume decision simultaneously, i.e.; it forces 
variables to have the same signs with respect to the decision to participate and the volume of 
transactions, given that participation takes place. To the extent that there are reasons, like 
those noted earlier, why some variables in the participation and volume regressions should 
have opposite signs, the tobit model would be mis-specified. Therefore, in the second stage 
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of his analysis, Haushalter (2000) has adopted a second approach in order to separate the 
decision to hedge production from the fraction of production hedged.  
The author has used a variant of a tobit model proposed by Cragg (1971), that does allow 
different parameter values for the participation and volume decisions. Cragg's framework is 
quite general and allows a variety of assumptions concerning the underlying probability 
distributions entering into the participation and volume decisions. Here the author has 
adopted an approach, explained previously in Allayannis and Ofek (2001), which assumes the 
SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW D ILUP¶V KHGJLQJ SROLF\ GHSHQGV RQ WZR GHFLVLRQV WKDW FRXOG KDYH GLIIHUHQW
determinants. The explanatory power of this approach is substantially greater in comparison 
to the probit or the tobit models. The differences between the results from the conditional 
regressions and those using the tobit model have suggested that there are substantial 
differences between the determinants of the decision to hedge and the decision of how much 
to hedge. Because the tobit model considered the combined effects of these decisions, it has 
QRW UHYHDOUG DOO WKH GHWHUPLQDQWV RI D ILUP¶V KHGJLQJ SROLF\ 7KHUHIRUH &UDJJ¶V PRGHO KDV
shown as more appropriate for this kind of analysis.  
Tufano (1996) has studied the 48 North American gold mine companies in the analysed 
period 1991-1993. He has conducted t-test of the differences in the means among firms 
employing different levels of risk management, as well as a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test of the differences between distributions. The univariate test of means has suggested 
that analysed firms that employ moderate levels of hedging are barely distinguishable from 
firms that do not hedge at all, apart from carrying higher cash balances. The Wilcoxon signed-
rank test has shown that the non-hedgers might be less leveraged and explore less than 
hedgers. Univariate analysis has proven that firms that hedge extensively differ from those 
employing moderate levels of risk management ± their managers hold greater equity stakes as 
expected, but they hold more options as well, contrary to what Smith and Stulz (1985) have 
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SUHGLFWHG 7KH XQLYDULDWH WHVW FDQQRW UHYHDO VLJQLILFDQW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ ILUPV¶ characteristics, 
therefore Tufano (1996) has conducted multivariate tests.  
He has employed a one-sided tobit model, regressing the extent of risk management 
activities against the different firm characteristics. Regression analysis has shown that the 
shareholders maximisation hypothesis of corporate risk management has no predictive power 
in the case of the gold-mining industry. There is no relationship between the risk management 
decision and either the likelihood of financial distress, convexities in the ILUP¶VWD[VFKHGXOHV
or the investment opportunities. In contrast, the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis 
seems to be very important in the case of risk management decision in the gold-mining 
industry. As predicted by Smith and Stulz (1985), firms whose managers hold more options 
manage less gold price risk, while firms whose managers have more wealth invested in the 
ILUP¶VVWRFNPDQDJHPRUHJROGSULFHULVN$GGLWLRQDOO\ILUPVZKRVH&)2VKDYHIHZHU\HDUV
in their current job are more likely to engage in greater risk management, which is consistent 
with Breeden and Viswanathan (1996), who have argued that newcomers prefer to hedge to 
signal their managerial quality. 
Mian (1996) has obtained data on hedging from 1992 annual reports for a sample of 3022 
COMPUSTAT firms. He has analysed firms in the sample by dividing them into the 
following categories: hedgers vs. nonhedgers, and then for each hedger in the sample data are 
obtained on whether the firm hedged currency risk, interest rate risk, and/or commodity price 
risk. He has applied both univariate and multivariate analysis to test the research hypothesis. 
He has performed a test of differences in means and correlation analysis for each financial 
characteristic between hedgers and nonhedgers, interest rate hedgers and nonhedgers of 
interest rate risk, as well as between currency price hedgers and nonhedgers of currency price 
risk. Both t-test and correlation analysis have shown that hedgers and interest rate hedgers 
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have lower market-to-book ratio. There was no such a result in the case of currency price 
hedgers and nonhedgers of currency price risk.  
Analysis has also shown that hedging is significantly less likely among regulated utilities 
as regards all three analysed samples. The evidence on foreign tax credits is consistent with 
the tax-based rationale for hedging, while the evidence on both tax loss carry-forwards and 
progressivity is inconsistent with tax-based explanations. Examination of firm value has 
revealed that hedgers of all types are significantly larger when compared with nonhedgers. In 
order to test the strength of these results, Mian (1996) has conducted a regression analysis 
using a logistic model.  
Logistic regression has shown that the probability of hedging is negatively related to the 
market-to-book ratio and failed to provide support for the contracting cost and capital market 
imperfections model. Additionally, the absence of a significant relation between hedging and 
two out of three measures for presence of tax shield incentive of hedging, has suggested that 
the association between hedging and the incidence of tax shield is not robust, and that 
research data provide only weak support for the prediction of the tax hypothesis. The only 
strong result was found between hedging and firm size, suggesting that the decision to hedge 
is more influenced by the economies of scale in risk management activities than by financial 
distress costs or cost associated with raising external capital. Mian (1996) has also found no 
significant difference in leverage between hedgers and nonhedgers. He also found that 
hedgers issue longer-term debt, have lower liquidity, higher dividend yield, and higher 
dividend payout, which is consistent with the theory of hedging substitutes.  
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have conducted a univariate test by employing 
comparison of means for hedgers and nonhedgers. T-statistic has shown that hedgers have 
significantly more investment tax credits and more of the range of their pretax income in the 
progressive region of the tax schedule, but there was no significant difference in tax loss 
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carry-forwards. Hedgers also were significantly larger and had larger research and 
development expenditures. However, the means reflected no significant difference regarding 
the leverage or the ratio of book-to-market value. Regarding the leverage, it should be noticed 
that the hypothesis that firms with more leverage have a greater incentive to hedge assumes 
WKDW WKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVDUH IL[HG6PLWKDQG:DWWVKDYe proven that 
firms with more investment options employ lower leverage, and have greater incentive to 
hedge. It could be concluded that the influence leverage has on hedging activity is 
indeterminate. Greater leverage implies more hedging to control the underinvestment 
problem, but, since greater leverage is associated with fewer investment options, greater 
leverage implies less hedging. Univariate analysis conducted by Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993) has also proven that firms that use the hedging instruments have significantly less 
liquid assets and higher dividend yields. However, there is no significant difference in the use 
of convertible debt and preferred stock.  
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have employed a logistic regression to provide 
evidence on conditional relations. They have chosen logit model because their dependent 
variable was of a dichotomous nature (it is coded one for firms which were hedgers, and zero 
otherwise). The original logit model has shown a low power due to the fact that the sample 
size was small relative to the number of parameters estimated. Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993) have used 12 right-hand side variables, while there were only 65 observations. 
Additionally, a problem of multicollinearty existed between independent variables; of the 66 
Pearson correlation coefficients reported, 29 were statistically different from zero. To increase 
the power of their model, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have grouped twelve right-hand 
size independent variables into five classes regarding the hypothesis they were testing ± two 
YDULDEOHV PHDVXUHG OHYHUDJH WKUHH YDULDEOHV UHIOHFWHG DVSHFWV RI WKH ILUP¶V HIIHFWLYH WD[
function, two variables proxy growth options in the investment opportunity set, one measured 
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firm size, while four variables reflected alternatives to hedging. Logit model has included as 
right side variables only one variable from each of these five classes of variables. In this way, 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have constructed and tested 48 different logit regression 
equations, which has increased the power of the tests of the hypothesised relations.  
The results of the restricted logit regressions have proven that the analysed firms are more 
likely to hedge if they have more tax credit and if more of the range of thH ILUPV¶ SUHWD[
income is in the convex region of the tax schedule, confirming the hypothesis regarding 
reduction of expected tax liabilities. Additionally, larger firms with more growth opportunities 
which face a higher probability of financial distress are more likely to hedge. Also, firms that 
have more preferred stock in their capital structure, more liquid assets and lower dividends are 
less likely to hedge, which is consistent with the hedging substitute hypothesis.  
 
3.4.2 Univariate and Multivariate Statistical Analysis  
 
At the beginning of our analysis, we have presented summary statistics for the proxy 
variables, which have given an insight into corporate characteristics of firms in the sample. 
Then, by using t-test, we have tested the differences between means for the two independent 
separate samples: hedgers and nonhedgers as well as users and nonusers of derivative 
instruments. T-test enables a calculation of statistically significant differences between small 
and mutually unrelated parametric samples. In other words, it points to those differences that 
DUH QRW UDQGRP $GGLWLRQDOO\ FRUUHODWLRQ DQDO\VLV ZDV FRQGXFWHG E\ FDOFXODWLQJ 3HDUVRQ¶V
correlation coefficient as a measure of linear correlation because variables in the model are of 
interval/ratio nature (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). 
Binominal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish among the possible rationales 
of the decision to hedge and/or to use derivatives as corporate risk management instruments. 
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We have chosen binomial (or binary) logistic regression because it is a form of regression 
which is used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy (limited, discrete and not 
continuous) and the independents are of any type. With a categorical dependent variable, 
discriminant function analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are continuous and 
nicely distributed; logit analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are categorical; 
and logistic regression is often chosen if the predictor variables are a mix of continuous and 
categorical variables and/or if they are not nicely distributed (logistic regression makes no 
assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables) (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; 
Rice, 1994; Allison, 1999; Menard, 2002).  
Logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis of 
independents and to determine the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained 
by the independents. Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after 
transforming the dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent 
occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the probability of a certain event 
occurring (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Logistic regression has many analogies to OLS 
regression: logit coefficients correspond to b coefficients in the logistic regression equation, 
the standardised logit coefficients correspond to beta weights, and a pseudo R2 statistic is 
available to summarise the strength of the relationship (Press and Wilson, 1978). Unlike OLS 
regression, however, logistic regression does not assume linearity of relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent, does not require normally distributed variables, does 
not assume homoscedasticity, normally distributed error terms are not assumed, does not 
require that the independents be interval or unbounded, and in general has less stringent 
requirements.  
It does, however, require that observations are independent and that the logit of the 
independent variables is linearly related to the dependent, as well as assuming no 
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multicollinearity between independents, no outliers, meaningful coding, inclusion of all 
relevant variables in the regression model and exclusion of irrelevant variables and large 
samples. The success of the logistic regression can be assessed by looking at the classification 
table, showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomous, ordinal, or 
polytomous dependent. Also, goodness-of-fit tests such as model chi-square are available as 
LQGLFDWRUVRI WKHPRGHO¶VDSSURSULDWHQHVV DV LV WKH:DOGVWDWLVWLF WR WHVW WKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI
individual independent variables (Press and Wilson, 1978; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; 
Rice, 1994; Estrella, 1998; Menard, 2002).  
   
The "logit" model: 
ln[p/(1-p)] = a + BX + e or 
[p/(1-p)] = exp(a + BX + e) 
where:  
x ln - the natural logarithm, logexpZKHUHH[S « 
x Y - a dummy dependent variable, =1 if event happens, =0 if event doesn't happen,  
x p - the probability that the event Y occurs, p(Y=1)  
x p/(1-p) - the "odds ratio"  
x ln[p/(1-p)] - the log odds ratio, or "logit"  
x a - the coefficient on the constant term,  
x B - the coefficient(s) on the independent variable(s),  
x X - the independent variable(s),   
x e - the error term.  
 
The logistic regression model is simply a non-linear transformation of the linear 
regression. The "logistic" distribution is an S-shaped distribution function which is similar to 
the standard-normal distribution (which results in a probit regression model) but easier to 
work with in most applications (the probabilities are easier to calculate). The logit distribution 
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constrains the estimated probabilities to lie between 0 and 1 (Allison, 1999). Apart from the 
fact that the dependent variable in our research is discrete and not continuous, we have chosen 
logistic regression because it enables the researcher to overcome many of the restrictive 
assumptions of OLS regression as well. Because multiple proxies are available to measure 
some firm characteristics, we have estimated separate logistic regressions, using all possible 
combinations of variables representing each predicted construct.  
 
3.5 Data Description  
 
A considerable part of the material presented in this thesis is the result of an analysis of 
existing literature, or literature survey. An extensive list of the prevailing theoretical and 
empirical literature regarding the determinants, rationales and practices of corporate risks 
management have been presented in Chapter 2.  
Apart from the literature survey, we have conducted an empirical research and collected 
our own data set. Research hypotheses were tested on the two different samples. The first 
sample contains the large Croatian non-financial companies and the second includes the large 
Slovenian non-financial companies. Criteria for selecting companies in the samples were 
similar for both countries. The Croatian companies needed to meet two out of three conditions 
required by the Croatian Accounting Law10 that relate to large companies - 1) a value of total 
assets higher than 108 million kuna, (2) income in the last 12 months higher than 216 million 
kuna, and/or (3) annual number of employees higher than 250. The Slovenian companies were 
included in the sample if they met two out of three conditions required by Slovenian 
Company Law11 related also to large companies - 1) a value of total assets higher than 3,400 
                                                 
10
 ,Q&URDWLDQ=DNRQRUDþXQRYRGVWYX1DURGQHQRYLQH 
11
 In SloveQH=DNRQRJRVSRGDUVNLKGUXåEDK8UDGQLOLVW 
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million tolars, (2) operating income in the last 12 months higher than 6,800 million tolars, 
and/or (3) annual number of employees higher than 250.  
We have used a list of the biggest 400 Croatian companies in the year 2005 published by 
The Business Herald12 and included 157 companies in the sample that met the required 
criteria. In the case of Slovenian companies, we have used the GVIN13 and AJPES14 
electronic data bases that offer a list of all existing companies on the Slovenian market, and 
on the basis of the selected criteria we have chosen 189 companies for further analysis. The 
primary advantage of these samples is that the evidence can be generalised to a broad class of 
firms in different industries. Empirical research was conducted on the big non-financial 
companies due to the fact that these companies have access to derivatives markets and should 
have developed risk management function. Financial firms are excluded from the sample 
because most of them are also market makers, hence their motivation in using derivatives may 
be different from the motivations of non-financial firms.  
The greatest challenge of this research was to find an appropriate data set, because the 
analysed companies have not been very public about their risk management activities. Data 
were collected from two sources: from annual reports and notes to the financial statements for 
the fiscal year 2005, and through our survey. We relied more on the survey data than on the 
annual reports for several reasons. Firstly, we wanted to explore perceptions of financial or 
                                                 
12
 The Business Herald is the leading Croatian business newspaper.  
13
 www.GVIN.com is intended for both synthetic business overview of individual companies or industries and 
for extremely sophisticated analysis. GVIN.com data cover 3 main information domains: market information, 
Slovenian companies, and management and governance. In our research we have used domain Slovenian 
companies, which enabled us to look into more than 220,000 companies and select our research sample. Domain 
6ORYHQLDQFRPSDQLHVRIIHUGDWDUHJDUGLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VFRQWDFWGHWDLOVEDQNDFFRXQWVWD[DQGUHJLVWU\QXPEHU
information whether the company is active and whether it has the status of a tax payer. Information is also 
available for newly established companies.  
14
 AJPES (Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services) performs various 
statistical tasks and tasks related to the provision of information such as: collection, processing and 
communication of data from annual reports prepared by business entities, collection and processing of financial 
account statistics, publication of annual reports returned by companies and sole proprietors via the AJPES 
webportal. AJPES also carries out different kinds of statistical research (e.g. on the revenues and expenses of 
legal entities, payments for investments made by legal entities, their salaries and overdue unsettled liabilities, 
etc.).   
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risk managers regarding the risk management policies and strategies in their companies. Also, 
we wanted to find out what are the reasons why companies that classified themselves as non-
hedgers do not manage risks. These data we could not find in the annual reports. 
Secondly, a part of the data that we have used as explanatory variables was not reported in 
the annual reports, therefore we needed to find them by using different sources. The last and 
the most important reason for relying on survey data was that not all of the analysed Croatian 
and Slovenian companies were obliged to report risk management activities in notes to the 
financial statements. This obligation refers only to those companies that are listed on the 
stock-exchange, while many companies in our sample are not public joint-stock companies. 
Therefore, annual reports could not be the only data source in the  case of our research and we 
needed to rely on a survey.  
$VXUYH\TXHVWLRQQDLUHZDVDGGUHVVHGWRWKHILUP¶VFKLHIILQDQFLDORIILFHURULIWKHUHZDV
no such position, to the financial controller or the treasurer. The implicit assumption was that 
these are the persons most likely to have the relevant information. The methodological 
framework of the questionnaire was constructed on the basis of the literature review presented 
in Chapter 2, which refers to parameters of corporate risk management. The questionnaire has 
covered three broad areas; foreign exchange rate risk management, interest rate risk 
management and commodity price risk management. Additionally, a part of the questionnaire 
referred to those companies that classified themselves as non-hedgers in order to search for 
reasons not to manage financial risks.  
A draft of a questionnaire was sent to several scholars specialised in Corporate Finance, 
Risk Management and Market Research, and a pilot research was conducted among MBA 
students at the Faculty of Business and Economics University of Zagreb. After we had 
received their feedback and had taken their suggestions into consideration, the questionnaire 
gained its final shape. The number of questions was decreased, and the structure of a few 
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questions was improved, aiming to avoid their wrong interpretation by participants, as well as 
to encourage a total return rate of questionnaires. The questionnaire consisted of 41 questions. 
No question was open-ended, meaning that managers were asked to check from a fixed set of 
possible answers to the one (or the ones) they agreed with (they are always given the option, 
however, of formulating their own answer if the ones we have offered do not apply).  
The questionnaire was mailed at the beginning of September 2006 to the Croatian and 
Slovenian managers involved in the financial risk management decision. The questionnaires 
were addressed to a specific individual. It should be emphasised that the problem with a 
survey is that the person who fills in the questionnaire out does not necessarily have the 
relevant information or the motivation to provide careful and truthful answers. Moreover, 
questions are not always interpreted correctly. We tried to gauge accuracy in different ways. 
First, we wanted to make sure that the people who completed the questionnaire had the 
information we were interested in. This is why the questionnaire was sent to the chief 
financial officer or to the controller and the treasurer of the firm. Then we asked firms to tell 
us who actually filled out the questionnaire. In the vast majority of the cases (more than 90 
per cent), the answering person is indeed, at least apparently, the CFO, the treasurer or the 
controller. Unless people who complete the questionnaire are dishonest or careless, we should 
therefore have received accurate information. 
In order to encourage willingness to participate, the respondents were promised a copy of the 
summarised results. In the case of Croatia, only 19 companies answered by the end of 
September, and we therefore sent a follow-up letter to the Croatian non-respondents. Sending a 
follow-up letter encouraged a response rate from 12 per cent to 31 per cent. In the case of 
Slovenian companies, 41 companies answered on the questionnaire without any additional 
contact with potential respondents, creating a response rate of 22 per cent, which is 
considered an adequate response rate in comparison to other studies (e.g. the response rate of 
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the 1998 Wharton survey of derivate usage, as reported in Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) 
is 21 per cent). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have provided a review of the methodology used in the most recent 
empirical studies conducted on corporate risk management, as well as the methodology of our 
research. The variables used as proxies to test different hypothesis in the analysed papers have 
been presented in section 3.2., where we have shown how different variables that proxy for 
the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection and costly 
external financing, taxes, hedging substitutes and the managerial utility maximisation 
hypothesis have been used to test whether these rationales influence corporate hedging 
decisions. 
This review has helped us to create our own set of research variables, which we have 
presented in the section 3.3, where we also explain the limitations we had due to data 
unavailability. We have employed a dependent variable in a form of a binary variable which 
SUHVHQWVDGLFKRWRPRXVPHDVXUH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVFRGHGDVD³´IRUWKRVHILUPVWKDW
manage foreign exFKDQJHLQWHUHVWUDWHRUFRPPRGLW\SULFHULVNDQG³´IRUWKRVHILUPVWKDW
GRQRWPDQDJHILQDQFLDOULVNV,QWKHILUVWJURXSRIFRPSDQLHVQDPHG³KHGJHUV´ZHLQFOXGHG
not only the companies that use derivatives instruments as an instrument of corporate risk 
management, but also the companies that use other types of hedging strategies like debt with 
embedded options, operational hedging, natural hedging, international diversification of 
business etc. 
The majority of the earlier empirical studies on risk management such as Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Allayannis and 
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Weston (2001) and Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) have used a dichotomous variable 
that equalled one if a firm has used derivatives and zero if it has not. Because of the decision 
to include all financial risk management activities, our dichotomous variable should not be a 
subject to the inaccurate categorisation of functionally equivalent financial position. This 
allowed us to disentangle derivatives activity from risk management activity, which is a major 
advantage of our approach.  
Additionally, we have expanded our analysis only to the companies that use derivatives as 
risk management instruments. As we have already explained, among companies that manage 
financial risks, there is a substantial number of hedgers who do not use derivatives, but 
manage risk exposure with some other instruments like natural hedge, matching liabilities and 
assets, operational hedging etc. By separating derivative users from companies that do not use 
derivatives, our intention was to show are there some statistically significant differences 
EHWZHHQWKHVHWZRVDPSOHVDQGWRH[SORUHZKHWKHUVRPHVSHFLILFFRPSDQ\¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
affect the decision to hedge by using derivative instruments.  
To examine the relation between hedging and the assumptions that relate to the 
shareholder maximisation hypothesis, we have characterised the cost of financial distress, 
agency cost of debt, taxes and underinvestment problem by employing the following firm-
specific explanatory variables: ILUP¶V VL]H GLYLGHQG SROLF\ LQYHVWPHQW SROLF\ WD[ SROLF\
credit rating, liquidity, and capital structure. On the other hand, in order to test the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis, we have employed several explanatory variables that 
represent the level of managerial firm-specific wealth invested in a company such as 
PDQDJHULDORZQHUVKLSRIDILUP¶VFRPPRQHTXLW\RUVWRFNRSWLRQVDVZHOODVPDQDJHUV¶DJH
and human capital vested in the firm.  
The analysis of variables is followed by section 3.4., where a review of sampling process 
and data collection as well as the econometric and statistical analysis used in the previous 
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studies is presented in sub-section 3.4.1. This again was a base for the econometric analysis 
conducted in our thesis, which has been presented in sub-section 3.4.2. Firstly, we have 
presented summary statistics for the proxy variables, which has given an insight into the 
corporate characteristics of the firms in the samples. Secondly, we have tested the differences 
between means of independent variables for hedgers and non-hedgers as well as derivative 
users and nonusers by using t-test. T-test enables a calculation of statistically significant 
differences between small and mutually unrelated parametric samples. In other words, it 
points to those differences that are not random. Additionally, a correlation analysis was 
conducted by using the Pearson test of correlation as a measure of linear correlation. Finally, 
in our multivariate analysis, binominal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish 
between the possible explanations for the decision to hedge and to use derivatives. We have 
chosen binomial (or binary) logistic regression because it is a form of regression which is 
used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy (limited, discrete and not continuous) and 
the independents are of any type. In our logistic model we have tested whether the decision to 
hedge or not, as well as the decision to hedge with derivatives, is a function of the six factors - 
financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections, taxes, managerial utility, 
and hedge substitutes. Because multiple proxies were available to measure some firm 
characteristics, we have estimated separate logistic regressions, using all possible 
combinations of variables representing each predicted construct. 
Finally, data description and a process of collecting research data have been presented in 
section 3.5. Here we have explained the sampling process for Croatia and Slovenia. Both 
samples contained the biggest non-financial companies, and the criteria for selecting 
companies in the samples were similar for both countries. The Croatian companies needed to 
meet two out of three conditions required by the Croatian Accounting Law15 that relate to 
                                                 
15
 ,Q&URDWLDQ=DNRQRUDþXQRYRGVWYX1DURGQHQRYLQH 
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large companies, while the Slovenian companies were included in the sample if they have met 
two out of three conditions required by the Slovenian Company Law16 related also to large 
companies. We have used a list of the biggest 400 Croatian companies in the year 2005 
published by The Croatian Business Herald and included 157 companies in the sample that 
have met the required criteria. In the case of the Slovenian companies, we have used GVIN 
and AJPES17 electronic data bases that offer a list of all existing companies on the Slovenian 
market, and on the basis of selected criteria, we have chosen 189 companies for further 
analysis. The primary advantage of these samples is that the evidence can be generalised to a 
broad class of firms in different industries. Empirical research was conducted on large non-
financial companies because these companies have acess to derivatives markets and should 
have developed risk management function. Financial firms are excluded from the sample 
because most of them are also market makers, hence their motivation in using derivatives may 
be different from the motivations of non-financial firms.  
Data were collected from two sources: from annual reports and notes to the financial 
statements for the fiscal year 2005, and through our survey. A survey questionnaire was 
DGGUHVVHGWRWKHILUP¶VFKLHIILQDQFLDORIILFHURULIWKHUHZDVQRVXFKSRVLWLRQWRWKHILQDQFLDO
controller or the treasurer. The questionnaire covered three broad areas; foreign exchange rate 
risk management, interest rate risk management and commodity price risk management. 
Additionally, a part of the questionnaire referred to those companies that classified themselves 
as non-hedgers in order to search for reasons not to manage financial risks. The questionnaire 
was mailed at the beginning of September 2006 to the Croatian and Slovenian managers 
involved in the financial risk management decision. The questionnaires were addressed to a 
specific individual. We asked firms to tell us who actually filled out the questionnaire. In the 
vast majority of cases (more than 90 per cent), the answering person is indeed, at least 
                                                 
16
 In SlovHQH=DNRQRJRVSRGDUVNLKGUXåEDK8UDGQLOLVW 
17
 See section 3.5. for detailed explanation of GVIN and AJPES databases.  
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apparently, the CFO, the treasurer or the controller. Unless people who complete the 
questionnaire are dishonest or careless, we should therefore have received accurate 
information. 
In order to encourage willingness to participate, the respondents were promised a copy of the 
summarised results. A follow-up letter was also sent to non-responding Croatian companies at 
the end of September 2006, which has encouraged a response rate from 12 per cent to 31 per 
cent, while 41 Slovenian companies answered the questionnaire without any additional 
contact with the potential respondents, creating the response rate of 22 per cent. An adequate 
response rate is the problem that has been often raised in research based on a survey. We 
believe that the achieved response rates regarding both the Croatian and Slovenian samples 
are satisfactory for statistical generalisation (e.g. the response rate of the 1998 Wharton 
survey of derivate usage, as reported in Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) is 21 per cent). 
However, it is important to mention that the inability to compare the survey results to the data 
of non-responding companies should be treated as a limitation of our research.  
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4. CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IN CROATIAN COMPANIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we present the research results on risk management practices in 
Croatian companies. In section 4.2. summary statistics of cRPSDQLHV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV are 
presented. The aim of the section is to provide a detailed description of risk management 
practices for large Croatian non-financial companies. We have explored how many companies 
manage financial risks, whether they manage all three types of financial risks and what kind 
of risk management instruments they use. We also asked financial managers about the 
intensity of influence of financial risks on the performance of their companies. Managers 
were questioned about the scope of WKHULVNPDQDJHPHQWSROLF\WKHILUP¶VKHGJLQJKRUL]RQ
the corporate risk management goals and the use of VaR or Monte Carlo analysis or some 
RWKHUW\SHRIVLPXODWLRQWHFKQLTXHVDVPHDVXUHVRIWKHILUP¶VULVNH[SRVXUH$GGLWLRQDOO\ZH
have explored which financial institutions and intermediaries are the most important in 
providing risk management instruments and what are the reasons why Croatian companies do 
not manage corporate risks or use derivative instruments.  
In section 4.3. results of univariate analysis have been presented. The analysis was 
conducted for two different groups. In the first group, we explored differences between sub-
samples of hedgers and nonhedgers, while in the second group we investigated the differences 
between companies that are derivative users and those companies that do not use derivatives. 
In both cases, we have employed the Pearson test of correlation as well as t-test for two 
unrelated means to determine whether the means of two unrelated samples differ regarding 
the size of the company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial shareholdings, 
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WD[HV DOWHUQDWLYH ILQDQFLDO SROLF\ DV VXEVWLWXWHV IRU KHGJLQJ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶
ownership.  
In section 4.4. we present the results of multivariate analysis for Croatian companies. The 
variables tested in our multivariate regression model are based on the determinants we have 
presented in the literature review as the key rationales of corporate hedging decision. The 
reviewed papers have suggested that, if corporate hedging decisions are capable of increasing 
firm values, they can do so for reasons such as the following: the reduction of the probability 
or costs of financial distress, taxes or transactions costs, the costs associated with information 
³DV\PPHWULHV´Ey signalling management's view of the company's prospects to investors, and 
WKH UHGXFWLRQRI³DJHQF\´SUREOHPV FRQIOLFWVRI LQWHUHVW DPRQJPDQDJHPHQW VKDUHKROGHUV
and creditors). We have employed logistic regression where we have tested the hypothesis 
that the decision to hedge or not, as well as the decision to hedge with derivatives, is a 
function of the six factors - financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market 
imperfections, tax incentives to hedge, managerial utility and hedge substitutes. The analysis 
presented in this chapter should produce a reasonable picture of risk management practices as 
well as rationales in the analysed Croatian firms. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
  
A survey has revealed that 73.5 per cent of respondents are using some form of financial 
risks hedging to manage interest-rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk, while 26.5 per 
cent of them do not manage financial risks at all. Results of univariate and multivariate 
analysis in which we analyse hedgers and nonhedgers separately are presented in sections 4.3. 
and 4.4. 
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Graph 4.1. Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers 
27%
73%
Nonhedgers Hedgers
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Additionally, we have expanded our analysis to companies that use or do not use 
derivatives as risk management instruments. Thus, among companies that manage financial 
risks, there is a substantial number of hedgers who do not use derivatives, but manage risk 
exposure with some other instruments like natural hedge, operational hedging, hedge 
substitutes, etc. By separating derivative users from companies that do not use derivatives, our 
intention was to show are there some statistically significant differences between these two 
VDPSOHVDQGWRH[SORUHZKHWKHUVRPHVSHFLILFFRPSDQ\¶VFKDracteristics affect the decision 
to hedge by using derivative instruments. We have created the two samples by taking together 
companies that manage risks but not with derivatives and companies that do not manage 
financial risks at all in the first sample, while in the second sample we have analysed only 
those companies that manage financial risks with derivatives.  
In this section we present only descriptive statistics, while results of univariate and 
multivariate analysis in which we analyse derivative users and nonusers separately are 
presented in sections 4.3. and 4.4. It can be seen that fifteen companies (41 per cent of 
companies that declare themselves as hedgers) manage corporate risks, but do not use 
derivatives as a risk management instrument. In other words, 43 per cent of the responding 
Croatian companies use derivative instruments for managing corporate risks (see graph 4.2.). 
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This result is similar to the findings of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) who have revealed 
that 50 per cent of US non-financial companies are using some form of financial engineering to 
manage interest rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk. However, it should be noted 
that the time difference needs to be taken into account. We believe that the use of derivatives has 
grown since 1998 in the US as well as globally, therefore results of our survey cannot be directly 
compared to those of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998).  
 
Graph 4.2. Croatian companies that use derivatives as risk management instrument 
57%
43%
Derivative non-users Derivative users
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
In the survey questionnaire we asked financial managers about the intensity of influence 
of all three types of financial risks on the performance of their companies. Results showed 
that the price risk and currency risk have the highest influence - 61.2 per cent of financial 
managers claim that price risk has a strong or very strong influence on the company 
performance, while 59.2 per cent of them think the same for currency risk. These numbers are 
followed by 44.9 per cent of managers who claim that the influence of interest-rate risk is 
strong or very strong. On the basis of their answers, both hedgers and nonhedgers, it could be 
concluded that Croatian companies are highly exposed to all three types of financial risk. 
We believe that these findings could be explained by the fact that Croatia is a small and 
relatively open economy, which results in great exposure of companies to financial risks, 
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especially to foreign exchange risk and commodity price risk due to the high dependence of 
the Croatian economy on international trade, especially on import activity. Exposure to the 
interest-UDWHULVNLVDUHVXOWRIH[WHUQDOILQDQFLQJWKURXJKERUURZLQJDFWLYLW\0LORãKDV
argued that the majority of Croatian companies are highly dependent on bank loans as the 
most important instrument of external corporate financing, while raising capital through debt 
securities is very rare among Croatian companies.  However, our results have shown that the 
long-term debt-to-assets ratio as a measure of corporate indebtedness ranges from 0 to 72.5 
per cent, while the mean value for Croatian companies is 21.7 per cent. Graham and Campbell 
(2001) have argued that companies are highly leveraged if the debt-to-assets ratio exceeds 30 
per cent, therefore it could be concluded that Croatian companies in the sample are not highly 
leveraged, which may explain why interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important in 
comparison with currency and commodity price risks.  
 
Graph 4.3. )LQDQFLDOULVNVLQIOXHQFHRQWKH&URDWLDQFRPSDQLHV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
no influence
low influence
medium influence
strong influence
very strong influence
currency risk interest-rate risk commodity price risk
commodity price risk 10,20408163 14,28571429 14,28571429 24,48979592 36,73469388
interest-rate risk 10,20408163 12,24489796 32,65306122 24,48979592 20,40816327
currency risk 2,040816327 4,081632653 34,69387755 28,57142857 30,6122449
no influence low influence medium influence strong influence very strong influence
 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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When we asked companies if they manage all three types of financial risks, 23 out of 36 
companies that declare themselves as hedgers claimed that they manage currency, interest rate 
and price risk, while 13 companies manage some but not all types of financial risks.  
Regarding the use and importance of different risk management instruments in risk 
management strategy, we have presented results in tables 4.1., 4.2. and 4.3. It could be 
concluded that the currency structure match of assets and liabilities is the most important 
instrument in managing currency risk. In respect to the use of derivatives, the currenc y 
forward is the most important and frequently used instrument, followed by currency swap as 
the second most important derivative instrument. Other derivatives such as currency futures, 
stock-exchange and OTC options, and structured derivatives are not frequently used by 
Croatian companies. As well, hybrid securities and operational hedging are not important 
currency risk management instruments.  
 
Table 4.1. Currency risk management instruments used by Croatian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
1. Matching currency structure of assets 
and liabilities (e.g. debt in foreign 
currency) 
88.2 61 1 14 15 
2. Currency forward 44.1 30.6 3 5 7 
3. Currency futures 5.9 4.1  2  
4. Currency swap 14.7 10.2 2 1 2 
5. Stock-Exchange Currency option  0 0    
6. OTC (over-the-counter) currency 
option 5.9 4.1 2   
7. Structured derivatives (e.g. currency 
swaption) 0 0    
8. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible 
bonds or preferred stocks) 2.9 2.0  1  
9. Operational hedging (International 
diversification ± moving part of the 
business abroad)  
8.8 6.1 1 2  
10. Other instruments - avoidance of 
operations in volatile currencies 2.9 2.0  1  
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Interest rate risk in Croatian companies is hedged most frequently by matching maturity of 
assets and liabilities. Again, forward contract and swap are the most important derivative 
instruments in risk management strategy, but in contrast to currency risk management, interest 
rate swap is more important than interest rate forward and is used by 27.6 per cent of 
companies that declare themselves as hedgers. Similarly to currency risk management, other 
derivative instruments do not play an important role in managing interest rate risk, but hybrid 
securities that are considered as substitutes for hedging have gained importance in comparison 
with currency risk management.  
 
Table 4.2. Interest-rate risk management instruments used by Croatian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
1. Matching maturity of assets and 
liabilities 89.7  53.1 1 8 17 
2. Interest rate forward 13.8 8.2 1 2 1 
3. Interest rate futures 0 0    
4. Interest rate swap 27.6 16.3 5 3 8 
5. Stock-Exchange interest rate option 3.6 2.0  1  
6. OTC (over-the-counter) interest rate 
option 0 0    
7. Structured derivatives (e.g. cap, floor, 
collar, corridor or swaption) 3.6 2.0 1   
8. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds 
or preferred stocks) 10.7 6.1 2 1  
9. Other instruments ± combining debt 
with fixed and fluctuating interest-rates 
 
3.6 2.0  1  
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
There is a lower frequency of commodity risk management amongst Croatian companies. 
Price risk management is usually hedged naturally by managing assets and liabilities. Among 
derivatives instruments the commodity forward is the most important, but not as popular as 
the currency forward. For the first time, futures contracts are used as representatives of 
standardised derivative instruments traded on the financial market. Contrary to the findings 
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presented while analysing currency and interest-rate risk, the commodity swap has not been 
used at all, and the same is true of other derivative instruments. Business diversification 
through mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations is quite important in 
managing price risk and has been used by 28.6 per cent of the analysed Croatian companies.  
 
Table 4.3. Price risk management instruments used by Croatian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
1. Managing assets and liabilities 96.4 55.1 1 6 20 
2. Commodity forward 14.3 8.2  2 2 
3. Commodity futures 7.1 4.1  1 1 
4. Commodity swap 0 0    
5. Stock-Exchange commodity option  0 0    
6. OTC (over-the-counter) commodity 
option 0 0    
7. Structured derivatives (combination of 
swaps, future contacts and options) 0 0    
8. Business diversification through 
mergers, acquisitions, and other 
business combinations 
28.6 16.3 2 2 4 
9. Other instruments ± like market 
diversification or long term contracts 
with suppliers where prices of goods are 
fixed  
 
10.7 6.1 1 1 1 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
The results of the survey clearly indicate that Croatian non-financial companies stick 
primarily with simple risk management instruments like natural hedging. Where derivatives 
are used, forwards and swaps are by far the most important instruments, which leads to the 
conclusion that the use of over-the-counter instruments dominates the exchange-traded 
instruments. Additionally, there is a lower frequency of commodity price risk management 
use among firms in comparison with interest-rate and currency risks. These findings are 
consistent to Bodnar et.al. (1995), Jesswein (1995), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Bodnar 
and Gebhardt (1998) as well as to Bodnar, Jong and Macrae (2003).  
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Regarding the scope of corporate risk management policy, 88.9 per cent of hedgers claim 
that they use selective hedging, while 11.1 per cent of them manage financial risks 
completely. Among the analysed Croatian companies, there appeared to be a decided 
SUHIHUHQFH IRU DFWLYH RU ³YLHZ-GULYHQ´ ULVN PDQDJHPHQW DV RSSRVHG WR D IXOO-cover or 
variance-minimising hedging approach. Only 36 per cent of the companies that manage 
financial risks have a documented policy regarding the use of financial risk management 
instruments, while the majority of hedgers manage risks without an official policy. 
Additionally, only 8.3 per cent of hedgers use Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk exposure, 
while 11.1 per cent of them use Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation 
techniques as measures of risk exposure. The survey has revealed that 71 per cent of analysed 
FRPSDQLHVPDQDJHULVNIRUWUDQVDFWLRQZLWKPDWXULW\XSWRD\HDU¶VWLPH7KHUHIRUHLWFRXOG
be concluded that the hedging horizon for financial risk management is typically less than one 
year  
An important issue in corporate risk management is defining its goals. The theoretical 
financial literature strongly recommends focusing on cash flows or on the value of the 
company. A focus on accounting numbers is generally discarded (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 
1998). However, the results of the Croatian survey have shown that the primary goal of 
hedging is managing volatility of cash flows, but that Croatian firms focus also on managing 
balance sheet and financial ratios. Some 80 per cent of respondents indicate that their key 
motive behind financial hedging is to decrease the volatility of cash flows; however, 
stabilising balance sheet and financial ratios is a close second (68.6 per cent respectively). 
Only 40 per cent of them claim that the market value of the company is the primary goal of 
corporate risk management. It should be emphasised that there is a strong link between the 
Croatian financial accounting and tax accounting. As a result of those institutional features, 
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we believe that there is a strong focus on accounting earnings in all business decisions and 
consequently also in hedging decisions.  
 
Graph 4.4. Corporate risk management goals in Croatian companies 
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Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Commercial banks are by far the primary source for derivatives transactions for 87.5 per  
cent of Croatian hedgers. Investment banks, insurance companies and exchange/ brokerage 
houses are not a very important source for derivative transaction, and very few Croatian firms 
use them as counterparties.  
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Graph 4.5. Importance of different counterparties in providing risk management instruments 
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Source: Croatian survey data 
 
The most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives as risk management 
LQVWUXPHQWV MXGJHG E\ ILQDQFLDO PDQDJHUV¶ RSLQLRQ DUH DV IROORZV 6RPH  SHU FHQW RI
managers argued that the supply of risk management instruments traded on domestic financial 
market is insufficient, while 53.9 per cent of them claimed the same for instruments offered 
by financial institutions (commercial and investment banks, etc.). Very important reasons that 
have influenced decision not to hedge financial risks are the costs of establishing and 
maintaining risk management programmes that exceed the benefits of it, as well as difficulties 
in pricing and valuing derivatives (50 per cent of financial managers numbered these two 
reasons as very important).  
Other reasons like concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors, regulators 
and the public, insufficient exposure to financial risks, insufficient knowledge about financial 
risk management instruments, and inefficiency and high costs of risk management 
instruments are not very important reasons why companies in Croatia do not hedge. On the 
basis of the respondents answers and informal interviews conducted at the 3 rd Annual 
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Conference of the Croatian Association of Corporate Treasurers held in September 2006, it 
could be concluded that, despite the fact that there is an increasing number of non-financial 
companies which are aware of the importance of corporate risk management, a lack of 
suitable instruments offered to them by domestic financial industry becomes a leading factor 
why many companies do not use derivatives when managing risks.  
This problem has the strongest impact on the shipbuilding industry. Anecdotal evidence 
collected through contacts with managers in a few Croatian shipbuilding companies has 
revealed that they are highly exposed to foreign exchange risk due to the sales revenues being 
denominated in the US dollars, while operating cost are in the Croatian national currency. 
Unfortunately, providers of currency risk management instruments (mainly commercial 
banks) are not able or willing to offer them adequate instruments which would protect their 
cash-flows from the currency risk that emerges from their specific economic position.  
 
Graph 4.6. Reasons why Croatian companies do not use derivative instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Regarding the industry structure of respondents, it can be seen from graph 4.7. that the 
majority of analysed companies (48 per cent) are manufacturers, followed by the trade 
companies, which hold a share of 20 per cent. 12 per cent of companies are from the 
construction and building sector, while the rest of them belong to other industry sectors.  
 
 
Graph 4.7. Industry structure of the analysed Croatian companies 
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Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Around 60 per cent of the responding companies were established more than 20 years ago. 
7DNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW WKDW WKHOHQJWKRIDFRPSDQ\¶VH[LVWHQFHLVRIWHQ taken as a measure of 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQHJVHH'LDPRQGD3HWHUVHQDQG5DMDQ%ROWRQDQG
Freixas (2000) and Hege (2002)), it could be concluded that, among the analysed companies, 
the majority of them are companies with the best reputation on the Croatian market and are 
market leaders. Therefore it is expected that the companies in the sample have a developed 
corporate risk management function, as this function is one of the most important objectives 
of modern corporate strategy.  
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4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
 
In this sub-section we present descriptive statistics of the variables we have used in our 
univariate analysis as well as in the logistic regression model. From the tables presented 
below, it can be seen that the majority of companies do not have credit rating, or tax 
incentives to hedge, while 51 per cent of respondents are public companies and are listed on 
the stock-exchange.  
 
Table 4.4. Credit rating of Croatian companies  
  Frequency Percent 
Do not have credit rating  39 79.6 
Have credit rating 10 20.4 
Total 49 100.0 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Table 4.5. Tax incentives of Croatian companies (tax loss carried forward, tax loss carried 
back and/or investment tax credits) 
  Frequency Percent 
Do not have tax incentives 31 63.3 
Have tax incentives 18 36.7 
Total 49 100.0 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Table 4.6. Croatian companies listed on the stock-exchange 
  Frequency Percent 
No 24 49.0 
Yes 25 51.0 
Total 49 100.0 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
Descriptive statistics of other company characteristics like the value of total assets, total 
sales, debt-to-equity ratio, dividend pay-out ratio, liquidity ratio, which were used as 
independent variables in the univariate and multivariate analysis, are shown in table 4.7. We 
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have presented minimal and maximal values as well as averages. The value of total assets 
ranges from Euro 3,117,000 to 3,796,086,000, with a mean value of Euro 262,189,670. The 
value of total sales revenues ranges from Euro 162,000 to 1,304,680,000, with a mean value 
of Euro 129,032,610.   
The long-term debt-to-assets ratio ranges from 0 to 72.5 per cent, while the mean value is 
21.7 per cent. Ownership by institutional investors ranges from 0 per cent to 72.5 per cent, but 
the average share is quite small and amounts to 6.78 per cent. The dividend pay-out ratio also 
ranges from 0 to 98 per cent, with the average value of 15.5 per cent. A very significant 
difference within the companies in the sample could be seen in the value of liquidity ratio 
which ranges from 0.02 to 25.61. It could be concluded that there is substantial variation in 
many of these variables, and that the results have shown a wide variation in financing policies 
and size within the sample. 
5HJDUGLQJ WKH PDQDJHUV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV WKH DYHUDJH VKDUH RI VWRFN RZQHUVKLS WKDW
managers hold in their companies is 19.3 per cent, while the maximum is 100 per cent. It 
could be concluded that the analysed Croatian companies are to a great extent owned by their 
managers. This is due to the Croatian privatisation process as well as to the ESOP 
programmes that have been employed in the Croatian corporate sector. Some 45 per cent of 
PDQDJHUV DUH EHWZHHQ  DQG  \HDUV ROG ZKLOH WKH DYHUDJH PDQDJHUV¶ WHQXUH LQ WKH
company is 12.35 years.  
The gender structure is almost equal ± 49 per cent are females, while 51 per cent of 
managers are males, which could be considered as interesting information in respect to world 
trends, which show that the position of financial manager is among the 20 leading occupations 
of employed women. This argument is confirmed by the fact that, in the year 2004, 55.7 per 
cent of financial managers in the US were women (see: www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm). 
Traditionally, the functions of financial managers in Croatian companies were performed by 
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men, but the data collected in our research show that this trend is changing. Managers are well 
educated persons ± SHUFHQWRIWKHPKROGDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHSHUFHQWKROGPDVWHU¶VRU
PhD, while 47 per cent of respondents have completed training in risk management. In respect 
of their education and knowledge, managers in the analysed companies should be able to 
realise the importance of the risk management function to the success of their companies as 
well as being capable of implementing and developing it. 
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Table 4.7. Descriptive statistics of independent variables ± Croatian sample  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness  
  Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Total assets 49 3,117 3,796,086 262,189.67 599,929.59 4.848 .340 
Total sales revenues 49 162 1,304,680 129,032.61 213,620.29 4.321 .340 
Debt-to-assets ratio 49 .0569 1.6767 .536147 .310749 1.001 .340 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 48 .0000 .7240 .217236 .182465 1.112 .343 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 48 -3.1860 22.9220 1.592013 4.072219 4.042 .343 
Interest cover ratio 44 -13.7689 120.2259 9.966513 23.660138 3.692 .357 
Share owned by institutional 
investors 48 .0000 .7250 0.06776 .145301 2.983 .343 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-
assets ratio 48 .0006 .3599 0.07488 0.0874973 1.522 .343 
Investment expenditures-to-
assets ratio 49 .0000 .5642 0.0885203 0.0105411 2.501 .340 
Investment expenditures-to-sales 
ratio 49 .0000 4.1468 .229198 .609356 5.830 .340 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 47 .0000 .0546 0.0454177 0.0109967 3.030 .347 
Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs 49 .00 988,041 41,355.8980 159,879.3119 5.029 .340 
Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs-to-total 
assets 
49 .0000 31.1823 .714151 4.451312 6.962 .340 
Investment tax credits 48 .00 9,660 298.3125 1,438.9671 6.187 .343 
Value of equity owned by 
managers 49 .0 108,566.0 7,010.596 18,523.473 4.239 .340 
Share of the company owned by 
management 49 .000 1.000 .19263 .33858 1.775 .340 
Managers tenure 49 2 38 12.35 10.36 1.095 .340 
Dividend pay-out ratio 43 .00 .98 .1550 .2663 1.605 .361 
Quick ratio 48 .0009 6.2500 .547654 1.044173 3.947 .343 
Liquidity ratio 49 .0216 25.6076 2.680185 3.959613 4.443 .340 
Share of the company owned by 
foreign investors 49 .0000 1.0000 .245890 .370236 1.171 .340 
   (Variables that are presented in absolute values are in Euro 000) 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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4.3 Univariate Analysis 
 
In this section, results of univariate analysis for the Croatian sample have been presented. 
We have employed t-test to determine if the means of two unrelated samples differ. 
Additionally, we have conducted the Pearson test of correlation because variables in the 
model are of an interval/ratio nature (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The analysis has been 
conducted for two different groups. In the first group, we have explored differences between 
the sub-samples of hedgers and nonhedgers, while in the second group we have investigated 
differences between companies that are derivative users and those companies that do not use 
derivatives.  
Table 4.8 presents summary statistics for the proxy variables described in the previous 
sections, while table 4.9 presents tests of differences between the means of these variables for 
hedgers and nonhedgers. According to a mean comparison test conducted for the sub-sample 
of hedgers/nonhedgers, our univariate test has discovered that hedgers are statistically 
different from nonhedgers with respect to variable that proxy for alternative financial policy 
as substitutes for hedging. Hedgers have a statistically greater quick ratio as a measure of 
short-term liquidity. We argued in chapter 2 that, although hedge substitutes are not 
considered as a special kind of risk management strategy, alternative financial policies can 
DOVR UHGXFH D ILUP¶V ULVN ZLWKRXW UHTXLULQJ WKH ILUP WR GLUHFWO\ HQJDJH LQ ULVN PDQDJHPHQW
activities. Firms could adopt conservative financial policies such as maintaining low leverage 
and a low dividend pay-out ratio or carrying large cash balances to protect them against 
potential financial difficulties (a form of negative leverage). Greater use of these substitute 
risk management activities should be associated with less financial risk management 
activities. Therefore, the coefficient on quick ratio is predicted to be negative (see: Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 
and Harford, 1999). Contrary to our prediction as well as to the findings of the cited 
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studies, our results show a positive relation between the decision to hedge and this 
explanatory variable, suggesting that companies that are more liquid are more likely to 
hedge. Therefore, our assumption regarding hedging substitutes should be rejected in the 
case of the Croatian companies.  
Another statistically significant variable is company ownership by foreign investors. 
Although other scholars have not examined this hypothesis, the specific economic situation 
in Croatia and the high value of foreign direct investments in the last five years has 
prompted us to examine whether foreign ownership of a company plays an important role 
in the decision to hedge risks. Our t-test has shown that hedgers have a statistically higher 
share owed by foreign investors in comparison with nonhedgers, which is confirmed with 
the correlation analysis (see table 4.12., Pearson correlation coefficient = 312). This result 
could be explained by the fact that investing companies which have headquarters in various 
countries (major investors in the Croatian business sector are companies from Austria, 
Germany, Italy, etc.), have enforced employment of corporate risk management in the 
acquired Croatian companies.  
The univariate tests suggest that hedgers are not statistically different from nonhedgers 
with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection, 
tax preference items, or managerial utility. Hedgers and nonhedgers do not differ regarding 
the size of the company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial shareholdings, 
ownership by institutional investors etc. In other words, on the basis of the univariate results, 
we should reject all research assumptions regarding the shareholder maximisation hypothesis 
and the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. Additionally, we should reject our 
hypothesis regarding alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management 
strategies. Our findings predict the opposite sign to what we have assumed, suggesting that 
companies that are more liquid have more incentives to hedge.  
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Table 4.8. Group statistics Croatian hedgers/non-hedgers 
 Hedgers/Nonhedgers N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Total assets 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 116,660.15 169,885.68 47,117.81 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 314,742.00 687,747.11 114,624.52 
Total sales revenues 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 58,597.77 44,758.38 12,413.74 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 154,467.42 243,697.19 40,616.20 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .624141 .296878 8.23392E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .504371 .313527 5.22544E-02 
Debt rating 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 7.692E-02 .2774 7.692E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .2500 .4392 7.319E-02 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .227984 .177947 4.93537E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 .213244 .186513 3.15264E-02 
Long-term debt-to-equity 
ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 1.855125 4.423624 1.226892 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 1.494286 3.997587 .675716 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 14.194680 27.878622 7.732139 
Companies that manage financial risks 31 8.193411 21.920321 3.937006 
Share owned by institutional 
investors 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 3.54154E-02 8.47931E-02 2.35174E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 7.94486E-02 .161575 2.73112E-02 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-
assets ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 6.22790E-02 7.98069E-02 2.21345E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 7.95655E-02 9.08391E-02 1.53546E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 4.55073E-02 4.59472E-02 1.27435E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .104053 .116531 1.94218E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-
sales ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 5.22958E-02 5.73013E-02 1.58925E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .293079 .701630 .116938 
R&D expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 3.12318E-03 9.76239E-03 2.70760E-03 
Companies that manage financial risks 34 5.08416E-03 1.15245E-02 1.97644E-03 
Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 86,849.3077 271,609.6296 75,330.9574 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 24,927.7222 93,360.1516 15,560.0253 
Total value of tax loss carry- Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 2.474096 8.627105 2.392728 
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forward and carry backs-to-
total assets 
  
Companies that manage financial risks 36 7.86145E-02 .300018 5.00030E-02 
Investment tax credits 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 743.0769 2,679.2019 743.0769 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 133.1143 474.5025 80.2056 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .5385 .5189 .1439 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .3056 .4672 7.786E-02 
Value of equity owned by 
managers 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 3,354.685 5,429.100 1,505.761 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 8,330.786 21,300.245 3,550.041 
Share of the company owned 
by management 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .34574 .44983 .12476 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .13734 .27567 4.5945E-02 
Managers ownership of stock 
options 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 12 8.33E-02 .29 8.33E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .11 .32 5.31E-02 
Managers age 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 3.31 .95 .26 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 3.28 .91 .15 
Managers tenure 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 15.15 9.21 2.55 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 11.33 10.69 1.78 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 12 4.358E-02 .1305 3.767E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 31 .1982 .2935 5.271E-02 
Company listed on the stock-
exchange 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .38 .51 .14 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .56 .50 8.40E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 .187749 .252538 7.00414E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 35 .681333 1.190270 .201192 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 1.675826 1.754851 .486708 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 3.042870 4.464996 .744166 
Share of the company owned 
by foreign investors 
  
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 5.58154E-02 .177023 4.90973E-02 
Companies that manage financial risks 36 .314528 .398721 6.64536E-02 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Table 4.9. Independent samples t-test Croatian hedgers/non-hedgers 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality 
of Means       
    F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
           Lower Upper 
Total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.928 .171 -1.021 47 .313 -198,081.85 194,037.16 -588,434.26 192,270.57 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.598 44.151 .117 -198,081.85 123,930.90 -447,824.09 51,660.40 
Total sales 
revenues 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.835 .099 -1.401 47 .168 -95,869.65 68,439.64 -233,552.44 41,813.15 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.257 40.806 .029 -95,869.65 42,470.89 -181,653.75 -10,085.55 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
Equal variances 
assumed .170 .682 1.196 47 .238 .119770 .100102 -8.160819E-02 .321149 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.228 22.368 .232 .119770 9.75206E-02 -8.228224E-02 .321823 
Debt rating 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 10.376 .002 -1.324 47 .192 -.1731 .1307 -.4361 8.994E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.630 34.007 .112 -.1731 .1062 -.3889 4.271E-02 
Long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .014 .906 .246 46 .807 1.47397E-02 5.98659E-02 -.105764 .135244 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .252 22.471 .804 1.47397E-02 5.85637E-02 -.106567 .136046 
Long-term debt-to-
equity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .685 .412 .270 46 .788 .360839 1.335894 -2.328176 3.049853 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .258 19.743 .799 .360839 1.400663 -2.563334 3.285011 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.480 .231 .764 42 .449 6.001269 7.856053 -9.852887 21.855425 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .692 18.531 .498 6.001269 8.676749 -12.190565 24.193103 
Share owned by 
institutional 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.258 .140 -.932 46 .356 -4.403319E-02 4.72600E-02 -.139163 5.10962E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.222 40.314 .229 -4.403319E-02 3.60412E-02 -.116858 2.87911E-02 
Cash & cash 
equivalents-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .286 .595 -.604 46 .549 -1.728653E-02 2.86130E-02 -7.488153E-02 4.03085E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.642 24.339 .527 -1.728653E-02 2.69388E-02 -7.284454E-02 3.82715E-02 
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Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.763 .058 -1.753 47 .086 -5.854539E-02 3.33946E-02 -.125727 8.63598E-03 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.520 46.491 .015 -5.854539E-02 2.32293E-02 -.105290 -1.180053E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
sales ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.783 .102 -1.228 47 .226 -.240784 .196139 -.635365 .153797 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.040 36.269 .049 -.240784 .118013 -.480064 -1.503154E-03 
R&D expenditures-
to-assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .828 .368 -.543 45 .590 -1.960984E-03 3.61375E-03 -9.239450E-03 5.31748E-03 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.585 25.557 .564 -1.960984E-03 3.35223E-03 -8.857404E-03 4.93544E-03 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.667 .036 1.202 47 .235 61,921.5855 51494.2900 -41,671.5640 165,514.7349 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .805 13.038 .435 61,921.5855 76,921.1774 -104,207.7188 228,050.8898 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs-to-
total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 12.825 .001 1.695 47 .097 2.395482 1.413014 -.447136 5.238100 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.001 12.010 .337 2.395482 2.393251 -2.818459 7.609423 
Investment tax 
credits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 8.352 .006 1.315 46 .195 609.9626 463.7890 -323.5962 1,543.5215 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .816 12.281 .430 609.9626 747.3930 -1,014.3489 2,234.2741 
Tax incentives-
dummy 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.018 .162 1.497 47 .141 .2329 .1556 -8.0139E-02 .5460 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.423 19.482 .170 .2329 .1636 -.1090 .5748 
Value of equity 
owned by managers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.627 .112 -.827 47 .412 -4,976.101 6,013.516 -17,073.735 7,121.533 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.290 44.523 .204 -4,976.101 3,856.178 -12,745.138 2,792.936 
Share of the 
company owned by 
management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 10.182 .003 1.957 47 .056 .20839 .10646 -5.78067E-03 .42257 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.567 15.379 .137 .20839 .13295 -7.43788E-02 .49117 
Managers 
ownership of stock 
options 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .297 .588 -.267 46 .790 -2.78E-02 .10 -.24 .18 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.281 20.683 .781 -2.78E-02 9.88E-02 -.23 .18 
Managers age 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .101 .752 .100 47 .921 2.99E-02 .30 -.57 .63 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .099 20.619 .922 2.99E-02 .30 -.60 .66 
Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .003 .955 1.143 47 .259 3.82 3.34 -2.91 10.55 
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Equal variances not 
assumed   1.227 24.528 .232 3.82 3.11 -2.60 10.24 
Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 14.493 .000 -1.749 41 .088 -.1546 8.838E-02 -.3331 2.388E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.387 40.007 .022 -.1546 6.478E-02 -.2855 -2.3677E-02 
Company listed on 
the stock-exchange 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .686 .412 -1.047 47 .300 -.17 .16 -.50 .16 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.045 21.190 .308 -.17 .16 -.51 .17 
Quick ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.531 .039 -1.473 46 .147 -.493584 .334999 -1.167903 .180735 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.317 41.033 .026 -.493584 .213036 -.923808 -6.336032E-02 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.276 .264 -1.069 47 .291 -1.367044 1.279344 -3.940752 1.206664 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.537 46.520 .131 -1.367044 .889195 -3.156360 .422273 
Share of the 
company owned by 
foreign investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 23.723 .000 -2.249 47 .029 -.258712 .115035 -.490133 -2.729163E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -3.131 44.749 .003 -.258712 8.26233E-02 -.425150 -9.227469E-02 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Regarding the univariate analysis of another sub-sample where we have explored 
statistically significant differences between companies that use derivative instruments and 
those which do not use them, table 4.10 presents summary statistics for the proxy variables, 
while table 4.11 presents tests of differences between the means of these variables for 
derivative users and nonusers. According to a mean comparison test, our univariate test has 
discovered that derivative users are statistically different from nonusers with respect to 
variables that are proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging as well as 
for capital market imperfection and costly external financing. Derivative users have a 
statistically greater quick ratio as well as a greater ratio of investment expenditures to the 
book value of assets. This finding suggests that these two groups differ with respect to 
proxies for short-term liquidity and investment (growth) opportunities.  
Similarly to the anaO\VLVRIKHGJHUVDQGQRQKHGJHUVDFRPSDQ\¶VTXLFNUDWLRKDVEHHQ
XVHGDVDSUR[\IRUWKHILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\DQGthe coefficient on this variable is predicted to be 
negative (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 
1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). Our results show a positive relation between the 
decision to use derivatives and the value of the quick ratio, suggesting that companies that 
have a higher quick ratio have more incentives to use derivatives. Consistent with these 
results, the correlation (see table 4.12.) between quick ratio and hedging is positive 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.383).  
$QRWKHU VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW YDULDEOH LV WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ratio of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets. Our t-test has shown that derivative users have a 
statistically higher value for this ratio, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis 
(Pearson rho = 384), suggesting that there is a positive relation between the value of a 
FRPSDQ\¶VLQYHVWPHQWDQG the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with our 
prediction that the benefits of hedging should be greater the more growth options there are in 
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WKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\VHWDQGZLWKWKHILQGLQJVRI%HVVHPELQGHU'REVRQ
and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) 
and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). Other variables that have been used to test the agency cost 
of debt and capital market imperfection hypothesis have not shown statistically significant 
differences between analysed derivative users and nonusers.  
The conducted t-tests and correlation analysis suggest that derivative users are not 
statistically different from nonusers with respect to other research assumptions regarding 
the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, tax preference items, or managerial utility. 
It could be concluded that, similarly to the findings in the case of hedgers and nonhedgers, we 
should reject all research assumptions regarding the managerial utility maximisation 
hypothesis and the shareholder maximisation hypothesis ± apart from capital market 
imperfection and costly external financing. Additionally, we should reject our hypothesis 
regarding alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management strategies. Our 
findings predict the opposite sign to what we assumed, suggesting that companies that are 
more liquid are using derivatives, while those that are less liquid do not use these risk 
management instruments.   
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Table 4.10. Group statistics Croatian derivative users/non-users 
 Derivative users N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Total sales revenues 
  
No 28 84,206.71 63,909.92 12,077.84 
Yes 21 188,800.48 312,158.22 68,118.51 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
No 28 .582110 .240959 4.55369E-02 
Yes 21 .474863 .382717 8.35156E-02 
Debt rating 
  
No 28 .1786 .3900 7.371E-02 
Yes 21 .2381 .4364 9.524E-02 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
No 27 .191917 .145948 2.80877E-02 
Yes 21 .249789 .220388 4.80926E-02 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 
  
No 27 1.147994 3.094295 .595497 
Yes 21 2.162896 5.090634 1.110867 
Interest cover ratio 
  
No 25 8.333333 21.029445 4.205889 
Yes 19 12.115435 27.185952 6.236885 
Total assets 
  
No 28 160,155.68 319,735.99 60,424.42 
Yes 21 398,235.00 831,730.83 181,498.55 
Share owned by institutional 
investors 
  
No 28 7.37571E-02 .163385 3.08769E-02 
Yes 20 5.87950E-02 .118968 2.66019E-02 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-assets 
ratio 
  
No 28 5.68881E-02 7.27744E-02 1.37531E-02 
Yes 20 .100078 .101324 2.26567E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
  
No 28 5.38305E-02 4.76998E-02 9.01442E-03 
Yes 21 .134773 .140231 3.06009E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-sales 
ratio 
  
No 28 9.26423E-02 .148749 2.81108E-02 
Yes 21 .411272 .894634 .195225 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
No 28 2.53515E-03 7.57482E-03 1.43151E-03 
Yes 19 7.49889E-03 1.44041E-02 3.30453E-03 
Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs 
  
No 28 57,943.1429 203,101.8061 38,382.6336 
Yes 21 19,239.5714 68,997.1212 15,056.4062 
Total value of tax loss carry- No 28 1.162172 5.884587 1.112083 
 153 
forward and carry backs-to-total 
assets 
  
Yes 21 .116788 .387347 8.45261E-02 
Investment tax credits 
  
No 28 486.2857 1,870.5861 353.5075 
Yes 20 35.1500 157.1956 35.1500 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
No 28 .4643 .5079 9.598E-02 
Yes 21 .2381 .4364 9.524E-02 
Value of equity owned by managers 
  
No 28 3,035.222 4,481.846 846.989 
Yes 21 12,311.095 27,289.985 5,955.163 
Share of the company owned by 
management 
  
No 28 .23624 .37290 7.0472E-02 
Yes 21 .13450 .28495 6.2182E-02 
Managers ownership of stock 
options 
  
No 27 7.41E-02 .27 5.14E-02 
Yes 21 .14 .36 7.82E-02 
Managers age 
  
No 28 3.39 .96 .18 
Yes 21 3.14 .85 .19 
Managers tenure 
  
No 28 13.36 10.52 1.99 
Yes 21 11.00 10.26 2.24 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
No 25 .1810 .2950 5.900E-02 
Yes 18 .1190 .2234 5.266E-02 
Company listed on the stock-
exchange 
  
No 28 .54 .51 9.60E-02 
Yes 21 .48 .51 .11 
Quick ratio 
  
No 28 .213558 .337625 6.38050E-02 
Yes 20 1.015388 1.462970 .327130 
Liquidity ratio 
  
No 28 2.372922 4.736564 .895126 
Yes 21 3.089869 2.651937 .578700 
Share of the company owned by 
foreign investors 
  
No 28 .186129 .346019 6.53914E-02 
Yes 21 .325571 .394560 8.61000E-02 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Table 4.11. Independent samples t-test Croatian derivative users/non-users 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality 
of Means       
    F Sig. T df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
           Lower Upper 
Total sales 
revenues 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 8.651 .005 -1.731 47 .090 -104,593.76 60,423.09 -226,149.35 16,961.82 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.512 21.262 .145 -104,593.76 69,180.96 -248,355.70 39,168.17 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
 
Equal variances 
assumed 2.393 .129 1.201 47 .236 .107247 8.92948E-02 -7.239080E-02 .286885 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.127 31.591 .268 .107247 9.51234E-02 -8.661123E-02 .301106 
Debt rating 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .992 .324 -.502 47 .618 -5.9524E-02 .1185 -.2979 .1788 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.494 40.398 .624 -5.9524E-02 .1204 -.3028 .1838 
Long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 6.740 .013 -1.092 46 .280 -5.787235E-02 5.29809E-02 -.164517 4.87726E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.039 33.016 .306 -5.787235E-02 5.56940E-02 -.171181 5.54358E-02 
Long-term debt-to-
equity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.485 .229 -.854 46 .397 -1.014902 1.188266 -3.406757 1.376953 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.805 31.166 .427 -1.014902 1.260414 -3.584977 1.555173 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .179 .674 -.521 42 .605 -3.782101 7.262880 -18.439187 10.874984 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.503 32.979 .618 -3.782101 7.522516 -19.087151 11.522948 
Total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.283 .076 -1.388 47 .172 -238,079.32 171,537.50 -583,168.25 107,009.61 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.245 24.457 .225 -238,079.32 191,292.53 -632,498.04 156,339.40 
Share owned by 
institutional 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .973 .329 .348 46 .729 1.49621E-02 4.29430E-02 -7.147772E-02 .101402 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .367 45.968 .715 1.49621E-02 4.07559E-02 -6.707685E-02 9.70011E-02 
Cash & cash 
equivalents-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.639 .063 -1.721 46 .092 -4.318938E-02 2.50983E-02 -9.370964E-02 7.33089E-03 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.630 32.478 .113 -4.318938E-02 2.65042E-02 -9.714558E-02 1.07668E-02 
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Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 16.483 .000 -2.851 47 .006 -8.094286E-02 2.83946E-02 -.138065 -2.382023E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.537 23.491 .018 -8.094286E-02 3.19011E-02 -.146859 -1.502668E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
sales ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 5.869 .019 -1.857 47 .070 -.318630 .171584 -.663813 2.65527E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.615 20.831 .121 -.318630 .197239 -.729012 9.17523E-02 
R&D expenditures-
to-assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 7.425 .009 -1.541 45 .130 -4.963742E-03 3.22078E-03 -1.145072E-02 1.52323E-03 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.378 24.807 .180 -4.963742E-03 3.60127E-03 -1.238361E-02 2.45613E-03 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.533 .118 .836 47 .407 38,703.5714 46,298.6630 -54,437.3246 131,844.4675 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .939 34.835 .354 38,703.5714 41,230.1095 -45,012.1637 122,419.3065 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs-to-
total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.641 .111 .811 47 .422 1.045384 1.289597 -1.548952 3.639719 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .937 27.312 .357 1.045384 1.115290 -1.241782 3.332549 
Investment tax 
credits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.500 .039 1.073 46 .289 451.1357 420.6140 -395.5163 1,297.7878 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.270 27.533 .215 451.1357 355.2508 -277.1193 1,179.3908 
Tax incentives-
dummy 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 9.460 .003 1.637 47 .108 .2262 .1382 -5.1856E-02 .5042 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.673 46.061 .101 .2262 .1352 -4.5968E-02 .4983 
Value of equity 
owned by managers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 14.694 .000 -1.773 47 .083 -9,275.874 5,231.725 -19,800.747 1,248.999 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.542 20.811 .138 -9,275.874 6,015.094 -21,791.867 3,240.119 
Share of the 
company owned by 
management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.683 .108 1.042 47 .303 .10174 9.7654E-02 -9.47142E-02 .29820 
Equal variances not 
assumed   1.083 46.971 .285 .10174 9.3983E-02 -8.73329E-02 .29081 
Managers 
ownership of stock 
options 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.374 .130 -.762 46 .450 -6.88E-02 9.02E-02 -.25 .11 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.735 35.831 .467 -6.88E-02 9.36E-02 -.26 .12 
Managers age 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .189 .666 .948 47 .348 .25 .26 -.28 .78 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .963 45.503 .340 .25 .26 -.27 .77 
Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .059 .810 .785 47 .437 2.36 3.00 -3.69 8.40 
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Equal variances not 
assumed   .788 43.801 .435 2.36 2.99 -3.68 8.39 
Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.739 .195 .749 41 .458 6.200E-02 8.274E-02 -.1051 .2291 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .784 40.861 .438 6.200E-02 7.909E-02 -9.7733E-02 .2217 
Company listed on 
the stock-exchange 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .024 .878 .405 47 .688 5.95E-02 .15 -.24 .36 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .404 43.056 .688 5.95E-02 .15 -.24 .36 
Quick ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 13.681 .001 -2.809 46 .007 -.801830 .285498 -1.376507 -.227154 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -2.406 20.452 .026 -.801830 .333294 -1.496086 -.107575 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .076 .784 -.623 47 .536 -.716946 1.150394 -3.031241 1.597348 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.673 43.927 .505 -.716946 1.065901 -2.865229 1.431337 
Share of the 
company owned by 
foreign investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.093 .155 -1.315 47 .195 -.139443 .106076 -.352841 7.39553E-02 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.290 39.895 .205 -.139443 .108117 -.357973 7.90875E-02 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
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Table 4.12. Pearson correlation coefficients ± Croatian sample 
   Hedgers/Nonhedgers Derivative users 
Investment 
expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
Quick ratio 
Share of the company 
owned by foreign 
investors 
Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1.000 
. 
49 
.520** 
.000 
49 
.248 
.086 
49 
.212 
.147 
48 
.312* 
.029 
49 
Derivative users 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.520** 
.000 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
.384** 
.006 
49 
.383** 
.007 
48 
.188 
.195 
49 
Investment 
expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.248 
.086 
49 
.384** 
.006 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
.146 
.321 
48 
-.102 
.487 
49 
Quick ratio 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.212 
.147 
48 
.383** 
.007 
48 
.146 
.321 
48 
1.000 
. 
48 
.047 
.753 
48 
Share of the company 
owned by foreign 
investors 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.312* 
.029 
49 
.188 
.195 
49 
-.102 
.487 
49 
.047 
.753 
48 
1.000 
. 
49 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
   Source: Croatian survey data 
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4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The variables tested in our multivariate regression model are based on the determinants 
we have presented in the literature review as the key rationales of corporate hedging 
decisions. The reviewed papers have suggested that, if corporate hedging decisions are 
capable of increasing firm values, they can do so for reasons such as the following: the 
reduction of the probability or costs of financial distress, taxes or transactions costs, the costs 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LQIRUPDWLRQ ³DV\PPHWULHV´ E\ VLJQDOOLQJ PDQDJHPHQW
V YLHZ RI WKH
FRPSDQ\
V SURVSHFWV WR LQYHVWRUV DQG WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI ³DJHQF\´ SUREOHPV FRQIOLFWV RI
interest between management, shareholders, and creditors), including distortions of 
management's incentives to undertake all value-adding investments. Thus, the decision to 
hedge or not, as well as the decision to hedge with derivatives, is a function of six factors - 
financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections, taxes, managerial utility, 
and hedge substitutes. 
Of these main factors, the first five are expected to have a positive influence on the firm's 
decision to hedge (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1985; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; MacMinn, 1987; Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; MacMinn and Han, 1990; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990; 
Bessembinder's, 1991; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1992; 
Dobson and Soenen, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 
1993; Dolde, 1995; May, 1995; Mian, 1996; Stulz, 1996; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 1997; 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Lamont, 1997; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Shapiro and 
Titman, 1998; Gay and Nam, 1998; Minton and Schrand, 1999; Graham and Smith, 1999; 
Haushalter 2000; Mello and Parsons, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Haushalter, Randall 
and Lie, 2002; Fatemi and Luft; 2002). That is, higher values for factors related to financial 
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distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections, taxes and managerial utility are 
expected to be associated with a greater likelihood that the firm will engage in hedging 
activities. The sixth factor (hedge substitutes), however, is expected to have a negative 
influence on the firm's hedging decision (Smith and Warner, 1979; Smith and Stulz; 1985; 
Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Culp, 1994; Tufano, 1996; Pulvino, 1998; Harford, 1999). 
The relationship between the decision to hedge and its potential determinants can be 
expressed in the format of a general function as follows: 
 
Hedge = f (FC, AC, CMI, T, MU, HS) (1) 
 
where: 
x Hedge - binary variable which takes on a value of 1 if the firm hedges and 0 if the firm does not hedge 
with these instruments 
x BC - the firm's probability of financial distress or bankruptcy 
x AC - agency costs of debt facing the firm 
x CMI - capital market imperfections and costly external financing  
x  T - the convexity of the firm's tax function  
x MU - level of managerial wealth invested in the company  
x HS - the extent of alternative hedging-related financial policies or hedge substitutes utilised by the firm. 
 
Here we present the results of our analysis on two separate decisions conducted on 
Croatian non-financial companies. First, we examine the influence of factors presented above 
on the decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks, and second, we explore the influence 
of these factors on the corporate decision to use derivative instruments when managing 
corporate risks.  
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4.4.1 Decision to Hedge Corporate Risks  
 
Table 4.13 reports multivariate analysis results relating the probability of hedging to the 
determinants of hedging. The predetermined independent variables include total sales 
revenues as a proxy for size and financial costs, debt rating as a proxy for agency cost of debt, 
investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for capital market imperfections, total value of 
tax loss carry-forwards as a proxy for tax incentives, share of the company value owned by 
management as a proxy for managerial utility, and quick ratio as a proxy for hedge 
substitutes. The underlined variables represent those independent variables which appear to be 
the most consistent in reporting statistically significant t-values, and which appear to be most 
consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic models. Apart from the model 
discussed in this sub-section, as we have created multiple proxies available to measure some 
firm characteristics, we have estimated separate logistic regressions using all possible 
combinations of variables representing each predicted construct.  
Inclusion of all relevant variables in the regression model is very important due to the fact 
that, if relevant variables are omitted, the common variance they share with included variables 
may be wrongly attributed to those variables, or the error term may be inflated. Additionally, 
we excluded from our analysis the variables that that have not contributed to the strengths of 
the logistic model in predicting the decision to hedge (regarding the ±2 Log Likelihood 
statistics and Goodness of fit tests). Exclusion of all irrelevant variables is very important 
because their presence in the model can cause the common variance they share with included 
variables to be wrongly attributed to the irrelevant variables. The greater the correlation of the 
irrelevant variable(s) with other independents, the greater the standard errors of the regression 
coefficients for these independents (http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm). 
The dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm hedges corporate risks and 0 otherwise.  
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The model can be expressed as:  
Hedge = f (Total sales revenues, Debt rating, Investment expenditures to assets, Total 
value of tax loss carry-forwards, Share of the company value owned by management, 
Quick ratio) 
Table 4.13.  Multivariate results for Croatian hedgers vs nonhedgers 
 
      Total number of cases:      49 (Unweighted) 
      Number of selected cases:   49 
      Number of unselected cases: 0 
 
      Number of selected cases:                 49 
      Number rejected because of missing data:  1 
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 48 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding: 
 
Original       Internal 
Value          Value 
       0       0 
       1       1 
 
 
Dependent Variable.   HEDGERS    Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
 
Beginning Block Number 0.  Initial Log Likelihood Function 
 
-2 Log Likelihood   56.072249 
 
* Constant is included in the model. 
 
 
Beginning Block Number 1.  Method: Enter 
 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1..       FINCOST2  Total sales revenues 
          AGCOST1   Credit rating 
          CMI2      Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
          TAX1      Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
          SUBSTIT3  Quick ratio 
          MNGUTIL2  Share of the company owned by management 
 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
 
-2 Log Likelihood        26.268 
 Goodness of Fit         26.163 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         .463 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          .671 
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                      Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
 Model                   29.805     6        .0000 
 Block                   29.805     6        .0000 
 Step                    29.805     6        .0000 
 
 
---------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test----------- 
 
    HEDGERS  = Companies that d HEDGERS  = Companies that m 
 
Group   Observed    Expected    Observed    Expected     Total 
 
    1      5.000       4.767        .000        .233     5.000 
    2      4.000       3.494       1.000       1.506     5.000 
    3      1.000       2.490       4.000       2.510     5.000 
    4      1.000       1.221       4.000       3.779     5.000 
    5      2.000        .744       3.000       4.256     5.000 
    6       .000        .259       5.000       4.741     5.000 
    7       .000        .022       5.000       4.978     5.000 
    8       .000        .003       5.000       4.997     5.000 
    9       .000        .000       5.000       5.000     5.000 
   10       .000        .000       3.000       3.000     3.000 
 
 
                      Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
Goodness-of-fit test     5.1031     8        .7465 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Classification Table for HEDGERS 
The Cut Value is .50 
                                      Predicted 
                             Nonhedgers         Hedgers     Percent Correct 
                                   0      Ù        1 
Observed                  ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Nonhedgers         0   Ù        9      Ù        4      Ù   69.23% 
                          ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Hedgers            1   Ù        3      Ù       32      Ù   91.43% 
                          ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
                                                     Overall  85.42% 
 
 
----------------- Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
 
Variable        B        S.E.     Wald     df     Sig      R 
 
FINCOST2    1.64E-05 1.162E-05   2.0035     1    .1569   .0079 
AGCOST1       9.2589    4.3783   4.4721     1    .0345   .2100 
CMI2         47.3943   22.4482   4.4575     1    .0347   .2093 
TAX1        -1.1E-06 6.311E-06    .0278     1    .8675   .0000 
SUBSTIT3      1.5195    1.2838   1.4008     1    .2366   .0000 
MNGUTIL2     -8.5670    3.9033   4.8172     1    .0282  -.2241 
Constant     -2.5073    1.3908   3.2500     1    .0714 
 
 
 
 
 
                        95% CI for Exp(B) 
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Variable       Exp(B)     Lower     Upper 
 
FINCOST2       1.0000    1.0000    1.0000 
AGCOST1     10498.017    1.9692  55965179 
CMI2        3.829E+20   29.8620 4.909E+39 
TAX1           1.0000    1.0000    1.0000 
SUBSTIT3       4.5699     .3691   56.5870 
MNGUTIL2        .0002     .0000     .3999 
 
 
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced. 
 
 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
From the regression model presented in table 4.13 it can be seen that the corporate 
decision to hedge is related to company debt rating, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
and share of the company owned by management. Other variables that tested the research 
hypothesis are not statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not influence the 
decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks.  
Company credit rating is a proxy for the agency cost of debt. In our research assumptions 
we argue that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively because the severity of agency 
cost of debt is related to the extent of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that 
firms with greater asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater 
incentive to engage in risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is 
inconsistent with the predictions derived from the agency cost of debt model, because the 
relationship between the dependent variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading 
to the conclusion that companies that have a credit rating hedge more intensively. This is 
contrary to the findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who have 
proven that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating 
and therefore greater informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity. 
An alternative variable that has been used as proxy for agency cost (the share of the company 
owned by institutional investors) has not shown as relevant for making the decision to hedge.  
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Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio is a proxy for capital market imperfections and 
FRVWO\ H[WHUQDO ILQDQFLQJ 7KLV YDULDEOH ZKLFK FRQWUROV IRU FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW JURZWK
opportunities, is very important in the model because it tests the prediction that hedgers are 
more likely to have larger investment opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
for theoretical arguments, or Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) for empirical 
evidence). Bessembinder (1991) has also shown that hedging activities are predicted to be 
greater in firms where growth opportunities constitute a larger proportion of firm value, 
because reductions in agency costs are most valuable for these firms. Therefore, we argue that 
WKH ILUP¶V GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH is predicted to be positively correlated with measures for 
investment (growth) opportunities. The results of our logistic model support our prediction and 
show a statistically significant positive relation between the decision to hedge and investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio. When we conducted a robustness test regarding this result by 
employing other variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and 
costly external financing hypothesis (cash and cash equivalents-to-assets ratio, investment 
expenditures to sales and R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio), they were not statistically 
significant in our model. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and the 
capital market imperfections is not robust. Overall, the data, at best, provide very weak 
support for the prediction of the tested hypothesis.  
The third variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction RIWKHILUP¶V
RXWVWDQGLQJ VKDUHVKHOG E\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW Smith and Stulz (1985) were the 
first to predict a positive relation between managerial wealth invested in the company and the 
XVHRIGHULYDWLYHV:HDUJXHWKDWGXHWRWKHIDFWWKDWILUP¶VPDQDJHUVKDYHOLPLWHGDELOLW\WR
diversify their own personal wealth position associated with stock holdings and their 
HDUQLQJV¶FDSLWDOLVDWLRQWKH\KDYHVWURQJLQFHQWLYHVWRKHGJH8VXDOO\WKDWNLQGRIKHGJLQJLV
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QRWFRQGXFWHGWRLPSURYHWKHYDOXHRIFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNKROGHUVEXWWRLPSURYHWKHPDQDJHUV¶
own wealth. The managerial utility maximisation hypothesis predicts that managers with 
greater stock ownership would prefer more risk management, while those with greater option 
holdings would prefer less risk management. Our results show a negative relation between the 
decision to hedge and the share of the company owned by management, which leads to the 
conclusion that firms that have a greater fraction of outstanding shares held by the 
FRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWKDYH OHVV LQFHQWLYHV WRKHGJH7KLV LVFRQWUDU\ WRRXUSUHGLFWLRQ
and to the findings of Tufano (1996), who has found that firms whose managers have more 
ZHDOWKLQYHVWHGLQWKHILUP¶VVWRFNVPDQDJHPRUHFRUSRUDWHULVN$GGLWLRQDOO\LWQHHGVWREH
emphasised that Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found 
evidence that corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. Other variables that 
were employed as proxies for the managerial utility hypothesis (value of company share 
RZQHG E\ PDQDJHPHQW PDQDJHUV¶ RZQHUVKLS RI VWRFN RSWLRQV PDQDJHU¶V DJH DQG WHQXUH 
were not statistically significant in the model.  
Overall, it could be concluded that evidence based on the empirical relation between the 
decision to hedge and financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and 
costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any 
support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly 
external financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Regarding this result, 
we need to emphasise that the association between hedging and capital market imperfections 
is not robust to other variables employed as proxies for testing this hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.14. Pearson correlation coefficients for independent variables in the regression ± 
Croatian hedgers/nonhedgers 
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Total sales 
revenues 
Debt rating 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and 
carry backs 
Share of the 
company owned 
by management 
Quick ratio 
Total sales 
revenues 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1.000 
. 
49 
.194 
.181 
49 
-.072 
.625 
49 
-.034 
.818 
49 
-.094 
.520 
49 
.176 
.232 
48 
Debt rating 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.194 
.181 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
-.160 
.272 
49 
.058 
.691 
49 
.092 
.529 
49 
-.019 
.896 
48 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.072 
.625 
49 
-.160 
.272 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
-.136 
.352 
49 
.180 
.215 
49 
.146 
.321 
48 
Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and 
carry backs 
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.034 
.818 
49 
.058 
.691 
49 
-.136 
.352 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
-.038 
.795 
49 
-.003 
.985 
48 
Share of the 
company owned 
by management 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.094 
.520 
49 
.092 
.529 
49 
.180 
.215 
49 
-.038 
.795 
49 
1.000 
. 
49 
-.180 
.221 
48 
Quick ratio 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.176 
.232 
48 
-.019 
.896 
48 
.146 
.321 
48 
-.003 
.985 
48 
-.180 
.221 
48 
1.000 
. 
48 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
To test the non-existence of multicollinearity as one of the important assumptions of 
logistic regression, we have calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables employed (see: table 4.14). To the extent that one independent is a 
linear function of another independent, the problem of multicollinearity will occur in logistic 
regression. As the independents increase in correlation with each other, the standard errors of 
the logit (effect) coefficients will become inflated. Multicollinearity does not change the 
estimates of the coefficients, only their reliability (http:// www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/ 
logistic.htm). From the data presented in the table 4.14. it could be concluded that there is no 
correlation between variables, therefore the calculated logit coefficient in our model should be 
reliable.  
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4.4.2 Decision to Use Derivatives as Risk Management Instruments 
 
7DEOHSUHVHQWV WKH UHVXOWVRIPXOWLYDULDWH DQDO\VLV IRU D FRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQ WRXVH
derivatives as risk management instruments. Again, the predetermined independent variables 
include total sales revenues as a proxy for size and financial costs, debt rating as a proxy for 
agency cost of debt, investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections, total value of tax loss carry-forwards as a proxy for tax incentives, share of the 
company value owned by management as a proxy for managerial utility, and quick ratio as a 
proxy for hedge substitutes. The underlined variables represent those independent variables 
which appear to be the most consistent in reporting statistically significant t-values and which 
appear to be most consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic models. The 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm uses derivatives as corporate risk management 
instruments and 0 otherwise. Apart from the model discussed in this sub-section, as we have 
created multiple proxies available to measure some firm characteristics, we have estimated 
separate logistic regressions using all possible combinations of variables representing each 
predicted construct.  
 
The model can be expressed as:  
Derivative use = f (Total sales revenues, Debt rating, Investment expenditures to assets, 
Total value of tax loss carry-forwards, Share of the company value owned by 
management, Quick ratio) 
Table 4.15.  Multivariate results for Croatian derivative users/nonusers 
       
Total number of cases:      47 (Unweighted) 
      Number of selected cases:   47 
      Number of unselected cases: 0 
 
      Number of selected cases:                 47 
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      Number rejected because of missing data:  1 
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 46 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding: 
 
Original       Internal 
Value          Value 
       0       0 
       1       1 
 
Dependent Variable..   DERIVATI   Derivative users 
 
Beginning Block Number  0.  Initial Log Likelihood Function 
 
-2 Log Likelihood   62.371137 
 
* Constant is included in the model. 
 
Beginning Block Number  1.  Method: Enter 
 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1..       FINCOST2  Total sales revenues 
          AGCOST1   Credit rating 
          CMI2      Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
          TAX1      Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
          MNGUTIL2  Share of the company owned by management 
          SUBSTIT3  Quick ratio 
 
 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
 
 
 -2 Log Likelihood       29.583 
 Goodness of Fit         37.988 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         .510 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          .687 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
 Model                   32.788     6        .0000 
 Block                   32.788     6        .0000 
 Step                    32.788     6        .0000 
 
 
---------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test----------- 
 
 
    DERIVATI = No               DERIVATI = Yes 
 
 
 
Group   Observed    Expected    Observed    Expected     Total 
 
    1      5.000       4.903        .000        .097     5.000 
    2      4.000       4.729       1.000        .271     5.000 
    3      5.000       4.497        .000        .503     5.000 
    4      5.000       4.389        .000        .611     5.000 
    5      4.000       4.025       1.000        .975     5.000 
    6      2.000       2.767       3.000       2.233     5.000 
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    7      2.000       1.362       3.000       3.638     5.000 
    8       .000        .310       5.000       4.690     5.000 
    9       .000        .017       6.000       5.983     6.000 
 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
Goodness-of-fit test     4.6679     7        .7004 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Classification Table for DERIVATI 
The Cut Value is .50 
                   Predicted 
 
                  No      Yes     Percent Correct 
                    N  Ù    Y 
Observed       ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ 
   No      N   Ù   24  Ù    3  Ù   88.89% 
               ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ 
   Yes     Y   Ù    5  Ù   14  Ù   73.68% 
               ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ
 
                          Overall  82.61% 
 
----------------- Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
Variable         B       S.E.     Wald     df     Sig       R 
 
FINCOST2    3.17E-06 4.859E-06    .4247     1    .5146   .0000 
AGCOST1       2.1261    1.5174   1.9633     1    .1612   .0000 
CMI2         21.8602    8.2232   7.0668     1    .0079   .2850 
TAX1        -9.6E-07 8.020E-06    .0145     1    .9043   .0000 
MNGUTIL2     -2.8989    2.0566   1.9869     1    .1587   .0000 
SUBSTIT3      3.3228    1.4111   5.5445     1    .0185   .2384 
Constant     -3.5885    1.1014  10.6146     1    .0011 
 
                        90% CI for Exp(B) 
Variable       Exp(B)     Lower     Upper 
 
FINCOST2       1.0000    1.0000    1.0000 
AGCOST1        8.3823     .6909  101.6950 
CMI2        3.117E+09 4163.9202 2.334E+15 
TAX1           1.0000    1.0000    1.0000 
MNGUTIL2        .0551     .0019    1.6223 
SUBSTIT3      27.7367    2.7228  282.5519 
 
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced. 
 
Source: Croatian survey data 
From the regression model presented in table 4.15, it can be seen that the corporate 
decision to use derivative instruments is related only to two variables - investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio and quick ratio. Other variables that tested the research hypothesis 
are not statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not influence the decision to use 
derivatives.  
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Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market imperfections and 
costly external financing, has a statistically significant positive relation with the decision to 
use derivatives. This result is consistent with results of multivariate analysis regarding the 
decision to hedge corporate risks, where it has been shown that companies with higher 
investment-to-assets ratio have more incentives to hedge. Additionally, the result is consistent 
with results of univariate analysis for sample derivative users/nonusers, where t-test has 
revealed that derivative users have a statistically higher value of this ratio, which is 
confirmed by the correlation analysis (Pearson rho = 0.384), suggesting that there is a 
SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW DQG WKH GHFLVLRQ WR XVH
derivatives.  
The results of our logistic model support our prediction WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLV
predicted to be positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. This 
is consistent with findings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). 
Again, as in the case of sample hedgers/nonhedgers, we have conducted a robustness test 
regarding this result by employing other variables that were used as proxies for the capital 
market imperfections and costly external financing hypothesis (cash and cash equivalents-to-
assets ratio, investment expenditures to sales and R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio). Results 
for alternative regression variables were not statistically significant. These findings suggest 
that the association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust. It should 
be emphasised that the data provide very weak support for the prediction of the tested 
hypothesis.  
$QRWKHUYDULDEOHWKDWLVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWLVTXLFNUDWLRDVDPHDVXUHRIDFRPSDQ\¶V
liquidity and substitute for hedging. Consistent with the findings of univariate analysis 
conducted for samples hedgers/nonhedgers as well as derivative users/nonusers, the 
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multivariate analysis results show a positive relation between the decision to use 
derivatives and the value of the quick ratio, suggesting that companies that have a high 
quick ratio have more incentives to use derivatives. The coefficient on this variable is 
predicted to be negative (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton 
and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999), therefore we should reject the 
hypothesis because the sign of relationship is contrary to what we have predicted. Other 
variables that were employed to test the hypothesis for hedging substitutes (dividend pay-
out ratio, stock-exchange quotation and liquidity ratio) were not significant in the model.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
 The Croatian survey has revealed that 73.5 per cent of respondents are using some form 
of financial engineering to manage interest-rate, foreign exchange or commodity price risk; 
while 43 per cent use derivatives among other instruments of corporate risk management. 
This result is similar to the findings of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) who have revealed 
that 50 per cent of US non-financial companies are using some form of financial engineering to 
manage interest rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk.  
Survey results have shown that price risk and currency risks have the highest influence - 
61.2 per cent of financial managers claim that price risk has strong or very strong influence on 
the company performance, and 59.2 per cent of them think the same for currency risk. These 
numbers are followed by 44.9 per cent of managers who claim that the influence of interest-
rate risk is strong and very strong. Therefore, it could be concluded that Croatian companies 
are highly exposed to all three types of financial risks. We believe that these findings could be 
explained by the fact that Croatia is very small and relatively open economy, which results in 
great exposure of companies to financial risks, especially to the foreign exchange risk and 
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commodity price risk due to the high dependence of the Croatian economy on international 
trade, especially on import activity. Exposure to the interest-rate risk is a result of external 
financing through borrowing activity. However, our results have shown that the long-term 
debt-to-assets ratio as a measure of corporate indebtedness, ranges from 0 to 72.5 per cent, 
while the mean value for Croatian companies is 21.7 per cent. This result leads to the 
conclusion that Croatian companies in the sample are not highly leveraged (Graham and 
Campbell, 2001), which may explain why interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important 
in comparison with currency and commodity price risks. 
Regarding the use and importance of different risk management instruments in risk 
management strategy, the survey revealed that the currency structure match of assets and 
liabilities is the most important instrument in managing currency risk. In respect of the use of 
derivatives, the currency forward is the most important and frequently used instrument, 
followed by currency swap as the second most important derivative instrument. Other 
derivatives like currency futures, stock-exchange and OTC options and structured derivatives 
are not frequently used by Croatian companies. As well, hybrid securities and operational 
hedging are not important currency risk management instruments.  
Interest rate risk in Croatian companies is hedged most frequently by matching maturity of 
assets and liabilities. Again, forward contract and swap are the most important derivative 
instruments in risk management strategy, but contrary to currency risk management, interest 
rate swap is more important than interest rate forward and is used by 27.6 per cent of 
companies that declare themselves as hedgers. Similarly to currency risk management, other 
derivative instruments do not play an important role in managing interest rate risk, but hybrid 
securities that are considered as substitutes for hedging have gained importance in comparison 
with currency risk management.  
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There is a lower frequency of commodity risk management among the analysed Croatian 
companies. Price risk management is usually hedged naturally by managing assets and 
liabilities. Among derivatives instruments, the commodity forward is the most important, but 
not as popular as the currency forward. For the first time, futures contracts are used as 
representatives of standardised derivative instruments traded on the financial market. Contrary 
to findings presented while analysing currency and interest-rate risk, the commodity swap has 
not been used at all, nor have other derivative instruments. Business diversification through 
mergers, acquisitions and other business combinations is quite important in managing price 
risk and has been used by 28.6 per cent of the analysed Croatian companies.  
Survey results have clearly indicated that Croatian non-financial companies stick 
primarily with simple risk management instruments like natural hedging. In the case of 
derivatives use, forwards and swaps are by far the most important instruments, which leads to 
the conclusion that the use of over-the-counter instruments dominates exchange-traded 
instruments. Additionally, there is a lower frequency of commodity price risk management 
use among firms in comparison with interest-rate and currency risks. These findings are 
consistent with Bodnar et al. (1995), Jesswein (1995), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), 
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) as well as with Bodnar, Jong and Macrae (2003).  
Amongst the Croatian companies analysed, there appeared to be a decided preference for 
"active" or "view-driven" risk management as opposed to a full-cover or variance-minimising 
hedging approach. Only 36 per cent of the companies that manage financial risks have a 
documented policy regarding the use of financial risk management instruments, while the 
majority of hedgers manage risks without an official policy. Additionally, only 8.3 per cent of 
hedgers use Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk exposure, while 11.1 per cent of them use the 
Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as measures of risk 
exposure. The survey has revealed that 71 per cent of the analysed companies manage risk for 
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WUDQVDFWLRQ ZLWK PDWXULW\ XS WR D \HDU¶V WLPH 7KHUHIRUH LW FRXOG EH FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH
hedging horizon for financial risk management is typically less than one year.  
An important issue in corporate risk management is defining its goals. The results of the 
Croatian survey have shown that the primary goal of hedging is managing volatility of cash 
flows, but that Croatian firms focus also on managing balance sheet and financial ratios. 
Commercial banks are by far the primary source for derivatives transactions for 87.5 per cent 
of Croatian hedgers. Investment banks, insurance companies and exchange/ brokerage houses 
are not a very important source for derivative transaction, and very few Croatian firms use 
them as counterparties.  
Amongst the most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives, financial 
managers have addressed the following problems: the supply of risk management instruments 
traded on domestic financial market or offered by financial institutions is insufficient, the 
costs of establishing and maintaining risk management programs exceed the benefits of it, as 
well as difficulties in pricing and valuing. Other reasons such as concerns about perceptions 
of derivatives use by investors, regulators and the public, insufficient exposure to financial 
risks, insufficient knowledge about financial risk management instruments, and the 
inefficiency and high costs of risk management instruments are not very important reasons 
why companies in Croatia do not hedge.  
On the basis of the respondHQWV¶ DQVZHUV DQG LQIRUPDO LQWHUYLHZV FRQGXFWHG DW WKH rd 
Annual Conference of the Croatian Association of Corporate Treasurers held in September 
2006, it could be concluded that, in spite of the fact that there is an increasing number of non-
financial companies which are aware of corporate risk management importance, a lack of 
suitable instruments offered to them by the domestic financial industry becomes a leading 
factor why many companies do not use derivatives when managing risks. This problem has 
the strongest impact on the shipbuilding industry. Anecdotal evidence collected through 
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contacts with managers in a few Croatian shipbuilding companies has revealed that they are 
highly exposed to foreign exchange risk due to the sales revenues being denominated in US 
dollars while operating costs are in the Croatian national currency. Unfortunately, providers 
of currency risk management instruments (mainly commercial banks) are not able or willing 
to offer them adequate instruments which would protect their cash-flows from the currency 
risk that emerges from their specific economic position.  
According to a mean comparison test for Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers, the hedgers 
are statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to variable that proxy for alternative 
financial policy as substitutes for hedging. Hedgers have a statistically greater quick ratio as a 
measure of short-term liquidity. The coefficient on quick ratio is predicted to be negative 
(see: Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). Contrary to our prediction as well as to the findings of 
the cited studies, our results show a positive relation between the decision to hedge and this 
explanatory variable, suggesting that companies that are more liquid are more likely to 
hedge.  
Another statistically significant variable is company ownership by foreign investors. 
Although other scholars have not examined this hypothesis, the specific economic situation 
of Croatia and the high value of foreign direct investments in the last five years have 
prompted us to examine whether foreign ownership of a company plays an important role 
in the decision to hedge risks. Our t-test has shown that hedgers have a statistically higher 
share owed by foreign investors in comparison with nonhedgers, which is confirmed by the 
correlation analysis. This result could be explained by the fact that foreign investors have 
enforced the employment of a corporate risk management strategy in the acquired Croatian 
companies.  
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The univariate tests suggest that hedgers are not statistically different from nonhedgers 
with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection, 
tax preference items, or managerial utility. Hedgers and nonhedgers do not differ regarding 
the size of the company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial shareholdings, 
ownership by institutional investors, etc. In other words, on the basis of the univariate results, 
we should reject all research assumptions regarding the shareholder maximisation hypothesis 
as well as the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. Additionally, we should reject our 
hypothesis regarding alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management 
strategies. Our findings predict the opposite sign to what we have assumed, suggesting that 
companies that are more liquid have more incentives to hedge.  
Regarding the univariate analysis of companies that use derivative instruments and those 
which do not use them, according to t-test, our analysis has discovered that these two groups 
differ with respect to proxies for short-term liquidity and investment (growth) opportunities. 
Derivative users have a statistically greater quick ratio as well as a greater rat io of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets. Similarly to the analysis of hedgers and 
QRQKHGJHUVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VTXLFNUDWLRKDVEHHQXVHGDVDSUR[\IRUWKHILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\DQG
the coefficient on this variable is predicted to be negative (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 
1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). 
Our results show positive a relation between the decision to use derivatives and the value 
of quick ratio, suggesting that companies that have a high quick ratio have more incentives 
to use derivatives. This result is confirmed by the correlation analysis.  
$QRWKHU VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW YDULDEOH LV WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ratio of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets. Our t-test has shown that derivative users have a 
statistically higher value of this ratio, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis, 
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
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and the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with our prediction that the 
EHQHILWV RI KHGJLQJ VKRXOG EH JUHDWHU WKH PRUH JURZWK RSWLRQV WKHUH DUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V
investment opportunity set and to the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen 
(1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001). Other variables that have been used to test the agency cost of 
debt and capital market imperfection hypothesis have not shown statistically significant 
differences between analysed derivative users and nonusers.  
The conducted t-tests and correlation analysis suggest that derivative users are not 
statistically different from nonusers with respect to other research assumptions regarding 
the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, tax preference items, or managerial utility. 
It could be concluded that, similarly to the findings in the case of the Croatian hedgers and 
nonhedgers, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the managerial utility 
maximisation hypothesis as well as the shareholder maximisation hypothesis ± apart from 
capital market imperfection and costly external financing. Additionally, we should reject our 
hypothesis regarding alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management 
strategies. Our findings predict the opposite sign to what we have assumed, suggesting that 
companies that are more liquid are using derivatives, while those that are less liquid do not 
use these risk management instruments.   
The multivariate regression model has shown that the corporate decision to hedge is 
related to company debt rating, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and share of the 
company owned by management. Other variables that tested the research hypothesis are not 
statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not influence the decision to hedge or 
not to hedge corporate risks.  
Company credit rating is a proxy for the agency cost of debt. In our research assumptions 
we argue that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively because the severity of agency 
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cost of debt is related to the extent of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that 
firms with greater asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater 
incentive to engage in risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is 
inconsistent with the predictions derived from the agency cost of debt model (see DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000) who have proven that firms with a credit rating 
hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating and therefore greater informational 
asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity, because the relationship between 
the dependent variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading to the conclusion 
that companies that have a credit rating hedge more intensively.  
The investment expenditures-to-assets ratio is a proxy for capital market imperfections 
DQGFRVWO\ H[WHUQDO ILQDQFLQJ:HDUJXH WKDW WKH ILUP¶VGHFLVLRQ WRKHGJH LVSUHGLFWHG WREH
positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) for theoretical arguments, or Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and 
Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) for empirical evidence). The results of our logistic model support 
our prediction and show a statistically significant positive relation between the decision to hedge 
and the investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. When we conducted a robustness test 
regarding this result by employing other variables that were used as proxies for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing hypothesis, they were not statistically significant 
in our model. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and capital market 
imperfections is not robust. Overall, the data provide very weak support for the prediction of 
the tested hypothesis.  
The third variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction RIWKHILUP¶V
outstandiQJVKDUHVKHOGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWWe argue that, due to the fact that a 
ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV KDYH OLPLWHG DELOLW\ WR GLYHUVLI\ WKHLU RZQ SHUVRQDO ZHDOWK SRVLWLRQ
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DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVWRFNKROGLQJVDQGWKHLUHDUQLQJV¶FDSLWDOLVDWLRQWKH\KDYHVWURQJLQFHQtives 
to hedge. Our results show a negative relation between the decision to hedge and the share of 
the company owned by management, which leads to the conclusion that firms that have a 
greater fraction RI RXWVWDQGLQJ VKDUHV KHOG E\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQt have less 
incentives to hedge. This is contrary to our prediction, and to the evidence of Tufano 
(1996), who has found that ILUPVZKRVHPDQDJHUVKDYHPRUHZHDOWKLQYHVWHGLQWKHILUP¶V
stock manage more corporate risk. Additionally, it needs to be emphasised that Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. Other variables that were employed as 
proxies for the managerial utility hypothesis (value of company share owned by management, 
PDQDJHUV¶ RZQHUVKLS RI VWRFN RSWLRQV PDQDJHU¶V DJH DQG WHQXUH were not statistically 
significant in the model. Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding managerial 
utility. 
Regarding the results of multivariate analysiVIRUDFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRXVHGHULYDWLYHV
as risk management instruments, it can be seen that the corporate decision to use derivative 
instruments is related only to two variables - investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and 
quick ratio. Other variables that tested the research hypothesis are not statistically significant 
in the model; therefore they do not influence the decision to use derivatives.  
The investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market imperfections 
and costly external financing, has a statistically significant positive relation with the decision 
to use derivatives. This result is consistent with results of multivariate analysis regarding the 
decision to hedge corporate risks, where it has been shown that a company with a higher 
investment-to-assets ratio has more incentives to hedge. Additionally, the result is consistent 
with results of univariate analysis for sample derivative users/nonusers, where t-test has 
revealed that derivative users have a statistically higher value of this ratio, which is 
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confirmed with the correlation analysis suggesting that there is a positive relation between 
WKHYDOXHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VLQYHVWPHQWDQGGHFLVLRQWRXVHGHULYDWLYHV  
The results of our logistic analysis support our prediction WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLV
predicted to be positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. 
Again, as in the case of sample hedgers/nonhedgers, we have conducted a robustness test 
regarding this result by employing other variables that were used as proxies for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing hypothesis. Results for alternative regression 
variables were not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the association between 
hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust. It should be emphasised that the data 
provide very weak support for the prediction of the tested hypothesis.  
Another variable that is statistically significant is quick ratio as a measure of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VOLTuidity and substitute for hedging. Consistently with the findings of univariate 
analysis conducted for samples hedgers/nonhedgers as well as derivative users/nonusers, 
multivariate analysis results show positive a relation between the decision to use 
derivatives and the value of quick ratio, suggesting that companies that have high quick 
ratio have more incentives to use derivatives. The coefficient on this variable is predicted to 
be negative (e.g. see Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and 
Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999), therefore we should reject the hypothesis 
because the sign of relationship is contrary to what we predicted.  
Overall, it could be concluded that evidence based on the empirical relation between 
CURDWLDQ FRPSDQLHV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DV ZHOO DV WKHLU GHFLVLRQ WR XVH GHULYDWLYHV DQG
financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing, taxes, managerial utility as well as hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support 
for any of the tested hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Regarding this result, we need 
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to emphasise that the association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not 
robust to other variables employed as proxies for testing this hypothesis; therefore it should be 
interpreted with care.  
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5. CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IN SLOVENIAN COMPANIES 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we present the research results on risk management practices in 
Slovenian companies. In section 5.2 summary statistics of FRPSDQLHV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV are 
presented. The aim of the section is to provide a detailed description of risk management 
practices for large Slovenian non-financial companies. We have explored how many 
companies manage financial risks, whether they manage all three types of financial risks and 
what kind of risk management instruments they use. We also asked financial managers about 
the intensity of influence of financial risks to the performance of their companies. Managers 
ZHUHTXHVWLRQHGDERXWWKHVFRSHRIWKHULVNPDQDJHPHQWSROLF\WKHILUP¶VKHGJLQJKRUL]RQ
corporate risk management goals and the use of VaR or Monte Carlo analysis or some other 
typHRIVLPXODWLRQWHFKQLTXHVDVPHDVXUHVRIWKHILUP¶VULVNH[SRVXUH$GGLWLRQDOO\ZHKDYH
explored which financial institutions and intermediaries are the most important in providing 
risk management instruments and what are the reasons why Slovenian companies do not 
manage corporate risks or use derivative instruments.  
In section 5.3 the results of univariate analysis have been presented. The analysis has been 
conducted for two different groups. In the first group, we have explored differences between 
sub-samples of hedgers and nonhedgers, while in the second group we have investigated 
differences between companies that are derivative users and those companies that do not use 
derivatives. In both cases, we have employed the Pearson test of correlation as well as t-test 
for two unrelated means to determine if the means of two unrelated samples differ regarding 
the size of the company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial shareholdings, 
 183 
taxes, alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedJLQJ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶
ownership.  
In section 5.4 we present the results of multivariate analysis for the Slovenian companies. 
The variables tested in our multivariate regression model are based on the determinants we 
have presented in the literature review as the key rationales of corporate hedging decision. 
The reviewed papers have suggested that, if corporate hedging decisions are capable of 
increasing firm values, they can do so for reasons such as the following: the reduction of the 
probability or costs of financial distress, taxes or transactions costs, the costs associated with 
LQIRUPDWLRQ ³DV\PPHWULHV´E\ VLJQDOOLQJPDQDJHPHQW
V YLHZRI WKHFRPSDQ\
VSURVSHFWV WR
LQYHVWRUVDQGWKHUHGXFWLRQRI³DJHQF\´SUREOHPVFRQIOLFWVRILQWHUHVWDPRQg management, 
shareholders, and creditors). We have employed logistic regression where we have tested the 
hypothesis that the decision whether or not to hedge and the decision to hedge with 
derivatives is a function of six factors - financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market 
imperfections, tax incentives to hedge, managerial utility and hedge substitutes. The analysis 
presented in this chapter should produce a reasonable picture of risk management practices 
and rationales in the analysed Slovenian firms. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The Slovenian survey has revealed that 78 per cent of respondents use some form of 
financial engineering to manage interest-rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk, while 
21.9 per cent of them do not manage financial risks at all. Results of univariate and 
multivariate analysis in which we analyse hedgers and nonhedgers separately are presented in 
sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
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Graph 5.1. Slovenian hedgers and nonhedgers 
22%
78%
Companies that do not manage financial risks
Companies that manage financial risks
 
                            Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Additionally, by using the same approach as in the analysis of Croatian companies, we 
have expanded our analysis to the Slovenian companies that use or do not use derivatives as 
risk management instruments. Among the companies that manage financial risks, there is a 
substantial number of hedgers who do not use derivatives, but manage risk exposure with 
some other instruments like natural hedge, operational hedging, hedge substitutes, etc. By 
separating derivative users from companies that do not use derivatives, we have explored 
whether there are statistically significant differences between these two samples, and whether 
VRPH VSHFLILF FRPSDQ\¶V FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DIIHFW WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH E\ XVLQJ GHrivative 
instruments. We have created the two samples by taking together companies that manage 
risks but not with derivatives and companies that do not manage financial risks at all in the 
first sample, while in the second sample we have analysed only those companies that manage 
financial risks with derivatives.  
In this section we present only descriptive statistics, and it can be seen that five companies 
or 35 per cent of companies that declare themselves as hedgers manage corporate risks, but do 
not use derivatives as a risk management instrument. It could be concluded that 65.9 per cent 
of the analysed Slovenian companies use derivatives as risk management instruments. If this 
result is compared to the findings of the Croatian survey, which showed that 43 per cent of the 
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responding Croatian companies use derivative instruments for managing corporate risks, it 
could be concluded that the Slovenian companies use derivatives more frequently than their 
counterparts in Croatia. In comparison to Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) whose survey has 
revealed that 50 per cent of the US non-financial companies are using some form of financial 
engineering to manage financial risks, the conclusion would be the same as in the case of 
Croatia. However, it should be noted that the time difference needs to be taken into account. We 
believe that the use of derivatives has grown since 1998 in the US as well as globally, therefore 
results of our survey cannot be directly compared to those of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998).  
 
Graph 5.2. Slovenian companies that use derivatives as risk management instruments 
34%
66%
Derivative non-users Derivative users
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
In the survey questionnaire we asked financial managers about the intensity of influence 
of all three types of financial risks to the performance of their companies. The results showed 
that the price risk has the highest influence ± 77.5 per cent of financial managers claim that 
SULFHULVNKDVVWURQJRUYHU\VWURQJLQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPance. This number is 
followed by 39 per cent of managers who think the same for currency risk, while 36.6 per cent 
of them claim that the influence of interest-rate risk is strong or very strong. On the basis of 
their answers, both hedgers and nonhedgers, it could be concluded that the Slovenian 
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companies are highly influenced by the price risk, while currency and interest-rate risk 
H[SRVXUHKDYHORZHULPSDFWRQWKHFRPSDQLHV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
We believe that these findings could be explained by the fact that Slovenia is a small and 
open economy, which results in high dependence on international trade. A balanced level of 
trade, with exports and imports each exceeding 50 per cent of annual GDP on a regular basis, 
FKDUDFWHULVHV 6ORYHQLD¶V VPDOO HFRQRP\ 7KH (FRQomist Intelligence Unit Limited 
publications, 2006). High exposures to the commodity price risk can be explained by the fact 
that Slovenia is oriented to trade with EU members ± roughly two-WKLUGVRI6ORYHQLD¶VWUDGHLV
with the EU. On the highly competitive market, prices of goods are volatile, therefore 
companies that compete on that market need to be prepared for these conditions and protect 
their risky positions. 
Exposure to foreign-exchange risk was not so high in 2006 and it is expected to be further 
GHFUHDVHG LQ  DV 6ORYHQLD KDV LQWURGXFHG WKH (XUR DV DQ RIILFLDO FXUUHQF\ 6ORYHQLD¶V
major trade partners are Germany, Italy, France and Austria, so the majority of transactions 
are now denominated in one currency since Slovenia entered the Euro Zone. This contributes 
to the lowering of risk in business transactions as companies no longer have to worry about 
their currency risk exposures, which should additionally enhance the trade between Slovenia 
and its partners. In respect to the currency risk management instruments that have been used 
in Slovenian companies, it could be expected that their importance will decrease sharply, 
especially for the ones that have their value attached to the Euro or Slovenian tolar. 
Exposure to interest-rate risk is a result of external financing through borrowing activity.  
However, our results have shown that the long-term debt-to-assets ratio ranges from 0 to 
30.69 per cent, while the mean value is 12.13 per cent. Graham and Campbell (2001) have 
argued that companies are highly leveraged if the debt-to-assets ratio exceeds 30 per cent, 
therefore it could be concluded that the Slovenian companies in the sample are not highly 
 187 
leveraged, which may explain why interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important in 
comparison with commodity price risks. 
 
Graph 5.3. )LQDQFLDOULVNVLQIOXHQFHRQ6ORYHQLDQFRPSDQLHV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
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Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
When we asked companies if they manage all three types of financial risks, 24 out of 32 
companies that declare themselves as hedgers claimed that they manage currency, interest rate 
and price risk, while 8 companies manage some both not all types of financial risks. 
Regarding the use and importance of different risk management instruments in the risk 
management strategy, we have presented the results in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. It could be 
concluded that currency structure netting of assets and liabilities is the most important 
instrument in managing currency risk. In respect to the use of derivatives, the currency 
forward is the most important and frequently used instrument, followed by currency swap as 
the second most important derivative instrument. Currency futures and structured derivatives 
have greater importance in comparison with Croatian companies, as well as operational 
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hedging. Other derivatives such as stock-exchange and OTC options and hybrid securities are 
not important currency risk management instruments.  
 
Table 5.1. Currency risk management instruments used by Slovenian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
11. Matching currency structure of assets 
and liabilities (e.g. debt in foreign 
currency) 
75.9 53.7 0 11 12 
12. Currency forward 44.8 31.7 2 6 4 
13. Currency futures 17.2 12.2 1 3 1 
14. Currency swap 24.1 17.1 0 3 4 
15. Stock-Exchange Currency option  6.9 4.9 1 1  
16. OTC (over-the-counter) currency option 3.4 2.4  1  
17. Structured derivatives (e.g. currency 
swaption) 13.8 9.8  3 1 
18. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds 
or preferred stocks) 0 0  0  
19. Operational hedging (International 
diversification ± moving part of the 
business abroad)  
27.6 19.5 2 2 4 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Interest rate risk in the Slovenian companies is hedged most frequently by matching 
maturity of assets and liabilities. Forward contract, swap and structured derivatives are the 
most important derivative instruments in risk management strategy, but in contrast to currency 
risk management, interest rate swap is more important than interest rate forward and is used 
by 27.6 per cent of companies that declare themselves as hedgers. Structured derivatives are 
important instrument of interest-rate risk management as well, and are used in 20.7 per cent of 
companies. These instruments are even more important than interest-rate forward. Regarding 
the use of other derivative instruments such as interest-rate options, futures or hybrid 
securities, they do not play an important role in managing interest rate risk.  
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Table 5.2. Interest-rate risk management instruments used by Slovenian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
10. Matching maturity of assets and 
liabilities 82.8 58.5 1 10 13 
11. Interest rate forward 17.2 12.2 1 1 3 
12. Interest rate futures 3.4 2.4  1  
13. Interest rate swap 27.6 19.5 1 4 3 
14. Stock-Exchange interest rate option 3.4 2.4  1  
15. OTC (over-the-counter) interest rate 
option 3.4 2.4   1 
16. Structured derivatives (e.g. cap, floor, 
collar, corridor or swaption) 20.7 14.6 1 2 3 
17. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds 
or preferred stocks) 0 0    
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Price risk management in the Slovenian companies is usually hedged naturally by 
managing assets and liabilities. Among derivatives instruments the commodity forward and 
commodity futures are equally important, followed by commodity swap and standardised 
options. In the case of commodity risk management, structured derivatives as well as OTC 
options are not important instruments. Business diversification through mergers, acquisitions, 
and other business combinations is quite important in managing price risk and has been used 
by 25 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies.  
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Table 5.3. Price risk management instruments used by Slovenian hedgers 
Instrument 
Per cent of 
hedgers 
that use the 
instrument 
Per cent of 
companies 
that use the 
instrument 
Importance 1-3 (frequencies of 
companies that use the instrument) 
 
1 = less 
important 
2 = 
important 
3 =  very 
important 
10. Managing assets and liabilities 71.4 48.8 1 4 15 
11. Commodity forward 14.3 9.8 1 1 2 
12. Commodity futures 14.3 9.8 1 1 2 
13. Commodity swap 10.7 7.3  2 1 
14. Stock-Exchange commodity option  7.1 4.9  1 1 
15. OTC (over-the-counter) commodity 
option 3.6 2.4  1  
16. Structured derivatives (combination of 
swaps, future contacts and options) 3.6 2.4   1 
17. Business diversification through 
mergers, acquisitions, and other 
business combinations 
25 17.1  6 1 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
The survey results have clearly indicated that the Slovenian non-financial companies 
manage financial risks primarily with simple risk management instruments such as natural 
hedging, but it should be noted that the use of derivatives is also frequent - not only plain 
vanilla instruments like forwards and swaps, but structured derivatives as well.  
Regarding the scope of the corporate risk management policy, 87.5 per cent of hedgers 
claim that they use selective hedging, while 12.5 per cent of them manage financial risks 
completely. Among the analysed Slovenian companies, there appeared to be a decided 
preference for "active" or "view-driven" risk management as opposed to a full-cover or 
variance-minimising hedging approach. 56.3 per cent of respondents that manage financial 
risks have a documented policy regarding the use of financial risk management instruments, 
while the rest of them manage risks without an official policy. Additionally, 18.8 per cent of 
hedgers use Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk exposure, while only 12.5 per cent of them use 
Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as measures of risk 
exposure. The survey has revealed that 49 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies 
PDQDJH ULVN IRU WUDQVDFWLRQ ZLWK PDWXULW\ XS WR D \HDU¶V WLPH  SHU FHQW RI WKHP KDYH D
hedging horizon of two years, in 16 per cent of companies the hedging horizon is five years, 
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while 16 per cent of respondents manage risk for transaction with maturity longer than five 
years.  
An important issue in corporate risk management is defining its goals. The theoretical 
financial literature strongly recommends focusing on cash flows or on the value of the 
company. A focus on accounting numbers is generally discarded. However, the results of the 
Slovenian survey have shown that the primary goal of hedging is managing the volatility of 
cash flows, but that the Slovenian firms focus also on accounting earning volatility as well as 
managing balance sheet and financial ratios. Some 78.2 per cent of respondents indicate that 
their key motive behind financial hedging is to decrease the volatility of the cash flows; 
however, stabilising accounting earnings volatility and balance sheet and financial ratios are 
second by importance (53.1 and 50 per cent respectively). Only 18.8 per cent of them claim 
that the market value of the company is the primary goal of corporate risk management. It 
should be emphasised that there is a strong link between the Slovenian financial accounting 
and tax accounting. As a result of those institutional features, we believe that there is a strong 
focus on accounting earnings in all business decisions and consequently also in hedging 
decisions.  
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Graph 5.4. Corporate risk management goals in Slovenian companies  
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Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Commercial banks are by far the primary source for derivatives transactions for 73.4 per  
cent of the Slovenian hedgers. Investment banks, insurance companies as well as 
exchange/brokerage houses are not a very important source for derivative transaction, and 
very few Slovenian firms use them as counterparties.  
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Graph 5.5. Importance of different counterparties in providing risk management instruments 
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Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
The most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives as risk management 
LQVWUXPHQWV MXGJHG E\ ILQDQFLDO PDQDJHUV¶ RSLQLRQ DUH DV IROORZV 6RPH 71.4 per cent of 
managers have argued that financial risk management instruments are too expensive, while 60 
per cent of them have named difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives. Very important 
reasons that have influenced decision not to hedge financial risks are the costs of establishing 
and maintaining risk management programmes that exceed the benefits of it, as well as 
insufficient exposure to financial risks.  
Insufficient supply of instruments offered by financial institutions or traded on the 
financial market, together with inefficiency of financial risk management instruments, are 
reasons of medium importance that affect the decision not to hedge financial risks. Other 
reasons such as concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors, regulators and the 
public as well as insufficient knowledge about financial risk management instruments are not 
very important reasons why the Slovenian companies do not hedge.  
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Graph 5.6. Reasons why Slovenian companies do not use derivative instruments 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Insufficient exposure to financial risks
Insufficient knowledge about risk management instruments 
Financial risk management instruments are not efficient
Financial risk management instruments are too expensive
Difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives
Concerns about public perceptions about derivatives use 
Costs of risk management program exceed the benefits
Supply of  instruments in the financial market is insufficient
Supply of instruments offered by financial institutions is insufficient 
low importance medium importance high importance
 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Regarding the industry structure of respondents, it can be seen from graph 5.7. that the 
majority of analysed companies (69 per cent) are manufacturers, while the rest of them belong 
to other industry sectors such as construction, energy, trade, communications etc. 
 
Graph 5.7. Industry structure of analysed Slovenian companies 
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Source: Slovenian survey data 
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Around 81 per cent of the responding companies were established more than 20 years ago. 
7DNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKDWWKHOHQJWKRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VH[LVWHQFHLVRIWHQWDNHQDVDPHDVXUHRI
its reputation (e.g. see: Diamond (1991a); Petersen and Rajan (1994); Bolton and Freixas 
(2000) and Hege (2002)), it could be concluded that, among the analysed companies, the 
majority of them are companies with the best reputation on the Slovenian market and are 
market leaders. Therefore, it is expected that companies in the sample have a developed 
corporate risk management function as this function is one of the most important objectives of 
modern corporate strategy.  
 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
 
In this sub-section we present descriptive statistics of the variables we have used in our 
univariate analysis as well as in the logistic regression model. From the tables presented 
below, it can be seen that the majority of analysed  the Slovenian companies (60 per cent) 
have credit rating, as well as tax incentives to hedge (67.5 per cent), while only 14.6 per cent 
of respondents are public companies and they are listed on the stock-exchange.  
 
Table 5.4. Credit rating of Slovenian companies 
  Frequency Percent 
Do not have credit rating  16 40 
Have credit rating 24 60 
Total 40 100.0 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
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Table 5.5. Tax incentives of Slovenian companies (tax loss carried forward, tax loss carried 
back and/or investment tax credits) 
  Frequency Percent 
Do not have tax incentives 13 32.5 
Have tax incentives 27 67.5 
Total 40 100.0 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Table 5.6. Slovenian companies listed on the stock-exchange 
  Frequency Percent 
No 35 85.4 
Yes 6 14.6 
Total 41 100.0 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Descriptive statistics of other company characteristics such as the value of total assets, 
total sales, debt-to-equity ratio, dividend pay-out ratio, liquidity ratio, which were used as 
independent variables in the univariate and multivariate analysis, are shown in table 5.7. We 
have presented minimal and maximal values as well as averages. The value of total assets 
ranges from Euro 12,194,000 to 1,179,145,000, with a mean value of Euro 151,222,000. The 
value of total sales revenues ranges from Euro 14,094,000 to 1,754,016,000, with a mean 
value of Euro 141,072,390.  
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio ranges from 0 to 30.69 per cent, while the mean value is 
12.13 per cent. Ownership by institutional investors ranges from 0 per cent to 100 per cent, 
but the average share is 17.68 per cent. The dividend pay-out ratio also ranges from 0 to as 
much as 160 per cent, with an average value of 23.72 per cent. A very significant difference 
within the companies in the sample could be seen in the value of liquidity ratio which ranges 
from -10.86 to 20.00, together with the interest cover ratio that ranges from -95.08 to 564.36. 
It could be concluded that there is substantial variation in many of these variables, and that the 
results have shown a wide variation in financing policies and size within the sample. 
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Regarding the managers characteristics, it could be concluded that the average share of 
stock ownership held by managers in their companies is 4.88 per cent, while the maximum is 
SHUFHQWSHUFHQWRIPDQDJHUVGRQRWRZQRSWLRQVRQFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNVSHUFHQWRI
them are between 46 and 55 years old, while 55 per cent of financial managers are 45 or 
younger. The averagHPDQDJHUV¶WHQXUHLQWKHFRPSDQ\LV\HDUV7KHJHQGHUVWUXFWXUHLV
slightly dominated by females (57 to 43 per cent), which could be considered as very 
interesting information in respect to the world trends, which shown that the position of a 
financial manager is among the 20 leading occupations of employed women. This argument is 
confirmed by the fact that, in the year 2004, 55.7 per cent of financial managers in the US 
were women (see: www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm). Slovenia has an even higher share of 
female managers in the year 2006.  
Managers are well educated persons ± SHUFHQWRI WKHPKROGDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHH
SHUFHQWKROGDPDVWHU¶VRU3K'ZKLOHSHUFHQWRIUHVSRQGHQWVKDYHFRPSleted training in 
risk management. In respect to their education and knowledge, managers in the analysed 
companies should be able to realise the importance of risk management function to the 
success of their companies as well as being capable of implementing and developing it. 
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Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics of independent variables - Slovenian sample  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness  
  Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Total assets 41 12,194 1,179,145 151,221.51 236,982.42 3.089 .369 
Total sales revenues 41 14,094 1,754,016 141,072.39 275,470.64 5.286 .369 
Debt-to-assets 41 .0456 .9967 .406892 .206677 .284 .369 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 41 .0000 .3069 .121320 9.21496E-02 .407 .369 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 41 .0000 .8407 .280353 .261797 .861 .369 
Interest cover ratio 40 -95.0833 564.3571 19.742316 91.284027 5.677 .374 
Share owned by institutional investors 40 .00 100.00 17.6833 28.3987 1.786 .374 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-assets 
ratio 
41 .0003 .2499 3.62719E-02 5.23842E-02 2.480 .369 
Investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
41 .0000 .2336 7.19644E-02 5.62824E-02 .744 .369 
Investment expenditures-to-sales ratio 41 .0000 .7295 8.43506E-02 .119113 4.251 .369 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 35 .0000 .0591 1.19042E-02 1.65807E-02 1.422 .398 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward 
and carry backs 
40 .00 1,696.00 42.4400 268.1548 6.325 .374 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward 
and carry backs-to-total assets 
40 .0000 .0500 1.25292E-03 7.90787E-03 6.325 .374 
Investment tax credits 38 .00 26,978.00 2,656.2105 5,196.7128 3.571 .383 
Value of equity owned by managers 41 .0 78,375.0 2,505.265 12,247.611 6.244 .369 
Share of the company owned by 
management 
39 .00 100.00 4.8815 17.9650 4.705 .378 
Managers age 40 2 5 3.25 .95 .023 .374 
Managers tenure 38 3 37 15.14 9.73 .675 .383 
Dividend pay-out ratio 38 .00 160.00 23.7161 38.0949 1.873 .383 
Quick ratio 41 -.5976 3.0000 .221750 .534335 3.828 .369 
Liquidity ratio 41 -10.8570 20.0000 1.896927 3.696341 2.075 .369 
Share of the company owned by 
foreign investors 
40 .00 100.00 23.0070 40.1712 1.291 .374 
(Variables that are presented in the absolute values are in Euro 000) 
Source: Slovenian survey data
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5.3 Univariate Analysis 
 
In this section, the results of univariate analysis for the Slovenian companies have been 
presented. We have employed t-test to determine if the means of two unrelated samples differ. 
Additionally, we have conducted the Pearson test of correlation because variables in the 
model are of an interval/ratio nature (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The analysis has been 
conducted for two different groups. In the first group, we have explored differences between 
sub-samples of hedgers and nonhedgers, while in the second group we have investigated 
differences between companies that are derivative users and those companies that do not use 
derivatives. 
Tables 5.8 and 5.10 present summary statistics for the proxy variables described in the 
previous sections, while table 5.9 presents tests of differences between the means of these 
variables for hedgers and nonhedgers. Table 5.11 presents the same results but for the sample 
derivative users and nonusers. According to a mean comparison test conducted for the sample 
of hedgers/nonhedgers, as well as for derivative users and nonusers, our univariate test has 
discovered that hedgers and derivative users are statistically different from nonhedgers and 
derivative nonusers with respect only to the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy 
variable that proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging. On the basis of 
the mean comparison test, a positive relation is predicted between the decision to hedge or use 
derivatives as risk management instruments and the coefficient of the publicly held company 
dummy variable. This finding leads to the conclusion that companies that list their shares on 
the stock-exchange have more incentives to hedge and use derivatives as risk management 
instruments. This result has not been supported by the correlation analysis (see table 5.12).  
Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) have considered the possibility that publicly traded 
and privately held stock companies may behave differently with respect to risk management. 
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Generally, they have expected that the owners of closely held firms may exhibit a degree of 
risk aversion, to the extent that the wealth of the shareholders is sub-optimally diversified 
because of their holdings in the company. They have predicted that, if closely held firms tend 
to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable is predicted to 
be negative.  
Our univariate test has revealed the coefficient of the publicly traded company dummy 
variable to be positive, suggesting that publicly held companies tend to be risk-averse, while 
privately held companies do not act in a risk-averse manner and do not hedge. Therefore, our 
assumption connected to the different behaviour of the publicly traded and privately held 
stock companies with regard to risk management should be rejected. We believe the 
explanation for this result can be found in the fact that, regardless to the opinion that the 
ownership of publicly traded companies is well diversified, research results have shown that 
even 64.7 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies are owned by the major shareholder, 
PHDQLQJWKDWWKHUHLVRQHRZQHUZKRKDVPRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIDFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHVDQGKDV
a power to control the business. Therefore, it can be argued that the major shareholder has 
poorly diversified wealth and therefore acts in risk-averse manner. Another explanation for 
the positive coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable could be found in the 
fact that publicly traded companies, which act in a risk-averse manner tend to signal good 
QHZVWRLQYHVWRUVRQWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWDVZHOODVWRDOOFRPSDQ\¶VVWDNHKROGHUVEHFDXVHD
company that manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky investment or a better rated 
business partner. However, to the best of our knowledge, we cannot support this argument by 
theoretical or empirical evidence, meaning that this second explanation is based only on our 
opinion.  
Other variables that test the hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies as 
substitutes for hedging are not statistically significant. The univariate tests also suggest that 
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hedgers and derivative users are not statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative 
nonusers with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market 
imperfection, tax preference items, or managerial utility. Hedgers and nonhedgers do not 
differ regarding the size of company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial 
shareholdings, ownership by institutional investors, liquidity, dividend-pay-out ratio etc. In 
other words, on the basis of the univariate analysis, both t-test and Pearson correlation 
coefficient, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the shareholder maximisation 
hypothesis as well as managerial utility maximisation hypothesis.  
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Table 5.8. Group statistics Slovenian hedgers/nonhedgers 
 Hedgers/Nonhedgers N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Total assets 
  
Nonhedgers 9 61,371.78 80,503.13 26,834.38 
Hedgers 32 176,491.75 260,365.08 46,026.48 
Total sales revenues 
  
Nonhedgers 9 40,950.33 25,668.20 8,556.07 
Hedgers 32 169,231.72 306,620.39 54,203.34 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .441924 .252914 8.43047E-02 
Hedgers 32 .397039 .195327 3.45293E-02 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .125330 .105724 3.52413E-02 
Hedgers 32 .120193 8.98127E-02 1.58768E-02 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .246852 .211561 7.05203E-02 
Hedgers 32 .289775 .276528 4.88837E-02 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 4.660217 17.324346 5.774782 
Hedgers 31 24.120990 103.269150 18.547687 
Debt rating 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .5556 .5270 .1757 
Hedgers 31 .6129 .4951 8.893E-02 
Share owned by institutional investors 
  
Nonhedgers 9 12.9778 32.8452 10.9484 
Hedgers 31 19.0494 27.4259 4.9258 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-assets ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 3.59765E-02 5.59756E-02 1.86585E-02 
Hedgers 32 3.63549E-02 5.22701E-02 9.24014E-03 
Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 8.02815E-02 5.51659E-02 1.83886E-02 
Hedgers 32 6.96252E-02 5.72387E-02 1.01185E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-sales ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .128244 .228290 7.60968E-02 
Hedgers 32 7.20055E-02 6.43498E-02 1.13755E-02 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 9.51924E-03 1.93990E-02 6.46634E-03 
Hedgers 26 1.27298E-02 1.58338E-02 3.10527E-03 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .1778 .5333 .1778 
Hedgers 31 54.7097 304.6106 54.7097 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs-to-total Nonhedgers 9 1.11747E-05 3.35240E-05 1.11747E-05 
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assets 
  
Hedgers 31 1.61343E-03 8.98318E-03 1.61343E-03 
Investment tax credits 
  
Nonhedgers 9 984.4444 914.0728 304.6909 
Hedgers 29 3,175.0345 5,854.0947 1,087.0781 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .7778 .4410 .1470 
Hedgers 31 .6452 .4864 8.736E-02 
Value of equity owned by managers 
  
Nonhedgers 9 575.337 1,682.404 560.801 
Hedgers 32 3,048.057 13,836.097 2,445.900 
Share of the company owned by management 
  
Nonhedgers 9 6.2778 18.2776 6.0925 
Hedgers 30 4.4627 18.1648 3.3164 
Managers ownership of stock options 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .11 .33 .11 
Hedgers 31 9.68E-02 .30 5.40E-02 
Managers age 
  
Nonhedgers 9 3.11 .93 .31 
Hedgers 31 3.29 .97 .17 
Managers tenure 
  
Nonhedgers 9 12.33 6.67 2.22 
Hedgers 29 16.02 10.45 1.94 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 14.6811 22.1772 7.3924 
Hedgers 29 26.5200 41.7466 7.7522 
Company listed on the stock-exchange 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .00 .00 .00 
Hedgers 32 .19 .40 7.01E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 .162216 .272903 9.09677E-02 
Hedgers 32 .238494 .589803 .104263 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Nonhedgers 9 2.202866 2.053383 .684461 
Hedgers 32 1.810881 4.062842 .718216 
Share of the company owned by foreign investors 
  
Nonhedgers 9 44.2889 52.5219 17.5073 
Hedgers 31 16.8284 34.4515 6.1877 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
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Table 5.9. Independent samples t-test Slovenian hedgers/nonhedgers 
 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality 
of Means       
    F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
           Lower Upper 
Total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.606 .115 -1.298 39 .202 -115,119.97 88,658.26 -294,448.23 64,208.28 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.161 38.444 .037 -115,119.97 53,277.77 -222,934.27 -7,305.68 
Total sales 
revenues 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.206 .145 -1.243 39 .221 -128,281.39 103,237.53 -337,099.00 80,536.23 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.338 32.486 .026 -128,281.39 54,874.48 -239,991.50 -16,571.27 
Debt-to-assets 
ratio 
 
Equal variances 
assumed .102 .751 .571 39 .571 4.48853E-02 7.86465E-02 -.114192 .203963 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .493 10.831 .632 4.48853E-02 9.11019E-02 -.156012 .245783 
Long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .355 .555 .146 39 .885 5.13743E-03 3.52021E-02 -6.606547E-02 7.63403E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .133 11.455 .897 5.13743E-03 3.86526E-02 -7.952561E-02 8.98005E-02 
Long-term debt-to-
equity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.159 .288 -.430 39 .669 -4.292319E-02 9.98000E-02 -.244788 .158941 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.500 16.549 .623 -4.292319E-02 8.58063E-02 -.224335 .138489 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .693 .410 -.558 38 .580 -19.460773 34.873127 -90.057728 51.136183 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.002 34.869 .323 -19.460773 19.425880 -58.902685 19.981140 
Debt rating 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .246 .623 -.302 38 .765 -5.7348E-02 .1901 -.4422 .3275 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.291 12.408 .776 -5.7348E-02 .1969 -.4848 .3701 
Share owned by 
institutional 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .130 .720 -.560 38 .579 -6.0716 10.8489 -28.0340 15.8908 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.506 11.442 .623 -6.0716 12.0055 -32.3715 20.2284 
Cash & cash 
equivalents-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .229 .635 -.019 39 .985 -3.784256E-04 2.00167E-02 -4.086596E-02 4.01091E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.018 12.216 .986 -3.784256E-04 2.08212E-02 -4.565522E-02 4.48984E-02 
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Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .034 .854 .497 39 .622 1.06564E-02 2.14385E-02 -3.270709E-02 5.40198E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .508 13.264 .620 1.06564E-02 2.09887E-02 -3.459534E-02 5.59081E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
sales ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 6.435 .015 1.261 39 .215 5.62384E-02 4.46150E-02 -3.400398E-02 .146481 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .731 8.360 .485 5.62384E-02 7.69424E-02 -.119868 .232345 
R&D 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .035 .852 -.495 33 .624 -3.210569E-03 6.48491E-03 -1.640423E-02 9.98309E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.448 11.913 .662 -3.210569E-03 7.17330E-03 -1.885259E-02 1.24315E-02 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.213 .278 -.532 38 .598 -54.5319 102.4807 -261.9931 152.9293 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.997 30.001 .327 -54.5319 54.7100 -166.2645 57.2007 
Total value of tax 
loss carry-forward 
and carry backs-to-
total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.205 .279 -.530 38 .599 -1.602252E-03 3.02223E-03 -7.720437E-03 4.51593E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.993 30.003 .329 -1.602252E-03 1.61347E-03 -4.897374E-03 1.69287E-03 
Investment tax 
credits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.333 .076 -1.108 36 .275 -2,190.5900 1,976.8168 -6,199.7603 1,818.5802 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.940 31.883 .061 -2,190.5900 1,128.9709 -4,490.5583 1,09.3783 
Tax incentives-
dummy 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.093 .087 .734 38 .467 .1326 .1807 -.2331 .4984 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .776 14.178 .451 .1326 .1710 -.2337 .4989 
Value of equity 
owned by 
managers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .887 .352 -.530 39 .599 -2,472.720 4,663.208 -11,904.949 6,959.509 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.985 33.981 .331 -2,472.720 2,509.367 -7,572.472 2,627.031 
Share of the 
company owned 
by management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .430 .516 .263 37 .794 1.8151 6.9130 -12.1919 15.8221 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .262 13.125 .798 1.8151 6.9367 -13.1561 16.7863 
Managers 
ownership of stock 
options 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .059 .809 .123 38 .903 1.43E-02 .12 -.22 .25 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .116 12.043 .910 1.43E-02 .12 -.25 .28 
Managers age 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .065 .800 -.491 38 .626 -.18 .36 -.92 .56 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.504 13.551 .622 -.18 .36 -.94 .59 
Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 5.464 .025 -.992 36 .328 -3.68 3.71 -11.22 3.85 
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Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.248 21.290 .225 -3.68 2.95 -9.82 2.45 
Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.000 .166 -.811 36 .423 -11.8389 14.6036 -41.4563 17.7785 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.105 26.213 .279 -11.8389 10.7118 -33.8487 10.1709 
Company listed on 
the stock-exchange 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 13.355 .001 -1.406 39 .168 -.19 .13 -.46 8.23E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.675 31.000 .012 -.19 7.01E-02 -.33 -4.45E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .495 .486 -.374 39 .710 -7.627812E-02 .203811 -.488526 .335970 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.551 29.629 .586 -7.627812E-02 .138369 -.359014 .206457 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .003 .960 .278 39 .783 .391984 1.411030 -2.462093 3.246062 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .395 26.900 .696 .391984 .992129 -1.644052 2.428021 
Share of the 
company owned 
by foreign 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 9.610 .004 1.862 38 .070 27.4605 14.7514 -2.4021 57.3231 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.479 10.082 .170 27.4605 18.5686 -13.8676 68.7886 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
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Table 5.10. Group statistics Slovenian derivative users/nonusers 
 
Use of derivatives as risk 
management instrument N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Total assets 
  
No 14 76,360.71 85,313.71 22,801.05 
Yes 27 190,038.22 279,605.99 53,810.20 
Total sales revenues 
  
No 14 56,293.00 41,068.07 10,975.90 
Yes 27 185,032.07 331,699.32 63,835.56 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
No 14 .393805 .265307 7.09062E-02 
Yes 27 .413677 .174304 3.35449E-02 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
No 14 .108051 9.31918E-02 2.49066E-02 
Yes 27 .128201 9.26152E-02 1.78238E-02 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 
  
No 14 .228968 .210634 5.62943E-02 
Yes 27 .306997 .284781 5.48062E-02 
Interest cover ratio 
  
No 14 8.836979 15.193103 4.060528 
Yes 26 25.614421 113.033780 22.167748 
Debt rating 
  
No 13 .4615 .5189 .1439 
Yes 27 .6667 .4804 9.245E-02 
Share owned by institutional investors 
  
No 14 8.7000 26.4743 7.0756 
Yes 26 22.5204 28.7077 5.6300 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-assets ratio 
  
No 14 2.56379E-02 4.62252E-02 1.23542E-02 
Yes 27 4.17858E-02 5.53250E-02 1.06473E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
No 14 7.46868E-02 5.87955E-02 1.57138E-02 
Yes 27 7.05527E-02 5.60257E-02 1.07821E-02 
Investment expenditures-to-sales ratio 
  
No 14 .105883 .184947 4.94292E-02 
Yes 27 7.31856E-02 6.59223E-02 1.26868E-02 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
No 13 7.37605E-03 1.63859E-02 4.54464E-03 
Yes 22 1.45800E-02 1.64768E-02 3.51287E-03 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
  
No 13 .1231 .4438 .1231 
Yes 27 62.8148 326.3954 62.8148 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs-to-total assets No 13 7.73631E-06 2.78937E-05 7.73631E-06 
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  Yes 27 1.85245E-03 9.62563E-03 1.85245E-03 
Investment tax credits 
  
No 13 1,837.1538 2,020.5632 560.4034 
Yes 25 3,082.1200 6,248.2241 1,249.6448 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
No 13 .7692 .4385 .1216 
Yes 27 .6296 .4921 9.471E-02 
Value of equity owned by managers 
  
No 14 1,075.104 2,491.098 665.774 
Yes 27 3,246.829 15,033.301 2,893.160 
Share of the company owned by management 
  
No 14 11.8500 29.2860 7.8270 
Yes 25 .9792 1.4999 .3000 
Managers ownership of stock options 
  
No 13 7.69E-02 .28 7.69E-02 
Yes 27 .11 .32 6.16E-02 
Managers age 
  
No 14 3.21 .89 .24 
Yes 26 3.27 1.00 .20 
Managers tenure 
  
No 14 13.61 8.49 2.27 
Yes 24 16.04 10.46 2.14 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
No 12 14.9692 22.2420 6.4207 
Yes 26 27.7531 43.3181 8.4954 
Company listed on the stock-exchange 
  
No 14 .00 .00 .00 
Yes 27 .22 .42 8.15E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
No 14 7.37278E-02 .294294 7.86535E-02 
Yes 27 .298502 .614843 .118327 
Liquidity ratio 
  
No 14 1.119036 3.844879 1.027587 
Yes 27 2.300277 3.624028 .697445 
Share of the company owned by foreign investors 
  
No 14 28.8286 46.5021 12.4282 
Yes 26 19.8723 36.9289 7.2424 
Yes 27 1.00 .00 .00 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
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Table 5.11. Independent samples t-test Slovenian derivative users/nonusers 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality 
of Means       
    F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
           Lower Upper 
Total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.263 .046 -1.478 39 .147 -113,677.51 76,917.78 -269,258.41 41,903.39 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.945 33.984 .060 -113,677.51 58,441.64 -232,447.32 5,092.31 
Total sales revenues 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.249 .079 -1.438 39 .158 -128,739.07 89,537.09 -309,844.94 52,366.79 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.988 27.512 .057 -128,739.07 64,772.29 -261,525.22 4,047.07 
Leverage-debt-to-assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.744 .106 -.289 39 .774 -1.987285E-02 6.88608E-02 -.159157 .119411 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.253 18.995 .803 -1.987285E-02 7.84407E-02 -.184054 .144309 
Long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .003 .958 -.659 39 .514 -2.014973E-02 3.05654E-02 -8.197417E-02 4.16747E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.658 26.279 .516 -2.014973E-02 3.06272E-02 -8.307237E-02 4.27729E-02 
Long-term debt-to-
equity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.654 .206 -.903 39 .372 -7.802939E-02 8.64204E-02 -.252831 9.67723E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.993 34.035 .328 -7.802939E-02 7.85669E-02 -.237691 8.16319E-02 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.488 .230 -.549 38 .586 -16.777442 30.534883 -78.592080 45.037197 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.744 26.648 .463 -16.777442 22.536569 -63.047253 29.492370 
Debt rating 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.345 .253 -1.233 38 .225 -.2051 .1664 -.5419 .1317 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.199 22.203 .243 -.2051 .1710 -.5597 .1494 
Share owned by 
institutional investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.655 .112 -1.491 38 .144 -13.8204 9.2699 -32.5863 4.9455 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.528 28.692 .137 -13.8204 9.0422 -32.3223 4.6816 
Cash & cash 
equivalents-to-assets 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .273 .604 -.935 39 .356 -1.614789E-02 1.72797E-02 -5.109931E-02 1.88035E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.990 30.947 .330 -1.614789E-02 1.63092E-02 -4.941312E-02 1.71173E-02 
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Investment 
expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .215 .646 .220 39 .827 4.13409E-03 1.87606E-02 -3.381273E-02 4.20809E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .217 25.317 .830 4.13409E-03 1.90572E-02 -3.509007E-02 4.33582E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-sales 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.035 .162 .830 39 .411 3.26974E-02 3.93820E-02 -4.696036E-02 .112355 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .641 14.737 .532 3.26974E-02 5.10313E-02 -7.624249E-02 .141637 
R&D expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.576 .218 -1.252 33 .219 -7.203927E-03 5.75247E-03 -1.890741E-02 4.49955E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.254 25.435 .221 -7.203927E-03 5.74404E-03 -1.902375E-02 4.61590E-03 
Total value of tax loss 
carry-forward and carry 
backs 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.047 .161 -.688 38 .496 -62.6917 91.1414 -247.1978 121.8143 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.998 26.000 .327 -62.6917 62.8149 -191.8096 66.4262 
Total value of tax loss 
carry-forward and carry 
backs-to-total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.039 .162 -.686 38 .497 -1.844716E-03 2.68783E-03 -7.285935E-03 3.59650E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.996 26.001 .329 -1.844716E-03 1.85247E-03 -5.652514E-03 1.96308E-03 
Investment tax credits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.470 .125 -.696 36 .491 -1,244.9662 1,789.4863 -4,874.2127 2,384.2804 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.909 32.033 .370 -1,244.9662 1,369.5489 -4,034.5341 1,544.6018 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.786 .059 .869 38 .390 .1396 .1606 -.1856 .4648 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .906 26.471 .373 .1396 .1541 -.1770 .4562 
Value of equity owned 
by managers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.089 .303 -.534 39 .597 -2,171.725 4,070.200 -10,404.481 6,061.031 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.732 28.666 .470 -2,171.725 2,968.776 -8,246.630 3,903.180 
Share of the company 
owned by management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 16.465 .000 1.871 37 .069 10.8708 5.8087 -.8987 22.6403 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.388 13.038 .188 10.8708 7.8328 -6.0458 27.7874 
Managers ownership of 
stock options 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .452 .505 -.330 38 .744 -3.42E-02 .10 -.24 .18 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.347 27.182 .731 -3.42E-02 9.86E-02 -.24 .17 
Managers age 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .172 .681 -.172 38 .865 -5.49E-02 .32 -.70 .59 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.178 29.560 .860 -5.49E-02 .31 -.69 .58 
Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.906 .176 -.739 36 .465 -2.43 3.29 -9.11 4.25 
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Equal variances 
not assumed   -.782 32.036 .440 -2.43 3.11 -8.78 3.91 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.966 .094 -.961 36 .343 -12.7839 13.3087 -39.7752 14.2074 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.201 35.438 .238 -12.7839 10.6488 -34.3926 8.8248 
Company listed on the 
stock-exchange 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 29.830 .000 -1.951 39 .058 -.22 .11 -.45 8.21E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.726 26.000 .011 -.22 8.15E-02 -.39 -5.46E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.924 .173 -1.288 39 .205 -.224774 .174548 -.577831 .128283 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.582 38.874 .122 -.224774 .142083 -.512194 6.26459E-02 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .071 .791 -.970 39 .338 -1.181241 1.218269 -3.645424 1.282941 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.951 25.075 .351 -1.181241 1.241920 -3.738633 1.376151 
Share of the company 
owned by foreign 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.425 .128 .668 38 .508 8.9563 13.4122 -18.1954 36.1079 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .623 22.008 .540 8.9563 14.3844 -20.8746 38.7871 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
Table 5.12. Pearson correlations ± Slovenian sample 
   Hedgers/Nonhedgers Use of derivatives as risk 
management instrument 
Company listed on the 
stock-exchange 
Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1.000 
. 
41 
.736** 
.000 
41 
 
.220 
.168 
41 
 
Use of derivatives as risk 
management instrument 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.736** 
.000 
41 
1.000 
. 
41 
.298 
.058 
41 
Company listed on the 
stock-exchange 
    
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.220 
.168 
41 
.298 
.058 
41 
 
1.000 
. 
41 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data
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5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The variables tested in our multivariate regression model are based on the determinants 
we have presented in the literature review as the key rationales of corporate hedging decision. 
The reviewed papers have suggested several potential explanations for corporate hedging and 
reveal some common themes. Thus, the decision to hedge or not, as well as the decision to 
hedge with derivatives, is a function of six factors - financial distress costs, agency costs, 
capital market imperfections, taxes, managerial utility, and hedge substitutes. 
Of these main factors, the first five are expected to have a positive influence on the firm's 
decision to hedge (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1985; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; MacMinn, 1987; Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; MacMinn and Han, 1990; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990; 
Bessembinder's, 1991; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1992; 
Dobson and Soenen, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 
1993; Dolde, 1995; May, 1995; Mian, 1996; Stulz, 1996; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 1997; 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Lamont, 1997; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Shapiro and 
Titman, 1998; Gay and Nam, 1998; Minton and Schrand, 1999; Graham and Smith, 1999; 
Haushalter 2000; Mello and Parsons, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Haushalter, Randall 
and Lie, 2002; Fatemi and Luft; 2002). That is, higher values for factors related to financial 
distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections, taxes and managerial utility are 
expected to be associated with a greater likelihood that the firm will engage in hedging 
activities. The sixth factor (hedge substitutes), however, is expected to have a negative 
influence on the firm's hedging decision (Smith and Warner, 1979; Smith and Stulz; 1985; 
Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Culp, 1994; Tufano, 1996; Pulvino, 1998; Harford, 1999). 
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The relationship between the decision to hedge and its potential determinants can be 
expressed in the format of a general function as follows: 
 
Hedge = f (FC, AC, CMI, T, MU, HS) (2) 
 
where: 
x Hedge - binary variable which takes on a value of 1 if the firm hedges and 0 if the firm does not hedge 
with these instruments 
x BC - the firm's probability of financial distress or bankruptcy 
x AC - agency costs of debt facing the firm 
x CMI - capital market imperfections and costly external financing  
x  T - the convexity of the firm's tax function  
x MU - level of managerial wealth invested in the company  
x HS - the extent of alternative hedging-related financial policies. or hedge substitutes, utilised by the firm. 
 
Here we present the results of our analysis on two separate decisions conducted on 
Slovenian non-financial companies. First, we examine the influence of factors presented 
above on the decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks, and second, we explore the 
influence of these factors on the corporate decision to use derivative instruments when 
managing corporate risks.  
 
5.4.1 Decision to Hedge Corporate Risks  
 
Table 5.13. reports multivariate analysis results relating the probability of hedging to the 
determinants of hedging. The predetermined independent variables include total sales 
revenues as a proxy for size and financial costs, credit rating as a proxy for agency cost of 
debt, investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for capital market imperfections, total value 
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of tax loss carry-forwards as a proxy for tax incentives, valuHRIFRPSDQ\¶VHTXLW\RZQHGE\
management as a proxy for managerial utility, and quick ratio as a proxy for hedge 
substitutes. The underlined variables represent those independent variables which appear to be 
the most consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic models. The 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm hedge corporate risks and 0 otherwise. 
Apart from the model discussed in this sub-section, as we have created multiple proxies 
available to measure some firm characteristics, we have estimated separate logistic 
regressions, using all possible combinations of variables representing each predicted 
construct. The importance of inclusion of all relevant variables in the regression model, as 
well as the exclusion of variables that are irrelevant and do not contribute to the strengths of 
the logistic model in predicting decision to hedge, has been explained in the chapter 4. In 
constructing the logistic model for the Slovenian companies we have respected the same 
rules.  
 
The model can be expressed as:  
Hedge = f (Total sales revenues, Credit rating, Investment expenditures to assets, Total 
9DOXHRI WD[ ORVVFDUU\ IRUZDUGV9DOXHRIFRPSDQ\¶VHTXLW\RZQHGE\PDQDJHPHQW
Quick ratio) 
Table 5.13. Logistic regression results Slovenian Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
      Total number of cases:      40 (Unweighted) 
      Number of selected cases:   40 
      Number of unselected cases: 0 
 
      Number of selected cases:                 40 
      Number rejected because of missing data:  2 
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 38 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding: 
 
Original       Internal 
Value          Value 
       0       0 
       1       1 
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Dependent Variable..   HEDGERS    Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
 
 
Beginning Block Number  0.  Initial Log Likelihood Function 
 
-2 Log Likelihood   39.113641 
 
* Constant is included in the model. 
 
 
Beginning Block Number  1.  Method: Enter 
 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1..       FINCOST2  Total sales revenues 
          AGCOST1   Credit rating 
          CMI2      Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
          TAX1      Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
          MNGUTIL1  Value of equity owned by managers 
          SUBSTIT3  Quick ratio 
 
 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 9 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
 
 -2 Log Likelihood       16.542 
 Goodness of Fit         15.928 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         .448 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          .697 
 
  
                      Chi-Square    df   Significance 
 
 Model                   22.571     6        .0010 
 Block                   22.571     6        .0010 
 Step                    22.571     6        .0010 
 
 
---------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test----------- 
 
    HEDGERS  = Nonhedgers       HEDGERS  = Hedgers 
 
Group   Observed    Expected    Observed    Expected     Total 
 
    1      3.000       3.446       1.000        .554     4.000 
    2      3.000       2.702       1.000       1.298     4.000 
    3      2.000       1.295       2.000       2.705     4.000 
    4       .000        .450       4.000       3.550     4.000 
    5       .000        .104       4.000       3.896     4.000 
    6       .000        .003       4.000       3.997     4.000 
    7       .000        .000       4.000       4.000     4.000 
    8       .000        .000       4.000       4.000     4.000 
    9       .000        .000       4.000       4.000     4.000 
   10       .000        .000       2.000       2.000     2.000 
 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
Goodness-of-fit test     1.7025     8        .9888 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Classification Table for HEDGERS 
The Cut Value is .50 
                              Predicted 
                       Nonhedgers    Hedgers     Percent Correct 
                             N    Ù      H 
Observed              ÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Nonhedgers     N   Ù      6    Ù      2    Ù   75.00% 
                      ÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Hedgers        H   Ù      2    Ù     28    Ù   93.33% 
                      ÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
                                         Overall  89.47% 
 
 
----------------- Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
Variable           B      S.E.     Wald    df      Sig       R 
 
FINCOST2       .0001 5.504E-05   3.7022     1    .0543   .2086 
AGCOST1       1.1796    1.3441    .7701     1    .3802   .0000 
CMI2        -32.6534   17.2962   3.5642     1    .0590  -.2000 
TAX1           .0041     .0402    .0105     1    .9184   .0000 
MNGUTIL1       .0002     .0007    .1312     1    .7172   .0000 
SUBSTIT3      5.2395    3.3843   2.3968     1    .1216   .1007 
Constant     -2.7620    2.2990   1.4434     1    .2296 
 
 
                        90% CI for Exp(B) 
Variable       Exp(B)     Lower     Upper 
 
FINCOST2       1.0001    1.0000    1.0002 
AGCOST1        3.2530     .3565   29.6788 
CMI2            .0000     .0000     .0149 
TAX1           1.0041     .9399    1.0728 
MNGUTIL1       1.0002     .9991    1.0014 
SUBSTIT3     188.5728     .7209 49323.669 
 
 
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced. 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
The regression model presented in table 5.13. has revealed that there is no statistically 
significant explanatory variable, therefore it could be concluded that the decision to hedge in 
the Slovenian companies is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging. 
Evidence based on empirical relation between decision to hedge and financial distress costs, 
agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, managerial 
utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested hypotheses. We 
have tested the robustness of this result by employing separate logistic regressions with all 
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combinations of exploratory variables, and these tests have supported the results of the model 
presented in table 5.13. It should be emphasised that, in the regression models where outliers 
have not been controlled, the total sales revenues as a proxy for size was marginally 
significant (p = 0.0503). When we removed the standardised residuals from the model (which 
is one of the important assumptions of logistic regressions and the reliability of the results), 
the total sales revenues were not significant (p = 0.0543).  
 
Table 5.14. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for independent variables in the regression- 
Slovenian hedgers/nonhedgers 
   Quick ratio Total sales 
revenues 
Debt rating 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and 
carry backs 
Value of equity 
owned by 
managers 
Quick ratio 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1.000 
. 
41 
-.084 
.601 
41 
.093 
.567 
40 
.208 
.191 
41 
-.061 
.710 
40 
-.044 
.786 
41 
Total sales 
revenues 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.084 
.601 
41 
1.000 
. 
41 
-.187 
.249 
40 
.064 
.693 
41 
-.060 
.712 
40 
.168 
.293 
41 
Debt rating 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.093 
.567 
40 
-.187 
.249 
40 
1.000 
. 
40 
.224 
.164 
40 
.128 
.436 
39 
.121 
.457 
40 
Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.208 
.191 
41 
.064 
.693 
41 
.224 
.164 
40 
1.000 
. 
41 
-.097 
.552 
40 
-.032 
.841 
41 
Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and 
carry backs 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.061 
.710 
40 
-.060 
.712 
40 
.128 
.436 
39 
-.097 
.552 
40 
1.000 
. 
40 
-.031 
.849 
40 
Value of equity 
owned by 
managers 
  
  
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.044 
.786 
41 
.168 
.293 
41 
.121 
.457 
40 
-.032 
.841 
41 
-.031 
.849 
40 
1.000 
. 
41 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
 
 
 
To test the non-existence of multicollinearity as one of the important assumptions of 
logistic regression, we have calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between the employed 
independent variables. From the data presented in table 5.14 it could be concluded that there 
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is no correlation between variables, therefore the calculated logit coefficient in our model is 
reliable.  
 
5.4.2 Decision to Use Derivatives as Risk Management Instruments 
 
7DEOHSUHVHQWV WKH UHVXOWVRIPXOWLYDULDWH DQDO\VLV IRU D FRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQ WRXVH
derivatives as risk management instruments. Again, the predetermined independent variables 
include total sales revenues as a proxy for size and financial costs, credit rating as a proxy for 
agency cost of debt, investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections, total value of tax loss carry-forwards as a proxy for tax incentives, value of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VHTXLW\RZQHGE\PDQDJHPHQWDVDSUR[\IRUPDQDJHULDOXWLOLW\DQGTXLFNUDWLRDV
a proxy for hedge substitutes. The underlined variables represent those independent variables 
which appear to be the most consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic 
models. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm uses derivatives as corporate risk 
management instruments, and 0 otherwise. Apart from the model discussed in this sub-
section, as we have created multiple proxies available to measure some firm characteristics, 
we have estimated separate logistic regressions, using all possible combinations of variables 
representing each predicted construct.  
 
The model can be expressed as:  
Derivative use = f (Total sales revenues, Credit rating, Investment expenditures to 
assets, Total value of tax loss carry-IRUZDUGV9DOXHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHTXLW\RZQHGE\
management, Quick ratio) 
 
Table 5.15. Logistic regression results Slovenian derivative users/nonusers 
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      Total number of cases:      39 (Unweighted) 
      Number of selected cases:   39 
      Number of unselected cases: 0 
 
      Number of selected cases:                 39 
      Number rejected because of missing data:  2 
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 37 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding: 
  
Original       Internal 
Value          Value 
        0       0 
         1       1 
 
Dependent Variable..   DERIVATI   Use of derivatives as risk management 
instrument 
 
 
Beginning Block Number  0.  Initial Log Likelihood Function 
 
-2 Log Likelihood   45.03321 
 
* Constant is included in the model. 
 
 
Beginning Block Number  1.  Method: Enter 
 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1..       FINCOST2  Total sales revenues 
          AGCOST1   Credit rating 
          CMI2      Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
          TAX1      Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
          SUBSTIT3  Quick ratio 
          MNGUTIL1  Value of equity owned by managers 
 
 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent. 
 
 -2 Log Likelihood       22.911 
 Goodness of Fit         23.319 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         .450 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          .639 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
 Model                   22.123     6        .0012 
 Block                   22.123     6        .0012 
 Step                    22.123     6        .0012 
 
 
---------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test----------- 
 
 
      DERIVATI = No               DERIVATI = Yes 
 
 
 
Group   Observed    Expected    Observed    Expected     Total 
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    1      4.000       3.751        .000        .249     4.000 
    2      3.000       3.231       1.000        .769     4.000 
    3      1.000       1.913       3.000       2.087     4.000 
    4      2.000        .930       2.000       3.070     4.000 
    5      1.000        .535       3.000       3.465     4.000 
    6       .000        .339       4.000       3.661     4.000 
    7       .000        .259       4.000       3.741     4.000 
    8       .000        .036       4.000       3.964     4.000 
    9       .000        .006       5.000       4.994     5.000 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
Goodness-of-fit test     3.9486     7        .7857 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Classification Table for DERIVATI 
The Cut Value is .50 
 
                   Predicted 
                  No      Yes     Percent Correct 
                    N  Ù    Y 
Observed       ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ 
   No      N   Ù    8  Ù    3  Ù   72.73% 
               ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ 
   Yes     Y   Ù    2  Ù   24  Ù   92.31% 
               ÚØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØÚ 
                          Overall  86.49% 
 
 
----------------- Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
Variable           B      S.E.     Wald    df      Sig       R 
 
FINCOST2    2.53E-05 1.039E-05   5.9371     1    .0148   .2957 
AGCOST1       2.5205    1.2417   4.1204     1    .0424   .2170 
CMI2        -24.3613   11.1995   4.7315     1    .0296  -.2463 
TAX1         -4.4433   37.7753    .0138     1    .9064   .0000 
SUBSTIT3      4.9059    2.5756   3.6282     1    .0568   .1901 
MNGUTIL1    -5.5E-05     .0002    .0792     1    .7784   .0000 
Constant     -1.3601    1.2706   1.1459     1    .2844 
 
 
                        90% CI for Exp(B) 
Variable       Exp(B)     Lower     Upper 
 
FINCOST2       1.0000    1.0000    1.0000 
AGCOST1       12.4352    1.6130   95.8680 
CMI2            .0000     .0000     .0026 
TAX1            .0118     .0000 1.135E+25 
SUBSTIT3     135.0866    1.9532 9342.9003 
MNGUTIL1        .9999     .9996    1.0003 
 
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced. 
 
 
Source: Slovenian survey data 
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From the regression model presented in table 5.15. it can be seen that the corporate 
decision to use derivative instruments is related to three variables ± total sales revenues, 
investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and credit rating. Other variables that tested the 
research hypothesis are not statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not 
influence the decision to use derivatives.  
Total sales revenues are a proxy for the effect of size on the decision to use derivatives as 
risk management instruments. The regression model has revealed a positive relation between 
the decision to use derivatives and the size of the company, implying that it is more likely for 
larger companies to use derivatives. Several previous empirical studies (e.g., Nance, Smith 
and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are more likely to hedge. These 
studies contend that the positive correlation between size and hedging can be attributed to 
significant economies of scale in the information and transaction costs of hedging. Based on 
WKLVDUJXPHQWDILUP¶VVL]HVKRXOGEHSRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGWRWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWWKHILUPKHGJHV 
Contrary to the predicted positive relation between the size and decision to hedge, a few 
scholars have predicted the degree of hedging to be negatively related to the size of a company 
(Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000). The issue of 
high costs of implementing the risk management programme is particularly relevant for the 
relation between hedging policy and firm size. An additional argument regarding the negative 
relationship between hedging and size is put forward by Weiss (1990). He has argued that, 
everything else being equal, companies with fewer total assets are likely to have greater 
informational asymmetries with potential public investors. Additionally, the direct costs of 
bankruptcy are proportionally greater for companies with fewer assets; therefore smaller firms 
are expected to hedge more.  
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Our assumption was that the argument is stronger in the case of the significant economies 
of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging, so we have predicted a positive 
UHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HDQGWKHGHFLVLRQWRKHGJH5HJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVVXSSort our 
hypothesis for the Slovenian companies. It should be noted that the alternative variable that has 
EHHQXVHGDVSUR[\IRUFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HWKHYDOXHRIWRWDODVVHWVKDVQRWVKRZQDVUHOHYDQW
for making the decision to use derivatives. Therefore, our result is not robust to the other 
control variable.  
Another variable that is significant for the decision of Slovenian companies to use 
GHULYDWLYHVLVDFRPSDQ\¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJDVDSUR[\IRUWKHDJHQF\FRVWRIGHEW,QRXUUHVHDUFK
assumptions we argue that firms with a credit rating use derivatives as risk management 
instruments less extensively because the severity of the agency cost of debt is related to the 
extent of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that firms with greater 
asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater incentive to engage in 
risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is inconsistent with the predictions 
derived from the agency cost of debt model, because the relationship between the dependent 
variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading to the conclusion that companies 
that have a credit rating hedge by using derivative instruments more intensively.  
This is contrary to the findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who 
have proven that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit 
rating and therefore greater informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management 
activity. On the basis of our findings, we should reject our hypothesis related to the agency 
cost of debt and asymmetric information problems. An alternative variable that has used as 
proxy for agency cost (the share of the company owned by institutional investors) has not 
been shown as relevant for making the decision to hedge.  
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Finally, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant negative relation 
with the decision to use derivatives. The results of our logistic model do not support our 
prediction WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHE\XVLQJGHULYDWLYHVLVSUHGLFWHGWREHpositively 
correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Additionally, this finding is 
inconsistent with our findings regarding the Croatian companies presented in the previous 
chapter, as well as with the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
(1993), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who have also proven a positive relation 
EHWZHHQWKHGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHDQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vinvestment (growth) opportunities.  
The negative relation found in the case of the Slovenian companies suggest that companies 
which have less investment (growth) opportunities have more incentives to hedge with derivative 
instruments. Again, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing 
other variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing hypothesis (cash and cash equivalents-to-assets ratio, investment expenditures to 
sales and R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio). The results for alternative regression variables 
were not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the capital market imperfection 
hypothesis, which implies that the benefits of hedging should be greater the more growth 
RSWLRQV DUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLW\ VHW VKRXOG EH UHMHFWHG LQ WKH FDVH RI WKH
Slovenian companies. This complements Mian (1996), who has shown that the probability of 
hedging is negatively related to the market-to-book ratio, and failed to provide support for the 
contracting cost and capital market imperfections model. 
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
 The Slovenian survey has revealed that 78 per cent of respondents use some form of 
financial engineering to manage interest-rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk. 
Additionally, among companies that manage financial risks, there is a substantial number of 
hedgers who do not use derivatives, but manage risk exposure with some other instruments 
like natural hedge, matching liabilities and assets, operational hedging etc. It could be 
concluded that 65.9 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies use derivatives as risk 
management instruments. In comparison with Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), whose 
survey has revealed that 50 per cent of US non-financial companies use some form of financial 
engineering to manage financial risks, it could be concluded that the Slovenian companies use 
derivatives more frequently than their counterparts in United States. However, it should be 
noted that the time difference needs to be taken into account. We believe that the use of 
derivatives has grown since 1998 in US as well as globally, therefore the results of our survey 
cannot be directly compared with those of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998). 
7KHVXUYH\¶V UHVXOWVKDYHVKRZQ WKDW WKHSULFH ULVNKDV WKHKLJKHVW LQIOXHQFH ± 77.5 per 
cent of financial managers claim that price risk has strong or very strong influence on the 
FRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH7KLVQXPEHULVIROORZHGE\SHUFHQWRIPDQDJHUVZKRWKLQNWKH
same for currency risk, while 36.6 per cent of them claim that the influence of interest-rate 
risk is strong and very strong. On the basis of their answers, both hedgers and nonhedgers, it 
could be concluded that the Slovenian companies are highly influenced by the price risk, 
while currency and interest-UDWH ULVN H[SRVXUH KDYH ORZHU LPSDFW RQ WKH FRPSDQLHV¶
performance.  
We believe that these findings could be explained by the fact that Slovenia is a small and 
open economy, which results in a high dependence on international trade. A balanced level of 
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trade, with exports and imports each exceeding 50 per cent of annual GDP on a regular basis, 
FKDUDFWHULVHV6ORYHQLD¶VVPDOOHFRQRP\7KH(FRQRPLVW,QWHOOLJHQFH+LJKH[SRVXUHV
to the commodity price risk can be explained by the fact that Slovenia is oriented to trade with 
the EU members ± roughly two-WKLUGV RI 6ORYHQLD¶V WUDGH LV ZLWK WKH EU. On the highly 
competitive market, prices of goods are volatile, therefore companies that compete on that 
market need to be prepared for these conditions and protect their risky positions. 
Exposure to foreign-exchange risk was not so high in 2006 and it is expected to be further 
GHFUHDVHG LQ  DV 6ORYHQLD KDV LQWURGXFHG WKH (XUR DV DQ RIILFLDO FXUUHQF\ 6ORYHQLD¶V
major trade partners are Germany, Italy, France and Austria, so the majority of transactions 
are now denominated in one currency since Slovenia entered the Euro Zone. This contributes 
to the lowering of risk in business transactions, as companies no longer have to worry about 
their currency risk exposures, which should additionally enhance the trade between Slovenia 
and its partners. In respect of the currency risk management instruments that have been used 
in the Slovenian companies, it could be expected that their importance will decrease sharply, 
which refers especially to the ones that have their value attached to the Euro or Slovenian 
tolar. Exposure to interest-rate risk is a result of external financing through borrowing 
activity. However, our results have shown that the long-term debt-to-assets ratio ranges from 
0 to 30.69 per cent, while the mean value is 12.13 per cent.  It could be concluded that the 
Slovenian companies in the sample are not highly leveraged (Graham and Campbell, 2001), 
which may explain why interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important in comparison 
with commodity price risks. 
Regarding the use and importance of different risk management instruments in risk 
management strategy, the survey revealed that natural hedge by currency structure match of 
assets and liabilities is the most important instrument in managing currency risk. In respect of 
use of derivatives, the currency forward is the most important and frequently used instrument, 
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followed by currency swap as the second most important derivative instrument. Currency 
futures and structured derivatives have gained importance in comparison with Croatian 
companies, as well as operational hedging. Other derivatives such as stock-exchange and 
OTC options, as well as hybrid securities are not important currency risk management 
instruments.  
Interest rate risk in the Slovenian companies is hedged most frequently by matching the 
maturity of assets and liabilities. Forward contract, swap and structured derivatives are the 
most important derivative instruments in risk management strategy, but in contrast to currency 
risk management, interest rate swap is more important than interest rate forward and is used 
by 27.6 per cent of companies that declare themselves as hedgers. Structured derivatives are 
important instrument of interest-rate risk management as well, and are used in 20.7 per cent of 
companies. These instruments are even more important than interest-rate forwards. As to the 
use of other derivative instruments such as interest-rate options, futures or hybrid securities, 
they do not play an important role in managing interest rate risk.  
Price risk management in the Slovenian companies is usually hedged naturally by 
managing assets and liabilities. Among derivatives instruments, the commodity forward and 
commodity futures are equally important, followed by commodity swap and standardised 
options. In the case of commodity risk management, structured derivatives as well as OTC 
options are not important instruments. Business diversification through mergers, acquisitions, 
and other business combinations is quite important in managing price risk and has been used 
by 25 peU FHQW RI WKH DQDO\VHG 6ORYHQLDQ FRPSDQLHV 7KH VXUYH\¶V UHVXOWV KDYH FOHDUO\
indicated that the Slovenian non-financial companies manage financial risks primarily with 
simple risk management instruments such as natural hedging, but it should be noted that the 
use of derivatives is also frequent - not only plain vanilla instruments like forwards and 
swaps, but structured derivatives as well.  
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Regarding the scope of corporate risk management policy, 87.5 per cent of hedgers claim 
that they use selective hedging, while 12.5 per cent of them manage financial risks 
completely. Among the analysed Slovenian companies, there appeared to be a decided 
preference for "active" or "view-driven" risk management as opposed to a full-cover or 
variance-minimising hedging approach. 56.3 per cent of respondents that manage financial 
risks have a documented policy regarding the use of financial risk management instruments, 
while the rest of them manage risks without an official policy. Additionally, 18.8 per cent of 
hedgers use Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk exposure, while only 12.5 per cent of them use 
Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as measures of risk 
exposure.  
An important issue in corporate risk management is defining its goals. The results of the 
Slovenian survey have shown that the primary goal of hedging is managing volatility of cash 
flows, but that the Slovenian firms focus also on accounting earning volatility as well as 
managing balance sheet and financial ratios. Commercial banks are by far the primary source 
for derivatives transactions for 73.4 per cent of the Slovenian hedgers. Investment banks, 
insurance companies and exchange/brokerage houses are not a very important source for 
derivative transactions, and very few Slovenian firms use them as counterparties.  
Among the most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives, financial 
managers have addressed the following problems: high costs of financial risk management 
instruments, difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives, costs of establishing and 
maintaining risk management programmes that exceed the benefits of it, and insufficient 
exposure to financial risks. Insufficient supply of instruments offered by financial institutions 
or traded on the financial market and the inefficiency of financial risk management 
instruments are reasons of medium importance that affect the decision not to hedge financial 
risks. Other reasons such as concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors, 
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regulators and the public and insufficient knowledge about financial risk management 
instruments are not very important reasons why Slovenian companies do not hedge.  
According to a mean comparison test conducted for the sample of hedgers/nonhedgers, as 
well as for derivative users and nonusers, our univariate test has discovered that hedgers and 
derivative users are statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with 
respect only to the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable that proxies for 
alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging. On the basis of the mean comparison 
test, a positive relation is predicted between decision to hedge or use derivatives as risk 
management instruments and the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable, 
suggesting that publicly held companies tend to be risk-averse, while privately held 
companies do not act in a risk-averse manner and do not hedge. This is contrary to what we 
predicted and to the findings of Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) who argued that, if 
closely held firms tend to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy 
variable is predicted to be negative. Therefore, our assumption connected to the different 
behaviour of the publicly traded and privately held stock companies with regard to risk 
management should be rejected. This result has not been supported by the correlation 
analysis.  
We believe the explanation for this result can be found in the fact that, regardless to the 
opinion that the ownership of publicly traded companies is well diversified, research results 
have shown that even 64.7 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies are owned by the 
major shareholder, meaning that there is one owner who has more than 50 per cent of a 
FRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHVand has a power to control the business. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
major shareholder has poorly diversified wealth and therefore acts in risk-averse manner. 
Another explanation for the positive coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable 
could be found in the fact that publicly traded companies, which act in a risk-averse manner 
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WHQG WR VLJQDO JRRG QHZV WR LQYHVWRUV RQ WKH ILQDQFLDO PDUNHW DV ZHOO DV WR DOO FRPSDQ\¶V
stakeholders, because a company that manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky 
investment or a better rated business partner. However, to the best of our knowledge, we 
cannot support this argument by theoretical or empirical evidence, meaning that this second 
explanation is based only on our opinion.  
Other variables that test the hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies as 
substitutes for hedging are not statistically significant. In other words, on the basis of the 
univariate analysis, both t-test and Pearson correlation coefficient, we should reject all the 
research assumptions regarding the shareholder maximisation hypothesis and the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis. This conclusion is supported by the regression analysis, but 
only for the sample hedgers vs nonhedgers. The analysis that we conducted by employing 
separate logistic regressions with all combinations of exploratory variables has revealed that 
there is no statistically significant explanatory variable, so it could be concluded that the 
decision to hedge in Slovenian companies is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of 
hedging.  
)URPWKHPXOWLYDULDWHDQDO\VLVFRQGXFWHGIRUDFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRXVHGHULYDWLYHVDV
risk management instruments, it could be seen that the corporate decision to use derivative 
instruments is related only to three variables ± total sales revenues, investment expenditures-
to-assets ratio and credit rating. Other variables that tested the research hypothesis are not 
statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not influence the decision to use 
derivatives. Total sales revenues are a proxy for the effect of size on the decision to use 
derivatives as risk management instruments. The regression model has revealed a positive 
relation between the decision to use derivatives and the size of the company, implying that it 
is more likely for larger Slovenian companies to use derivatives. Several previous empirical 
studies (e.g., Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton 
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and Schrand, 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are 
more likely to hedge. These studies contend that the positive correlation between size and 
hedging can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and transaction 
costs of hedging.  
Contrary to the predicted positive relation between size and the decision to hedge, few 
scholars have predicted the degree of hedging to be negatively related to the size of a company 
(Weiss, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000), 
due to the issue of high costs of implementing the risk management programme as well as to 
the greater informational asymmetries with potential public investors and direct costs of 
bankruptcy. Our assumption was that the argument is stronger in the case of the significant 
economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging, so we have predicted a 
SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH 5HJUHVVLRQ UHVXOWV
support our hypothesis for the Slovenian companies. It should be noted that the alternative 
YDULDEOHWKDWKDVEHHQXVHGDVDSUR[\IRUFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HWKHYDOXHRIWRWDODVVHWVKDVQRW
been shown as relevant for making the decision to use derivatives. Therefore, our result is not 
robust to the other control variable.  
Another variable that is significant for a decision of the Slovenian companies to use 
GHULYDWLYHVLVDFRPSDQ\¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJDVDSUR[\IRUWKHDJHQF\FRVWRIGHEW,QRXUUHVHDUFK
assumptions we argue that firms with a credit rating use derivatives as risk management 
instruments less extensively because the severity of agency cost of debt is related to the extent 
of informational asymmetries present at the firm, and that firms with greater asymmetric 
information problems are more likely to have a greater incentive to engage in risk-shifting and 
under-investment activities. Our evidence is inconsistent with the predictions derived from the 
agency cost of debt model (see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991 and Haushalter, 2000), because the 
relationship between the dependent variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading 
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to the conclusion that companies that have a credit rating hedge by using derivative 
instruments more intensively. Therefore, we should reject our hypothesis related to the agency 
cost of debt and asymmetric information problems. An alternative variable that has used as 
proxy for agency cost (the share of the company owned by institutional investors) has not 
been shown as relevant for making decision to hedge.  
Finally, the investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant negative relation to 
the decision to use derivatives. The results of our logistic model do not support our prediction 
WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHE\XVLQJGHULYDWLYHVLVpositively correlated with measures 
for investment (growth) opportunities. Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with our 
findings regarding the Croatian companies presented in the previous chapter, as well as to the 
findings of Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and Soenen 
(1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who have also proven a positive relation between the decision to 
KHGJHDQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vinvestment (growth) opportunities.  
The negative relation found in the case of the Slovenian companies suggest that companies 
which have less investment (growth) opportunities have more incentives to hedge with derivative 
instruments. Again, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing 
other variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing hypothesis (cash and cash equivalents-to-assets ratio, investment expenditures to 
sales and R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio). The results for alternative regression variables 
were not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the capital market imperfection 
hypothesis, which implies that the benefits of hedging should be greater the more growth 
RSWLRQV DUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLW\ VHW VKRXOG EH UHMHFWHG LQ WKH FDVH RI WKH
Slovenian companies.  
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6. CROATIA VS SLOVENIA ± COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Among other research methods that we have employed in this thesis, a comparative 
analysis is used in this chapter to compare the results of the empirical research conducted on 
WKH&URDWLDQDQG6ORYHQLDQFRPSDQLHV&KDSWHUSUHVHQWVD³FODVVLF´FRPSDUH-and-contrast 
work (Walk, 1998), in which we weight results for both countries equally, trying to find 
crucial differences as well as commonalities in financial risk management practices presented 
in chapters 4 and 5. We compare results of descriptive statistics as well as results of both 
univariate and multivariate analysis. The body of chapter 6 is organised in the point-by-point 
way, in which the points about Slovenia are presented with comparable points about Croatia.  
Here we test the last group of assumptions that refer to risk management practices in 
Croatia and Slovenia. We explore whether financial risk management, as one of the most 
important objectives of modern corporate strategy, is more developed or has different 
rationales among the Slovenian than among Croatian companies. Firstly, we propose that the 
Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices in comparison to the 
Croatian companies, measured by the total number of companies that use derivative 
instruments to manage their risk exposures.  
Secondly, we argue that the Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management 
practices than the Croatian companies, measured by the implementation of more sophisticated 
risk management strategies. To distinguish the less and more sophisticated risk management 
strategies, we took the use of different derivatives instruments as an example of more 
advanced risk management strategies with an emphasis on structured derivatives use, while 
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instruments like natural hedge, assets and liabilities matching, and international and business 
diversification we have classified as a less sophisticated risk management strategies.  
 
6.2 Comparative Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
 
The survey results have revealed that the majority of analysed companies in both countries 
manage financial risks - 78 per cent Slovenian respondents and 73.5 per cent Croatian 
respondents claim that they are using some form of financial engineering to manage interest-
rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk. Regarding the use of derivatives as risk 
management instrument, 65.9 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies use derivatives as 
risk management instruments, while in Croatia only 43 per cent of respondents declare 
themselves as derivative users. It could be concluded that the Slovenian companies use 
derivatives more frequently than their counterparts in Croatia. Therefore, our research 
hypothesis, which argues that the Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management 
practices than the Croatian companies, measured by the total number of companies that use 
derivative instruments to manage their risk exposures, should be accepted.  
If we compare the results of the Slovenian survey with the findings of Bodnar, Hayt and 
Marston (1998), who have revealed that 50 per cent of US non-financial companies use some 
form of financial engineering to manage financial risks, the conclusion would be the same as in 
the case of Croatia. However, it should be noted that the time difference needs to be taken into 
account. We believe that the use of derivatives has grown since 1998 in the US as well as 
globally, therefore the results of our survey cannot be directly compared with those of Bodnar, 
Hayt and Marston (1998).  
In the survey questionnaire we asked financial managers about the intensity of influence 
of all three types of financial risks to the performance of their companies. The results have 
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shown that the price risk has the highest influence among the Slovenian companies, which can 
be seen from the fact that 77.5 per cent of financial managers claim that price risk has strong 
RUYHU\VWURQJLQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH3ULFHULVNLV WKHPRVW LQIOXHQWLDO LQ
the Croatian companies as well ± 61.2 companies claim that their performance is highly 
affected by price fluctuations. We believe that these findings could be explained by the fact 
that Slovenia and Croatia are small and open economies, which results in a high dependence 
on international trade. On the highly competitive market, prices of goods are volatile, 
therefore companies that compete on that market need to be prepared for these conditions and 
protect their risky positions.  
Regarding the currency risk exposure, 59.2 of Croatian managers think that this particular 
risk has strong or very strong influence on the company performance, while 39 per cent of the 
Slovenian managers claim the same. This finding leads to the conclusion that the Croatian 
companies are more affected by currency risk than the Slovenian companies, which could be 
explained by the fact that the exposure to foreign-exchange risk was not so high in 2006, and 
it is expected to be further decreased in 2007 as Slovenia has introduced the Euro as an 
RIILFLDOFXUUHQF\6ORYHQLD¶VPDMRUWUDGHSDUWQHUVDUH*HUPDQ\,WDO\)UDQFHDQG$XVWULa, so 
the majority of transactions are now denominated in one currency since Slovenia entered the 
Euro Zone (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited publications, 2006).  
Finally, 44.9 per cent of the Croatian companies think that the influence of interest-rate 
risk is strong or very strong, while 36.6 per cent of their Slovenian counterparts claim the 
same. Exposure to the interest-rate risk is a result of external financing through borrowing 
activity. Our results have shown that the average long-term debt-to-assets ratio in the two 
countries is 12.13 and 21.7 per cent respectively. Croatian companies are more leveraged than   
Slovenian companies, but according to Graham and Campbell (2001), who have argued that 
companies are highly leveraged if the debt-to-assets ratio exceeds 30 per cent, it could be 
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concluded that the Slovenian and Croatian companies do not use debt capital heavily. This 
argument offers an explanation why the interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important in 
comparison with commodity price and currency risks. Overall, it could be concluded that, 
regarding the pecking order of financial risk management types and their influence on 
FRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHUVLQERWKFRXQWULHVFRQFOXGHWKHVDPH3ULFHULVNLVWKHPRVW
influential, which is followed by currency risk, while interest-rate risk is the last.  
Regarding the risk management instruments that companies use in managing currency 
risk, it could be concluded that natural hedge or the currency structure match of assets and 
liabilities is the most important instrument in managing currency risk in both countries. In 
respect to the use of derivatives, the currency forward is the most important and frequently 
used instrument, followed by currency swap as the second most important derivative 
instrument. Currency futures and structured derivatives use in the Slovenian companies have 
gained importance in comparison with the Croatian companies, as well as operational 
hedging. Other derivatives such as stock-exchange and OTC options, as well as hybrid 
securities are not important currency risk management instruments among the Croatian and 
Slovenian companies. However, it should be emphasised that, in respect of the currency risk 
management instruments that were used in the Slovenian companies before the Euro was 
introduced at the beginning of 2007, it is expected that their importance will decrease sharply, 
especially for those that have their value attached to the Euro or Slovenian tolar. 
Interest rate risk in the Slovenian as well as in the Croatian companies is hedged most 
frequently by matching maturity of assets and liabilities. Again, forward contract and swap 
are the most important derivative instruments in the risk management strategy, but in contrast 
to currency risk management, interest rate swap is more important than interest rate forward. 
Contrary to the findings of the Croatian analysis, structured derivatives are an important 
instrument of interest-rate risk management among the Slovenian respondents. In comparison 
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with other instruments, structured derivatives are even more important than interest-rate 
forward. Regarding the use of other derivative instruments like interest-rate options, futures or 
hybrid securities, in respect to risk management practices in both countries, it could be 
concluded that they do not play an important role in managing interest rate risk.  
Price risk management, in both the Slovenian and Croatian companies, is usually hedged 
naturally by managing assets and liabilities. Among derivatives instruments, the commodity 
forward and commodity futures are equally important. For the first time, futures contracts are 
used as representatives of standardised derivative instruments traded on the financial market. 
In Slovenia, futures and forwards are followed by commodity swap and standardised options, 
while in Croatia, contrary to the findings presented while analysing currency and interest-rate 
risk, the commodity swap has not been used at all, nor have the other derivative instruments. 
In the case of commodity risk management, structured derivatives as well as OTC options are 
not important instruments, while business diversification through mergers, acquisitions, and 
other business combinations is quite important in managing price risk in both countries.  
The survey results have clearly indicated that the Croatian and Slovenian non-financial 
companies manage financial risks primarily with simple risk management instruments such as 
natural hedging. In the case of derivatives use, forwards and swaps are by far the most 
important instruments in both countries, but futures as representatives of standardised 
derivatives together with structured derivatives are more important in the Slovenian than in 
the Croatian companies. Exchange-traded and OTC options as well as hybrid securities are 
not important means of financial risk management. 
Regarding the scope of corporate risk management policy, the majority of the analysed 
Slovenian and Croatian companies claim that they use selective hedging (87.5 per cent and 
88.9 per cent respectively), while the rest of them manage financial risks completely. It could 
be concluded that there appeared to be a decided preference for "active" or "view-driven" risk 
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management as opposed to a full-cover or variance-minimising hedging approach. 56.3 per 
cent of the Slovenian respondents that manage financial risks have a documented policy 
regarding the use of financial risk management instruments, while 64 per cent of their 
Croatian counterparts manage risks without an official corporate policy.  
Additionally, only 18.8 per cent of the Slovenian and 8.3 per cent of the Croatian hedgers 
use Value-at-Risk as a measure of risk exposure, while the same can be concluded for 12.5 
per cent of the Slovenian and 11.1 per cent of the Croatian companies regarding the use of 
Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as measures of risk 
exposure. The survey has revealed that 49 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies 
PDQDJHULVNIRUWUDQVDFWLRQZLWKPDWXULW\XSWRD\HDU¶VWLPHDQGthe same can be said for 71 
per cent Croatian companies. Therefore, it could be concluded that the hedging horizon for 
financial risk management in both countries is typically less than one year.  
An important issue in corporate risk management is defining its goals. The theoretical 
financial literature strongly recommends focusing on cash flows or on the value of the 
company. A focus on accounting numbers is generally discarded. However, the results of the 
survey have shown that, in spite of the fact that the primary goal of hedging is managing the 
volatility of cash flows, 53.1 per cent of Slovenian and 68.6 per cent of Croatian firms focus 
also on accounting earning volatility as well as managing balance sheet and financial ratios. 
Some 40 per cent of the Croatian companies argue that the market value of the company is the 
primary goal of corporate risk management, while only 18.8 per cent of the Slovenian 
respondents claim the same thing. It should be emphasised that there is a strong link between   
Slovenian and Croatian financial accounting and tax accounting. As a result of those 
institutional features, we believe that there is a strong focus in both countries on accounting 
earnings in all business decisions and consequently also in hedging decisions.  
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Commercial banks are by far the primary source for derivatives transactions for 73.4 per  
cent of the Slovenian and 87.5 per cent of the Croatian hedgers. Investment banks, insurance 
companies and exchange/brokerage houses are not a very important source for derivative 
transactions, and very few analysed firms in both countries use them as counterparties.   
Amongst the most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives, the Slovenian 
financial managers have addressed two problems, which they share with their Croatian 
counterparts, as the most important reasons why their companies do not hedge - high costs of 
establishing and maintaining risk management programs that exceed the benefits of it (the 
explanation offered by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000 and Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000) and difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives. Apart from these problems, 
the Slovenian managers have numbered two additional reasons that have stopped them from 
hedging ± the high cost of financial risk management instruments (e.g. see Mian, 1996; Getzy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997 and Hushalter, 2000) and insufficient exposure to financial risks. 
  The Croatian managers have argued that insufficient supply of risk management 
instruments traded on the domestic financial market or offered by financial institutions is a 
very important reason why they do not hedge. 2QWKHEDVLVRIWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DQVZHUVDQG
informal interviews conducted at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Croatian Association of 
Corporate Treasurers held in September 2006, we conclude that, in spite of the fact that there 
is an increasing number of Croatian non-financial companies which are aware of corporate 
risk management importance, a lack of suitable instruments offered to them by the domestic 
financial industry becomes a leading factor why many companies do not use derivatives when 
managing risks. This problem has the strongest impact on the shipbuilding industry. 
Anecdotal evidence collected through contacts with managers in a few Croatian shipbuilding 
companies has revealed that they are highly exposed to foreign exchange risk due to sales 
revenues being denominated in US dollars while operating costs are in the Croatian national 
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currency. Unfortunately, providers of currency risk management instruments (mainly 
commercial banks) are not able or willing to offer them adequate instruments which would 
protect their cash-flows from the currency risk that emerges from their specific economic 
position.  
Other reasons such as concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors, 
regulators and the public, and insufficient knowledge about financial risk management 
instruments are not very important reasons why Slovenian and Croatian companies do not 
hedge.  
 
6.3 Comparative Analysis of Univariate Results 
 
According to a mean comparison test for Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers, the hedgers 
are statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to variable that proxy for alternative 
financial policy as substitutes for hedging. Hedgers have a statistically greater quick ratio as a 
measure of short-term liquidity. Although hedge substitutes are not considered as a special 
NLQGRIULVNPDQDJHPHQWVWUDWHJ\DOWHUQDWLYHILQDQFLDOSROLFLHVFDQDOVRUHGXFHDILUP¶VULVN
without requiring the firm to directly engage in risk management activities. Firms could adopt 
conservative financial policies such as maintaining low leverage and a low dividend pay-out 
ratio or carrying large cash balances to protect them against potential financial difficulties (a 
form of negative leverage). Greater use of these substitute risk management activities should 
be associated with less financial risk management activities. Therefore, the coefficient on 
quick ratio is predicted to be negative (see: Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 
1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). Contrary to 
our prediction as well as to the findings of the cited studies, our results show a positive 
relation between the decision to hedge and this explanatory variable, suggesting that 
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companies that are more liquid are more likely to hedge. Therefore, our assumption 
regarding hedging substitutes should be rejected in the case of the Croatian companies.  
Another statistically significant variable is company ownership by foreign investors. T-
test has shown that the Croatian hedgers have a statistically higher share owed by foreign 
investors in comparison with nonhedgers, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis. 
This finding leads to the conclusion that investing companies which have headquarters in 
more developed countries have enforced employment of corporate risk management in the 
acquired Croatian companies.  
Other results of univariate tests suggest that hedgers are not statistically different from 
nonhedgers with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market 
imperfection, tax preference items, or managerial utility. Therefore, we should reject all 
research hypotheses regarding the shareholder maximisation and managerial utility 
maximisation in the case of the Croatian companies. Additionally, we should reject our 
hypothesis regarding alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management 
strategies. Our findings predict the opposite sign to what we assumed, suggesting that the 
Croatian companies that are more liquid have more incentives to hedge.  
Regarding the univariate analysis of the Croatian derivative users vs derivative nonusers, 
t-test has discovered that derivative users are statistically different from nonusers with respect 
to variables that are proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging as well 
as for capital market imperfection and costly external financing. Derivative users have a 
statistically greater quick ratio as well as greater ratio of investment expenditures to the book 
value of assets. This finding suggests that these two groups differ with respect to proxies for 
short-term liquidity and investment (growth) opportunities. Similarly to the analysis of 
hedgers and nonhedgers, our results suggest that the Croatian companies that have a higher 
quick ratio use derivatives more intensively, which is contrary to our predictions and to the 
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findings of Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997), Pulvino (1998) and Harford (1999). Our result is also confirmed by the Pearson 
correlation coefficient.  
Another statistically significant variable is the company ratio of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets. Our t-test has shown that derivative users have a 
statistically higher value of this ratio, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis, 
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
and the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with our prediction and with 
the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who have proven 
that the benefits of hedging should be greDWHU WKH PRUH JURZWK RSWLRQV DUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V
investment opportunity set. Other variables that have been used to test the agency cost of debt 
and capital market imperfection hypothesis has not shown statistically significant differences 
between analysed derivative users and nonusers.  
On the basis of t-tests and correlation analysis results for the Croatian sample, it could 
be concluded that derivative users are not statistically different from nonusers with respect 
to other research assumptions regarding the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, 
tax preference items, or managerial utility. Similarly to the findings in the case of the Croatian 
hedgers and nonhedgers, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis as well as shareholder maximisation hypothesis ± apart from 
capital market imperfection and costly external financing.  
If we compare the Croatian univariate analysis results with the results of the identical 
analysis conducted for the Slovenian sample, we come to similar findings and conclusions ± 
that the tested hedging theories have little predictive power regarding the risk management 
practices in both countries. Univariate tests has discovered that the Slovenian hedgers as well 
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as derivative users are statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with 
respect only to the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable that proxies for 
alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging. A positive relation between the decision 
to hedge or to use derivatives and the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy 
variable leads to the conclusion that companies which list their shares on the stock-exchange 
have more incentives to hedge and use derivatives as risk management instruments. This 
result has not been supported by the correlation analysis.   
We have predicted that, if closely held firms tend to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the 
publicly held company dummy variable is predicted to be negative (Cummins, Phillips and 
Smith, 2001). Our univariate test has revealed the coefficient of the publicly traded company 
dummy variable to be positive, suggesting that publicly held companies tend to be risk-averse, 
while privately held companies do not act in a risk-averse manner and do not hedge. 
Therefore, our assumption connected to the different behaviour of publicly traded and 
privately held stock companies with regard to risk management should be rejected. Other 
variables that test the hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies as substitutes for 
hedging are not statistically significant.  
Other univariate results have shown that the Slovenian hedgers and derivative users are 
not statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with respect to the cost 
of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection, tax preference items, or 
managerial utility, therefore we should reject all research assumptions regarding the 
shareholder maximisation hypothesis as well as the managerial utility maximisation 
hypothesis for the Slovenian companies.  
For the purpose of our comparative analysis, we have employed additional tests to 
distinguish between the Croatian and Slovenian companies regarding the corporate risk 
management practice in non-financial companies. Here we present the results of independent 
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sample t-tests conducted both for regression variables and those that are not in the regression 
model. T-tests have shown that there are many differences in means between companiHV¶
characteristics and risk management practices in the analysed countries that are statistically 
significant. From the tables presented below, it can be seen that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the analysed companies regarding the intensity of influence of 
FXUUHQF\ DQG SULFH ULVN RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH ± the Croatian companies are more 
affected by the currency risk, while the Slovenian companies are more affected by the price 
risk. We have offered a reasonable explanation for this result in section 6.1, where we have 
argued that the Slovenian companies are less exposed to the currency risk due to the fact that 
two-WKLUGVRI6ORYHQLD¶VWUDGHLVZLWKWKH(8+RZHYHURQWKHKLJKO\FRPSHWLWLYH(XUR=RQH
market, prices of goods are volatile, therefore the Slovenian companies that are doing 
business on that market need to be prepared for these conditions and protect their risky 
positions. This is the reason why they are more affected by the commodity price risk.  
A very important result of t-test refers to the use of derivative instruments, with an 
emphasis on structured derivatives use as representatives of more complex and sophisticated 
risk management instruments. There is statistically significant evidence that the Slovenian 
companies use all derivatives, especially structured derivatives like swaptions, caps, floors, 
collars or corridors, as instruments for managing currency and interest-rate risk more 
intensively than the Croatian companies. Additionally, the Croatian companies use simple risk 
management instruments like managing assets and liabilities to a greater extent in comparison 
with the Slovenian companies when managing price risk.  
These findings are consistent with our research prediction that the Slovenian companies 
have more advanced risk management practices than the Croatian companies, measured by 
the implementation of the more sophisticated risk management strategies. To distinguish the 
less and more sophisticated risk management strategies, we took the use of different 
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derivatives instruments as an example of more advanced risk management strategies with an 
emphasis on structured derivatives use, while instruments like natural hedge, assets and 
liabilities matching and international and business diversification we have classified as less 
sophisticated risk management strategies. Therefore, in respect of the use of structured 
derivative instruments and assets and liabilities matching, our research hypothesis should be 
accepted.  
  The Croatian companies differ from their Slovenian counterparts in evaluation of balance 
sheet and financial ratios management as an important risk management goal, and to the 
company establishment and finished educational programmes in risk management. Balance 
sheet and financial ratios management is more important to the Croatian companies, while the 
analysed Slovenian companies have a longer existence on the market, and their financial 
managers are better educated in respect of the specific knowledge gained at risk management 
programmes. 
In respect of regression variables, there are statistically significant differences in the rating 
grade, tax incentives to hedge, and stock-exchange quotation. The majority of analysed 
Slovenian companies have credit rating, together with tax incentives to hedge (which emerges 
primarily from investment tax credit provision), while only 14.6 per cent of respondents are 
listed on the stock-exchange. By contrast, the majority of the Croatian companies do not have 
credit rating or tax incentives to hedge, while 51 per cent of respondents are public 
FRPSDQLHV5HJDUGLQJ WKHPDQDJHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRXUHYLGHQFHKDV VKRZQ WKDW WKHUH LV D
difference in the average share of stock ownership that managers hold in their companies.  
The average share for Croatia is 18.17 per cent, while for Slovenia it is significantly smaller 
and amounts to only 5 per cent. It can be concluded that the analysed Croatian companies are 
to a great extent owned by their managers. This is due to the Croatian privatisation process 
and to the ESOP programmes that have been employed in the Croatian corporate sector. 
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$GGLWLRQDOO\DFRPSDQ\¶VRZQHUVKLSE\ LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV LVVLJQLILFDQWO\ELJJHU LQ WKH
case of Slovenia and comes to 18.14 per cent in comparison with Croatia where the average 
VKDUHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶RZQHUVKLSLVSHUFHQW 
Other statistically different variables are debt-to-assets ratio, long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
and long-term debt-to-equity ratio as proxies for financial leverage and financial distress 
costs. These variables are significantly higher in the case of Croatia, which leads us to the 
conclusion that Croatian companies are more dependent on debt financing in comparison with 
Slovenian companies. Additionally, two proxies for investment (growth) opportunities ± cash 
and cash equivalents-to-assets ratio and R&D expenditures-to-assets have statistically higher 
vales in the case of the Croatian companies. These findings are interesting, because it could be 
argued that the Croatian companies have more growth options than their Slovenian 
counterparts and that they need more debt capital to finance the R&D expenditures.  
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Table 6.1. Group statistics for the comparative analysis (variables not in regression) 
 Country N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
What is the intensity of influence of currency risk on the 
FRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH" 
  
Croatia 49 3.82 .99 .14 
Slovenia 41 3.24 1.28 .20 
What is the intensity of influence of interest-rate risk on the 
cRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH" 
  
Croatia 49 3.33 1.23 .18 
Slovenia 41 3.20 1.08 .17 
What is the intensity of influence of price risk on the 
FRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH" 
  
Croatia 49 3.63 1.38 .20 
Slovenia 40 4.20 .94 .15 
Natural hedge or netting 
  
Croatia 34 .74 .45 .08 
Slovenia 29 .79 .41 .08 
Matching currency structure of assets and liabilities 
  
Croatia 34 .88 .33 5.61E-02 
Slovenia 29 .76 .44 8.09E-02 
Currency forward 
  
Croatia 34 .44 .50 8.64E-02 
Slovenia 29 .45 .51 9.40E-02 
Currency futures 
  
Croatia 34 5.88E-02 .24 4.10E-02 
Slovenia 29 .17 .38 7.14E-02 
Currency swap 
  
Croatia 34 .15 .36 6.17E-02 
Slovenia 29 .24 .44 8.09E-02 
Stock-Exchange Currency option 
  
Croatia 34 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 29 6.90E-02 .26 4.79E-02 
OTC (over-the-counter) currency option 
  
Croatia 34 5.88E-02 .24 4.10E-02 
Slovenia 29 3.45E-02 .19 3.45E-02 
Structured derivatives (e.g. currency swaption) 
  
Croatia 34 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 29 .14 .35 6.52E-02 
Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds or preferred stocks) 
  
Croatia 34 2.94E-02 .17 2.94E-02 
Slovenia 29 .00 .00 .00 
Operational hedging 
  
Croatia 34 8.82E-02 .29 4.94E-02 
Slovenia 29 .28 .45 8.45E-02 
Matching maturity of assets and liabilities Croatia 29 .90 .31 5.76E-02 
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  Slovenia 29 .83 .38 7.14E-02 
Interest rate forward 
  
Croatia 29 .14 .35 6.52E-02 
Slovenia 29 .17 .38 7.14E-02 
Interest rate futures 
  
Croatia 29 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 29 3.45E-02 .19 3.45E-02 
Interest rate swap 
  
Croatia 29 .28 .45 8.45E-02 
Slovenia 29 .28 .45 8.45E-02 
Stock-Exchange interest rate option 
  
Croatia 28 3.57E-02 .19 3.57E-02 
Slovenia 29 3.45E-02 .19 3.45E-02 
OTC (over-the-counter) interest rate 
  
Croatia 28 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 29 3.45E-02 .19 3.45E-02 
Structured derivatives (e.g. cap. floor. collar. corridor or 
swaption) 
  
Croatia 28 3.57E-02 .19 3.57E-02 
Slovenia 29 .21 .41 7.66E-02 
Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds or preferred stocks) 
  
Croatia 28 .11 .31 5.95E-02 
Slovenia 29 .00 .00 .00 
Natural hedge or netting 
  
Croatia 28 .68 .48 8.99E-02 
Slovenia 28 .71 .46 8.69E-02 
Managing assets and liabilities 
  
Croatia 28 .96 .19 3.57E-02 
Slovenia 28 .71 .46 8.69E-02 
Commodity forward 
  
Croatia 28 .14 .36 6.73E-02 
Slovenia 28 .14 .36 6.73E-02 
Commodity futures 
  
Croatia 28 7.14E-02 .26 4.96E-02 
Slovenia 28 .14 .36 6.73E-02 
Commodity swap 
  
Croatia 28 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 28 .11 .31 5.95E-02 
Commodity option 
  
Croatia 28 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 28 7.14E-02 .26 4.96E-02 
OTC (over-the-counter) commodity option) 
  
Croatia 28 .00 .00 .00 
Slovenia 28 3.57E-02 .19 3.57E-02 
Structured derivatives (combination of swaps. future contacts Croatia 28 .00 .00 .00 
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and options) 
  
Slovenia 28 3.57E-02 .19 3.57E-02 
Business diversification through mergers. acquisitions. and 
other business combinations 
  
Croatia 28 .29 .46 8.69E-02 
Slovenia 28 .25 .44 8.33E-02 
Risk management policy scope 
  
Croatia 36 1.89 .32 5.31E-02 
Slovenia 32 1.88 .34 5.94E-02 
Company's hedging horizon 
  
Croatia 35 1.63 1.11 .19 
Slovenia 32 1.97 1.15 .20 
Importance of accounting earnings volatility management as a 
risk management aim 
  
Croatia 35 3.29 .96 .16 
Slovenia 32 3.50 1.30 .23 
Importance of cash-flow volatility management as a risk 
management aim 
  
Croatia 35 4.03 1.07 .18 
Slovenia 32 4.16 .92 .16 
Importance of balance sheet and financial ratios management 
as a risk management aim 
  
Croatia 35 4.06 .91 .15 
Slovenia 32 3.41 1.24 .22 
Importance of company's market value management as a risk 
management aim 
  
Croatia 35 2.91 1.40 .24 
Slovenia 32 2.44 1.27 .22 
Does a company have documented policy regarding the use of 
financial risk management instruments? 
  
Croatia 36 .36 .49 8.12E-02 
Slovenia 32 .56 .50 8.91E-02 
Does a company use "Value-at-Risk" (VaR) as a measure of 
risk exposure? 
  
Croatia 36 8.33E-02 .28 4.67E-02 
Slovenia 32 .19 .40 7.01E-02 
Does a company use Monte Carlo analysis or some other type 
of simulation techniques as a measure of risk exposure? 
  
Croatia 36 .11 .32 5.31E-02 
Slovenia 32 .13 .34 5.94E-02 
Importance of commercial banks in providing derivative 
instruments to companies 
  
Croatia 24 4.25 1.03 .21 
Slovenia 30 3.90 1.40 .26 
Importance of investment banks in providing derivative 
instruments to companies 
  
Croatia 24 2.17 1.40 .29 
Slovenia 30 1.63 1.19 .22 
Importance of insurance companies in providing derivative 
instruments to companies 
  
Croatia 24 1.67 1.20 .25 
Slovenia 30 1.40 .86 .16 
Importance of exchange/brokerage houses in providing 
derivative instruments to companies 
  
Croatia 24 1.67 1.01 .21 
Slovenia 30 1.53 .86 .16 
Insufficient exposure to financial risks Croatia 13 2.85 1.28 .36 
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  Slovenia 8 3.13 1.46 .52 
Insufficient knowledge about financial risk management 
instruments and their use 
  
Croatia 13 2.54 1.20 .33 
Slovenia 7 2.86 1.35 .51 
Financial risk management instruments are not efficient 
  
Croatia 12 3.00 1.21 .35 
Slovenia 6 2.17 .98 .40 
Financial risk management instruments are too expensive 
  
Croatia 12 2.67 1.15 .33 
Slovenia 7 3.57 .79 .30 
Difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives 
  
Croatia 12 3.33 1.56 .45 
Slovenia 5 3.60 .55 .24 
Concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors. 
regulators and public 
  
Croatia 12 2.00 1.04 .30 
Slovenia 5 2.60 1.67 .75 
Costs of establishing and maintaining a risk management 
program exceed the expected benefits 
  
Croatia 12 3.33 1.07 .31 
Slovenia 6 3.17 1.47 .60 
Supply of risk management instruments traded on domestic 
financial market is insufficient 
  
Croatia 13 3.54 1.45 .40 
Slovenia 6 3.33 1.03 .42 
Supply of risk management instruments offered by financial 
institutions is insufficient 
  
Croatia 13 3.46 1.45 .40 
Slovenia 6 3.17 .98 .40 
Industry 
  
Croatia 49 5.71 2.10 .30 
Slovenia 41 4.85 2.06 .32 
Company establishment 
  
Croatia 49 3.98 1.39 .20 
Slovenia 41 4.59 .87 .14 
Number of employees 
  
Croatia 49 3.82 2.30 .33 
Slovenia 41 3.51 2.18 .34 
Gender 
  
Croatia 49 1.49 .51 7.22E-02 
Slovenia 40 1.58 .50 7.92E-02 
Formal education 
  
Croatia 49 3.12 .56 8.06E-02 
Slovenia 40 3.08 .57 9.05E-02 
Finished educational programmes in risk management 
  
Croatia 49 .47 .50 7.20E-02 
Slovenia 40 .68 .47 7.50E-02 
 
Source: Croatian and Slovenian survey data 
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Table 6.2. Independent samples t-test ± the comparative analysis (variables not in regression) 
  
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for 
Equality of 
Means 
      
   F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
          Lower Upper 
What is the intensity of influence of 
FXUUHQF\ULVNRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
performance?  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.839 .053 2.388 88 .019 .57 .24 9.60E-02 1.05 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.335 74.653 .022 .57 .25 8.40E-02 1.06 
What is the intensity of influence of 
interest-UDWHULVNRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
performance?  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.573 .213 .533 88 .595 .13 .25 -.36 .62 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .540 87.808 .591 .13 .24 -.35 .62 
What is the intensity of influence of 
SULFHULVNRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
performance? 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 10.175 .002 -2.214 87 .029 -.57 .26 -1.08 -5.81E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.299 84.461 .024 -.57 .25 -1.06 -7.66E-02 
Natural hedge or netting 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.149 .288 -.530 61 .598 -.06 .11 -.28 .16 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.533 60.621 .596 -.06 .11 -.27 .16 
Matching currency structure of assets 
and liabilities 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 6.893 .011 1.286 61 .203 .12 9.62E-02 -6.87E-02 .32 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.257 51.336 .214 .12 9.84E-02 -7.38E-02 .32 
Currency forward 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .012 .912 -.056 61 .956 -7.10E-03 .13 -.26 .25 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.056 59.363 .956 -7.10E-03 .13 -.26 .25 
Currency futures 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 8.983 .004 -1.430 61 .158 -.11 7.94E-02 -.27 4.52E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.380 45.305 .174 -.11 8.23E-02 -.28 5.21E-02 
Currency swap 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.584 .063 -.942 61 .350 -9.43E-02 .10 -.29 .11 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.928 54.411 .358 -9.43E-02 .10 -.30 .11 
Stock-Exchange Currency option 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 11.377 .001 -1.562 61 .124 -6.90E-02 4.42E-02 -.16 1.93E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.440 28.000 .161 -6.90E-02 4.79E-02 -.17 2.91E-02 
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OTC (over-the-counter) currency option 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .808 .372 .446 61 .657 2.43E-02 5.46E-02 -8.49E-02 .13 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .455 60.523 .651 2.43E-02 5.35E-02 -8.27E-02 .13 
Structured derivatives (e.g. currency 
swaption) 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 29.860 .000 -2.295 61 .025 -.14 6.01E-02 -.26 -1.78E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.117 28.000 .043 -.14 6.52E-02 -.27 -4.44E-03 
Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds 
or preferred stocks) 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.620 .062 .922 61 .360 2.94E-02 3.19E-02 -3.43E-02 9.32E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.000 33.000 .325 2.94E-02 2.94E-02 -3.04E-02 8.93E-02 
Operational hedging 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 18.005 .000 -1.985 61 .052 -.19 9.45E-02 -.38 1.37E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.918 45.861 .061 -.19 9.78E-02 -.38 9.33E-03 
Matching maturity of assets and 
liabilities 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.336 .132 .752 56 .455 6.90E-02 9.17E-02 -.11 .25 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .752 53.589 .455 6.90E-02 9.17E-02 -.11 .25 
Interest rate forward 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .512 .477 -.357 56 .723 -3.45E-02 9.67E-02 -.23 .16 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.357 55.541 .723 -3.45E-02 9.67E-02 -.23 .16 
Interest rate futures 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.302 .043 -1.000 56 .322 -3.45E-02 3.45E-02 -.10 3.46E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.000 28.000 .326 -3.45E-02 3.45E-02 -.11 3.62E-02 
Interest rate swap 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .000 1.000 .000 56 1.000 .00 .12 -.24 .24 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .000 56.000 1.000 .00 .12 -.24 .24 
Stock-Exchange interest rate option 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .002 .961 .025 55 .980 1.23E-03 4.96E-02 -9.82E-02 .10 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .025 54.844 .980 1.23E-03 4.96E-02 -9.83E-02 .10 
OTC (over-the-counter) interest rate 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.151 .046 -.982 55 .330 -3.45E-02 3.51E-02 -.10 3.59E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.000 28.000 .326 -3.45E-02 3.45E-02 -.11 3.62E-02 
Structured derivatives (e.g. cap. floor. 
collar. corridor or swaption) 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 21.357 .000 -2.003 55 .050 -.17 8.55E-02 -.34 9.27E-05 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.026 39.571 .049 -.17 8.45E-02 -.34 -3.96E-04 
Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds 
or preferred stocks) 
Equal variances 
assumed 17.344 .000 1.832 55 .072 .11 5.85E-02 -1.00E-02 .22 
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  Equal variances 
not assumed   1.800 27.000 .083 .11 5.95E-02 -1.50E-02 .23 
Natural hedge or netting 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .326 .571 -.286 54 .776 -3.57E-02 .13 -.29 .21 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.286 53.940 .776 -3.57E-02 .13 -.29 .21 
Managing assets and liabilities 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 46.266 .000 2.660 54 .010 .25 9.40E-02 6.16E-02 .44 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.660 35.860 .012 .25 9.40E-02 5.94E-02 .44 
Commodity forward 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .000 1.000 .000 54 1.000 .00 9.52E-02 -.19 .19 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .000 54.000 1.000 .00 9.52E-02 -.19 .19 
Commodity futures 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.059 .086 -.854 54 .397 -7.14E-02 8.36E-02 -.24 9.62E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.854 49.615 .397 -7.14E-02 8.36E-02 -.24 9.66E-02 
Commodity swap 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 16.736 .000 -1.800 54 .077 -.11 5.95E-02 -.23 1.22E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.800 27.000 .083 -.11 5.95E-02 -.23 1.50E-02 
Commodity option 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 9.750 .003 -1.441 54 .155 -7.14E-02 4.96E-02 -.17 2.79E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.441 27.000 .161 -7.14E-02 4.96E-02 -.17 3.03E-02 
OTC (over-the-counter) commodity 
option) 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.314 .043 -1.000 54 .322 -3.57E-02 3.57E-02 -.11 3.59E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.000 27.000 .326 -3.57E-02 3.57E-02 -.11 3.76E-02 
Structured derivatives (combination of 
swaps. future contacts and options) 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.314 .043 -1.000 54 .322 -3.57E-02 3.57E-02 -.11 3.59E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.000 27.000 .326 -3.57E-02 3.57E-02 -.11 3.76E-02 
Business diversification through 
mergers. acquisitions. and other business 
combinations 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .352 .555 .297 54 .768 3.57E-02 .12 -.21 .28 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .297 53.903 .768 3.57E-02 .12 -.21 .28 
Risk management policy scope 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .122 .728 .175 66 .862 1.39E-02 7.94E-02 -.14 .17 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .174 64.100 .862 1.39E-02 7.97E-02 -.15 .17 
Company's hedging horizon 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .219 .642 -1.230 65 .223 -.34 .28 -.89 .21 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.228 64.037 .224 -.34 .28 -.89 .21 
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Importance of accounting earnings 
volatility management as a risk 
management aim 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 5.553 .021 -.775 65 .441 -.21 .28 -.77 .34 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.764 56.777 .448 -.21 .28 -.78 .35 
Importance of cash-flow volatility 
management as a risk management aim 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .010 .920 -.521 65 .604 -.13 .24 -.62 .36 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.525 64.761 .601 -.13 .24 -.61 .36 
Importance of balance sheet and 
financial ratios management as a risk 
management aim 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.848 .054 2.468 65 .016 .65 .26 .12 1.18 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.434 56.364 .018 .65 .27 .12 1.19 
Importance of company's market value 
management as a risk management aim 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .617 .435 1.455 65 .150 .48 .33 -.18 1.13 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.462 64.995 .149 .48 .33 -.17 1.13 
Does a company have a documented 
policy regarding the use of financial risk 
management instruments? 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.386 .243 -1.674 66 .099 -.20 .12 -.44 3.88E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.671 64.479 .100 -.20 .12 -.44 3.94E-02 
Does the company use "Value-at-Risk" 
(VaR) as a measure of risk exposure? 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 6.765 .011 -1.261 66 .212 -.10 8.26E-02 -.27 6.07E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.237 55.035 .222 -.10 8.42E-02 -.27 6.47E-02 
Does the company use Monte Carlo 
analysis or some other type of simulation 
techniques as a measure of risk 
exposure? 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .122 .728 -.175 66 .862 -1.39E-02 7.94E-02 -.17 .14 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.174 64.100 .862 -1.39E-02 7.97E-02 -.17 .15 
Importance of commercial banks in 
providing derivative instruments to 
companies 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.308 .135 1.023 52 .311 .35 .34 -.34 1.04 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.057 51.710 .295 .35 .33 -.31 1.01 
Importance of investment banks in 
providing derivative instruments to 
companies 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.592 .113 1.512 52 .137 .53 .35 -.17 1.24 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.484 45.161 .145 .53 .36 -.19 1.26 
Importance of insurance companies in 
providing derivative instruments to 
companies 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.480 .068 .951 52 .346 .27 .28 -.30 .83 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .916 40.126 .365 .27 .29 -.32 .85 
Importance of exchange/brokerage 
houses in providing derivative 
instruments to companies 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.054 .158 .525 52 .602 .13 .25 -.38 .64 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .515 45.415 .609 .13 .26 -.39 .65 
Insufficient exposure to financial risks 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .251 .622 -.460 19 .651 -.28 .61 -1.55 .99 
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Equal variances 
not assumed   -.445 13.461 .663 -.28 .63 -1.63 1.07 
Insufficient knowledge about financial 
risk management instruments and their 
use 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .049 .828 -.544 18 .593 -.32 .59 -1.55 .91 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.525 11.200 .610 -.32 .61 -1.65 1.02 
Financial risk management instruments 
are not efficient 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .000 1.000 1.461 16 .163 .83 .57 -.38 2.04 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.568 12.212 .142 .83 .53 -.32 1.99 
Financial risk management instruments 
are too expensive 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.641 .217 -1.830 17 .085 -.90 .49 -1.95 .14 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.025 16.415 .059 -.90 .45 -1.85 4.03E-02 
Difficulties in pricing and valuing 
derivatives 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 7.164 .017 -.368 15 .718 -.27 .73 -1.81 1.28 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.521 14.892 .610 -.27 .51 -1.36 .83 
Concerns about perceptions of 
derivatives use by investors. regulators 
and public 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.582 .228 -.906 15 .379 -.60 .66 -2.01 .81 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.744 5.353 .488 -.60 .81 -2.63 1.43 
Costs of establishing and maintaining a 
risk management program exceed the 
expected benefits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.016 .329 .275 16 .787 .17 .61 -1.12 1.45 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .247 7.761 .812 .17 .68 -1.40 1.73 
Supply of risk management instruments 
traded on domestic financial market is 
insufficient 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.316 .267 .310 17 .760 .21 .66 -1.19 1.60 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .352 13.560 .730 .21 .58 -1.05 1.46 
Supply of risk management instruments 
offered by financial institutions is 
insufficient 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.574 .127 .449 17 .659 .29 .66 -1.09 1.68 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .519 14.140 .612 .29 .57 -.92 1.51 
Industry 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.968 .164 1.954 88 .054 .86 .44 -1.47E-02 1.74 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.958 85.836 .054 .86 .44 -1.33E-02 1.73 
Company establishment 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 17.711 .000 -2.422 88 .018 -.61 .25 -1.10 -.11 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.520 81.676 .014 -.61 .24 -1.08 -.13 
Number of employees 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .655 .421 .640 88 .524 .30 .48 -.64 1.25 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .643 86.571 .522 .30 .47 -.64 1.24 
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Gender 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 1.038 .311 -.795 87 .429 -8.52E-02 .11 -.30 .13 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.795 83.753 .429 -8.52E-02 .11 -.30 .13 
Formal education 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .171 .680 .392 87 .696 4.74E-02 .12 -.19 .29 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .392 82.971 .696 4.74E-02 .12 -.19 .29 
Finished educational programmes in risk 
management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 6.027 .016 -1.965 87 .053 -.21 .10 -.41 2.37E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.977 85.219 .051 -.21 .10 -.41 1.14E-03 
 
Source: Croatian and Slovenian survey data 
 
Table 6.3. Group statistics for the comparative Analysis (regression variables) 
 Country N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
  
Croatia 49 .73 .45 6.37E-02 
Slovenia 40 .80 .41 6.41E-02 
Derivative users 
  
Croatia 49 .43 .50 7.14E-02 
Slovenia 40 .68 .47 7.50E-02 
Total assets 
  
Croatia 49 262,189.67 599,929.59 85,704.23 
Slovenia 40 152,230.05 239,912.30 37,933.47 
Total sales revenues 
  
Croatia 49 129,032.61 213,620.29 30,517.18 
Slovenia 40 141,978.40 278,918.09 44,100.82 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Croatia 49 .536147 .310749 4.43927E-02 
Slovenia 40 .408271 .209119 3.30646E-02 
Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Croatia 48 .217236 .182465 2.63366E-02 
Slovenia 40 .120618 9.32124E-02 1.47382E-02 
Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 
  
Croatia 48 1.592013 4.072219 .587774 
Slovenia 40 .279875 .265114 4.19182E-02 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Croatia 44 9.966513 23.660138 3.566900 
Slovenia 39 20.184427 92.433938 14.801276 
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Debt rating 
  
Croatia 49 .2041 .4072 5.817E-02 
Slovenia 39 .5897 .4983 7.979E-02 
Share owned by institutional investors 
  
Croatia 48 6.775833 14.520084 2.095794 
Slovenia 39 18.136667 28.622883 4.583329 
Cash & cash equivalents-to-assets ratio 
  
Croatia 48 7.48837E-02 8.74973E-02 1.26292E-02 
Slovenia 40 3.47355E-02 5.21076E-02 8.23894E-03 
Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
Croatia 49 8.85203E-02 .105411 1.50587E-02 
Slovenia 40 7.37635E-02 5.57926E-02 8.82159E-03 
Investment expenditures-to-sales ratio 
  
Croatia 49 .229198 .609356 8.70508E-02 
Slovenia 40 8.64593E-02 .119853 1.89504E-02 
R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio 
  
Croatia 47 4.54176E-03 1.09967E-02 1.60404E-03 
Slovenia 34 1.18867E-02 1.68297E-02 2.88627E-03 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
  
Croatia 49 41,355.8980 159,879.3119 22,839.9017 
Slovenia 39 43.5282 271.5707 43.4861 
Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs-to-total 
assets 
  
Croatia 49 .714151 4.451312 .635902 
Slovenia 39 1.28505E-03 8.00860E-03 1.28240E-03 
Investment tax credits 
  
Croatia 48 298.3125 1,438.9671 207.6970 
Slovenia 37 2,673.5135 5,267.2852 865.9363 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Croatia 49 .3673 .4871 6.958E-02 
Slovenia 39 .6667 .4776 7.647E-02 
Value of equity owned by managers 
  
Croatia 49 7,010.596 18,523.473 2,646.210 
Slovenia 40 2,567.896 12,396.986 1,960.136 
Share of the company owned by management 
  
Croatia 49 18.16735 32.25816 4.60831 
Slovenia 38 5.01000 18.18804 2.95049 
Managers ownership of stock options 
  
Croatia 48 .10 .31 4.46E-02 
Slovenia 39 7.69E-02 .27 4.32E-02 
Managers age 
  
Croatia 49 3.29 .91 .13 
Slovenia 39 3.28 .94 .15 
Managers tenure 
  
Croatia 49 12.35 10.36 1.48 
Slovenia 37 15.39 9.75 1.60 
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Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
Croatia 43 15.5116 26.6390 4.0624 
Slovenia 37 24.3570 38.4120 6.3149 
Company listed on the stock-exchange 
  
Croatia 49 .51 .51 7.22E-02 
Slovenia 40 .15 .36 5.72E-02 
Quick ratio 
  
Croatia 48 .547654 1.044173 .150713 
Slovenia 40 .215218 .539482 8.52996E-02 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Croatia 49 2.680185 3.959613 .565659 
Slovenia 40 1.874846 3.740691 .591455 
Share of the company owned by foreign investors 
  
Croatia 49 7.502278 21.095962 3.013709 
Slovenia 39 21.032821 38.680690 6.193868 
(Variables that are presented in absolute values like total assets, total sales revenues, total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs, investment tax credits, value of 
equity owned by managers, are in 000 Euros) 
 
Source: Croatian and Slovenian survey data 
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Table 6.4. Independent samples t-test ± the comparative analysis (regression variables) 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
 
t-test for Equality 
of Means       
    F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
           Lower Upper 
Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.120 .149 -.716 87 .476 -6.53E-02 9.12E-02 -.25 .12 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.723 85.976 .472 -6.53E-02 9.04E-02 -.24 .11 
Derivative users 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.783 .055 -2.367 87 .020 -.25 .10 -.45 -3.95E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.379 85.009 .020 -.25 .10 -.45 -4.05E-02 
Total assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.179 .144 1.089 87 .279 109,959.62 100,938.09 -90,665.75 310,585.00 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.173 65.552 .245 109,959.62 93,723.86 -77,189.95 297,109.20 
Total sales revenues 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .285 .595 -.248 87 .805 -12,945.79 52,218.79 -116,736.30 90,844.72 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.241 71.898 .810 -12,945.79 53,630.04 -119,857.91 93,966.34 
Debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.998 .049 2.223 87 .029 .127876 5.75271E-02 1.35346E-02 .242217 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.310 84.154 .023 .127876 5.53532E-02 1.78031E-02 .237949 
Long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 12.675 .001 3.033 86 .003 9.66176E-02 3.18519E-02 3.32981E-02 .159937 
Equal variances 
not assumed   3.201 72.480 .002 9.66176E-02 3.01800E-02 3.64618E-02 .156774 
Long-term debt-to-
equity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 11.424 .001 2.032 86 .045 1.312138 .645630 2.86680E-02 2.595609 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.227 47.478 .031 1.312138 .589267 .127001 2.497276 
Interest cover ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 2.359 .128 -.708 81 .481 -10.217913 14.430844 -38.930766 18.494939 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -.671 42.415 .506 -10.217913 15.224997 -40.934290 20.498463 
Debt rating 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 15.276 .000 -3.996 86 .000 -.3857 9.651E-02 -.5775 -.1938 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -3.906 72.839 .000 -.3857 9.875E-02 -.5825 -.1889 
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Share owned by 
institutional investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 17.096 .000 -2.398 85 .019 -11.360833 4.737053 -20.779363 -1.942303 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.254 53.656 .028 -11.360833 5.039768 -21.466445 -1.255222 
Cash & cash 
equivalents-to-assets 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 10.251 .002 2.548 86 .013 4.01482E-02 1.57544E-02 8.82955E-03 7.14669E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.663 78.404 .009 4.01482E-02 1.50790E-02 1.01307E-02 7.01657E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-assets 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.485 .037 .798 87 .427 1.47568E-02 1.84861E-02 -2.198627E-02 5.14999E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .846 75.635 .400 1.47568E-02 1.74523E-02 -2.000527E-02 4.95189E-02 
Investment 
expenditures-to-sales 
ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 5.191 .025 1.457 87 .149 .142739 9.79533E-02 -5.195412E-02 .337432 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.602 52.512 .115 .142739 8.90896E-02 -3.599118E-02 .321469 
R&D expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 9.819 .002 -2.375 79 .020 -7.344946E-03 3.09295E-03 -1.350132E-02 -1.188575E-03 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.224 52.912 .030 -7.344946E-03 3.30205E-03 -1.396827E-02 -7.216232E-04 
Total value of tax loss 
carry-forward and 
carry backs 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 9.192 .003 1.612 86 .111 41312.3698 25631.5667 -9,641.4984 92,266.2379 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.809 48.000 .077 41312.3698 22839.9431 -4,610.4051 87,235.1446 
Total value of tax loss 
carry-forward and 
carry backs-to-total 
assets 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.534 .063 .999 86 .321 .712865 .713627 -.705777 2.131508 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.121 48.000 .268 .712865 .635903 -.565703 1.991434 
Investment tax credits 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 14.547 .000 -2.988 83 .004 -2,375.2010 795.0177 -3,956.4592 -793.9428 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.667 40.159 .011 -2,375.2010 890.4964 -4,174.7388 -575.6633 
Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .439 .509 -2.888 86 .005 -.2993 .1036 -.5053 -9.3319E-02 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -2.895 82.306 .005 -.2993 .1034 -.5050 -9.3654E-02 
Value of equity owned 
by managers 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.252 .075 1.297 87 .198 4,442.700 3,424.092 -2,363.055 11,248.454 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.349 84.000 .181 4,442.700 3,293.108 -2,106.007 10,991.407 
Share of the company 
owned by management 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 11.831 .001 2.250 85 .027 13.15735 5.84674 1.53246 24.78223 
Equal variances 
not assumed   2.405 78.341 .019 13.15735 5.47192 2.26434 24.05035 
Managers ownership of 
stock options 
Equal variances 
assumed .760 .386 .433 85 .666 2.72E-02 6.30E-02 -9.79E-02 .15 
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  Equal variances 
not assumed   .439 84.512 .662 2.72E-02 6.21E-02 -9.62E-02 .15 
Managers age 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .129 .720 .018 86 .985 3.66E-03 .20 -.39 .40 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .018 80.350 .985 3.66E-03 .20 -.39 .40 
Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .055 .816 -1.384 84 .170 -3.04 2.20 -7.42 1.33 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.396 79.990 .167 -3.04 2.18 -7.39 1.30 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 3.091 .083 -1.210 78 .230 -8.8454 7.3114 -23.4012 5.7104 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.178 62.750 .243 -8.8454 7.5087 -23.8516 6.1608 
Company listed on the 
stock-exchange 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 45.849 .000 3.786 87 .000 .36 9.51E-02 .17 .55 
Equal variances 
not assumed   3.913 85.645 .000 .36 9.21E-02 .18 .54 
Quick ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 4.382 .039 1.820 86 .072 .332436 .182646 -3.065208E-02 .695524 
Equal variances 
not assumed   1.920 72.917 .059 .332436 .173178 -1.271365E-02 .677585 
Liquidity ratio 
  
Equal variances 
assumed .439 .510 .978 87 .331 .805339 .823176 -.830813 2.441491 
Equal variances 
not assumed   .984 85.115 .328 .805339 .818407 -.821841 2.432519 
Share of the company 
owned by foreign 
investors 
  
Equal variances 
assumed 22.054 .000 -2.091 86 .040 -13.530543 6.471624 -26.395706 -.665380 
Equal variances 
not assumed   -1.964 55.653 .054 -13.530543 6.888137 -27.331039 .269953 
 (Variables that are presented in absolute values like total assets, total sales revenues, total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs, investment tax credits, value of 
equity owned by managers, are in 000 Euros) 
 
Source: Croatian and Slovenian survey data 
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6.4 Comparative Analysis of Multivariate Results 
 
The multivariate regression model conducted for the Croatian companies has shown that 
the corporate decision to hedge is related to company debt rating, investment expenditures-to-
assets ratio and share of the company owned by management. Other variables that tested the 
research hypothesis are not statistically significant in the model; therefore they do not 
influence the decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks.  
Company credit rating is a proxy for the agency cost of debt. In our research assumptions 
we argue that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively because the severity of agency 
cost of debt is related to the extent of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that 
firms with greater asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater 
incentive to engage in risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is 
inconsistent with the predictions derived from the agency cost of debt model (see: DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who have proven that firms with a credit rating 
hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating and therefore greater informational 
asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity) because the relationship between 
the dependent variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading to the conclusion 
that companies that have credit rating hedge more intensively.  
Investment expenditures-to-DVVHWV UDWLR ZKLFK FRQWUROV IRU FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
(growth) opportunities, is very important in the model because it tests our prediction that 
hedgers are more likely to have larger investment opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) for theoretical arguments, or Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) for empirical evidence). The results of the logistic model support our prediction 
and show a statistically significant positive relation between the decision to hedge and investment 
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expenditures-to-assets ratio. A robustness test, which was employed by replacing investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio with other variables that were used as proxies for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing hypothesis, have not shown statistically 
significant results. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and capital 
market imperfections is not robust. Overall, the data, at best, provide very weak support for 
the prediction of the tested hypothesis.  
The third variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction RIWKHILUP¶V
RXWVWDQGLQJ VKDUHV KHOG E\ FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW We argue that, due to the fact that a 
ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV KDYH OLPLWHG DELOLW\ WR GLYHUVLI\ WKHLU RZQ SHUVRQDO ZHDOWK SRVLWLRQ
associated with stock holdings and WKHLUHDUQLQJV¶FDSLWDOLVDWLRQWKH\KDYHVWURQJLQFHQWLYHV
to hedge. Our results show a negative relation between the decision to hedge and the share of 
the company owned by management, which leads to the conclusion that firms that have a 
greater fraction RIRXWVWDQGLQJVKDUHVKHOGE\FRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWKDYHOHVVLQFHQWLYHV
to hedge. This is contrary to our prediction, and to the evidence of Tufano (1996), who 
has found that ILUPVZKRVHPDQDJHUVKDYHPRUHZHDOWKLQYHVWHGLQWKHILUP¶VVWRFNVPDQDJH
more corporate risk. Additionally, it needs to be emphasised that Geczy, Minton and Schrand 
(1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate hedging is affected by 
managerial shareholdings. Other variables that were employed as proxies for the managerial 
XWLOLW\K\SRWKHVLV YDOXHRIFRPSDQ\VKDUHRZQHGE\PDQDJHPHQWPDQDJHUV¶RZQHUVKLSRI
VWRFN RSWLRQV PDQDJHUV¶ DJH DQG WHQXUH were not statistically significant in the model. 
Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding managerial utility. 
Overall, it could be concluded that the evidence based on the empirical relation between 
the decision to hedge made by the Croatian non-financial companies and financial distress 
costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, 
managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested 
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hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly external financing measured by 
investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Regarding this result, we need to emphasise that the 
association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust to other variables 
employed as proxies for testing this hypothesis.  
The regression model conducted for the Slovenian companies has revealed that there is no 
statistically significant explanatory variable, therefore it could be concluded that the decision 
to hedge in the Slovenian companies is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of 
hedging. Evidence based on the empirical relation between the decision to hedge and financial 
distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, 
managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested 
hypotheses. It should be emphasised that, in the regression models where outliers have not 
been controlled, the total sales revenues as a proxy for size has been marginally significant (p 
= 0.0503). When we removed the standardised residuals from the model, the total sales 
revenues has not been significant. We have tested the robustness of this result by employing 
separate logistic regressions with all combinations of exploratory variables, and these tests 
have supported the results of the model presented in the section 5.4.  
WheQ ZH XVHG D FRPSDQ\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR XVH GHULYDWLYH LQVWUXPHQWV DV D GHSHQGHQW
variable, the regression model conducted for the Croatian companies showed that the use of 
derivative instruments is related only to two variables - investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio and quick ratio. Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant positive relation 
with the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with the results of multivariate 
analysis regarding the decision to hedge corporate risks in Croatian companies, where it has 
been shown that companies with a higher investment-to-assets ratio have more incentives to 
hedge. Additionally, the result is consistent with the results of univariate analysis for the 
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sample Croatian derivative users/nonusers, where t-test and correlation analysis have shown 
that derivative users have a statistically higher value of this ratio, as well as with the 
findings of Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and Soenen 
(1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001).  
This finding supports our prediction WKDW WKH ILUP¶V GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH LV SUHGicted to be 
positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Again, as in the 
case of sample hedgers/nonhedgers, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this result 
by employing other variables that were used as proxies for the capital market imperfections 
and costly external financing hypothesis. The results for alternative regression variables were 
not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and 
capital market imperfections is not robust.  
,QUHVSHFWRI WKHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWTXLFNUDWLRDVDPHDVXUHRIFRPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\
and substitute for hedging, consistently with the findings of univariate analysis conducted 
for the samples Croatian hedgers/nonhedgers and for derivative users/nonusers, the 
multivariate analysis results show a positive relation between the decision to use 
derivatives and the value of quick ratio, suggesting that companies that have a high quick 
ratio have more incentives to use derivatives. As we predicted a negative relation for this 
variable, and our prediction was based on the findings of Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), 
Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Pulvino (1998) and Harford (1999), we 
should reject the hypothesis regarding the hedging substitutes. Other variables that were 
HPSOR\HGWRWHVWWKHKHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWHV¶K\SRWKHVLVwere not significant in the model.  
Regarding the corporate decision to use derivative instruments in the Slovenian 
companies, the regression model has shown that this decision is related to three variables ± 
total sales revenues, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and credit rating. Other variables 
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that tested the research hypothesis are not statistically significant in the model; therefore they 
do not influence the decision to use derivatives.  
Total sales revenues are a proxy for the effect of size on the decision to use derivatives as 
risk management instruments. The regression model has revealed a positive relation between 
the decision to use derivatives and the size of the company, implying that it is more likely for 
larger Slovenian companies to use derivatives. Several previous empirical studies (e.g., 
Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 
1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are more likely to 
hedge. These studies have contended that the positive correlation between size and hedging 
can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of 
hedging.  
Contrary to the predicted positive relation between size and the decision to hedge, few 
scholars have predicted the degree of hedging to be negatively related to the size of a company 
(Weiss, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000) 
due to the issue of high costs of implementing the risk management program and to the 
greater informational asymmetries with potential public investors and direct costs of 
bankruptcy. Our assumption was that the argument is stronger in the case of the significant 
economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging, so we have predicted a 
SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQEHWZHHQD FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG WKHGHFLVLRQ WRKHGJH7KH UHJUHVVLRQ UHVXOWV
support our hypothesis for the Slovenian companies. It should be noted that the alternative 
YDULDEOHWKDWKDVEHHQXVHGDVSUR[\IRUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HWKHYDOXHRIWRWDODVVHWVKDVQRW
been shown as relevant for making the decision to use derivatives. Therefore, our result is not 
robust to the other control variable.  
Another variable that is significant for the decision of Slovenian companies to use 
GHULYDWLYHVLVDFRPSDQ\¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJDVDSUR[\IRUWKHDJHQF\FRVWRIGHEW,QRXUUHVHDUFK
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assumptions we argue that firms with a credit rating use derivatives as risk management 
instruments less extensively because the severity of agency cost of debt is related to the extent 
of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that firms with greater asymmetric 
information problems are more likely to have a greater incentive to engage in risk-shifting and 
under-investment activities. The relationship between the dependent variable and credit rating 
in our model is positive, leading to the conclusion that companies that have a credit rating 
hedge by using derivative instruments more intensively. This evidence is inconsistent with the 
findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who have proven that firms 
with a credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating and therefore 
greater informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity.  
Therefore, we should reject our hypothesis related to the agency cost of debt and 
asymmetric information problems for the Slovenian companies. An alternative variable that 
has been used as proxy for agency cost (the share of the company owned by institutional 
investors) has not been shown as relevant for making decision to hedge. It should be 
emphasised that we have proven the identical result when we analysed the decision of 
Croatian companies to hedge or not to hedge, where we have found a positive relation with 
the credit rating variable. 
Finally, the investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant negative relation 
with the decision to use derivatives. The results of our logistic model do not support our 
prediction WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHE\XVLQJGHULYDWLYHVLVpositively correlated with 
measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with 
our findings regarding the Croatian companies, as well as with the findings of Bessembinder 
(1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who 
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KDYH DOVR SURYHQ D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DQG WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
investment (growth) opportunities.  
The negative relation found in the case of the Slovenian companies suggest that companies 
which have less investment (growth) opportunities have more incentives to hedge with derivative 
instruments. Again, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing 
other variables that were used as proxies for the capital market imperfections and costly 
external financing hypothesis (cash and cash equivalents-to-assets ratio, investment 
expenditures to sales and R&D expenditures-to-assets ratio). The results for alternative 
regression variables were not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the capital 
market imperfection hypothesis, which implies that the benefits of hedging should be greater 
WKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVDUHLQWKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\ set, should be rejected in the 
case of the Slovenian companies.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Comparative analysis of survey results have revealed that the majority of analysed 
companies in both Croatia and Slovenia are using some form of financial engineering to 
manage interest-rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk. Regarding the use of 
derivatives as a risk management instrument, it could be concluded that the Slovenian 
companies use derivatives more frequently than their counterparts in Croatia. Therefore, our 
research hypothesis, which argues that the Slovenian companies have more advanced risk 
management practices than the Croatian companies, measured by the total number of 
companies that use derivative instruments to manage their risk exposures, is accepted.  
Regarding the intensity of influence of financial risks on the performance of the analysed 
companies, the results have shown that the price risk has the highest influence among the 
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Slovenian as well as the Croatian companies. We believe that these findings could be 
explained by the fact that Slovenia and Croatia are small and open economies, which results 
in a high dependence on international trade. On the highly competitive market, prices of 
goods are volatile, therefore companies that compete on that market need to be prepared for 
these conditions and protect their risky positions.  
In respect of the currency risk exposure, the survey has revealed that the Croatian 
companies are more affected by currency risk than the Slovenian companies, which could be 
explained by the fact that the exposure to foreign-exchange risk was not so high in 2006 and it 
is expected to be further decreased in 2007, as Slovenia has introduced the Euro as an official 
currency (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited publications  6ORYHQLD¶V PDMRU
trade partners are Germany, Italy, France and Austria, so the majority of transactions are now 
denominated in one currency since Slovenia entered the Euro Zone. This contributes to the 
lowering of risk in business transactions as companies no longer have to worry about their 
currency risk exposures, which should additionally enhance the trade between Slovenia and 
its partners. The results of the t-test presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 have confirmed the results 
of descriptive statistics and have revealed a statistically significant difference between the 
analysed companies regarding the intensity of influence of currency and price risk on the 
FRPSDQ\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH ± the Croatian companies are more affected by the currency risk, 
while the Slovenian companies are more affected by the price risk.  
Finally, the interest-rate risk has been ranged as less important in comparison with 
commodity price and currency risks. The explanation of this result could be found in the fact 
that   the Slovenian and Croatian companies do not use debt capital heavily. The average 
long-term debt-to-assets ratio in both countries is below 30 per cent ± the level of company 
indebtedness taken as a threshold to distinguish from highly levered companies (Graham and 
Campbell, 2001). However, the results of the t-test have revealed that debt-to-assets ratio, 
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long-term debt-to-assets ratio and long-term debt-to-equity ratio as proxies for financial 
leverage and financial distress costs are significantly higher in the case of Croatia, which 
leads us to the conclusion that the Croatian companies are more leveraged in comparison with 
the Slovenian companies. 
7KH VXUYH\¶V UHVXOWV KDYH FOHDUO\ LQGLFDWHG WKDW &URDWLDQ DQG 6ORYHQLDQ QRQ-financial 
companies manage financial risks primarily with simple risk management instruments such as 
natural hedging. In the case of derivatives use, forwards and swaps are by far the most 
important instruments in both countries, but futures as representatives of standardised 
derivatives and structured derivatives are more important in the Slovenian than in the Croatian 
companies. Exchange-traded and OTC options as well as hybrid securities are not important 
means of financial risk management. 
The result of the t-test conducted to explore for statistically significant differences 
between risk management practices in Slovenian and Croatian companies has shown 
statistically significant evidence that the Slovenian companies use all derivatives, especially 
structured derivatives such as swaptions, caps, floors, collars or corridors as instruments for 
managing currency and interest-rate risk more intensively than the Croatian companies. 
Additionally, the Croatian companies use simple risk management instruments like managing 
assets and liabilities to a greater extent in comparison with the Slovenian companies when 
managing price risk.  
These findings are consistent with our research prediction that the Slovenian companies 
have more advanced risk management practices than the Croatian companies, measured by 
the implementation of more sophisticated risk management strategies. To distinguish the less 
and more sophisticated risk management strategies, we took the use of different derivatives 
instruments as an example of more advanced risk management strategies with an emphasis on 
structured derivatives use, while instruments like natural hedge, assets and liabilities 
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matching, together with international and business diversification we have classified as less 
sophisticated risk management strategies. Therefore, in respect of the use of structured 
derivative instruments and assets and liabilities matching, our research hypothesis should be 
accepted.  
Regarding the scope of corporate risk management policy, the majority of the analysed 
Slovenian and Croatian companies claim that they use selective hedging, but they do not use 
Value-at-Risk as well as Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as 
measures of risk exposure. Regarding the hedging horizon for financial risk management, it is 
typically less than one year in both countries. Commercial banks are by far the primary source 
for derivatives transactions. Very few analysed firms in either country use investment banks, 
insurance companies or exchange/brokerage houses as counterparties. The primary goal of 
hedging is managing volatility of cash flows, but both Slovenian and Croatian firms focus 
also on accounting earning volatility as well as managing balance sheet and financial ratios. 
This result could be explained by the strong link between the Slovenian and Croatian financial 
accounting and tax accounting. As a result of those institutional features, we believe that there 
is a strong focus in both countries on accounting earnings in all business decisions and 
consequently also in hedging decisions. However, the results of the t-test have revealed that 
the Croatian companies differ from their Slovenian counterparts in the evaluation of balance 
sheet and financial ratios management as an important risk management goal, so it could be 
concluded that in the case of Croatia the focus on accounting earnings is even stronger.  
Among the most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives, the Slovenian 
financial managers have addressed two problems, which they share with their Croatian 
counterparts as the most important reasons why their companies do not hedge ± the high costs 
of establishing and maintaining risk management programmes that exceed the benefits of it 
(explanation offered by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000 and Hoyt and 
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Khang, 2000), together with difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives. Apart from these 
problems, the Slovenian managers have numbered two additional reasons that have stopped 
them from hedging ± the high cost of financial risk management instruments (e.g. see Mian, 
1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997 and Hushalter, 2000) and insufficient exposure to 
financial risks. 
  The Croatian managers have argued that the insufficient supply of risk management 
instruments traded on domestic financial market or offered by financial institutions is a very 
important reason why they do not hedge. 2Q WKH EDVLV RI WKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ DQVZHUV DQG
informal interviews conducted at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Croatian Association of 
Corporate Treasurers held in September 2006, we conclude that, in spite of the fact that there 
is an increasing number of Croatian non-financial companies which are aware of the 
importance of corporate risk management, a lack of suitable instruments offered to them by 
the domestic financial industry becomes a leading factor why many companies do not use 
derivatives when managing risks. This problem has the strongest impact on the shipbuilding 
industry. Other reasons such as concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors, 
regulators and the public and insufficient knowledge about financial risk management 
instruments are not very important reasons why the Slovenian and Croatian companies do not 
hedge.  
According to a mean comparison test for Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers, the hedgers 
are statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to variable that proxy for alternative 
financial policy as substitutes for hedging. Hedgers have a statistically greater quick ratio as a 
measure of short-term liquidity. The coefficient on quick ratio is predicted to be negative 
(see: Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Pulvino, 1998 and Harford, 1999). Contrary to our prediction as well as to the findings of 
the cited studies, our results show a positive relation between the decision to hedge and this 
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explanatory variable, suggesting that companies that are more liquid are more likely to 
hedge. Therefore, our assumption regarding hedging substitutes should be rejected in the 
case of the Croatian companies. Additionally, t-test has shown that the Croatian hedgers 
have a statistically higher share owed by foreign investors in comparison with nonhedgers, 
which is confirmed by the correlation analysis. This finding leads to the conclusion that 
investing companies which have their headquarters in more developed countries have 
enforced employment of corporate risk management in the acquired Croatian companies.  
Other results of univariate tests suggest that hedgers are not statistically different from 
nonhedgers with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market 
imperfection, tax preference items, or managerial utility. Therefore, we should reject all 
research hypotheses regarding shareholder maximisation and managerial utility maximisation 
in the case of the Croatian companies. Additionally, we should reject our hypothesis regarding 
alternative activities that substitute for financial risk management strategies. Our findings 
predict the opposite sign to what we assumed, suggesting that the Croatian companies that are 
more liquid have more incentives to hedge.  
Regarding the univariate analysis of the Croatian derivative users vs derivative nonusers, 
t-test has discovered that derivative users are statistically different from nonusers with respect 
to variables that are proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging and for 
capital market imperfection and costly external financing. Derivative users have a statistically 
greater quick ratio and a greater ratio of investment expenditures to the book value of assets. 
This finding suggests that these two groups differ with respect to proxies for short-term 
liquidity and investment (growth) opportunities. Similarly to the analysis of hedgers and 
nonhedgers, our results suggest that the Croatian companies that have a higher quick ratio 
use derivatives more intensively, which is contrary to our predictions and to the findings of 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), 
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Pulvino (1998) and Harford (1999). Our result is also confirmed by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient.  
Another statistically significant variable is the company ratio of investment 
expenditures to the book value of assets. Our t-test has shown that derivative users have a 
statistically higher value of this ratio, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis, 
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
and the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with our prediction and with 
the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who have proven 
that the benefits of hedging should be gUHDWHU WKH PRUH JURZWK RSWLRQV DUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V
investment opportunity set. Other variables that have been used to test the agency cost of debt 
and capital market imperfection hypothesis has not shown statistically significant differences 
between analysed derivative users and nonusers.  
On the basis of t-tests and correlation analysis results for the Croatian sample, it could 
be concluded that derivative users are not statistically different from nonusers with respect 
to other research assumptions regarding the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, 
tax preference items, or managerial utility. Similarly to the findings in the case of the Croatian 
hedgers and nonhedgers, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the managerial 
utility maximisation hypothesis and the shareholder maximisation hypothesis ± apart from 
capital market imperfection and costly external financing.  
Comparison of the Croatian univariate analysis results with the findings of the identical 
analysis conducted for the Slovenian sample has revealed that the tested hedging theories 
have little predictive power regarding risk management practices in both countries. Univariate 
tests have discovered that the Slovenian hedgers and derivative users are statistically different 
from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with respect only to the coefficient of the publicly 
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held company dummy variable that proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for 
hedging. The positive relation between the decision to hedge or to use derivatives and the 
coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable leads to the conclusion that publicly 
held companies tend to be risk-averse, while privately held companies do not act in a risk-
averse manner and do not hedge. This is contrary to what we predicted in our assumption 
connected to the different behaviour of publicly traded and privately held stock companies 
with regard to risk management (Cummins, Phillips and Smith, 2001). Therefore, our 
assumption should be rejected.  
We believe the explanation for this result can be found in the fact that, regardless to the 
opinion that the ownership of publicly traded companies is well diversified, research results 
have shown that even 64.7 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies are owned by the 
major shareholder, meaning that there is one owner who has more than 50 per cent of a 
FRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHVDQGKDVDSRZHUWRFRQWUROWKHEXVLQHVV7KHUHIRUHLWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWWKH
major shareholder has poorly diversified wealth and therefore acts in risk-averse manner. 
Another explanation for the positive coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable 
could be found in the fact that publicly traded companies, which act in a risk-averse manner 
tend to signal good news to investors on the finanFLDO PDUNHW DV ZHOO DV WR DOO FRPSDQ\¶V
stakeholders, because a company that manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky 
investment or a better rated business partner. However, to the best of our knowledge, we 
cannot support this argument by theoretical or empirical evidence, meaning that this second 
explanation is based only on our opinion.  
Other univariate results have shown that the Slovenian hedgers and derivative users are 
not statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with respect to the cost 
of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection, tax preference items, or 
managerial utility, therefore we should reject all research assumptions regarding the 
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shareholder maximisation hypothesis and the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis for   
the Slovenian companies.  
The multivariate regression model for the Croatian companies has revealed that the 
corporate decision to hedge is related to company debt rating, investment expenditures-to-
assets ratio and share of the company owned by management. Company credit rating is a 
proxy for the agency cost of debt. In our research assumptions we argue that firms with a 
credit rating hedge less extensively because the severity of agency cost of debt is related to 
the extent of informational asymmetries present in the firm, and that firms with greater 
asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater incentive to engage in 
risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is inconsistent with the predictions 
derived from the agency cost of debt model (see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991 and Haushalter, 
2000) because the relationship between the dependent variable and credit rating in our model 
is positive, leading to the conclusion that companies that have a credit rating hedge more 
intensively.  
The investment expenditures-to-DVVHWV UDWLRZKLFKFRQWUROV IRU D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
(growth) opportunities, is very important in the model because it tests our prediction that 
hedgers are more likely to have larger investment opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) for theoretical arguments, or Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) for empirical evidence). The results of the logistic model support our prediction 
and show a statistically significant positive relation between the decision to hedge and investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio. A robustness test, which were employed by replacing investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio with other variables that were used as proxies for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing hypothesis, have not shown statistically 
significant results. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and capital 
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market imperfections is not robust. Overall, the data, at best, provide very weak support for 
the prediction of the tested hypothesis.  
The third variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction RIWKHILUP¶V
RXWVWDQGLQJVKDUHVKHOGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWWe argue that, due to the fact that 
WKH ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV KDYH OLPLWHG DELOLW\ WR GLYHUVLI\ WKHLU RZQ SHUVRQDO ZHDOWK SRVLWLRQ
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVWRFNKROGLQJVDQGWKHLUHDUQLQJV¶FDSLWDOLVDWLon, they have strong incentives 
to hedge. Our results show a negative relation between the decision to hedge and the share of 
the company owned by management, which leads to the conclusion that firms that have 
greater fraction of outstanding shares held by WKH FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW KDYH OHVV
incentives to hedge. This is contrary to our prediction, and to the evidence of Tufano 
(1996), who has found that ILUPVZKRVHPDQDJHUVKDYHPRUHZHDOWKLQYHVWHGLQWKHILUP¶V
stocks manage more corporate risk. Additionally, it needs to be emphasised that Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. Other variables that were employed as 
proxies for the managerial utility hypothesis (value of company share owned by management. 
PDQDJHUV¶ RZQHUVKLS RI VWRFN RSWLRQV PDQDJHUV¶ DJH DQG WHQXUH were not statistically 
significant in the model. Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding managerial 
utility. 
Overall, it could be concluded that the evidence based on the empirical relation between 
the decision to hedge made by Croatian non-financial companies and financial distress costs, 
agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, managerial 
utility as well as hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested 
hypothesis but one - capital market imperfections and costly external financing measured by 
investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Regarding this result, we need to emphasise that the 
association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust to other variables 
 277 
employed as proxies for testing this hypothesis. The regression model conducted for the 
Slovenian companies has revealed that there is no statistically significant explanatory 
variable, therefore it could be concluded the decision to hedge in the Slovenian companies is 
not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging. 
:KHQ ZH XVHG WKH FRPSDQ\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR XVH GHULYDWLYH LQVWUXPHQWV DV D Gependent 
variable, the regression model conducted for the Croatian companies showed that the use of 
derivative instruments is related only to two variables - investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio and quick ratio. The investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital 
market imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant positive 
relation with the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with the results of 
multivariate analysis regarding the decision to hedge corporate risks in Croatian companies, 
where it has been shown that companies with a higher investment-to-assets ratio have more 
incentives to hedge. Additionally, the result is consistent with the results of univariate analysis 
for the sample of Croatian derivative users/nonusers, where t-test and correlation analysis 
have shown that derivative users have a statistically higher value of this ratio, as well as to 
the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and 
Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001).  
This finding supports our prediction WKDW WKH ILUP¶V GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH LV SUHGLFWHG WR EH
positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Again, as in the 
case of sample hedgers/nonhedgers, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this result 
by employing other variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and 
costly external financing hypothesis. The results for alternative regression variables were not 
statistically significant. These findings suggest that the association between hedging and 
capital market imperfections is not robust.  
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In respect to the statistically significant quick ratLRDVDPHDVXUHRIDFRPSDQ\¶VOLTXLGLW\
and substitute for hedging, consistently with the findings of univariate analysis conducted 
for the samples Croatian hedgers/nonhedgers as well as for derivative users/nonusers, 
multivariate analysis results show a positive relation between the decision to use 
derivatives and the value of quick ratio, suggesting that companies that have a high quick 
ratio have more incentives to use derivatives. As we predicted a negative relation for this  
variable, and our prediction was based on the findings of Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), 
Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Pulvino (1998) and Harford (1999), we 
should reject the hypothesis regarding hedging substitutes. Other variables that were 
employed to test hHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWHV¶K\SRWKHVLVwere not significant in the model.  
Regarding the corporate decision to use derivative instruments in the Slovenian 
companies, the regression model has shown that this decision is related to three variables ± 
total sales revenues, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and credit rating. Total sales 
revenues are a proxy for the effect of size on the decision to use derivatives as risk 
management instruments. The regression model has revealed a positive relation between the 
decision to use derivatives and the size of company, implying that it is more likely for larger 
Slovenian companies to use derivatives. Several previous empirical studies (e.g., Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are more likely to 
hedge. These studies have contended that the positive correlation between size and hedging 
can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of 
hedging. :H KDYH DOVR SUHGLFWHG D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG WKH
decision to hedge. The regression results support our hypothesis for the Slovenian companies. It 
should be noted that the alternative variable tKDWKDVEHHQXVHGDVSUR[\ IRUFRPSDQ\¶VVL]H
 279 
(the value of total assets), has not been shown as relevant for making the decision to use 
derivatives. Therefore, our result is not robust to the other control variable.  
Another variable that is significant for the decision of the Slovenian companies to use 
GHULYDWLYHV LV D FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJ DV D SUR[\ IRU WKH DJHQF\ FRVW RI GHEW The 
relationship between the dependent variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading 
to the conclusion that companies that have a credit rating hedge by using derivative 
instruments more intensively. This evidence is inconsistent with our prediction and with the 
findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who have proven that firms 
with a credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating and therefore 
greater informational asymmetry, benefit greatly from risk management activity. Therefore, 
we should reject our hypothesis related to the agency cost of debt and asymmetric information 
problems for the Slovenian companies. It should be emphasised that we have proven the 
identical result when we analysed the decision of Croatian companies to hedge or not to 
hedge, where we found a positive relation with the credit rating variable. 
Finally, the investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant negative relation 
with the decision to use derivatives. The results of our logistic model do not support our 
prediction WKDWWKHILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHE\XVLQJGHULYDWLYHVLVpositively correlated with 
measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with 
our findings regarding the Croatian companies, as well as with findings of Bessembinder 
(1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who 
have also proven a positive relation between WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DQG WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
investment (growth) opportunities.  
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The negative relation found in the case of the Slovenian companies suggests that companies 
which have less investment (growth) opportunities have more incentives to hedge with derivative 
instruments. Again, we have conducted a robustness test regarding this finding and found no 
statistically significant variables in the employed separate logistic regressions. These findings 
suggest that the capital market imperfection hypothesis, which implies that the benefits of 
KHGJLQJVKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVDUHLQ WKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\
set, should be rejected in the case of Slovenian companies. This is an interesting result if we 
compare it with the findings of the Croatian sample, where we have proven a positive relation 
EHWZHHQ ERWK WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DQG WR XVH GHULYDWLYHV DQG D FRPSDQ\¶V investment 
(growth) opportunities.  
Overall, it could be concluded that the explored hedging rationales have little predictive 
power in explaining financial risk management decisions both in the Croatian and the 
Slovenian companies. The evidence based on univariate and multivariate empirical relation 
between the decision to hedge or to use derivatives made by Croatian non-financial 
companies and financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly 
external financing, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support 
for any of the tested hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio.  
The univariate analysis and multivariate regression conducted for the Slovenian 
companies has revealed that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the 
decision to hedge; therefore we can conclude it is not dependent on any of the predicted 
theories of hedging. The decision to use derivatives, however, has been shown as dependent 
on the size of the company. The multivariate test has proven a positive relation between the 
use of derivatives and the size of Slovenian companies, which supports the informational and 
transactional scale economies argument that larger firms will be more likely to hedge.  
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Moreover, our analysis has revealed statistically significant relations between the decision 
to hedge or to use derivatives and different hedging theories, but these relations are contrary 
WRWKHSUHGLFWHGVLJQ8QLYDULDWHWHVWVFRQGXFWHGIRUWKHKHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWHV¶K\SRWKHVLVKDYH
shown that the Croatian hedgers have statistically greater dividend pay-out ratio. Additionally, 
the Croatian hedgers as well as derivative users have a statistically greater quick ratio, which 
is confirmed by the multivariate analysis. Therefore, not only have we rejected the assumption 
that less liquid companies have more incentives to hedge, but we have proven that companies 
that are more liquid are more likely to hedge.  
The positive relation between the decision of Slovenian companies to hedge or to use 
derivatives and the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable leads to the 
conclusion that companies which list their shares on the stock-exchange have more incentives 
to hedge and use derivatives as risk management instruments. We have predicted that, if 
closely held firms tend to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy 
variable is predicted to be negative. Therefore, we have proven our hypothesis regarding the 
different behaviour of publicly traded and privately held stock companies with regard to risk 
management, but it is rejected because the relation is reversed ± publicly traded companies 
are more risk-averse in comparison with those that are privately held.  
Other hypotheses where the opposite sign has been proven are managerial utility 
maximisation in the case of the Croatian companies and costly external financing in the case 
of the Slovenian companies, together with the agency cost of debt hypothesis in both 
countries. The multivariate regression model conducted for the Croatian companies has 
revealed that the corporate decision to hedge is positively related to company credit rating and 
negatively related to the share of the company owned by management, while the regression 
model employed for the Slovenian companies has shown that the decision to use derivatives is 
positively related to credit rating and negatively related to the investment expenditures-to-
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assets ratio. Therefore, we can conclude that both the Croatian and Slovenian companies that 
have credit rating, and therefore less asymmetric information, have more incentives to hedge. 
Additionally, the Croatian companies where managers have more wealth invested are less 
likely to hedge, which could also be said for the Slovenian companies that have more 
investment opportunities.  
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Financial or corporate risks - the risks to a corporation stemming from price fluctuations - are 
pervasive and directly or indirectly influence the value of a company. A combination of greater 
deregulation, international competition, interest rates and foreign exchange rates volatility, 
together with commodity price discontinuities starting in the late 1960s, have heightened 
corporate concerns, which have resulted in the increased importance of financial risk 
management in the decades that followed. However, from the point of view of financial 
theory, for a long time it was believed that corporate risk management is irrelevant to the value 
of a firm. The arguments in favour of irrelevance were based on the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958).  
One of the most important implications of the CAPM is that diversified shareholders 
should care only about the systematic component of total risk, which leads to the conclusion 
that managers of firms who are acting in the best interests of shareholders should be 
indifferent about hedging of risks that are unsystematic. Business risk management is 
unnecessary from the perspective of the CAPM, and if the design and execution of such 
hedging strategies are costly, it would seem that these activities would not be in the interests of 
diversified shareholders (Shapiro and Titman, 1998). 
Miller and Modigliani's "M&M" proposition supports CAPM findings with the argument 
that, in the "frictionless" M&M framework, management cannot increase a firm's value by 
changing either capital structure or hedging policy. These are purely financial transactions 
WKDW GR QRW DIIHFW WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V RSHrating assets. The conditions underlying the 
M&M propositions also imply that decisions to hedge corporate exposures to interest rates, 
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exchange rates and commodity prices are completely irrelevant because stockholders already 
protect themselves against such risks by holding well-diversified portfolios.  
However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging activities that 
are directed to the reduction of unsystematic risk. In the real world, financial managers and 
treasurers give a great deal of thought to matters of capital structure and securities design. 
Additionally, the corporate use of derivatives in hedging interest rate, currency, and 
commodity price risks is widespread and growing. As an explanation for this clash between 
theory and practice, imperfections in the capital market are used to argue for the relevance of 
corporate risk management function. It is well known that the M&M propositions were 
intended to hold only under a restrictive set of conditions, the most important of which are 
that there are no costs associated with bankruptcy or financial distress, no taxes or 
transactions costs, that corporate investment decisions are not influenced by financing 
choices, including decisions to hedge various price risks, that reliable information about the 
firm's future earnings prospects is costlessly available to all investors and managers alike, and 
that individuals and firms have equal access to all security markets, including the ability to 
issue identical securities on the same terms (Culp, 1994). 
It has been only in the last two decades that both scholars and practitioners have realised 
that managing corporate risk lies at the heart of a competitive corporate strategy, and that the 
management of corporate risk is central to organisational evolution. Based on seminal work 
by Mayers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate demand for insurance, researchers 
such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Shapiro and Titman (1998) have examined 
why large, diversified firms actively engage in hedging activities. These authors argued that 
the earlier theories are applicable to individuals and small, closely held firms but could not be 
used as a solid theoretical rationale for hedging by large corporations. Several theories of 
hedging have been demonstrated which overcome the irrelevancy arguments of modern 
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portfolio and corporate finance theory. Most of these theories rely on the introduction of some 
frictions into the M&M model and argue that market imperfections enable firms to add value 
through hedges that cannot be exactly duplicated by individual investors.  
The results of the literature review presented in this thesis suggest that the use of 
derivatives and risk management practices are broadly consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical literature, which is based upon value-maximising behaviour (among others see: 
Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; MacMinn, 1987; Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; 
MacMinn and Han, 1990; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990; Bessembinder's, 1991; Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1992; Dobson and Soenen, 1993; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; May, 1995; 
Mian, 1996; Stulz, 1996; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 1997; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Lamont, 1997; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Minton and Schrand, 1999; 
Graham and Smith, 1999; Haushalter 2000; Mello and Parsons, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Haushalter, Randall and Lie, 2002). By hedging financial risks such as currency, 
interest rate and commodity risk, firms can decrease cash flow volatility, which leads to a 
ORZHUYDULDQFHRI WKHILUP¶VYDOXH7KLVPHDQV WKDWQRWRQO\ WKHILUPYDOXHPRYHV OHVVEXW
that the probability of occurring low values is smaller than without hedging.  
However, it needs to be emphasised that, in spite of the extensive body of literature on 
corporate risk management and the efforts that have been devoted in developing theoretical 
rationales for hedging, it seems fair to say that there is not yet a single accepted framework 
which can be used to guide hedging strategies, or a widely accepted explanation for risk 
management as a corporate policy. There is no consensus as to what theory is the most 
important in explaining corporate risk management. Rather than presenting additional 
evidence on the existence of financial market imperfections, this dissertation has aimed to 
produce new empirical evidence on hedging rationales by exploring the risk management 
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activity in Croatian and Slovenian companies, which should support the implications of the 
theory it develops.  
Corporate risk management is a propulsive field that has made a significant progress, but 
it still has much room for further contributions. In this thesis the rationales of corporate risk 
management, the implementation of different risk management strategies and the use of risk 
management instruments in the Croatian and Slovenian companies have been investigated. 
We have tested hypotheses explaining corporate hedging rationales and offered empirical 
evidence on the relative importance of these corporate motives. Based on the arguments that 
arise from the literature review presented in chapter 2, we have proposed several hypotheses. 
First, we have argued that hedging can increase the value of the firm by reducing the costs 
associated with the financial distress, agency costs of debt, expected taxes or capital market 
imperfections. These premises are known as the shareholder maximisation hypothesis and 
were explored in the following research assumptions.   
The first assumption argues that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can 
decrease the costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1985; 
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998). In the MM world, financial distress is 
assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the probability of financial distress does not affect a 
ILUP¶VYDOXH,IILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVLVFRVWO\ILUPVKDYHLQFHQWLYHVWRUHGXFHLWVSUREDELOLW\DQG
hedging is one method by which a firm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing 
WKHYDULDQFHRID ILUP¶VFDVKIORZVRUDFFRXQWLQJSURILWVKHGJLQJGHFUHDVHVWKHSUREDELOLW\
and thus the expected costs, of financial distress. Additionally, Smith and Stulz (1985) have 
argued that, while the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm value, it augments 
VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH HYHQ IXUWKHU E\ VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ UDLVLQJ WKH ILUP¶V SRWHQWLDO WR FDUU\ GHEW
Corporate risk management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a higher 
optimal debt ratio and the tax shields of the additional debt capital further increase the value 
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of the firm. This theory has been empirically proven by, among others, Campbell and Kracaw 
(1987), Bessembinder (1991), Dolde (1995), Mian (1996) and Haushalter (2000). The 
argument of reducing the costs of financial distress implies that the benefits of hedging should 
EHJUHDWHUWKHODUJHUWKHIUDFWLRQRIIL[HGFODLPVLQWKHILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHTherefore, we 
have predicted a positive UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V GHEW FDSLWDO DQG WKH
decision to hedge.  
The second assumption suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can 
decrease the agency costs (see: Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Dobson and 
Soenen (1993) there are three sound reasons based on agency costs why management should 
hedge corporate risk. First, hedging reduces uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow stream 
thereby lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency cost is borne by management, 
assuming informational asymmetry between management and bondholders, hedging will 
increase the value of the firm. Therefore, management will rationally choose to hedge. 
Second, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing through risk hedging will 
tend to reduce the risk-shifting as well as the underinvestment problems (see: Jensen and 
Smith, 1985). Finally, hedging reduces the probability of financial distress and thereby 
increases the duration of contractual relations between shareholders. By fostering the 
acquisition of corporate reputation, hedging contributes directly to the amelioration of the 
moral-hazard agency problem. The results of MacMinn (1987), MacMinn and Han (1990), 
Bessembinder (1991), Minton and Schrand (1999) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) 
support this hedging rationale. Hence, we have predicted that the benefits of hedging 
VKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKHKLJKHUWKHILUP¶VOHYHUDJHDQGDV\PPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQSUREOHP 
The third assumption argues that reducing cash flow volatility with hedging can improve 
the probability of having sufficient internal funds for planned investments eliminating the 
need either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external 
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funding. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing (debt and/or equity) is 
costly, firms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a 
shortfall in their funds, which could precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets. An 
interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is that firms which have substantial 
growth opportunities and face high costs when raising funds under financial distress will have 
an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the average firm. This rationale has been 
explored by numerous scholars, among others by Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), 
Lessard (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1998), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), 
Graham and Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand (1999), Haushalter (2000), Mello and 
Parsons (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002). In our 
research, we have predicted that the higher values for factors related to the capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing are associated with a greater likelihood that the 
firm will engage in hedging activities.  
The last assumption, which focuses on risk management as a means to maximise 
shareholder value, suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease 
expected taxes. This rationale is put forward by Smith and Stulz (1985), who have argued that 
the structure of the tax code can make it beneficial for firms to take positions in futures, 
forward, or option markets. If a firm faces a convex tax function, then the after-tax value of the 
firm is a concave function of its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax 
firm values, then the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the 
firm is increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the effective 
long-run average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported earnings will 
enhance shareholder value. The more convex the effective tax schedule is, the greater the 
reduction in expected taxes. This rationale has been supported by Zimmerman (1988), Froot, 
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Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996) and Graham 
and Smith (1996). Therefore, in our thesis we have suggested that the benefits of hedging 
VKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKHKLJKHUWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWWKHILUP¶VSUH-tax income is in the progressive 
UHJLRQ RI WKH WD[ VFKHGXOH DQG WKH JUHDWHU WKH YDOXH RI WKH ILUP¶V WD[ ORVV FDUry-forwards, 
investment tax credits and other provisions of the tax code. 
The next group of research assumptions, which presents the other line of reasoning 
differing from the shareholders value maximisation hypothesis, refers to the managerial utility 
maxLPLVDWLRQ K\SRWKHVLV :H KDYH DUJXHG WKDW EHFDXVH D ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV KDYH OLPLWHG
ability to diversify their own personal wealth position associated with stock holdings and the 
capitalisation of their career earnings, they have strong incentives to hedge. Usually that kind 
RIKHGJLQJLVQRWFRQGXFWHGWRLPSURYHWKHYDOXHRIFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNKROGHUVEXWWRLPSURYH
PDQDJHUV¶RZQZHDOWK7RDYRLGWKLVSUREOHPPDQDJHULDOFRPSHQVDWLRQFRQWUDFWVQHHGWREH
designed so that when managers increase the value of the firm, they also increase their 
expected utility. This can usually be achieved by adding option-like provisions to managerial 
contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been further explored 
by Smith and Stulz (1985). The results of some empirical studies have confirmed this 
hypothesis (e.g., see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate hedging is 
affected by managerial shareholdings. We have made a proposition that managers with greater 
stock ownership would prefer more risk management, while those with greater option 
holdings would prefer less risk management.  
A different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric information, has been 
presented by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who have 
IRFXVHGRQPDQDJHUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQV ,QERWKRI WKHVHPRGHOV LW LV DUJXHG WKDWPDQDJHUVPD\
prefer to engage in risk management activities in order to better communicate their skills to 
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the labour market. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have 
argued that younger executives and those with shorter tenures have less developed reputation 
than older and longer-tenure managers. Therefore, they are more willing to embrace new 
concepts like risk management with the intention of signalling their management quality. In 
order to test this hypothesis, in our thesis we have argued that firms with younger managers 
and those whose managers have shorter tenures would be more inclined to manage risk. 
We have also tested the hypothesis regarding the alternative financial policies, usually 
UHIHUUHG WRDV³KHGJHVXEVWLWXWHV´ZKLFK FDQDOVR UHGXFHD ILUP¶VULVNZLWKRXW UHTXLULQJ WKH
firm to directly engage in risk management activities. Firms could adopt conservative 
financial policies (e.g. low leverage, low dividend pay-out ratio, large cash balances) to 
protect them against potential hardship (see: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Pulvino, 1998; Harford, 1999). Structured debt as 
ZHOODVSUHIHUUHGVWRFNFDQEHVHHQDVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHRI³KHGJHVXEVWLWXWHV´VHH6PLWKDQG
Stulz, 1985; Smithson and Chew, 1992; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Culp, 1994). In 
our thesis it has been argued that the likelihood of the firm employing risk management 
instruments is lower the more convertible debt the firm issues, the more preferred stock the 
ILUPLVVXHVWKHPRUHOLTXLGWKHILUP¶VDVVHWVDUHDQGWKHORZHUWKH ILUP¶VGLYLGHQGSD\RXWLV 
The last group of assumptions regards risk management practices in Croatia in 
comparison with risk management practices in Slovenia. In order to test the hypothesis that 
financial risk management is more developed or has different rationales among Slovenian 
than among Croatian companies, we have argued that Slovenian companies have more 
advanced risk management practices measured by the total number of companies that use 
derivative instruments to manage their risk exposures.  
Additionally, we have discussed that Slovenian companies have more advanced risk 
management practices than Croatian companies, measured by the implementation of more 
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sophisticated risk management strategies. To distinguish the less and more sophisticated risk 
management strategies, we took the use of different derivatives instruments as an example of 
more advanced risk management strategies with an emphasis on structured derivatives use, 
while instruments like natural hedge or international and business diversification we have 
classified as a less sophisticated risk management strategies.  
Research was conducted on the biggest non-financial companies and the criteria for 
selecting companies in the sample were similar for both countries. The Croatian companies 
needed to meet two out of three conditions required by the Croatian Accounting Law18 that 
relate to large companies, while the Slovenian companies were included in the sample if they 
met two out of three conditions required by the Slovenian Company Law19 related also to 
large companies. We have used a list of the biggest 400 Croatian companies in the year 2005 
published by The Croatian Business Herald and included 157 companies in the sample that 
have met the required criteria. In the case of the Slovenian companies, we used GVIN and 
AJPES20 electronic databases and, on the basis of selected criteria, we chose 189 companies 
for further analysis. The primary advantage of these samples is that the evidence can be 
generalised to a broad class of firms in different industries. Research was conducted on the 
large non-financial companies because these companies have access to derivatives markets 
and should have a developed risk management function. Financial firms were excluded from 
the sample because most of them are also market makers, hence their motivation in using 
derivatives may be different from the motivations of non-financial firms.  
Data were collected from two sources: from annual reports and notes to the financial 
statements for the fiscal year 2005, and through our survey. A survey questionnaire was 
DGGUHVVHGWRWKHILUP¶VFKLHIILQDQFLDORIILFHURULIWKHUHZDVQRVXFKSRVLWLRQWRWKHILQDQFLDO
controller or the treasurer. The questionnaire covered three broad areas; foreign exchange rate 
                                                 
18
 ,Q&URDWLDQ=DNRQRUDþXQRYRGVWYX1DURGQHQRYLQH 
19
 ,Q6ORYHQH=DNRQRJRVSRGDUVNLKGUXåEDK8UDGQLOLVW 
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risk management, interest rate risk management and commodity price risk management. 
Additionally, a part of the questionnaire referred to those companies that classified themselves 
as non-hedgers in order to search for reasons not to manage financial risks. The questionnaire 
was mailed at the beginning of September 2006 to the Croatian and Slovenian managers 
involved in the financial risk management decision. In order to encourage willingness to 
participate, the respondents were promised a copy of the summarised results. A follow-up letter 
was also sent to non-responding Croatian companies at the end of September 2006, which 
encouraged a response rate from 12 per cent to 31 per cent, while 41 Slovenian companies 
answered the questionnaire without any additional contact with the potential respondents, 
creating a response rate of 22 per cent.  
We have started the analysis of our results with a detailed description of risk 
management practices in analysed countries. We have explored how many companies manage 
financial risks, what kind of risk management instruments they use and which corporate risk 
management strategies are employed in the analysed Croatian and Slovenian companies. 
Additionally, we have explored different types of derivatives instrument employed by the 
analysed companies, as well as the intensity of their use, to show what the most important 
financial contracts in interest-rate, foreign-exchange and commodity price risk management 
are. Managers were also questioned about the scope of the risk management policyWKHILUP¶V
hedging horizon, corporate risk management goals and the use of VaR or Monte Carlo 
DQDO\VLVRUVRPHRWKHUW\SHRIVLPXODWLRQWHFKQLTXHVDVPHDVXUHVRIWKHILUP¶VULVNH[SRVXUH
Additionally, we explored which financial institutions and intermediaries are the most 
important in providing risk management instruments and what are the reasons why Croatian 
and Slovenian companies do not manage corporate risks or use derivative instruments.  
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 See the section 3.5. for detailed explanation of GVIN and AJPES databases.  
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The survey results have revealed that the majority of analysed companies in both countries 
manage financial risks - 78 per cent of Slovenian respondents and 73.5 per cent of Croatian 
respondents claim that they use some form of financial engineering to manage interest-rate, 
foreign exchange, or commodity price risk. Regarding the use of derivatives as a risk 
management instrument, 65.9 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies use derivatives as 
risk management instruments, while in Croatia only 43 per cent of respondents declare 
themselves as derivative users. It could be concluded that the Slovenian companies use 
derivatives more frequently than their counterparts in Croatia. Therefore, our research 
hypothesis, which argues that the Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management 
practices than Croatian companies, measured by the total number of companies that use 
derivative instruments to manage their risk exposures, is accepted.  
Regarding the influence of financial risks on the performance of the analysed companies, 
the results have shown that the price risk has the highest influence among the Slovenian as 
well as among the Croatian companies. We believe that these findings could be explained by 
the fact that Slovenia and Croatia are small and open economies, which results in a high 
dependence on international trade. On the highly competitive international market, prices of 
goods are volatile, therefore companies that compete on that market need to be prepared for 
these conditions and manage their risky positions.  
The survey has revealed that the Croatian companies are more affected by the currency 
risk than Slovenian companies. This could be explained by the fact that the exposure of 
Slovenian companies to foreign-exchange risk was not so high in 2006 when our survey was 
carried out, and it is expected to be further decreased in 2007, due to the introduction of the 
(XURDVDQRIILFLDOFXUUHQF\6ORYHQLD¶VPDMRUWUDGHSDUWQHUVDUH*HUPDQ\,WDO\)UDQFHDQG
Austria, so the majority of transactions are now denominated in one currency since Slovenia 
entered the Euro Zone. This contributes to the lowering of risk in business transactions as 
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companies no longer have to worry about their currency risk exposures, which should 
additionally enhance trade between Slovenia and its partners. Univariate analysis has 
confirmed the results of descriptive statistics and has revealed a statistically significant 
difference between the analysed companies regarding the intensity of influence of currency as 
ZHOODVSULFHULVNRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSHUIRUPDQFH± the Croatian companies are more affected 
by the currency risk, while the Slovenian companies are more affected by the price risk.  
Finally, the interest rate risk has been ranged as less important in comparison with 
commodity price and currency risks. The explanation for this result could be found in the fact 
that Slovenian and Croatian companies do not use debt capital heavily. The average long-term 
debt-to-assets ratio in both countries is below 30 per cent ± the level of company indebtedness 
taken as the threshold to distinguish highly levered companies (Graham and Campbell, 2001). 
However, the results of t-test have revealed that debt-to-assets ratio, long-term debt-to-assets 
ratio and long-term debt-to-equity ratio as proxies for financial leverage and financial distress 
costs are significantly higher in the case of Croatia, which leads us to the conclusion that 
Croatian companies use more debt capital in comparison with Slovenian companies. 
([SODQDWLRQIRUWKLVUHVXOWFDQEHIRXQGLQHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGE\0LORã2004) on 
the long-term financing methods in the large Croatian companies. The survey has revealed 
that even 80 per cent of the analysed Croatian companies collect long-term capital by using 
bank loans, while 47 per cent of them are highly dependent on bank loans as the most 
important instrument of corporate financing.  
The survey results have clearly indicated that the Croatian and Slovenian non-financial 
companies manage financial risks primarily with simple risk management instruments such as 
natural hedging. In the case of derivatives use, forwards and swaps are by far the most 
important instruments in both countries, but futures as representatives of standardised 
derivatives and structured derivatives are more important in the Slovenian than in the Croatian 
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companies. Exchange-traded and OTC options together with hybrid securities are not 
important means of financial risk management in either country.  
The results of t-test conducted to explore for statistically significant differences between 
risk management practices in the Slovenian and Croatian companies have shown statistically 
significant evidence that the Slovenian companies use all types of derivatives, especially 
structured derivatives like swaptions, caps, floors, collars or corridors, as instruments for 
managing currency and interest-rate risk more intensively than the Croatian companies. 
Additionally, the Croatian companies use simple risk management instruments like managing 
assets and liabilities to a greater extent in comparison with the Slovenian companies when 
managing price risk. These findings are consistent with our research prediction that Slovenian 
companies have more advanced risk management practices than Croatian companies, 
measured by the implementation of more sophisticated risk management strategies. Therefore, 
in respect of the use of structured derivative instruments, our research hypothesis is accepted.  
Regarding the scope of the corporate risk management policy, the majority of the analysed 
Slovenian and Croatian companies claim that they use selective hedging. The hedging horizon 
for financial risk management in Slovenian and Croatian companies is typically less than one 
year. Commercial banks are by far the primary source for derivatives transactions and very 
few analysed firms in both countries use investment banks, insurance companies or 
exchange/brokerage houses as counterparties. The primary goal of hedging is managing the 
volatility of cash flows, but both the Slovenian and Croatian firms focus also on accounting 
earnings volatility and managing balance sheet and financial ratios. This result could be 
explained by the strong link between the Slovenian as well as the Croatian financial 
accounting and tax accounting. As a result of those institutional features, we believe that there 
is a strong focus in both countries on accounting earnings in all business decisions and 
consequently also in hedging decisions. However, the results of t-test has revealed that the 
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Croatian companies differ from their Slovenian counterparts in evaluation of balance sheet 
and financial ratios management as an important risk management goal, so it could be 
concluded that in the case of Croatia the focus on accounting earnings is even stronger. 
Amongst the most important reasons why companies do not use derivatives, the Slovenian 
financial managers have addressed two problems, which they share with their Croatian 
counterparts as the most important reasons why their companies do not hedge ± difficulties in 
pricing and valuing derivatives together with the high costs of establishing and maintaining 
risk management programs that exceed the benefits of it. The explanation of this problem is 
that there are substantial economies of scale or economically significant costs related to 
hedging. (e.g. costs related to executing the transactions, hiring personnel with the required 
skills, acquiring relevant information and monitoring the hedge positions, etc.). Indeed, for 
many firms (particularly smaller firms), the marginal benefits of a hedging program may be 
exceeded by these marginal costs (see: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, 2000; 
Hoyt and Khang, 2000). 
Apart from these problems, the Slovenian managers have numbered two additional 
reasons that have stopped them from hedging. The first is the high cost of financial risk 
management instruments (e.g. see: Mian (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Hushalter (2000)). Transaction costs of hedging include the costs of trading, as well as the 
substantial costs of information systems needed to provide the data necessary to decide on the 
appropriate hedging positions. For forwards, futures, options, and swaps, this cost consists of 
out-of-pocket costs such as brokerage fees in futures markets and the implicit cost of the bid-
ask spread. Then, there are agency costs that such activities bring, which include the costs of 
the internal control systems to run the hedging program. These include the problems 
associated with the opportunities for speculation that participation in derivative and other 
markets allows. Transaction costs have fallen with the growth of the derivatives markets, 
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but Slovenian derivatives market is still small and shallow, so the high cost of risk 
management instruments remains the problem for the substantial number of analysed 
Slovenian companies.  
The second problem that has prevented Slovenian companies from using derivatives is 
insufficient exposure to financial risks. This problem is closely connected to the problems of 
the high costs of establishing and maintaining risk management programs and the high cost of 
risk management instruments discussed above. It has been argued that only firms with 
sufficiently large risk exposures are likely to benefit from a formal hedging program, because 
organising the Treasury for risk management involves significant fixed costs (Dolde, 1995). 
In addition to economies of scale in obtaining information on hedging techniques and 
instruments, there are also economies of scale in transaction costs associated with trading 
financial derivatives. These facts suggest there are sizable set-up costs related to operating a 
corporate risk-management program. It can be concluded that numerous analysed companies 
do not hedge at all, even though they are exposed to financial risks, simply because it is not an 
economically worthwhile activity. 
  The Croatian managers have argued that the insufficient supply of risk management 
instruments traded on domestic financial market or offered by financial institutions is a very 
important reason why they do not hedge. On WKH EDVLV RI WKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ DQVZHUV DQG
informal interviews conducted at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Croatian Association of 
Corporate Treasurers held in September 2006, we have concluded that, in spite of the fact that 
there is an increasing number of Croatian non-financial companies which are aware of the 
importance of corporate risk management, a lack of suitable instruments offered to them by 
the domestic financial industry becomes a leading factor why many companies do not use 
derivatives when managing risks. Other reasons such as concerns about perceptions of 
derivatives use by investors, regulators and the public or insufficient knowledge about 
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financial risk management instruments are not very important reasons why the Slovenian and 
Croatian companies do not hedge.  
After presenting descriptive statistics, we have conducted univariate analysis for the two 
different groups. Firstly, we have explored differences between hedgers and nonhedgers, and 
secondly we have investigated differences between companies that are derivative users and 
those companies that do not use derivatives. In both cases, we have employed the Pearson test 
of correlation as well as t-test to determine if the means of two unrelated samples differ 
regarding the size of the company, financial leverage, growth opportunities, managerial 
shareholdings, taxes, alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging or institutional 
LQYHVWRUV¶RZQHUVKLS 
According to a mean comparison test for Croatian hedgers and nonhedgers, the hedgers 
are statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to variable that proxy for alternative 
financial policy as substitutes for hedging. Hedgers have a statistically greater quick ratio as a 
measure of short-term liquidity. We argued in chapter 2 that, although hedge substitutes are 
not considered as a special kind of risk management strategy, alternative financial policies can 
DOVR UHGXFH D ILUP¶V ULVN ZLWKRXW UHTXLULQJ WKH ILUP WR GLUHFWO\ HQJDJH LQ ULVN PDQDJHPHQW
activities. Firms could adopt conservative financial policies such as maintaining low leverage 
and a low dividend pay-out ratio or carrying large cash balances to protect them against 
potential financial difficulties (a form of negative leverage). Greater use of these substitute 
risk management activities should be associated with less financial risk management 
activities. Therefore, the coefficient on quick ratio is predicted to be negative (see: Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Getzy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Pulvino, 1998 
and Harford, 1999). Contrary to our prediction as well as to the findings of the cited 
studies, our results show a positive relation between the decision to hedge and this 
explanatory variable, suggesting that companies that are more liquid are more likely to 
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hedge. Therefore, our assumption regarding hedging substitutes should be rejected in the 
case of the Croatian companies.  
Additionally, t-test has shown that the Croatian hedgers have a statistically higher share 
owed by foreign investors in comparison with nonhedgers, which is confirmed by the 
Pearson correlation coefficient. Although other scholars have not examined this hypothesis, 
the specific economic situation in Croatia and the high value of foreign direct investment 
in the last five years have prompted us to examine whether foreign ownership of a 
company plays an important role in the decision to hedge risks. The result, which shows 
that the Croatian hedgers have a statistically higher share owed by foreign investors in 
comparison with nonhedgers, leads to the conclusion that investing companies which have 
headquarters in developed countries (major investors in the Croatian business sector are 
companies from Austria, Germany and Italy) have enforced employment of corporate risk 
management in the acquired Croatian companies. 
Other results of univariate tests suggest that hedgers are not statistically different from 
nonhedgers with respect to the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market 
imperfection, tax preference items or managerial utility. Therefore, we should reject all 
research hypotheses regarding shareholder maximisation as well as managerial utility 
maximisation in the case of Croatian companies. Additionally, we should reject our 
hypothesis regarding alternative financial policies that substitute for risk management 
strategies. Our findings predict the opposite sign to what we assumed, suggesting that the 
Croatian companies that are more liquid have more incentives to hedge. However, it needs to 
be mentioned that Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have predicted a positive association 
between liquidity and hedging, which results from the interpretation of liquidity not as a 
substitute for hedging, but as a measure of the availability of internal funds. Therefore, we 
argue that the positive relation between the decision to hedge and quick ratio can be explained 
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by the capital market imperfection and costly external financing hypothesis and not by 
KHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWH¶VUDWLRQDOH 
Regarding the univariate analysis of the Croatian derivative users vs derivative nonusers, 
t-test has discovered that derivative users are statistically different from nonusers with respect 
to variables that are proxies for alternative financial policy as substitutes for hedging as well 
as for capital market imperfection and costly external financing. Derivative users have a 
statistically greater quick ratio and a greater ratio of investment expenditures to the book 
value of assets. This finding suggests that these two groups differ with respect to proxies for 
short-term liquidity and investment (growth) opportunities. Similarly to the analysis of 
hedgers and nonhedgers, our results suggest that the Croatian companies that are more 
liquid use derivatives more intensively, which is also confirmed by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. This result is contrary to our predictions and to the findings of Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Pulvino (1998) 
and Harford (1999). Here we also argue that the positive relation between the decision to 
hedge and quick ratio can be explained by the capital market imperfection and costly external 
ILQDQFLQJK\SRWKHVLV DQGQRWE\KHGJLQJ VXEVWLWXWH¶V UDWLRQDOH )URRW6FKDUIVWHLQ DQG6WHLQ
(1993) have predicted a positive association between liquidity and hedging, which results 
from the interpretation of liquidity not as a substitute for hedging, but as a measure of the 
availability of internal funds. 
In respect to the other statistically significant variable, our t-test has shown that 
derivative users have statistically higher value of investment expenditures to the book value 
of assets, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis. This result suggests that there is a 
SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDOXH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V LQYestment and the decision to use 
derivatives, which is consistent with our prediction and the findings of Bessembinder 
(1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and 
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Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). They have proven that the benefits of 
KHGJLQJVKRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVDUHLQ WKHILUP¶VLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\
set, because the reduction of cash flow volatility with hedging can improve the probability of 
having sufficient internal funds for planned investments eliminating the need either to cut 
profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external funding. Other variables 
that have been used to test the capital market imperfection hypothesis have not shown 
statistically significant differences between analysed derivative users and nonusers.  
On the basis of t-tests and correlation analysis, it could be concluded that the Croatian 
derivative users are not statistically different from nonusers with respect to other research 
assumptions regarding the cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, tax preference 
items, or managerial utility. Similarly to the findings for the Croatian hedgers and 
nonhedgers, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the managerial utility 
maximisation hypothesis and shareholder maximisation hypothesis, apart from the capital 
market imperfection and costly external financing assumption.  
Comparison of the Croatian univariate analysis results with the findings of the identical 
analysis conducted for the Slovenian sample has revealed that the tested hedging theories 
have little predictive power regarding the risk management practices in both countries. 
Univariate tests have discovered that the Slovenian hedgers as well as derivative users are 
statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with respect only to the 
coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable that proxy for alternative financial 
policy as substitutes for hedging. A positive relation between the decision to hedge or to use 
derivatives and the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable leads to the 
conclusion that companies that list their shares on the stock-exchange have more incentives to 
hedge and use derivatives as risk management instruments., while privately held companies 
do not act in a risk-averse manner and do not hedge.  
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This is contrary to what we predicted in our assumption connected to the different 
behaviour of publicly traded and privately held stock companies with regard to risk 
management (e.g. see: Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; 
Cummins, Phillips and Smith, 2001). Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) constructed models of corporate hedging, which have predicted 
that firms attempt to reduce the risks they face if they have poorly diversified and risk-averse 
owners. Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) have expected that the owners of closely held 
firms may exhibit a degree of risk aversion, to the extent that the wealth of the shareholders is 
sub-optimally diversified because of their holdings in the company. They have predicted that, 
if closely held firms tend to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company 
dummy variable is predicted to be negative.  
As our univariate test has revealed the coefficient of the publicly traded company dummy 
variable to be positive, our research assumption should be rejected. We believe the 
explanation for this result can be found in the fact that, regardless to the opinion that the 
ownership of publicly traded companies is well diversified, research results have shown that 
even 64.7 per cent of the analysed Slovenian companies are owned by the major shareholder, 
meaning that there is one owner who has PRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIDFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHVDQGKDV
a power to control the business. Therefore, it can be argued that the major shareholder has 
poorly diversified wealth and therefore acts in risk-averse manner. Another explanation for 
the positive coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable could be found in the 
fact that publicly traded companies, which act in a risk-averse manner tend to signal good 
QHZVWRLQYHVWRUVRQWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWDVZHOODVWRDOOFRPSDQ\¶VVWDNHKROGHUVEHFDXVHD 
company that manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky investment or a better rated 
business partner. However, to the best of our knowledge, we cannot support this argument by 
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theoretical or empirical evidence, meaning that this second explanation is based only on our 
opinion.  
Other univariate results have shown that the Slovenian hedgers and derivative users are 
not statistically different from nonhedgers and derivative nonusers with respect to the cost 
of financial distress, agency cost of debt, capital market imperfection, tax preference items or 
managerial utility. Therefore, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the 
shareholder maximisation hypothesis and managerial utility maximisation hypothesis for the 
Slovenian companies.  
We have concluded our analysis by employing the multivariate regression model. 
Binominal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish among the possible explanations 
for the decision to hedge and to use derivative. We have chosen binomial (or binary) logistic 
regression because it is a form of regression which is used when the dependent variable is a 
dichotomy (limited, discrete and not continuous) and the independents are of any type. In the 
ILUVW JURXS RI FRPSDQLHV QDPHG ³KHGJHUV´ ZH LQFOXGHG QRW RQOy companies that use 
derivatives instruments as an instrument of corporate risk management, but also companies 
that use other types of hedging strategies such as debt with embedded options, operational 
hedging, natural hedging, international diversification of business, etc.  
The majority of the earlier empirical studies on risk management such as Nance, Smith 
and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) and Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) have used a dichotomous variable 
that equalled one if a firm used derivatives and zero if it did not. Because of the decision to 
include all financial risk management activities, our dichotomous variable should not be 
subject to the inaccurate categorisation of functionally equivalent financial position. This 
allowed us to disentangle derivatives activity from risk management activity, which is a major 
advantage of our approach.  
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We have expanded our analysis only to companies that use derivatives as risk 
management instruments. As we have already explained, among companies that manage 
financial risks, there is a substantial number of hedgers who do not use derivatives, but 
manage risk exposure with some other instruments like natural hedge, operational hedging 
etc. By separating derivative users from companies that do not use derivatives, our intention 
was to explore whether some specific company characteristics affect the decision to hedge by 
using derivative instruments.  
The variables tested in multivariate analysis were based on the determinants we have 
presented in the literature review as the key rationales of corporate hedging decision. In our 
logistic model we have tested whether the decision to hedge or not, and the decision to hedge 
with derivatives, is a function of the six factors ± the financial distress costs, agency costs, 
capital market imperfections, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes. Because multiple 
proxies were available to measure some firm characteristics, we have estimated separate 
logistic regressions, using all possible combinations of variables representing each predicted 
construct. 
The multivariate regression model for the Croatian companies has revealed that the 
FRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLVUHODWHGWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJinvestment expenditures-
to-assets ratio and share of the company owned by management. Company credit rating is a 
proxy for the agency cost of debt. In our research assumptions we argue that firms that have a 
credit rating hedge less extensively. The severity of agency cost of debt is related to the extent 
of informational asymmetries present in the firm and it is expected that firms with greater 
asymmetric information problems are more likely to have a greater incentive to engage in 
risk-shifting and under-investment activities. Our evidence is inconsistent with the predictions 
derived from the agency cost of debt model, because the relationship between the dependent 
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variable and credit rating in our model is positive, leading to the conclusion that companies 
that have a credit rating hedge more extensively.  
This is contrary to the findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who 
have proven that firms with a credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit 
rating and therefore greater informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management 
activity. An alternative variable that has been used as proxy for the agency cost (the share of 
the company owned by institutional investors) has not been shown as relevant for making the 
decision to hedge. We argue that positive relation between the decision to hedge and 
FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJ FDQ EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH DFWLYLW\ RI FRUSRUDWH ULVN
PDQDJHPHQWKDVDSRVLWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VUDWLQJJUDGHEHFDXVHDFRmpany that 
manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky investment or a better rated business partner. 
However, we cannot support this argument by theoretical or empirical evidence, meaning that 
this explanation is based only on our opinion and that further research should be conducted to 
test this assumption.  
The investment expenditures-to-DVVHWV UDWLR ZKLFK FRQWUROV IRU FRPSDQ\¶V LQYHVWPHQW
(growth) opportunities, is very important in the model because it tests our prediction that 
hedgers are more likely to have larger investment opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) for theoretical arguments, or Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) for empirical evidence). They have argued that reducing cash flow volatility 
with hedging can improve the probability of having sufficient internal funds for planned 
investments eliminating the need either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs 
of obtaining external funding. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing 
(debt and/or equity) is costly, firms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge 
their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their funds, which could precipitate a costly visit to the 
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capital markets. An interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is that firms which 
have substantial growth opportunities and face high costs when raising funds under financial 
distress will have an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the average firm.  
The results of our logistic model support this prediction and show a statistically significant 
positive relation between the decision to hedge and investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. 
However, robustness tests employed by replacing investment expenditures-to-assets ratio with 
other variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing hypothesis have not shown statistically significant results. These findings suggest 
that the association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust. 
Overall, the data, at best, provide a weak support for the prediction of the tested 
hypothesis.  
The third variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction RIWKHILUP¶V
RXWVWDQGLQJ VKDUHV KHOG E\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW :H DUJXH WKDW EHFDXVH D ILUP¶V
managers have limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth position associated with 
the stock holdings and their HDUQLQJV¶ FDSLWDOLVDWLRQ WKH\ KDYH VWURQJ LQFHQWLYHV WR KHGJH
8VXDOO\WKDWNLQGRIKHGJLQJLVQRWFRQGXFWHGWRLPSURYHWKHYDOXHRIFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNKROGHUV
EXW WR LPSURYH PDQDJHUV¶ RZQ ZHDOWK 7R DYRLG WKLV SUREOHP PDQDJHULDO FRPSHQVDWLRQ
contracts need to be designed so that when managers increase the value of the firm, they also 
increase their expected utility. This can usually be achieved by adding option-like provisions 
to managerial contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been 
further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). The results of some empirical studies have 
confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that 
corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings.  
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Our results show a negative relation between the decision to hedge and share of the 
company owned by management, which leads to the conclusion that firms that have a greater 
fraction RIRXWVWDQGLQJVKDUHVKHOGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWKDYHOHVVLQFHQWLYHVWR
hedge. This is contrary to our prediction, and to the evidence of Tufano (1996), who has 
found that ILUPVZKRVHPDQDJHUVKDYHPRUHZHDOWK LQYHVWHG LQ WKHILUP¶VVWRFNVPDQDJH
more corporate risks. Other variables that were employed as proxies for the managerial 
utility hypothesis (YDOXHRIFRPSDQ\VKDUHRZQHGE\PDQDJHPHQWPDQDJHUV¶RZQHUVKLSRI
VWRFN RSWLRQV PDQDJHUV¶ DJH DQG WHQXUH were not statistically significant in the model. 
Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding managerial utility maximisation.  
However, we need to emphasise that the inability to use variables employed in other 
studies (see e.g.: Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; 
Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000) as proxies for the extent to which options are used in 
PDQDJHUV¶ FRPSHQVDWLRQ SODQV21, has prevented us from testing whether managerial option 
holdings in Croatian companies has an impact on the fact that manageUVZKRRZQFRPSDQ\¶V
shares do not act in a risk averse manner and have less incentive to hedge corporate risks. 
Managerial option holdings are not available as public information in the case of Croatian 
companies and managers were not willing to reveal this information in the survey 
questionnaire.  
Therefore, we believe a negative relation between the decision to hedge and share of the 
company owned by management can be explained by the fact that, apart from stock holdings, 
Croatian managers also have option-like provisions. It has been proven (see: Tufano, 1996; 
Gay and Nam, 1998) that managers with greater option holdings would prefer less risk 
management. The theoretical explanation for this is offered by Smith and Stulz (1985) who 
FODLPHG WKDW PDQDJHUV¶ compensation plans can influence their hedging choices. They 
                                                 
21
 Like the total option holdings held by officers and directors or the market value of shares that could be owned 
by managers and directors by exercising their options. 
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argued that the expected utility of managerial wealth has the shape of a convex function of the 
ILUP¶VH[SHFWHGSURILWVZKHQPDQDJHUVRZQXQH[HUFLVHGRSWLRQVTherefore, the more option-
like features there are in the compensation plans, the less managers will hedge.  In this case, 
managers can choose to increase the risk of the firm in order to increase the value of their 
options. Yet, further research among the analysed Croatian companies should be conducted to 
confirm this argument as it is based only on our opinion, not on empirical evidence.  
Overall, it could be concluded that the evidence based on an empirical relation between 
the decision to hedge made by Croatian non-financial companies and financial distress 
costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, 
managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested 
hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly external financing measured by 
investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Regarding this result, we need to emphasise that the 
association between hedging and capital market imperfections is not robust to other 
variables employed as proxies for testing this hypothesis. Moreover, the multivariate 
regression model conducted for the Slovenian hedgers has revealed that there is no 
statistically significant explanatory variable, therefore it could be concluded that the decision 
to hedge in Slovenian companies is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging. 
:KHQ ZH XVHG D FRPSDQ\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR XVH GHULYDWLYH LQVWUXPHQWV DV D GHSHQGHQW
variable, the multivariate analysis conducted for Croatian companies showed that the use of 
derivative instruments is related only to two variables - investment expenditures-to-assets 
ratio and quick ratio. The investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital 
market imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant positive 
relation with the decision to use derivatives. This result is consistent with the results of 
multivariate analysis regarding the decision to hedge corporate risks in Croatian companies, 
where it has been shown that companies with a higher investment-to-assets ratio have more 
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incentives to hedge. Additionally, the result is consistent with the results of univariate analysis 
for the sample of Croatian derivative users/nonusers, where t-test and correlation analysis 
have shown that derivative users have a statistically higher value of this ratio, as well as to 
the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and 
Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001).  
This finding supports our prediction WKDWDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHGJHLVpositively related to 
measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Again, as in the case of sample 
hedgers/nonhedgers, we conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing other 
variables that were used as proxies for capital market imperfections and costly external 
financing hypothesis. The results for alternative regression variables were not statistically 
significant. These findings suggest that the association between derivative use and capital 
market imperfections is not robust.  
,Q UHVSHFW RI WKH VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW TXLFN UDWLR DV D PHDVXUH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V
liquidity and substitute for hedging, consistently with the findings of univariate analysis 
conducted for the samples of Croatian hedgers/nonhedgers and for derivative 
users/nonusers, the multivariate analysis results show a positive relation between the 
decision to use derivatives and the value of quick ratio, suggesting that companies that are 
more liquid have more incentives to use derivatives. As we predicted a negative relation 
for this variable, and our prediction was based on the findings of Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Tufano (1996), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Pulvino (1998) and Harford 
(1999), we should reject the hypothesis regarding hedging substitutes. Other variables that 
ZHUHHPSOR\HGWRWHVWWKHKHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWHV¶K\SRWKHVLVwere not significant in the model. 
However, it needs to be mentioned that Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have predicted a 
positive association between liquidity and hedging, which results from the interpretation of 
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liquidity not as a substitute for hedging, but as a measure of the availability of internal funds. 
Therefore, we argue that the positive relation between the decision to hedge and quick ratio 
can be explained by the capital market imperfection and costly external financing hypothesis 
DQGQRWE\KHGJLQJVXEVWLWXWH¶VUDWLRQDOH 
Regarding the corporate decision to use derivative instruments in the Slovenian 
companies, the regression model has shown that this decision is related to three variables ± 
total sales revenues, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and credit rating. Total sales 
revenues are a proxy for the effect of size on the decision to use derivatives as risk 
management instruments. The regression model has revealed a positive relation between the 
decision to use derivatives and the size of the company, implying that it is more likely for 
larger Slovenian companies to use derivatives. Several previous empirical studies (e.g. 
Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 
1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are more likely 
to hedge. These studies have contended that the positive correlation between the size and 
hedging can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and transaction 
costs of hedging. :HKDYHDOVRSUHGLFWHGDSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVL]HDQG
decision to hedge. The regression results support our hypothesis for the Slovenian companies. It 
should be noted that the DOWHUQDWLYHYDULDEOH WKDWKDVEHHQXVHGDVSUR[\ IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
size (the value of total assets), has not been shown as relevant for making the decision to use 
derivatives. Therefore, our result regarding the FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG WKH GHFLVLRQ WR XVH
derivatives is not robust.  
$ SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VL]H DQG GHFLVLRQ WR XVH GHULYDWLYHV can be 
related to the most important reasons why Slovenian companies do not use derivatives, which 
were discussed earlier in this chapter. Slovenian financial managers have addressed the high 
costs of establishing and maintaining risk management programs that exceed the benefits of it 
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together with the high cost of financial risk management instruments as very important 
reasons that have prevented them from using derivatives. In addition to economies of scale in 
obtaining information on hedging techniques and instruments, there are also economies of 
scale in transaction costs associated with trading financial derivatives. These facts suggest 
there are sizable set-up costs related to operating a corporate risk-management program. A 
substantial number of the analysed Slovenian companies do not use derivatives, even though 
they are exposed to financial risks, simply because it is not an economically worthwhile 
activity. It can be concluded that these companies are not large enough as it is proven that the 
FRPSDQ\¶VVL]HLVUHOHYDQWIDFWRULQWKHGHFLVLRQWRXVHGHULYDWLYHinstruments.  
Another variable that is significant for the decision of the Slovenian companies to use 
GHULYDWLYHV LV D FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJ DV D SUR[\ IRU WKH DJHQF\ FRVW RI GHEW The 
relationship between the dependent variable and FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW UDWLng in our model is 
positive, leading to the conclusion that companies that have credit rating use derivative 
instruments more extensively. This evidence is inconsistent with our prediction and with the 
findings of DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) and Haushalter (2000), who have proven that firms 
with credit rating hedge less extensively, while firms without credit rating and therefore 
greater informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity. Therefore, 
we should reject our hypothesis related to the agency cost of debt and asymmetric information 
problems for the Slovenian companies.  
It should be emphasised that we have proven the identical result when we analysed the 
decision of Croatian companies to hedge or not to hedge, where we also found a positive 
relation with the credit rating variable. We argue that a positive relation between the decision 
WR KHGJH DQG FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW UDWLQJ FDQ EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH DFWLYLW\ RI
corporate risk management has a positive influence on the compDQ\¶VUDWLQJJUDGHEHFDXVHD
company that manages its risk exposures is seen as a less risky investment or a better rated 
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business partner. However, we cannot support this argument by theoretical or empirical 
evidence, meaning that this explanation is based only on our opinion. Further research should 
be conducted to explore this thesis.  
Finally, investment expenditures-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for capital market 
imperfections and costly external financing, has a statistically significant negative relation 
with the decision to use derivatives. The results of the logistic model do not support our 
prediction WKDW D ILUP¶V GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH E\ XVLQJ GHULYDWLYHV LV positively related to 
measures for investment (growth) opportunities. Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with 
our findings regarding the Croatian companies, as well as with the findings of Bessembinder 
(1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), who 
KDYH DOVR SURYHQ D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH GHFLVLRQ WR KHGJH DQG D FRPSDQ\¶V
investment (growth) opportunities.  
The negative relation found in the case of the Slovenian companies suggest that companies 
which have less investment (growth) opportunities have more incentives to hedge with derivative 
instruments. Again, we conducted a robustness test in order to further investigate this result 
and found no statistically significant variables in the employed separate logistic regressions. 
These findings suggest that the capital market imperfection hypothesis, which imply that the 
EHQHILWVRIKHGJLQJVKRXOGEHJUHDWHU WKHPRUHJURZWKRSWLRQVDUH LQ WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW
opportunity set, should be rejected in the case of the Slovenian companies. This is an 
interesting result if we compare it with the findings of the Croatian sample, where we have 
proven a positive relation between both the decision to hedge and use derivatives and the 
FRPSDQ\¶Vinvestment (growth) opportunities. Further research should be carried out to explore 
why Slovenian companies that invest less in the growth opportunities have more incentives to use 
derivative instruments, when there is both theoretical and empirical evidence that firms with 
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investment projects requiring funding hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their 
funds. 
Overall, on the basis of the research results it could be concluded that the explored hedging 
rationales have little predictive power in explaining financial risk management decisions both 
in Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence based on univariate and multivariate 
empirical relations between the decision to hedge or use derivatives in Croatian non-
financial companies and financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections 
and costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide 
any support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly 
external financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio.  
The univariate analysis and multivariate regression conducted for the Slovenian 
companies have revealed that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the 
decision to hedge; therefore we can conclude it is not dependent on any of the predicted 
theories of hedging. The decision to use derivatives, however, has been shown as dependent 
on the size of the company. The multivariate test has proven a positive relation between the 
use of derivatives and the size of Slovenian companies, which supports the informational and 
transactional scale economies argument that larger firms will be more likely to use 
derivatives.  
The analysis conducted to explore differences between risk management practices in 
Slovenian and Croatian companies has shown statistically significant evidence that Slovenian 
companies use all types of derivatives, especially structured derivatives, more intensively than 
Croatian companies. Additionally, Croatian companies use simple risk management 
instruments like natural hedging to a greater extent in comparison with Slovenian companies. 
These findings are consistent with our research prediction that Slovenian companies have 
more advanced risk management practices than Croatian companies.  
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Moreover, our analysis has revealed statistically significant relations between the decision 
to hedge or use derivatives and different hedging theories, but these relations are contrary to 
the predicted sign. Univariate tests conducted for the hedging subsWLWXWHV¶ K\SRWKHVLV KDYH
shown that the Croatian hedgers and derivative users have a statistically greater quick ratio, 
which is confirmed by the multivariate analysis. Therefore, not only have we rejected the 
assumption that less liquid companies have more incentives to hedge, but we have proven that 
companies that are more liquid are more likely to hedge.  
The positive relation between the decision of Slovenian companies to hedge or use 
derivatives and the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy variable leads to 
conclusion that companies which list their shares on the stock-exchange have more incentives 
to hedge and use derivatives as risk management instruments. We have predicted that, if 
closely held firms tend to be risk-averse, the coefficient of the publicly held company dummy 
variable is negative. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the different behaviour of publicly 
traded and privately held stock companies with regard to risk management is proven to be 
relevant, but it is rejected because the relation is reversed ± publicly traded companies are 
more risk-averse in comparison with those that are privately held.  
Other hypotheses where the opposite sign has been proven are managerial utility 
maximisation in the case of the Croatian companies and costly external financing in the case 
of the Slovenian companies, together with the agency cost of debt hypothesis in both 
countries. The multivariate regression model conducted for the Croatian companies has 
revealed that the corporate decision to hedgH LV SRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FUHGLW
rating and negatively related to the share of the company owned by management, while the 
regression model employed for the Slovenian companies has shown that the decision to use 
derivatives is positively related to a credit rating and negatively related to investment 
expenditures-to-assets ratio. Therefore, we can conclude that both the Croatian and Slovenian 
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companies that have a credit rating, and therefore less asymmetric information, have more 
incentives to hedge. Additionally, the Croatian companies where managers have more wealth 
invested in company stocks are less likely to hedge, which can also be said for the Slovenian 
companies that have more investment opportunities.  
Our thesis contributes to the existing theory as it indicates the weak predictive power of 
well-known and accepted hedging theories on corporate risk management behaviour in the 
Croatian and Slovenian companies. Our research has confirmed that, in spite of the extensive 
body of literature on corporate risk management and the efforts that have been devoted to 
developing theoretical rationales for hedging, there is no single accepted framework which 
can be used to guide hedging strategies, and no widely accepted explanations for risk 
management as a corporate policy. The majority of existing studies, from which this 
conclusion has been drawn, were conducted on American or Western European companies. 
The contribution of our thesis is in bringing new empirical evidence on hedging rationales and 
practices of corporate risk management in South-eastern European countries, which confirms 
such a conclusion.  
Directions for further research stem from the research findings as well as from missed 
opportunities that indicate avenues for future research. It would be worthwhile to conduct a 
more comprehensive and detailed analysis of reasons why our research has revealed several 
statistically significant relations between the decision to hedge or use derivatives and different 
hedging theories, but these relations were contrary to the predicted sign. Further research 
should find answers to the following questions: 
 Why the Slovenian companies which list their shares on the stock-exchange have 
more incentives to hedge and use derivatives as risk management instruments 
 Why the Slovenian companies which have less investment opportunities have more 
incentives to use derivatives as risk management instruments 
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 Why the Croatian companies whose managers have more wealth invested in the 
company stocks hedge less 
 Why the Croatian companies which are more liquid have more incentives to hedge and 
use derivatives as risk management instruments 
 Why the Croatian and Slovenian companies which have credit rating and therefore 
less asymmetric information, have more incentives to hedge. 
The advantage of our work is that it provides an impetus for further research to address 
these issues and move beyond the existing hedging theories, which have proven inadequate in 
explaining risk management decisions in the Croatian and Slovenian companies. We believe 
that this cannot be accomplished by using the same research methods as we have used in our 
thesis. Qualitative methods such as the in-depth explanatory case study type of research need 
to be employed because they enable scholars to expand existing theories or test new ones, and 
to produce results that can be generalised. As discussed by Spicer (1992), the objective of 
case study research is not to draw inferences to a larger population based on sample evidence, 
but rather to generalise back to the theory.  
Further research should explore why the analysed Croatian and Slovenian companies act 
in the opposite way to what was predicted by existing hedging theories. By using explanatory 
case study research, new theories which provide a convincing explanation of hedging 
behaviour should be retained and used in other case studies, while theories that do not offer an 
explanation should be modified or rejected. This kind of approach provides scholars with a 
deeper understanding of the research problem and offers possible solutions. We believe that 
the in-depth explanatory case study type of research would enable a more comprehensive 
analysis of corporate risk management rationales in the Croatian and Slovenian companies 
and consequently find answers to the questions this thesis has left open.  
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APPENDICES 
1. LETTER TO FINANCIAL MANAGERS 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
I would like to ask for your participation in a research project conducted by a doctoral student MSc 
'DQLMHOD0LORãRQFRUSRUDWHULVNPDQDJHPHQWLQ6ORYHQLDQDQG&URDWLDQFRPSDQLHV06F'DQLMHOD0LORãLV
a research assistant at the Faculty of Economics University of Zagreb in Croatia. Moreover, she is a 
doctoral student at the University of Greenwich Business School, London, UK, under tutorship of professor 
äHOMNRâHYLüDQG WKLV UHVHDUFKSURMHFW LVDSDUWRIKHUGLVVHUWDWLRQ06F'DQLMHOD0LORãKDVDVWDWXVRID
visiting research assistant at the Faculty of Economics Ljubljana, where I am appointed her supervisor as I 
am a fellow professor at the University of Greenwich Business School, London.  
 
Her research aims to explore existing practice of Slovenian and Croatian companies connected with 
different activities and instruments that companies use when managing corporate risks. In this way, the 
development of corporate risk management practices has been monitored and compared to the world trends. 
Only the biggest and most successful Slovenian and Croatian companies are included in this research. On 
WKHEDVLVRIWKHUHVHDUFKUHVXOWV0V0LORãLVSODQQLQJWRGHYHORSDPRGHOWKDWZLOOVKRZZKLFKFRUSRUDWH
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQIOXHQFHFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRPDQDJHFRUSRUDWHULVNV 
 
As you know, in modern and dynamic economic surrounding, corporate risk management has become a 
YHU\LPSRUWDQWDFWLYLW\DQGSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQLPSURYLQJFRPSDQ\¶VVXFFHVVDQGFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
With these new trends, a need to quantify and pursue this corporate function has emerged. We believe that 
you are aware of this fact as well as we are, so we should both share the same interest. Hence, we need your 
cooperation in collecting relevant data to realise this idea. Therefore, we will be very grateful if you could 
spend a few minutes of your time and fill out a questionnaire that is enclosed with this letter.  
 
As a sign of our gratitude, after we analyse collected data, we will send you the Report on corporate risk 
management practices. We believe that the Report will be very useful to you as you will be able to compare 
risk management practice of your own company to the practice of other companies in the sample, as well as 
WRHYDOXDWHIHDVLELOLW\RIWKLVFRUSRUDWHIXQFWLRQDQGLWVFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVXFFHVV 
 
It is very important to emphasise that collected data will be analysed and reported only in an aggregate 
form, which means that your company specific data ZLOOEHDWWDLQDEOHRQO\WR0V0LORãDQGWKDWLWZLOOQRW
be published nor publicly available.  
 
If you are interested for this cooperation, we would like to ask you to fill out the questionnaire by the 20th 
of September 2006, and to send it back to the Faculty of Economics Ljubljana using addressed envelope 
that is enclosed in the letter.  
 
We hope that you will find this cooperation interesting and we are looking forward to hearing from you. 
 
Sincerely 
 
0HWND7HNDYþLþ PhD       
Vice-Dean for Finance and Administration 
 
 
 
If you do not want to use the addressed envelope, please send a questionnaire to the following address:  
'DQLMHOD0LORã(NRQRPVNLIDNXOWHW=DJUHE 
Trg J. F. Kennedya 6, 10 000 Zagreb 
Croatia 
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2. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
1. What is the intensity of influence (on the scale from 1 to 5) of the following types of financial risks on the performance of your 
company? 
        Low intensity/effect      High intensity/effect         
   1       2      3     4      5     
a) Currency risk 
b) Interest rate risk 
c) Price risk 
 
2. Does your company manage financial risks? (NOTE: it is possible to mark several answers)  
 
a) Yes, we manage all kinds of financial risk (currency, interest-rate and price risk)  
b) Yes, but we manage only interest-rate risk.  
c) Yes, but we manage only currency risk.  
d) Yes, but we manage only price risk.  
e) No, we do not manage financial risks at al.  
 
NOTE: If your company manages financial risks, please answer to all questions, except the question number 13. If your company 
does not manage financial risks, please go directly to the question number 13.  
 
3. Which of the following instruments are used in your company as a currency risk management tool?  
NOTE: it is possible to mark more than one instrument. If some of instruments numbered bellow is used in your company, please 
mark it with X and give a grade to it regarding its importance in risk management strategy. For instruments you are not using, do not 
mark it at al.  
  
Instrument In use Importance 1-3 (1 less important, 
2 important, 3 very important) 
20. Natural hedge or netting   
21. Matching currency structure of assets and liabilities (e.g. debt in 
foreign currency) 
  
22. Currency forward   
23. Currency futures   
24. Currency swap   
25. Stock-Exchange Currency option    
26. OTC (over-the-counter) currency option   
27. Structured derivatives (e.g. currency swaption)   
28. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds or preferred stocks)   
29. Operational hedging (International diversification ± moving part of 
the business abroad)  
  
30. Something else? Please name what! 
 
  
 
4. Which of the following instruments are used in your company as an interest-rate risk management tool?  
NOTE: it is possible to mark more than one instrument. If some of instruments numbered bellow is used in your company, please 
mark it with X and give a grade to it regarding its importance in risk management strategy. For instruments you are not using, do not 
mark it at al.  
 
Instrument In use Importance 1-3 (1 less important, 
2 important, 3 very important) 
1. Matching maturity of assets and liabilities   
2. Interest rate forward   
3. Interest rate futures   
4. Interest rate swap   
5. Stock-Exchange interest rate option   
6. OTC (over-the-counter) interest rate 
    option 
  
7. Structured derivatives (e.g. cap, floor, collar, corridor or swaption)   
8. Hybrid securities (e.g. convertible bonds or preferred stocks)   
9. Something else? Please name what! 
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5. Which of the following instruments are used in your company as a price risk management tool?  
NOTE: it is possible to mark more than one instrument. If some of instruments numbered bellow is used in your company, please 
mark it with X and give a grade to it regarding its importance in risk management strategy. For instruments you are not using, do not 
mark it at al.  
 
Instrument In use Importance 1-3 (1 less important, 
2 important, 3 very important) 
1. Natural hedge or netting   
2. Managing assets and liabilities   
3. Commodity forward   
4. Commodity futures   
5. Commodity swap   
6. Commodity option   
7. OTC (over-the-counter) commodity option)   
8. Structured derivatives (combination of swaps, future contacts and 
options)  
  
9. Business diversification through mergers, acquisitions, and other 
business combinations)    
  
10. Something else? Please name what! 
 
  
 
6. How would you describe risk management policy in your company regarding its scope?  
 
a) We manage a particular risk exposure completely (complete hedge) 
b) We cover/manage only potential losses caused by the possible negative changes of financial prices (interest-rate, 
exchange rate or price changes), but we leave a possibility of potential gains open if changes of the financial prices 
have a positive impact on the performance of our company (partial or selective hedge) 
 
7. For each RIWKHIROORZLQJH[SRVXUHVZKLFKRQHGHVFULEHVWKHEHVW\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VW\SLFDOKHGJLQJKRUL]RQ" 
 
a) Risk is managed for transaction with maturity up to a year time  
b) Risk is managed for transaction with maturity up to a two year time  
c) Risk is managed for transaction with maturity up to a five year time  
d) Risk is managed for transaction with maturity longer than a five year time  
 
8. On the scale from one to five, please give grades to the following risk management aims regarding their importance in risk 
management policy of your company.   
            Not important     Very important 
                       1      2      3      4      5      
a)   Managing accounting earnings volatility  
b)   Managing cash flow volatility  
c)   Managing balance sheet and financial ratios 
d)   Managing market value of the company 
 
9. Does you company have a documented policy regarding the use of financial risk management instruments?  
a) Yes 
b) No 
10. 'RHV\RXUFRPSDQ\XVH³9DOXH-at-5LVN´9D5DVDPHDVXUHRIULVNH[SRVXUH" 
a) Yes 
b) No 
11. Does your company use Monte Carlo analysis or some other type of simulation techniques as a measure of risk exposure? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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12. Please give grades (on the scale from 1 to 5) to the following financial institutions regarding their importance in providing 
derivative instruments to your company. 
          Not important     Very important 
                       1      2      3      4      5  
     
a)   Commercial banks  
b)   Investment banks  
c)   Insurance companies  
d)   Exchange/brokerage houses  
e)   Some other institutions? Please name which ones! 
 
13. If your company does not manage financial risks, please give grades to the following factors (regarding their importance on 
the scale from 1 to 5) if they have influenced a decision not to manage risk in your company.  
                  Not important   Very important 
                      1      2      3       4       5     
a) Insufficient exposure to financial risks 
b) Insufficient knowledge about financial risk management instruments  
    and their use 
c) Financial risk management instruments are not efficient 
d) Financial risk management instruments are too expensive 
e) Difficulties in pricing and valuing derivatives 
f) Concerns about perceptions of derivatives use by investors,  
    regulators and the public  
g) Costs of establishing and maintaining a risk management program  
     exceed the expected benefits 
h) Supply of risk management instruments traded on domestic  
    financial market is insufficient 
i)  Supply of risk management instruments offered by  
    financial institutions is insufficient  
j)  Something else? Please name what! 
 
NOTE: We would like to ask all survey participants, those whose companies manage as well as not manage financial risks, to 
complete the following section of a questionnaire (questions from the number 14 to 41) 
 
14. What is the share of your company owned by management? (e.g. 23%)    -----------------------% 
 
15. Does management own call options on your company¶VFRPPRQVWRFNV" 
 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
16. What is the share of your company owned by institutional investors (banks, insurance company, mutual funds or brokerage 
house)    
 
------------------------% 
 
17. Please estimate (at least approximately) what is the share of your company owned by: 
 
a) State             -----------------------% 
b) Major shareholders   -----------------------% 
c) Minority shareholders    -----------------------% 
 
18. What is the share of your company owned by foreign investors?    ---------------------------% 
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19. What business market (regarding geographical orientation) your company is primarily oriented to? 
 
a) National 
b) Regional  
c) European 
d) International  
 
20. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRIthe long-term debt in 2005? 
 
Long-term debt in 2005. 
 
 
21. What was your company¶VERRNYDOXHRIthe total debt (long and short-term) in 2005? 
 
Total debt in 2005. 
 
 
22. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRIthe total common equity (preferred capital excluded) in 2005?  
 
Total common equity in 2005. 
 
 
23. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXe of the preferred equity in 2005?  
 
Preferred equity in 2005. 
 
 
24. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRIthe convertible debt in 2005?  
 
Convertible debt in 2005. 
 
 
25. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRIthe total assets (long and short-term) in 2005?  
 
Total assets in 2005. 
 
 
26. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRI the total short-term assets in 2005?  
 
Total short-term assets in 2005. 
 
 
27. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VERRNYDOXHRI the money and short-term securities in 2005?  
 
Money and short-term securities in 2005. 
 
 
28. :KDWZDV\RXUFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHRIthe interest cost in 2005?  
 
Interest costs in 2005. 
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29. What was the value of the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in 2005?  
 
Earnings before interest and taxes in 2005. 
 
 
30. What was the value of the research and development (R&D) expenditures in 2005?  
 
Research and development expenditures in 2005. 
 
 
31. What was the value of the total sales revenues of your company in 2005? 
 
Total sales revenues in 2005. 
   
 
32. What was the value invested in long term assets and operating capital of your company in 2005?  
 
Investment in long-term assets in 2005. 
 
 
33. What was the value of the earnings after interest and taxes (net income available to owners) in 2005?  
 
Net income in 2005. 
 
 
34. What was the value of the investment tax credits of your company in 2005?  
 
Investment tax credits in 2005. 
 
 
 
35. What was the value of the net operating loss carry-forwards of your company in 2005?  
 
Net operating loss carry-forwards in 2005. 
 
 
 
36. What percentage of the net income was distributed through dividends (the dividend pay-out ratio) to the owners in 2005?   
 
Dividend pay out ratio in 2005. 
% 
 
37. Are the shares of your company listed on the stock-exchange?  
 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
38. Does your company have credit rating rated by rating agencies?   
 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
39. What is the notional value of derivative securities that your company currently holds in its portfolio? (e.g. 1,2 million Euro) 
 
      ---------------------------------------------? 
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40. PLEASE MARK THE FIELD WHICH DESCRIBES THE BEST CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR COMPANY.  
 
Industry: 
  
(in the case your company belongs to more than one industrial segment, mark as many fields as you consider necessary for describing your 
company)  
 
1. Agriculture and forestry      
2. Fishing 
3. Mining 
4. Manufacture  
5.  Power/Energy (gas, electric, water) 
6.  Construction 
7.  Trade (wholesale and retail) 
8. Catering industry (hotels and restaurants) 
9.   Transport and storage 
10. Communication 
11. Financial intermediation and other financial services 
12. Real estate  
13. Other. Please name what! 
 
Your company was establish:    
 
1. 5 years or less 
2. 6 ± 10 years 
3. 11 ± 15 years 
4. 16 ± 20 years 
5. More than 20 years 
 
Number of employees:  
 
1. 250 ± 350 
2. 351 ± 450 
3. 451 ± 550  
4. 551 ± 650 
5. 651 ± 750 
6. > 751 
 
41. QUESTION ABOUT THE RESPONDENT 
 
Gender 
 
a) Mail 
b) Female 
Age  
 
a) 20-25 
b) 26-35 
c) 36-45 
d) 46-55 
e) 56-65 
f) More than 65 
 
Formal education 
 
a) High school  
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b) College  
c) Bachelor degree  
d) Master degree 
e) PhD 
 
 How many years you work for your company?  
 
 
 
 
Did you attend educational programmes regarding risk management? 
 
a) Yes 
 
b) No 
 
What is your position and a department that you work in?  
  
Position 
 
Department 
 
 
NAME OF THE COMPANY (this question is optional, company does not need to reveal its identity):  
 
  
 
 
 
 
